United States v. Steven Dent , 599 F. App'x 584 ( 2015 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0288n.06
Case No. 14-1526
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Apr 16, 2015
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
STEVEN D. DENT, aka James Walker, ) MICHIGAN
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
BEFORE: SILER, COOK, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
COOK, Circuit Judge. Steven Dent appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence
discovered following a traffic stop. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.
I.
On March 15, 2007, Michigan State Trooper Matthew Unterbrink stopped Dent on
Interstate 69 for what he believed to be a defective headlight on Dent’s GMC Yukon. Although
the sun had risen almost ninety minutes before the stop, many vehicles on the road had their
headlights on due to what Unterbrink described as “gloomy” weather. Unterbrink saw through
his side-view mirror that a passenger-side light on Dent’s truck was not functioning. During the
stop, Dent handed Unterbrink a Michigan driver’s license bearing the name “James Walker” and
vehicle registration in the name of “Steven Duane Dent.” Another trooper, Ben Bordner, arrived
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and radioed for a background check of both names. Unterbrink asked Dent to step out of the
truck while waiting for the background check. Dent consented to a pat-down search but refused
to let the officers search his vehicle.
When the background check suggested that “James Walker” was an alias for “Steven
Duane Dent,” Unterbrink and Bordner had a third trooper review the driver’s license images of
Walker and Dent. After the third trooper confirmed the images were of the same man,
Unterbrink and Bordner arrested Dent for providing false information regarding his identity.
Approximately thirty minutes passed between the initial stop and Dent’s arrest. The officers
searched Dent’s truck after taking him into custody and found a duffle bag containing thirteen
kilograms of cocaine.
Upon closer inspection, Unterbrink learned that the defective light was a daytime running
light located directly below the Yukon’s main headlights. Michigan law does not prohibit
operating a vehicle with a defective daytime running light.
After the government indicted Dent for conspiracy to distribute the cocaine, Dent moved
to suppress the fruits of the traffic stop. The district court denied the motion, finding the initial
traffic stop lawful and the length of detention reasonable. Dent then pleaded guilty, but reserved
the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The court sentenced him to 240 months’
imprisonment, and Dent appealed.
II.
Dent argues that Unterbrink lacked probable cause to stop him because Michigan law
prohibits operating a vehicle with defective headlights, not daytime running lights. He also
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contends that the officers unreasonably extended the length of the stop. We review the district
court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error, considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Pritchett, 749 F.3d 417,
435 (6th Cir. 2014).
Though Unterbrink mistakenly believed Dent’s vehicle had a defective headlight, “a
search or seizure may be permissible even though the justification for the action includes a
reasonable factual mistake.” Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014). The district
court credited Unterbrink’s testimony that he, in fact, mistook the daytime running light for a
headlight and found that mistake reasonable. Dent attacks this ruling in three ways, all
unavailing. First, he suggests that Unterbrink’s “brief glimpse” of the Yukon in his side-view
mirror “cannot possibly be sufficient to establish probable cause for a traffic stop.” But he fails
to cite any authority to support this categorical statement or explain why Unterbrink would
necessarily need more than a brief glimpse to observe a burnt-out light.
Second, Dent asserts that Unterbrink also lacked probable cause to stop him because
Michigan law does not prohibit operating a motor vehicle with defective headlights during
daylight hours. As the district court noted, however, “[t]he [relevant] statute does not limit an
officer’s ability to pull over a vehicle for a broken headlight only at those times when the
headlights are required to be on.” See Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.683(1) (“A person shall not
drive . . . a vehicle . . . [that] is not at all times equipped with lamps and other equipment in
proper condition . . . .” (emphasis added)).
Third, pointing to aspects of Unterbrink’s testimony he claims are either inconsistent or
suspicious, Dent argues that the district court erred in crediting Unterbrink’s statement that he
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mistook the running light for a headlight. He contends that the court should have rejected
Unterbrink’s testimony and credited the “much more believable scenario that Unterbrink in fact
saw that the defective light was the smaller light, and decided to stop Mr. Dent based on a belief
that it was an equipment defect for which Mr. Dent could be cited.” But Dent fails to persuade
us that the court erred either in accepting Unterbrink’s version of events or in concluding that his
mistake was reasonable. He does not contest that most vehicles had their headlights on that
morning or that his passenger-side running light was missing a bulb at the time. And given the
size and placement of the daytime running lights directly below the Yukon’s headlights, we
cannot say the court erred in finding Unterbrink’s mistake reasonable.
Dent further argues that, even if the initial stop was legal, the officers unreasonably
extended the stop in order to obtain information over the police radio that would allow them to
search his vehicle. “A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to
the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to
complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). But “[i]n a traffic stop,
an officer can lawfully detain the driver of a vehicle until after the officer has finished making
record radio checks and issuing a citation, because this activity would be well within the bounds
of the initial stop.” United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, Unterbrink and Bordner radioed the station to run Dent’s information
because their cruisers were not equipped with computers. “[A]ny time that the [troopers] spent
in pursuing other matters while the background check was processing, even if those matters were
unrelated to the original purpose of the stop, did not extend the length of the stop.” Id. at 542.
And the information suggesting that James Walker was an alias of Steven Dent justified
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prolonging the stop in order to confirm the officers’ suspicion. We therefore agree with the
district court that “the length of the stop was reasonable given the circumstances in this case.”
III.
We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.1
1
Dent also moves to strike the government’s appellate brief because it cites materials not
expressly admitted during the suppression hearing. But as the government notes, the materials it
cites were part of the record when the court issued its ruling. Dent’s motion is denied.
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