United States v. Patrick Winters , 2015 FED App. 0057P ( 2015 )


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  •                                RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
    File Name: 15a0057p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    _________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                       ┐
    Plaintiff-Appellee,     │
    │
    │         No. 13-6349
    v.                                                   │
    >
    │
    PATRICK J. WINTERS,                                             │
    Defendant-Appellant.        │
    ┘
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
    No. 1:12-cr-00102-1—Harry S. Mattice, Jr., District Judge.
    Argued: December 3, 2014
    Decided and Filed: March 31, 2015
    Before: BOGGS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; and HOOD, District Judge.*
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: C. Mark Pickrell, THE PICKRELL LAW GROUP, P.C., Nashville, Tennessee, for
    Appellant. Terra L. Bay, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Chattanooga, Tennessee,
    for Appellee. ON BRIEF: C. Mark Pickrell, THE PICKRELL LAW GROUP, P.C., Nashville,
    Tennessee, for Appellant. Terra L. Bay, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
    Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee.
    *
    The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting
    by designation.
    1
    No. 13-6349                          United States v. Winters                         Page 2
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Patrick J. Winters appeals from the district
    court’s denial of his motion to suppress drug evidence discovered by the police following a
    traffic stop and dog sniff. In August 2012, a Chattanooga, Tennessee police officer stopped a
    rental car, in which Winters was the passenger, for speeding. During the stop, the occupants’
    nervous behavior, inconsistent and implausible travel plans, and suspicious rental arrangement
    led the officer to believe that the occupants may have been trafficking contraband. After he had
    completed issuing a warning ticket for speeding, the officer extended the traffic stop for four
    minutes to retrieve his drug-detection dog from his cruiser. Twenty-four minutes after the stop
    was initiated, the officer deployed his dog around the rental car, and the dog alerted to the
    presence of narcotics.    Upon searching the vehicle, the officer discovered a one-kilogram
    package of heroin in Winters’s bag on the back seat. Winters was arrested and charged with
    possession with intent to distribute heroin. He later moved unsuccessfully to suppress the drug
    evidence and entered a conditional guilty plea that reserved his right to appeal the denial of his
    suppression motion.
    On appeal, Winters asserts that the officer unreasonably extended the traffic stop of the
    rental car in order to conduct a dog sniff, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In addition,
    Winters argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Jardines, 
    133 S. Ct. 1409
     (2013),
    establishes that a dog sniff of an automobile must be justified by probable cause, and not mere
    reasonable suspicion.
    We hold that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable,
    articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified extending the stop for a few minutes to
    conduct a dog sniff using a drug-detection dog that was already on the scene. Furthermore, the
    Supreme Court’s decision in Jardines is premised on a trespass rationale involving the special
    protection accorded to the home and, therefore, it does not alter the analysis for traffic stops. In
    any event, the officer was entitled to reasonably rely in good faith on the binding precedent
    existing at the time of the traffic stop, which established that the use of a drug-detection dog
    No. 13-6349                         United States v. Winters                        Page 3
    during a lawful traffic stop does not require probable cause. As a result, we affirm the denial of
    Winters’s motion to suppress.
    I
    A
    Winters was arrested in connection with a traffic stop conducted by Chattanooga Police
    Officer Jason Duggan on August 9, 2012. Following the use of a drug-detection dog during that
    stop, Officer Duggan discovered a one-kilogram package of heroin in Winters’s bag on the back
    seat of the rental car in which he was traveling. Winters later pleaded guilty to possession with
    intent to distribute at least one kilogram of heroin, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1),
    (b)(1)(A), on the condition that he preserve his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
    suppress the drug evidence.
    The magistrate judge assigned to consider Winters’s motion held an evidentiary hearing
    on December 21, 2012, at which Officer Duggan testified. Following the hearing, the magistrate
    judge issued a report and recommendation recounting the largely undisputed facts and finding,
    among other things, that the stop was not unreasonably extended when Officer Duggan
    conducted a dog-sniff inspection after he completed the warning ticket for speeding. United
    States v. Winters, No. 1:12-CR-102, 
    2013 WL 1498075
     (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 22, 2013). Although
    the original purpose of the traffic stop was concluded, the magistrate judge determined that
    Officer Duggan developed reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified
    extending the stop beyond what was originally permissible based on the speeding violation
    alone. See 
    id. at *10
    . Winters did not object to the facts outlined in the magistrate judge’s
    report, only to the legal conclusions regarding, inter alia, the reasonableness of the dog sniff.
    The district court subsequently adopted the report and recommendation and denied Winters’s
    motion to suppress on April 10, 2013. United States v. Winters, No. 1:12-CR-102, 
    2013 WL 1482925
     (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013). The factual background presented below is largely derived
    from the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.
    No. 13-6349                         United States v. Winters                        Page 4
    B
    At 12:04 a.m. on August 9, 2012, Officer Jason Duggan, patrolling with his dog, Red, in
    a K-9 unit assigned to the Chattanooga Police Department’s Highway Interdiction Team, stopped
    a rental car on I-24 for driving 72 mph in a 55 mph zone. Officer Duggan approached the car at
    12:06 a.m., and spoke with the driver, Jessica Harris, who acknowledged that she was driving in
    excess of the speed limit. Ms. Harris appeared nervous when questioned by Officer Duggan.
    She apologized to Patrick Winters, who was the only passenger in the car, for speeding, and
    trembled as she produced her license. Ms. Harris informed Officer Duggan that she was en route
    to Memphis from Georgia.
    When Officer Duggan requested the contract for the rental car, Winters handed him all of
    the vehicle’s registration paperwork and stated that he was responsible for the car even though it
    was rented in his cousin’s name. When Officer Duggan returned to his patrol car to examine the
    rental contract, he learned that the car was rented in Atlanta, Georgia by Robin Winters at 7:45
    p.m. on August 8, roughly four hours before the stop was made; Robin Winters was the only
    authorized driver; and the rental car was due to be dropped off in Chicago, Illinois at 5:00 p.m.
    that evening, August 9. Officer Duggan found this information suspicious, as Ms. Harris had
    stated that she was going to Memphis, not Chicago; neither Ms. Harris nor Winters was an
    authorized driver; and a car rented for less than a day was making an out-of-the-way journey
    through Memphis en route to Chicago.
    At 12:12 a.m., Officer Duggan had Ms. Harris get out of the car and began to write her a
    warning ticket for speeding. He further questioned Ms. Harris regarding her travel plans and
    learned the following: 1) Winters was Ms. Harris’s cousin and he frequently traveled from
    Chicago to Atlanta; 2) they were traveling to Memphis to visit Ms. Harris’s family and then rest,
    and would continue on to Chicago where Winters would remain; 3) Ms. Harris would fly back to
    Atlanta from Chicago after a day or so; and 4) the car was rented by another cousin. Ms. Harris
    did not mention Chicago as their destination until Officer Duggan asked where she was traveling
    after Memphis. Officer Duggan’s suspicions were further aroused by Ms. Harris’s descriptions
    of her travel plans, which involved a significant detour of 200 miles to Memphis during a trip
    from Atlanta to Chicago, all within the period of less than 24 hours for which the car was rented.
    No. 13-6349                           United States v. Winters                       Page 5
    He believed that these plans were implausible and inconsistent with Ms. Harris’s statement that
    she was traveling to Memphis to visit family and rest.
    At 12:17 a.m., Officer Duggan informed Ms. Harris that he would finish the warning
    citation after speaking to Winters about the rental contract. At the evidentiary hearing held by
    the magistrate judge, Officer Duggan testified that, by 12:17, he had “addressed” the speeding
    violation, though he had not yet completed the section of the warning ticket regarding consent to
    search the vehicle, which he completes on every ticket that he writes.
    Officer Duggan then left Ms. Harris near his patrol car and returned to the rental car to
    question Winters. As Officer Duggan approached, Winters was speaking on his cell phone but
    abruptly hung up. Winters told Officer Duggan the following: 1) Winters and Ms. Harris were
    going to Memphis for about two days (which conflicted with Ms. Harris’s initial statements and
    the rental agreement); 2) Ms. Harris would fly back to Atlanta from Memphis (and not from
    Chicago as Ms. Harris claimed); 3) Winters would travel alone to Chicago; and 4) Winters’s
    cousin who rented the car could easily add time to the rental contract or pay a late fee. Winters
    “nervously engaged in excessive talking” throughout the encounter, and, like Ms. Harris, he did
    not mention traveling to Chicago until Officer Duggan asked where they were going after
    Memphis. Ms. Harris herself continued to pace and move around nervously as she waited
    outside the car while Officer Duggan spoke to Winters. Suspicious that criminal activity was
    afoot, Officer Duggan radioed for backup at 12:21 a.m. He then returned to speak with Ms.
    Harris.
    Around 12:22 a.m., Officer Duggan obtained Ms. Harris’s telephone number to include
    on the warning ticket. Ms. Harris seemed surprised when Officer Duggan told her that Winters
    claimed they were staying in Memphis for two days, and Officer Duggan testified that Ms.
    Harris’s behavior changed when he asked her if there was anything illegal in the car and if she
    had any packages. Ms. Harris denied having any illegal items and claimed that she was only
    responsible for her purse and one bag, and she denied consent to search the car. She then signed
    the warning ticket at 12:24 a.m., which completed the citation. At this time, Officer Duggan
    informed Ms. Harris that he was going to deploy his dog on the car, and he returned to speak
    with Winters. Winters admitted to being responsible for all items in the car, including his bag on
    No. 13-6349                          United States v. Winters                       Page 6
    the back seat. According to Officer Duggan, when he asked Winters if he would consent to a
    search of the car, Winters said that there was nothing illegal in the car and “something to the
    effect of ‘you can do whatever you want to do’ and ‘yeah, go ahead.’” Officer Duggan,
    however, did not accept Winters’s statements as consent. After backup arrived around 12:25
    a.m., Officer Duggan returned to his patrol car to retrieve his dog, Red.
    Officer Duggan deployed Red at the rental car at 12:28 a.m. Red immediately alerted to
    the presence of narcotics near the passenger-side door. While Officer Duggan was returning Red
    to the patrol car, Winters removed a small bag of marijuana from his pants and threw it into the
    grass alongside the road. When Officer Duggan returned, he informed Ms. Harris and Winters
    about Red’s alert and asked them if they had any drugs. Winters admitted to possessing and
    hiding the marijuana and helped Officer Duggan retrieve the bag. At 12:32 a.m., Officer Duggan
    searched the car and found a one-kilogram package of heroin in Winters’s bag on the back seat.
    Winters and Ms. Harris were placed under arrest.
    II
    We review the district court’s decision on a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of
    review. United States v. Davis, 
    430 F.3d 345
    , 351 (6th Cir. 2005). Under this approach, “we
    review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.”
    United States v. Johnson, 
    656 F.3d 375
    , 377 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Gross,
    
    624 F.3d 309
    , 314 (6th Cir. 2010)). When the district court has denied the motion, “we consider
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Rose, 
    714 F.3d 362
    , 366 (6th Cir. 2013).
    Whether a seizure is reasonable is a question of law, which we review de novo. United
    States v. Campbell, 
    549 F.3d 364
    , 370 (6th Cir. 2008). We also review de novo whether an
    officer had reasonable suspicion to justify extending a traffic stop, which is a mixed question of
    law and fact. 
    Ibid.
     Although our review of this mixed question is de novo, the lower courts are
    “at an institutional advantage, having observed the testimony of the witnesses and understanding
    local conditions,” and, therefore, “‘due weight’ should be given to the inferences drawn from the
    facts by ‘resident judges.’” United States v. Townsend, 
    305 F.3d 537
    , 542 (6th Cir. 2002)
    (internal citation omitted).   “Ultimately,” however, “‘[i]t is the [Government’s] burden to
    No. 13-6349                                 United States v. Winters                                  Page 7
    demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was
    sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.’”
    United States v. Johnson, 482 F. App’x 137, 143 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 
    460 U.S. 491
    , 500 (1983)) (alterations in original).1
    III
    The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
    persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST.
    amend. IV. “[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within
    the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the
    resulting detention quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 
    440 U.S. 648
    , 653 (1979). The question of
    whether a particular traffic stop passes constitutional muster is analyzed under “the standard for
    temporary detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
     (1968), and its progeny.” United
    States v. Everett, 
    601 F.3d 484
    , 488 (6th Cir. 2010). Under this framework, the stop must be 1)
    “justified at its inception”; and 2) “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
    justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 
    392 U.S. at 20
    . If an officer develops
    reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity during a stop, “he may extend [the]
    traffic stop long enough to confirm or dispel his suspicions. Any such extension, though, must
    be ‘limited in scope and duration.’” Johnson, 482 F. App’x at 143 (quoting Royer, 
    460 U.S. at 500
    ).
    1
    Winters argues that this approach is not appropriate here because the district court did not hear any
    evidence itself and its determination was based entirely on a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s report and
    recommendation. Thus, Winters maintains, “this Court is in exactly the same position as the district court in
    reviewing the magistrate judge’s recommendation,” and “[b]ecause the district court’s review of the magistrate
    judge’s recommendation . . . was de novo, this Court’s review should logically be entirely de novo as well, without a
    presumption of correctness.” Appellant Br. 12 n.2. However, a district court only engages in de novo review of
    “those portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
    objection is made,” 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (b)(1)(C), and Winters did not object to “the basic facts as outlined” in the
    magistrate judge’s report in this case, but only to the “findings and the legal conclusions as they relate to those
    facts.” United States v. Winters, No. 1:12-CR-102, 
    2013 WL 1482925
    , at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013). Thus, we
    will follow the normal approach of reviewing the factual findings adopted by the district court for clear error. To the
    extent that Winters raises Article III concerns regarding deference to the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as
    adopted by the district court, we note that the Supreme Court has made clear that Article III is satisfied “so long as
    the ultimate decision” regarding the proposed findings “is made by the district court,” United States v. Raddatz,
    
    447 U.S. 667
    , 683 (1980), as it was in this case. District judges may properly give to a magistrate judge’s proposed
    findings “such weight as [their] merit commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants,” Mathews v.
    Weber, 
    423 U.S. 261
    , 275 (1976), without being required to have the evidence at issue presented to them personally.
    Raddatz, 
    447 U.S. at 676
    , 683–84.
    No. 13-6349                                    United States v. Winters                              Page 8
    A. Initial Stop and Questioning
    There is no dispute that the traffic stop of the rental car in which Winters was a passenger
    was lawful at its outset.2 It is well-established that where an “officer has probable cause to
    believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resultant stop is not unlawful
    and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Bradshaw, 
    102 F.3d 204
    , 210
    (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, Officer Duggan
    witnessed Ms. Harris driving 72 mph in a 55-mph zone, and thus had probable cause to believe
    that a traffic violation was occurring. See United States v. Hill, 
    195 F.3d 258
    , 265 (6th Cir.
    1999) (“[T]he Tennessee Code prohibits speeding, . . . and Defendants do not dispute the fact
    that they were traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. Therefore, . . . [the officer] had
    probable cause to make the initial traffic stop.”).
    Moreover, Winters does not dispute that Officer Duggan’s initial questioning of Ms.
    Harris and Winters regarding their rental agreement and travel plans while he was preparing the
    traffic citation was proper.3 The Supreme Court has stressed that “[a]n officer’s inquiries into
    matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into
    something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the
    duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 
    555 U.S. 323
    , 333 (2009). That Officer Duggan also
    questioned Winters, who was a passenger in the car and not the driver, does not alter the
    analysis.         See 
    id. at 328, 332
     (considering police questioning of a passenger about gang
    affiliation, and noting that “a passenger is seized, just as the driver is,” during a traffic stop).
    B. Extending the Stop for a Dog Sniff
    1
    “[A] seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its
    manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” Illinois v.
    Caballes, 
    543 U.S. 405
    , 407 (2005). Under the second step of the Terry framework, a traffic
    2
    See Appellant Br. at 14 (“When Duggan caught Ms. Harris speeding, he correctly and lawfully pulled her
    over.”).
    3
    See Appellant Br. at 14–15 (“It was reasonable for Duggan to question Harris and Mr. Winters about the
    car rental agreement, about their travel plans, and other topics.”).
    No. 13-6349                                 United States v. Winters                                Page 9
    stop “must . . . last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” and “the
    investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to
    verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Royer, 
    460 U.S. at 500
    . Once
    the original purpose of the traffic stop—here, investigating a speeding violation—has been
    completed, the occupants “cannot be further detained unless something that occurred during the
    stop caused the officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was
    afoot.” Hill, 
    195 F.3d at 264
    ; see also Davis, 
    430 F.3d at 353
     (same).
    The Supreme Court has established that the use of a trained narcotics dog during a lawful
    traffic stop “generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.” Caballes, 
    543 U.S. at 409
    . Therefore, because Officer Duggan’s use of his narcotics dog does not in itself raise Fourth
    Amendment concerns, Winters can only prevail by “show[ing] that the officer no longer had
    reason to keep him where he was” in order to conduct the dog sniff. United States v. Campbell,
    511 F. App’x 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2013). As a result, the main argument between the parties
    concerns whether Officer Duggan unreasonably extended the lawfully initiated traffic stop.4
    Upon obtaining Ms. Harris’s signature at 12:24 a.m., Officer Duggan completed the
    warning ticket for speeding. The purpose of the initial stop was therefore complete at this time.
    See, e.g., United States v. Stepp, 
    680 F.3d 651
    , 662 (6th Cir. 2012) (initial stop not completed
    because the officer “had not completed the warning citation . . . at the time the drugs were
    discovered”). We note that had Officer Duggan or his backup conducted the drug sniff before
    finalizing the ticket (and without unreasonably prolonging the stop), Caballes instructs us that
    the dog sniff would be of no constitutional significance. See 
    543 U.S. at 406, 409
     (use of a
    4
    Before the magistrate judge, Winters argued that the purpose of the stop was completed at 12:17 a m., by
    which time Officer Duggan had completed most of the warning ticket and had “addressed” the speeding violation.
    At this point, Officer Duggan informed Ms. Harris that he would complete the ticket only after speaking with
    Winters. Between 12:17 and 12:24 a m., Officer Duggan questioned Winters and Ms. Harris, and, at 12:24, Officer
    Duggan completed the citation by obtaining Ms. Harris’s signature.
    On appeal, however, Winters does not raise Officer Duggan’s conduct during this time period, but only
    challenges Officer Duggan’s actions in conducting a dog sniff after completing the citation. See Appellant Br. at 14
    (“Winters respectfully submits that, looking at the totality of the circumstances, Officer Duggan unnecessarily (and,
    therefore, unreasonably) extended the scope and duration of the traffic stop in order to conduct a dog-sniff search
    without reasonable, articulable suspicion.”) (emphasis added). At oral argument, Winters’s appellate counsel
    confirmed that Winters was arguing that the allegedly unconstitutional delay was from 12:24 to 12:28 a m., after the
    ticket was signed and before the dog was deployed. Oral Argument at 4:42, United States v. Winters, No. 13-6349
    (6th Cir. argued Dec. 3, 2014). We need not address, therefore, the finding below that “Officer Duggan did not
    unreasonably [prolong] the not-yet-completed stop by engaging Defendant in further conversation from 12:17 a.m.
    until 12:22 a m. when he returns to Ms. Harris to complete the warning ticket, which was finally signed at 12:24
    a.m.” United States v. Winters, No. 1:12-CR-102, 
    2013 WL 1498075
    , at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 22, 2013).
    No. 13-6349                          United States v. Winters                      Page 10
    narcotics dog on the exterior of a lawfully seized car, while the police were “in the process of
    writing a warning ticket,” “does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable
    infringement”). In this case, by contrast, Officer Duggan extended an already-completed stop by
    four minutes to conduct a dog sniff after the ticket was finished.
    The brief duration of this extension does provide support for the government’s argument
    that Officer Duggan’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances, as do the facts that the
    narcotics dog was already present on the scene and his deployment was delayed only for safety
    reasons until backup arrived.      However, given circuit precedent suggesting that “even de
    minimis” extensions of a completed stop are “unreasonable” absent further justification, Stepp,
    
    680 F.3d at
    661–62, and in light of the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in a case, discussed
    further below, presenting the question whether “an officer may extend [an] already-completed
    stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification,” Question
    Presented in Rodriguez v. United States, No. 13-9972 (cert. granted Oct. 2, 2014), we do not rest
    our ultimate holding on these grounds.
    Instead, we assume that the “Terry clock” was reset when the initial purpose of the stop
    was completed and, as a result, the further detention of Ms. Harris and Winters must have been
    supported by an independent reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was
    afoot. Johnson, 482 F. App’x at 143-44; see also Hill, 
    195 F.3d at 264
    . We therefore proceed to
    a reasonable-suspicion analysis.
    2
    Whether an officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity “is based on
    the totality of the circumstances presented to the officer.” United States v. Jones, 
    673 F.3d 497
    ,
    502 (6th Cir. 2012). This is an objective standard premised on “specific facts” that “would lead
    a reasonable officer to suspect illicit activity.” Johnson, 482 F. App’x at 143. Although the
    subjective beliefs of the officer are irrelevant, law-enforcement officials are “permitted to draw
    on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
    the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United
    States v. Shank, 
    543 F.3d 309
    , 315 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
    No. 13-6349                           United States v. Winters                       Page 11
    omitted). Ill-defined hunches, however, are not sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion.
    
    Ibid.
    The factors proffered by the government in its attempt to articulate reasonable suspicion
    include that:
    (1) Ms. Harris and [Winters] were traveling out of their way by coming from
    Atlanta through Chattanooga to Memphis on the way to Chicago in a 24-hour
    rental period; (2) conflicting information was provided by Ms. Harris and
    [Winters] about when Ms. Harris would be returning to Atlanta and how long they
    would be staying in Memphis; (3) neither occupant of the car was listed on the car
    rental agreement as an authorized driver; (4) [Winters] handed the entire vehicle
    registration paperwork to Officer Duggan instead of just the rental contract;
    (5) Ms. Harris and [Winters] acted more nervous than the usual motorist facing a
    traffic violation, including that Ms. Harris engaged in a wide range of emotion
    while Officer Duggan talked to [Winters] and [Winters] engaged in excessive
    talking; (6) [Winters] and Ms. Harris did not initially bring up that they were
    traveling on to Chicago; (7) Ms. Harris’s behavior changed when she denied
    having any [illegal] packages in the car; (8) [Winters] hung up his phone mid-
    sentence upon Officer Duggan’s approach to speak with him; and (9) Ms. Harris
    addressed her apologies for speeding to [Winters], not to Officer Duggan.
    Appellee Br. at 9. In her analysis, the magistrate judge focused on three general categories that
    incorporated many of the specific factors listed above: 1) Ms. Harris’s and Winters’s
    nervousness; 2) their bizarre and inconsistent explanations of their travel plans; and 3) the fact
    that neither occupant was an authorized driver of the rental car. Although finding reasonable
    suspicion under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate judge recognized that such
    factors, when viewed individually, have been given only little or moderate weight by this court.
    First, “although nervousness has been considered in finding reasonable suspicion in
    conjunction with other factors, it is an unreliable indicator, especially in the context of a traffic
    stop.” United States v. Richardson, 
    385 F.3d 625
    , 630 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted);
    see also Stepp, 
    680 F.3d at 665
     (noting that this court has found nervousness to be an unreliable
    indicator “on numerous occasions”); United States v. Bell, 
    555 F.3d 535
    , 540 (6th Cir. 2009)
    (factors such as “seeming nervous . . . have previously [been] given little weight”); United States
    v. Urrieta, 
    520 F.3d 569
    , 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]his court has found nervousness inherently
    unsuspicious, and has therefore given it very limited or no weight in the reasonable-suspicion
    calculation.”). This is based on the recognition that “[m]any citizens become nervous during a
    No. 13-6349                                United States v. Winters                                  Page 12
    traffic stop, even when they have nothing to hide or fear.” Richardson, 
    385 F.3d at
    630–31.
    Indeed, by focusing on indications of nervousness that are “relatively commonplace behaviors,”
    such as engaging in a wide range of emotion, talking excessively, apologizing to a passenger for
    being pulled over, pacing back and forth, or trembling while handing over a license to the police,
    “a court risks impaling the defendant on Morton’s Fork.” Johnson, 482 F. App’x at 145.5
    We therefore accord Officer Duggan’s observations of Ms. Harris’s and Winters’s
    nervousness little weight, and even then only “in conjunction with other factors.” Richardson,
    
    385 F.3d at 630
    ; see also United States v. Wilson, 
    506 F.3d 488
    , 495–96 (6th Cir. 1995)
    (“Although there are a plethora of cases referring to a defendant appearing nervous, nervousness
    is generally included as one of several grounds for finding reasonable suspicion and not a ground
    sufficient in and of itself.”) (citation omitted). That Ms. Harris’s behavior changed when Officer
    Duggan asked her about packages in the car does generate some reasonable concern, cf. Stepp,
    
    680 F.3d at 666
     (mentioning a “noticeable change” in the occupant’s behavior when asked
    “relatively basic follow-up questions” by the officer), but this too is not necessarily suspicious.
    Second, conflicting or implausible explanations of travel plans have been accorded some
    weight by this court in certain cases. See Townsend, 
    305 F.3d at 543
     (“[W]e have repeatedly
    recognized that lying about travel plans can form the basis for reasonable suspicion.”). Here,
    Ms. Harris and Winters had inconsistent explanations of the duration of their stay in Memphis
    and of Ms. Harris’s return to Atlanta, and were making a significant detour to Memphis on their
    way from Atlanta to Chicago in a car rented for less than 24 hours. Of course, there are
    potentially innocent explanations for such oddities, but we have “placed weight on implausible
    travel plans in considering whether reasonable suspicion has arisen.” Stepp, 
    680 F.3d at 666
    .
    5
    Morton’s Fork refers to:
    [Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal, and Minister of Henry VII] John Morton’s
    (supposed) method of levying forced loans by arguing that those who were
    obviously rich could afford to pay, and those who lived frugally must have
    amassed savings. . . . Hence in extended and allusive use [it is]: a practical
    dilemma, [especially] one in which both of the choices or alternatives available
    disadvantage or discredit the chooser.
    Johnson, 482 F. App’x at 145 n.14 (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Online Ed., March 2012)).
    No. 13-6349                           United States v. Winters                      Page 13
    For example, in Stepp, we found it “indicative of criminal activity under the facts of
    [that] case” that a vehicle’s occupants did not know the name or location of their destination—a
    gym—even though they were less than an hour away from it. 
    Id.
     at 666–67. In Hill, we
    determined that the detained occupants’ “implausible explanation” for their cross-country
    journey reasonably aroused the officer’s suspicions when combined with “inconsistent stories
    regarding their travel itinerary” and other factors. Hill, 
    195 F.3d at 272
    . Indeed, similar to the
    instant case, we considered it relevant that the driver and passenger in Hill differed in their
    explanations of how long they would remain at their destination. Ibid.; see also United States v.
    Manjate, 327 F. App’x 562, 565–56 (6th Cir. 2009) (relevant factor that the defendant “gave
    information to [the officer] regarding his destination that was inconsistent with common sense”);
    United States v. Walton, 258 F. App’x 753, 758 (6th Cir. 2007) (relevant factor that the
    “defendant and his passenger gave conflicting explanations of their travel plans,” where the
    defendant-driver said they were going to a fashion show in New York and then a sister’s
    wedding in Philadelphia, and the passenger said they were going to New York for a different
    wedding); United States v. Johnson, 
    58 F.3d 356
    , 358 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting “inconsistent
    explanation[s]” of the occupants’ travel).
    Ms. Harris’s and Winters’s “allegedly conflicting explanations of their travel plans” here
    were, in fact, “mutually exclusive,” Richardson, 
    385 F.3d at 631
    , at least regarding the duration
    of their trip and Ms. Harris’s flight plans. Thus, this is a not a case where differing explanations
    of travel plans were seemingly inconsistent but in fact reconcilable, see, e.g., 
    ibid.
     (“entirely
    plausible that the group traveled both to see a doctor,” as claimed by the driver, “and a lawyer,”
    as claimed by the passenger); United States v. Bonilla, 357 F. App’x 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2009)
    (“plausible” that the occupants could “accomplish both stated objectives” of visiting friends and
    going on vacation); United States v. Smith, 
    263 F.3d 571
    , 592 (6th Cir. 2001) (purported
    discrepancy in travel plans not a factor where “[t]here was nothing inherently implausible” about
    them), or suspect only because of an inchoate hunch. Cf. Townsend, 
    305 F.3d at 543-44
     (plans
    involving late-night travel between large cities known for drug-trafficking not “inherently
    suspicious” absent “indicia of . . . untruthfulness”).
    No. 13-6349                           United States v. Winters                       Page 14
    Third, we have described “an oddity in a rental-car contract” as a “legitimate
    consideratio[n] in the reasonable-suspicion analysis.” Johnson, 482 F. App’x at 146. In United
    States v. Branch, for example, we included as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion that the
    defendants were driving a rental car that was several weeks overdue. 
    537 F.3d 582
    , 588 (6th Cir.
    2008). In United States v. Randall, we noted “the suspicious nature” of the “rental arrangement”
    whereby the defendant was driving a car rented by a friend, and in return had rented a car for the
    friend to drive. 62 F. App’x 96, 101 (6th Cir. 2003).
    In the instant case, the rental car was obtained by a third party. We have stressed that
    drug couriers “may commonly drive other people’s rental cars, [using] so called ‘third-party
    rentals.’” Stepp, 
    680 F.3d at 666
    . Furthermore, neither Ms. Harris nor Winters was listed as an
    authorized driver in the rental agreement. Although this might be “noticeably less suspicious
    when the owner or renter is present in the vehicle,” ibid., the renter here—Robin Winters—was
    not a passenger in the car at all. Cf. Smith, 
    263 F.3d at 592
     (although not suspicious in that case,
    the fact that neither occupant “was listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver . . . may
    be a critical factor” under some circumstances). That neither Ms. Harris nor Winters was on the
    rental agreement is entitled to some weight, especially in light of their bizarre plans for using the
    car during the brief rental period. See United States v. Garrido-Santana, 
    360 F.3d 565
    , 575
    (6th Cir. 2004) (finding reasonable suspicion based on factors including that an “unusually
    nervous” defendant not clearly listed as an additional driver was driving a car rented by his
    cousin, taking a “circuitous and impractical” route, and traveling to New York the day before the
    car was due to be returned in Houston).
    3
    This is a close case, as the indicators cited by the government do not strongly suggest
    illicit activity. Indeed, under somewhat similar circumstances in Johnson, we determined that
    the very same Officer Duggan did not have reasonable suspicion based on the defendant-
    motorist’s nervousness, criminal history, and lack of luggage; the presence of industrial-strength
    degreaser; and the fact that the rental car was not authorized for operation in the state in which
    the defendant was driving. 482 F. App’x at 145. But see Hill, 
    195 F.3d at 272
     (implausible
    explanation for trip, inconsistent explanation of itinerary, presence of used Kleenex, and
    No. 13-6349                           United States v. Winters                        Page 15
    nervousness furnished reasonable suspicion of drug activity). While certain factors in Johnson
    were clearly of little weight, such as the lack of luggage, others, like the defendant’s prior history
    of crime, could be stronger than some of the factors cited here. But cf. Johnson, 482 F. App’x at
    148 (“[T]he fact that [the defendant] had committed crimes in the past, while it has a place in the
    reasonable-suspicion analysis, is not, without more, strong evidence of criminal activity in the
    present.”). On the other hand, the oddity with the rental car in Johnson—i.e., that the defendant
    was authorized to operate the vehicle only in Georgia and Florida, but was pulled over in
    Tennessee on the way to Kentucky, 
    id.
     at 139—is seemingly less significant than the suspicious
    rental agreement here, where neither occupant was authorized to operate the vehicle at all.
    Ultimately, as Johnson itself stresses, because “the concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat
    abstract,” United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 274 (2002), “one determination will seldom be a
    useful precedent for another” and “our reasonable-suspicion cases do not offer a coherent
    principle that resolves the question we face.” Johnson, 482 F. App’x at 147 (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). However, in close cases such as this, we have consistently stressed
    that we must “review the evidence ‘in the light most likely to support the district court’s
    decision.’” United States v. Braggs, 
    23 F.3d 1047
    , 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States
    v. Gomez, 
    846 F.2d 557
    , 560 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also United States v. Stubblefield, 
    682 F.3d 502
    , 505 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Smith, 
    549 F.3d 355
    , 359 (6th Cir. 2008).
    The Supreme Court has warned against engaging in a “divide-and-conquer analysis” that
    examines the factors supporting reasonable suspicion “in isolation from each other.” Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. at 274
    . Thus, under the proper totality-of-the-circumstances approach, “we must determine
    whether the individual factors, taken as a whole, give rise to reasonable suspicion, even if each
    individual factor is entirely consistent with innocent behavior when examined separately.”
    Smith, 
    263 F.3d at 588
     (emphases added); see also United States v. Marxen, 
    410 F.3d 326
    , 329
    (6th Cir. 2005) (“In considering all the circumstances, the question is not whether there is a
    possible innocent explanation for each of the factors, but whether all of them taken together give
    rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.”). Here, we conclude that
    Officer Duggan had reasonable suspicion to detain Winters for the dog sniff based on Ms.
    Harris’s and Winters’s nervousness, inconsistent and implausible travel plans, and odd rental
    arrangement, considered in the aggregate. Cf. Campbell, 511 F. App’x at 428 (finding that the
    No. 13-6349                                 United States v. Winters                               Page 16
    same officer had reasonable suspicion based on “visible signs of nervousness beyond what
    Officer Duggan was accustomed to seeing during traffic stops,” the defendant’s history of drug-
    trafficking and prior charges, and strong smell of air freshener).                     This information, when
    considered in light of Officer Duggan’s “experience,” “specialized training,” and ability “to
    make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information . . . that might well elude
    an untrained person,” Shank, 
    543 F.3d at 315
     (internal citation omitted), supports a finding of
    reasonable suspicion that Ms. Harris and Winters were trafficking contraband, which proved to
    be the case. Cf. United States v. Garrido, 
    467 F.3d 971
    , 983 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he officers
    were entitled to judge [the defendant’s] behavior and the information obtained during the safety
    inspection against the backdrop of their own experience and knowledge . . . .”).
    Winters’s appellate counsel argued that Officer Duggan’s actions were unreasonable in
    part because after he became suspicious of the occupants’ travel plans and rental agreement, he
    choose not to further explore those lines of inquiry—by, for example, contacting Winters’s
    cousin who had rented the car or the rental agency—and instead conducted a dog sniff looking
    for contraband. See Appellant Br. at 16 (“Even when Winter[s] had offered to have their travel
    plans confirmed by a relative, Officer Duggan had refused . . . , conducting no further
    investigation or inquiry about the rental agreement or the occupants’ travel plans.”). Thus, the
    argument goes, because Officer Duggan’s suspicions were aroused by the travel arrangements,
    he was entitled to investigate only facts related to those arrangements. See Oral Argument at
    12:40, 14:10, United States v. Winters, No. 13-6349 (6th Cir. argued Dec. 3, 2014) (“[T]he
    officer is supposed to pursue those facts that come out, not other facts. . . . [The facts regarding
    the travel arrangements established grounds for further investigation] of those facts.”) (emphasis
    added). This contention goes too far.
    First, regarding the suggestion that Officer Duggan should have accepted Winters’s
    invitation to speak with his cousin, we note that it is not the role of this court to dictate the
    precise methods of investigation to be pursued by police officers.6 Indeed, “[a] creative judge
    6
    Winters’s argument makes apparent the dangers that would arise if this court were to dictate the exact
    methods an officer must follow when attempting to dispel suspicions that might arise during a detention. It is
    obvious why a reasonable officer might have been reluctant to accept Winters’s offer to speak by phone with his
    cousin to “confirm” Winters’s version of events. The officer would have no means of verifying the identity of the
    person he might be speaking to, nor would he have any reason to doubt that Winters arranged for a confederate to
    vouch for him with the police. In any event, there is no indication that attempting to speak with Winters’s cousin or
    No. 13-6349                                 United States v. Winters                                Page 17
    engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative
    means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished,” but this would
    require us to “indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.” United States v. Sharpe, 
    470 U.S. 675
    ,
    686–87 (1985); see also United States v. Sokolow, 
    490 U.S. 1
    , 11 (1989) (In the reasonable-
    suspicion context, courts should avoid making “rule[s that] would unduly hamper the police’s
    ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions . . . .”); Hill, 
    195 F.3d at 270
     (refusing to adopt a
    position that would require the court to “draw a bright line limitation as to an officer’s course
    and conduct during a stop”). Rather, we are concerned with ensuring that the investigation was
    justified and reasonable under the circumstances in its scope and duration. See Terry, 
    392 U.S. at 20
    .
    More fundamentally, Winters’s argument relies on the premise that the reasonable
    suspicion furnished by the inconsistent travel plans and rental agreement only justified further
    investigation specifically tailored to those exact issues. For this reason, Winters’s counsel felt
    comfortable in all but accepting at oral argument that Officer Duggan had reasonable suspicion
    with regard to the travel arrangements and arguing that deploying the drug dog was simply not
    justified by that suspicion.7 This is an improperly narrow understanding of the reasonable-
    suspicion analysis in this case. Our holding that Officer Duggan had reasonable suspicion under
    the circumstances reflects the conclusion that a reasonable officer in his situation was presented
    with sufficient facts to give rise to suspicion of illicit activity such as trafficking contraband,
    which justified a reasonable investigation to uncover that activity. This is to be judged by an
    objective standard that does not depend on the subjective beliefs of the officer on the scene.
    Indeed, “[i]f the facts known to the officer support reasonable suspicion” of illicit activity, “it
    does not matter that the officer was motivated by a belief that a different offense (even one for
    the rental agency regarding the suspicious travel arrangements—at midnight, no less—would have taken any less
    time than conducting a dog sniff of the vehicle, which, as Caballes establishes, reveals only the possession of
    contraband. Indeed, encouraging police to employ particular investigatory tactics as Winters suggests might result
    in further prolongation of traffic stops.
    7
    See Oral Argument at 10:26, 11:38, 12:40, 14:10, Winters, No. 13-6349 (“[W]hen facts arose that
    objectively . . . caused [Officer Duggan] to have reasonable suspicion, he did not pursue that line of inquiry
    [regarding the travel arrangements]. . . . [W]hen facts arise . . . that cause an officer to have questions, he may
    reasonably pursue that line of inquiry. That is not what happened here. He here did not look at their travel plans, he
    did not look at their rental contract, he went and got his drug dog, and that’s the problem. . . . [T]he officer is
    supposed to pursue those facts that come out, not other facts. . . . [The facts regarding the travel arrangements
    established grounds for further investigation] of those facts.”) (emphasis added).
    No. 13-6349                           United States v. Winters                       Page 18
    which there was not reasonable suspicion) had been committed.” Johnson, 482 F. App’x at 143
    (quoting United States v. Haskins, 430 F. App’x 727, 728–29 (10th Cir. 2011)).
    Here, as in Branch, 
    537 F.3d 582
    , Randall, 62 F. App’x 96, and Garrido-Santana,
    
    360 F.3d 565
    , for example, Winters’s nervousness and bizarre travel arrangements were salient
    not because they suggested that he was committing rental fraud, but because they would lead a
    reasonable officer under the circumstances to believe that Winters was engaged in criminal
    activity such as trafficking contraband—just as the used Kleenex found in Hill was relevant to
    suspected drug activity, and not littering. See Hill, 
    195 F.3d at 272
    . Deploying the drug-
    detection dog, then, was a reasonable means of investigating the suspected illicit activity.
    We do not mean to suggest that a finding of reasonable suspicion justifies inquiry into
    every possible crime or use of every investigatory method. An officer who pulls over and
    questions an erratic driver whom he reasonably believes to be intoxicated, for example, cannot,
    on that basis alone, investigate the driver for securities fraud. Rather, as Terry makes clear, the
    officer’s investigation must be “reasonably related in scope” to the factual basis underlying the
    finding of reasonable suspicion, 
    392 U.S. at 20
    , which it was in this case. We hold that there was
    reasonable suspicion to justify the extended detention of Winters and that the dog-sniff
    inspection was a reasonable means to dispel that suspicion.
    C. Searching the Car After the Dog’s Alert
    Once his dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, Officer Duggan searched the rental car
    and discovered a kilogram package of heroin in Winters’s bag on the back seat. It is clear that
    “[a]n alert by a properly trained and reliable drug-detection dog is sufficient to establish probable
    cause for the presence of a controlled substance.”        Stubblefield, 682 F.3d at 507 (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, such probable cause extends to “every part of
    the vehicle and all containers found therein in which the object of the search could be hidden.”
    Ibid. Thus, Officer Duggan’s search of the vehicle was proper.
    No. 13-6349                          United States v. Winters                       Page 19
    IV
    A. Rodriguez v. United States
    As noted above, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Rodriguez v. United States,
    which involves factual circumstances similar to the instant case. In Rodriguez, the Eighth Circuit
    held that a seven- to eight-minute delay between completing a warning ticket and conducting a
    dog sniff did “not unreasonably prolong the stop.” United States v. Rodriguez, 
    741 F.3d 905
    ,
    907 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 
    135 S. Ct. 43
     (2014). Because such a delay is considered “a de
    minimis intrusion” in the Eighth Circuit, the court did not need to address whether the officers
    had reasonable suspicion to continue the detention after the initial purpose of the stop had been
    completed. 
    Id. at 908
    . The defendant’s petition for certiorari thus framed the question presented
    as whether “an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without
    reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.”       Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i,
    Rodriguez, No. 13-9972 (emphasis added).
    Our holding in this case is premised on the conclusion that Officer Duggan had
    reasonable, articulable suspicion that justified the extended detention after the traffic stop was
    completed. As a result, a Supreme Court ruling on the Eighth Circuit’s approach in Rodriguez
    will not necessarily implicate our decision here. Cf. 
    id.
     at 12–13 (citing, inter alia, this court’s
    conclusion in Stepp, 
    680 F.3d at
    661–62, that “any subsequent prolonging, even de minimis, is
    an unreasonable extension of an otherwise lawful stop” absent reasonable suspicion to establish
    circuit split).   In any event, as discussed below, even if the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Rodriguez alters the applicable framework, suppression would still likely not be justified because
    Officer Duggan would be “entitled to an objective reasonable reliance on existing judicial
    precedent.” United States v. Holleman, 
    743 F.3d 1152
    , 1159 (8th Cir. 2014).
    B. Florida v. Jardines
    Winters concedes that under Caballes and its progeny, a dog sniff, which “only reveals
    the possession of contraband,” “does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy” and thus
    does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.            
    543 U.S. at
    408–09 (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Place, 
    462 U.S. 696
    , 707 (1983) (use of a
    No. 13-6349                            United States v. Winters                     Page 20
    drug-detection dog at the airport “did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
    Amendment”).       Moreover, under the Supreme Court’s and this court’s jurisprudence, the
    appropriate standard for the temporary detention during a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion.
    See Hill, 
    195 F.3d at 264
    ; Appellant Br. at 18 (“‘[R]easonable suspicion’ is the appropriate legal
    inquiry in deciding Winters’[s] Fourth Amendment claim.”). Nevertheless, Winters argues that
    the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Florida v. Jardines, 
    133 S. Ct. 1409
     (2013), alters the
    analysis such that “a drug-dog search at a traffic stop should properly be scrutinized by the courts
    under the regular ‘probable cause’ standard.” Appellant Br. at 19. This argument is mistaken.
    In Jardines, Justice Scalia, writing for a five-justice majority, concluded that the use of
    “trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within
    the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 
    133 S. Ct. at
    1417–18 (emphasis added). The Court’s
    opinion was based on a trespass rationale that contemplated the government’s “unlicensed
    physical intrusion” of the “constitutionally protected area” of the defendant’s home. 
    Id. at 1415
    ;
    see also 
    id.
     at 1415–16 (explaining that there is an implied license to approach a home’s entry
    and “wait briefly to be received,” but “no customary invitation” to deploy a police dog to explore
    the area around a home). This rationale is not implicated when law-enforcement officers are
    “‘on public thoroughfares.’” 
    Id. at 1415
     (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 
    476 U.S. 207
    , 213
    (1986)). Indeed, the opinion consistently stressed the special solicitude accorded to the home,
    which “is first among equals” under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1414. Thus, the central
    holding of Jardines does not impact the use of drug-detection dogs during lawful traffic stops.
    Cf. id. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The holding of the Court is based on what the Court sees
    as a ‘physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area,’ . . . [and] it does not apply when a
    dog alerts while on a public sidewalk or street . . . .”).
    Winters is correct that the Jardines Court “avoided” the government’s argument, relying
    on Caballes and Place, that “a drug-dog inspection does not implicate citizens’ ‘reasonable
    expectation[s] of privacy.’” Appellant Br. at 18. However, the Court did not call into question
    the continued vitality of those cases. It simply did not need to address the issue because the
    government’s “physical intrusion to explore details of the home” was “enough to establish that a
    search occurred.” Jardines, 
    133 S. Ct. at 1417
    . Indeed, Justice Scalia, who authored Jardines,
    No. 13-6349                                 United States v. Winters                                Page 21
    also joined the Court’s opinion in Caballes, which held that “the use of a well-trained narcotics-
    detection dog . . . during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy
    interests.” 
    543 U.S. at 409
    .8
    The other courts that have addressed this issue agree that Jardines does not call Caballes
    and its progeny into doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Seybels, 526 F. App’x 857, 859 n.1 (10th
    Cir. 2013) (“The recent decision in Florida v. Jardines . . . was based on property rights not
    implicated in the traffic stop context and, hence, did not undermine Caballes.”); United States v.
    Cordero, 
    2014 WL 3513181
    , at *9 (D. Vt. July 14, 2014) (“Jardines did not reverse the Court’s
    decisions holding that canine sniffs during traffic stops do not implicate the Fourth
    Amendment . . . .”); United States v. Taylor, 
    979 F. Supp. 2d 865
    , 881–82 (S.D. Ind. 2013)
    (“[N]othing in Jardines disturbed th[e] well-settled proposition” “that [a] dog sniff [is] not a
    Fourth Amendment search” if “conducted by law enforcement from an area they have a legal
    right to be.”).
    Winters’s reliance on Jardines fails for the additional reason that “[e]vidence obtained
    during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the
    exclusionary rule.” Davis v. United States, 
    131 S. Ct. 2419
    , 2429 (2011). The traffic stop and
    dog sniff at issue here were conducted on August 9, 2012, more than seven months prior to the
    Supreme Court’s Jardines decision. And, to this day, there is no precedent in this circuit
    suggesting that Jardines requires law-enforcement officers to have probable cause before
    conducting dog sniffs during lawful traffic stops. Thus, “[e]ven assuming Jardines casts doubt
    on previous cases involving” dog sniffs during traffic stops, “suppression of the evidence
    discovered [by Officer Duggan] would not be appropriate” because he was “entitled to an
    objective reasonable reliance on existing judicial precedent.” Holleman, 743 F.3d at 1159; see
    also United States v. Thomas, 
    726 F.3d 1086
    , 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (Under the “‘faith-in-
    caselaw’ exception to the exclusionary rule,” suppression is not warranted where pre-Jardines
    “authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court allowed the particular actions of” law
    8
    Winters’s reliance on Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Jardines does not change the outcome. In addition
    to speaking for only three members of the Court, Justice Kagan’s concurrence, which explored a privacy rationale in
    support of the Court’s holding, itself stressed that “[t]he police officers here conducted a search because they used a
    ‘device . . . not in general public use’ (a trained drug-detection dog) to ‘explore details of the home.’” Florida v.
    Jardines, 
    133 S. Ct. 1409
    , 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 
    533 U.S. 27
    , 40
    (2001)) (emphasis added).
    No. 13-6349                           United States v. Winters                       Page 22
    enforcement.) (citations omitted); United States v. Buford, 
    632 F.3d 264
    , 276–77 (6th Cir. 2011)
    (“A police officer who reasonably relies on settled circuit precedent that authorizes the search of
    a vehicle acts in objective good faith,” and “the judicially-created exclusionary rule does not
    apply.”).
    V
    We hold that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Duggan developed
    reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified extending the traffic stop after its initial
    purpose was completed to conduct a dog sniff. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial
    of Winters’s suppression motion.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-6349

Citation Numbers: 782 F.3d 289, 2015 FED App. 0057P, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5143, 2015 WL 1431269

Judges: Boggs, Griffin, Hood

Filed Date: 3/31/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (31)

Davis v. United States , 131 S. Ct. 2419 ( 2011 )

Mathews v. Weber , 96 S. Ct. 549 ( 1976 )

United States v. Raddatz , 100 S. Ct. 2406 ( 1980 )

California v. Ciraolo , 106 S. Ct. 1809 ( 1986 )

United States v. Sokolow , 109 S. Ct. 1581 ( 1989 )

Florida v. Royer , 103 S. Ct. 1319 ( 1983 )

Florida v. Jardines , 133 S. Ct. 1409 ( 2013 )

United States v. Robert Braggs (92-3804) Avery Clemmons (92-... , 23 F.3d 1047 ( 1994 )

United States v. Buford , 632 F.3d 264 ( 2011 )

Delaware v. Prouse , 99 S. Ct. 1391 ( 1979 )

Kyllo v. United States , 121 S. Ct. 2038 ( 2001 )

United States v. Arvizu , 122 S. Ct. 744 ( 2002 )

Illinois v. Caballes , 125 S. Ct. 834 ( 2005 )

United States v. Place , 103 S. Ct. 2637 ( 1983 )

United States v. Campbell , 549 F.3d 364 ( 2008 )

United States v. Stepp , 680 F.3d 651 ( 2012 )

United States v. Wilbert Gomez and Nelson Zahriya , 846 F.2d 557 ( 1988 )

United States v. Shank , 543 F.3d 309 ( 2008 )

United States v. Elvis A. Garrido-Santana , 360 F.3d 565 ( 2004 )

United States v. John Jay Hill and Malcolm Scott Hill , 195 F.3d 258 ( 1999 )

View All Authorities »