679637 Ontario Ltd. v. Alpine Sign & Printer Supply ( 2019 )


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  •                NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 19a0001n.06
    Case No. 18-1120
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    FILED
    679637 ONTARIO LTD,                                )                      Jan 04, 2019
    )                  DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                        )
    )       ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    v.                                                 )       STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    )       THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
    ALPINE SIGN AND PRINTER SUPPLY,                    )       MICHIGAN
    INC,                                               )
    )
    Defendant,                                  )
    )
    MARABU NORTH AMERICA, LP,                          )
    )
    Defendant-Appellee.                         )
    BEFORE: MERRITT, COOK, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
    COOK, Circuit Judge. This case concerns a contract dispute over a defect in laminate
    used to protect truck tarps. On appeal, we must decide the sole question of whether the plaintiff,
    679637 Ontario Ltd., provided timely notice to defendant Marabu North America, LP of an alleged
    breach of warranty caused by the defective laminate. Because we agree with the district court that
    no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Ontario timely notified Marabu of the defect, we
    AFFIRM its grant of summary judgment.
    Case No. 18-1120, 679637 Ontario Ltd. v. Alpine Sign & Printer Supply, Inc., et al.
    I.
    Ontario manufactures large tarpaulin systems printed with advertisements that customers
    affix to the sides of tractor trailer trucks. During manufacturing, it applies industrial laminate to
    the tarps to shield them from the environment and to facilitate cleaning. In 2010, Ontario began
    purchasing laminate from a new supplier, Clearstar LP, Marabu’s predecessor company.
    Shortly thereafter, in the fall of 2011, Ontario began to receive customer complaints about
    dirty and hard-to-clean tarps. While Ontario continued to receive “occasional” complaints in 2012
    and 2013, the company claims that the number of complaints “sky rocketed” in the spring of 2014.
    Only then did it begin to investigate the source of the problem and, after a few weeks of testing,
    determine that Marabu’s laminate caused the tarps to trap and retain dirt. On September 5, 2014,
    Ontario notified Marabu and asked for its help to clean the tarps. The company continued to
    purchase Marabu’s laminate until early 2015.
    Over a year later, Ontario sued Marabu and its distributor, Alpine Sign and Printer Supply,
    Inc.1 As relevant here, Ontario argued that Marabu’s laminate breached the implied warranty of
    merchantability.    The district court rejected Ontario’s claim under Michigan’s Uniform
    Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) because the company failed to provide notice of the alleged defect
    to Marabu within a reasonable time. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.2607(3). It found that the clock
    for calculating reasonable notice started running for the purposes of section 440.2607(3) in the fall
    of 2011 when Ontario received its first customer complaints. Because Ontario waited nearly three
    years to notify Marabu of the problem, the district court held that no reasonable factfinder could
    conclude that the delay was reasonable and awarded summary judgment to Marabu.
    1
    After Ontario filed this appeal, Alpine and Ontario settled. Alpine therefore no longer
    remains a party to this appeal.
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    Case No. 18-1120, 679637 Ontario Ltd. v. Alpine Sign & Printer Supply, Inc., et al.
    II.
    This appeal asks whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Marabu
    based on its finding that Ontario failed to timely notify Marabu of the defective laminate. We
    review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc.,
    
    295 F.3d 623
    , 629 (6th Cir. 2002). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if it “shows
    that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to
    the nonmovant as well as draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.” Hopkins v.
    Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 
    196 F.3d 655
    , 660 (6th Cir. 1999).
    Michigan’s U.C.C. requires that after acceptance of goods, a buyer must notify the seller
    of any breach “within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered [the] breach
    . . . or be barred from any remedy.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.2607(3)(a). Whether the passage
    of time proves reasonable “depends on the nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action.”
    § 440.1205(1); see also Kelynack v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 
    394 N.W.2d 17
    , 20 (Mich. Ct. App.
    1986). Generally, the trier of fact determines whether a reasonable time has elapsed. Moore v.
    First Sec. Cas. Co., 
    568 N.W.2d 841
    , 845 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). “If reasonable minds could not
    differ, however, the question of what constitutes a reasonable time should be decided on summary
    disposition as a matter of law.” Bev Smith, Inc. v. Atwell, 
    836 N.W.2d 872
    , 879 (Mich. Ct. App.
    2013) (citing Comput. Network, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 
    696 N.W.2d 49
    , 58 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)).
    Ontario concedes that it received its first complaints about dirty tarps in 2011, but it argues
    that the district court erred in finding that it knew or should have known about Marabu’s breach at
    that time. It classifies the early complaints about hard-to-clean tarps as isolated “symptoms” and
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    Case No. 18-1120, 679637 Ontario Ltd. v. Alpine Sign & Printer Supply, Inc., et al.
    contends that it discovered the cause of the problem only after the explosion of customer
    complaints in the spring of 2014.
    Even accepting Ontario’s distinction between awareness of symptoms and awareness of
    the underlying cause, Michigan’s U.C.C. still bars this implied warranty claim because the statute
    requires that the buyer notify the seller within a reasonable time after he “should have discovered”
    the breach. See § 440.2607(3)(a). Although Ontario fails to discuss in detail the progression of
    complaints from the fall of 2011 to early 2014, it acknowledges that the onset occurred in 2011.
    R. 1, Compl., PageID 5 (“Beginning in the fall of 2011, customers of [Ontario] . . . began to
    complain that the printed panels laminated with [Marabu’s laminate] absorbed dirt and could not
    be cleaned.”). In addition, its brief admits that it continued to receive complaints about the tarps
    in 2012 and 2013. These several complaints should have alerted Ontario to the defect in the
    laminate well before 2014. On this, reasonable minds could not differ.
    As the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision in Bev Smith illustrates, the time at which a
    buyer “could have discovered [a breach] . . . by means of an inspection or an expert appraisal,”
    informs when he “should have discovered” the breach under section 
    440.2607(3)(a). 836 N.W.2d at 881
    –82 (affirming dismissal of an aggrieved purchaser’s claim). While reasonableness depends
    on the nature and circumstances of each individual case, see 
    Kelynack, 394 N.W.2d at 20
    , Ontario’s
    own actions demonstrate that it could have discovered the laminate defect much earlier had it
    pursued finding the cause in 2011 and 2012. Indeed, within weeks of its decision to investigate
    the problem’s origin in May 2014, it determined that Marabu’s laminate trapped and retained dirt.
    Thus, the district court correctly held that reasonable minds could not differ in finding Ontario’s
    tardy notice to Marabu in September 2014 unreasonable under section 440.2607(3).
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    Case No. 18-1120, 679637 Ontario Ltd. v. Alpine Sign & Printer Supply, Inc., et al.
    Finally, as the district court pointed out, this result accords with the purposes of
    section 440.2607(3)’s notice requirement. The Michigan Court of Appeals has summarized these
    purposes as follows: “(1) to prevent surprise and allow the seller the opportunity to make
    recommendations . . . , (2) to allow the seller the fair opportunity to investigate and prepare for
    litigation, (3) to open the way for settlement of claims through negotiation, and (4) to protect the
    seller from stale claims and provide certainty in contractual arrangements.” Am. Bumper & Mfg.
    Co. v. Transtechnology Corp., 
    652 N.W.2d 252
    , 256 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). Ontario’s delay in
    notifying Marabu of the breach frustrated each of these purposes and allowed added damages to
    accrue, further supporting the conclusion that reasonable minds could not disagree that
    section 440.2607(3) bars the implied warranty claim.
    III.
    We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Marabu.
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    Case No. 18-1120, 679637 Ontario Ltd. v. Alpine Sign & Printer Supply, Inc., et al.
    MERRITT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The only issue on appeal is whether the district
    court properly granted summary judgment to Marabu on Ontario’s implied warranty claim
    concerning Marabu’s Clear Shield Star 1020 LL laminate because Ontario failed to provide
    reasonable notice of a breach of the implied warranty under Section 2-607 of the Uniform
    Commercial Code. Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.2607(3)(a) (“Where a tender has been accepted . . .
    . the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach
    notify the seller of the breach or be barred from any remedy.”). Whether a reasonable time has
    elapsed is generally a question for the trier of fact. Moore v. First Sec. Cas. Co., 
    568 N.W.2d 841
    (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). “If reasonable minds could not differ, however, the question of what
    constitutes a reasonable time should be decided on summary disposition as a matter of law.” Bev
    Smith, Inc. v. Atwell, 
    836 N.W.2d 872
    , 879 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Comp. Network, Inc. v.
    AM Gen. Corp, 
    696 N.W.2d 49
    (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)). “Whether a time for taking an action . . .
    is reasonable depends on the nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action.” Mich. Comp.
    Laws § 440.1205(1); see also Kelynack v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 
    394 N.W.2d 17
    , 20 (Mich.
    Ct. App. 1986).
    Marabu maintains that Ontario waited an unreasonable time— nearly three years— before
    notifying Marabu of the allegedly defective laminate and it is barred from any recovery as a matter
    of law by Section 2-607. Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.2607(3)(a) (Failure to timely notify seller bars
    the buyer “from any remedy.”). Marabu relies solely on Ontario’s representation in its complaint
    that “[b]eginning in the fall of 2011, customers of [Ontario] . . . began to complain that the printed
    panels laminated with Clear Shield Star 1020 LL absorbed dirt and could not be cleaned” to argue
    that Ontario discovered or should have discovered any alleged breach concerning the laminate in
    the fall of 2011, and that is when the clock started running in determining whether Ontario notified
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    Case No. 18-1120, 679637 Ontario Ltd. v. Alpine Sign & Printer Supply, Inc., et al.
    Marabu of a defect in the laminate within a “reasonable time” for purposes of Mich. Comp. Laws
    § 440.2607(3).
    Marabu argues that Ontario did not meet its burden to give factual support below for its
    claim that it didn’t know about the problem with the laminate until May 2014. Mich. Comp. Laws
    § 440.2607(4) (“The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the goods
    accepted.”). Ontario concedes that it received its first complaint in the fall of 2011, but it did not
    “discover” the cause of the problem until at least May 2014. Ontario contends that the defective
    nature of the laminate could not have been determined earlier because the laminate had to be
    applied to the tarps and exposed to the environment for a period of time before the problem would
    manifest. Based on the dramatic rise in complaints in 2014, Ontario employee James Martel
    prepared a “Project Report” in late spring 2014 to help investigate and identify the cause of the
    dirt-retention problem with the tarps. See Exhibit E to Ontario’s Supplemental Brief in Response
    to Marabu’s Summary Judgment Motion.            The report confirms that the first complaint of
    excessively dirty tarp panels was made by a Nebraska customer in the fall of 2011. The report
    does not document any complaints of uncleanable or excessively dirty tarps during the period 2012
    to 2014, thereby creating a genuine issue of material fact as to when Ontario “discovered or should
    have discovered” that the laminate was defective. In addition, Martel submitted an affidavit
    identifying the time frame in which Ontario became aware that the laminate itself was causing the
    problem with the dirt-retention:
    Shortly after I started [working at Ontario] in May of 2014, [m]any [Ontario]
    customers began to complain about dirty and uncleanable tarpaulins. We made
    several attempts to clean dirty tarps and to assist customers to clean dirty tarps, all
    of which were unsuccessful, prompting us to call Marabu in September 2014 to
    inform them of the problem and ask for their assistance.
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    Case No. 18-1120, 679637 Ontario Ltd. v. Alpine Sign & Printer Supply, Inc., et al.
    Martel Aff. ¶ 4. According to Ontario, it notified Marabu within three or four months of learning
    that the dirt retention problem was caused by Marabu’s laminate.
    The notice provision of Section 440.2607(3) requires the buyer to give notice to the seller
    “within a reasonable time” after he discovers any breach. The district court erroneously relied on
    only one isolated fact from the record to find that Ontario discovered the breach in the fall of 2011:
    Ontario’s complaint where it alleged that the first customer complaint came in the fall of 2011.
    The district court and our Court’s analysis does not go far enough in examining the “discovered
    or should have discovered” requirement under Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.2607(3)(a). The district
    court did not give adequate weight to Ontario’s evidence in the report and in the Martel Affidavit
    that customer complaints increased dramatically in 2014. This evidence created a genuine issue
    of material fact as to whether Ontario waited too long to investigate and discover that the
    underlying cause of the dirty tarps was the laminate. The district court failed to take into
    consideration the “nature, purpose, and circumstances” of any action or lack of action on the part
    of Ontario when it relied on one complaint in the fall of 2011 to serve as the discovery date for the
    alleged breach.
    As Ontario demonstrated, it knew only of a symptom before May 2014, not a defect or
    breach. In 2014, complaints “skyrocketed” and Ontario was compelled to look more extensively
    into the matter because customers were demanding replacement of the tarps or compensation for
    the problem. The customer complaints standing alone did not give Ontario knowledge of the cause
    of the problem. Once it started looking for the cause and testing various components of its
    processes, it discovered the source. The question becomes when would a reasonably prudent buyer
    in Ontario’s shoes have started to investigate the complaints in a manner that would lead to
    discovery of the breach or defect? One complaint about a dirty tarp in the fall of 2011 did not give
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    Case No. 18-1120, 679637 Ontario Ltd. v. Alpine Sign & Printer Supply, Inc., et al.
    Ontario sufficient information that it “should have discovered” that Marabu’s laminate was the
    cause of the problem and that a breach had occurred. The answer may lie somewhere between the
    parties’ two extreme positions, but Ontario produced unrebutted evidence below that it received
    only one complaint in 2011 and numerous complaints in 2014. Contrary to the district court’s
    finding, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Ontario’s notice to Marabu in September
    2014 came within a reasonable time after discovery of the alleged breach under Section
    440.2607(3)(a). Thus, the factual issue should not be decided as a matter of law, but by the jury
    as a fact-finder.
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