United States v. Charles Collins , 359 F. App'x 639 ( 2010 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 10a0001n.06
No. 08-5876
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Jan 04, 2010
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. On appeal from the United States
District Court for the Eastern
CHARLES WESLEY COLLINS, District of Kentucky
Defendant-Appellant.
/
BEFORE: RYAN, COLE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
RYAN, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Charles Wesley Collins, appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of firearms recovered during a
search of his residence. We conclude that the police officers conducting the search had
a valid arrest warrant and, in addition, had probable cause to conduct the search that led
to the recovery of the evidence. We conclude, therefore, that the motion to suppress was
properly denied by the district court.
I.
On August 30, 2007, Deputy Sheriff Mark Craycraft of the Clark County, Kentucky,
Sheriff’s Office received a warrant to arrest the defendant Collins. The warrant for Collins’s
arrest was a bench warrant, issued by a family court judge after Collins had been found in
contempt of court for failing to comply with the court’s order for a mental health evaluation.
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The following was written at the bottom of the arrest warrant: “this person is mental and
could be possible trouble – when attempting to serve take 3 deputies.”
Craycraft and three other officers went to an address listed on the arrest warrant,
a trailer rented by Tiffany Morefield, Collins’s girlfriend. When Morefield answered the
door, Craycraft told her that he had a warrant for Collins’s arrest. At first, Morefield denied
that Collins was in the trailer, but then admitted that he was sleeping in a back bedroom.
Morefield offered to go get Collins, but Craycraft refused Morefield’s offer and said, “we’ll
get him.” There is a factual dispute as to whether, at that point, Morefield gave her consent
to the officers’ entry of the trailer. A witness, Kristi Walker, testified that Morefield
expressly denied entry to the officers and attempted to close the door. However, in a later
signed written statement and in her testimony presented to the grand jury, Morefield said
that she permitted the officers to enter.
The officers entered the trailer, went to the back bedroom, and found Collins
sleeping on a bed. The officers arrested and handcuffed him, and then noticed two rifles
on a gun rack in the bedroom. They seized the weapons, took Collins into custody, and
returned to the police station. Five days later, Morefield delivered to the police another
handgun that belonged to Collins. All of the firearms were to be introduced into evidence
in Collins’s prosecution.
Collins was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and two counts of possession of a firearm by a person
subject to a domestic violence order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The latter two
counts were subsequently dismissed by the district court.
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On April 4, 2008, Collins filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the seized weapons.
At the hearing on the motion, Morefield asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and refused to testify.
At the conclusion of the hearing, in an opinion from the bench, the district judge
denied the motion to suppress. In his decision, the judge credited the testimony of Deputy
Craycraft, finding it was corroborated by Morefield’s written statement and grand jury
testimony. The judge then stated the following:
[A]ssuming that Ms. Morefield had not invited the officers into the house,
there was [sic] still exigent circumstances here which would require a
reasonable officer to want to initiate the arrest rather than having the
defendant presented to them, where the defendant would have the
opportunity to arm himself, or whatever.
There was a potential for real problems there. Had the officers
allowed Ms. Morefield to go back and bring Mr. – – bring the defendant out,
then the officers would have been derelict in their duty, I believe. And
certainly, the actions the officers took on the morning when Mr. Collins was
arrested were appropriate, reasonable, and responsible.
So the motion of the defendant to suppress will be denied.
On April 8, 2008, Collins entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of the
indictment—being a felon in possession of a firearm—preserving the right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress. The district court accepted the conditional guilty plea and
sentenced Collins to a year and one day in prison. Collins now appeals the court’s
decision to deny the motion to suppress.
II.
When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we review
findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Dillard, 438
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F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2006). When the district court denies a defendant’s motion to
suppress, the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the government. United
States v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 772
(2008), and cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2020 (2009). “‘[A] denial of a motion to suppress will
be affirmed on appeal if the district court’s conclusion can be justified for any reason.’”
United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 417 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Pasquarille, 20 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 1994)).
III.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Law enforcement officers
have the authority to enter a residence in order to execute an arrest warrant if there is
probable cause to believe that the suspect is inside. Hardin, 539 F.3d at 410 (citing Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980)).
A.
Collins first challenges the validity of the arrest warrant. He argues that the warrant
was not for the commission of a felony, but rather a bench warrant issued for misdemeanor
contempt of court. Collins also suggests that the family court judge who issued the warrant
did not have the authority to do so because the domestic relations case had previously
been dismissed. We think both of these arguments are without merit.
There is no legal support we know of, and Collins cites none, for the proposition that
a bench warrant issued for contempt of court is fundamentally different, under the Fourth
Amendment, than an arrest warrant for a felony, or that police officers lack authority to
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enter a residence in order to execute a bench warrant issued for a misdemeanor. And our
attention is not invited to any authority for the contention that a family court judge is without
authority to issue a bench warrant. Accordingly, we conclude that the officers had a valid
warrant for Collins’s arrest.
B.
Collins also challenges the officers’ authority to enter the trailer. He concedes that
law enforcement officials have authority to enter a dwelling in order to execute an arrest
warrant if they have probable cause to believe that a suspect is inside. Hardin, 539 F.3d
at 410 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 603). But Collins argues that the officers exceeded their
authority because, given Morefield’s offer to bring Collins to the officers, it was
unreasonable and unnecessary for them to enter the residence, and that doing so was a
violation of Collins’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Not surprisingly, Collins has
presented no authority for his novel theory that the officers could enter the trailer if
Morefield had refused them entry, but could not enter if Morefield offered to get Collins
from the bedroom herself. Collins concedes in his reply brief that his theory appears to
present a case of “first impression.”
We are satisfied that it is well-established that law enforcement officials have
authority to enter a residence in order to execute an arrest warrant if there is probable
cause to believe the person named in the warrant is inside. Hardin, 539 F.3d at 410.
Deputy Craycraft had a valid arrest warrant naming the defendant Collins and, given
Morefield’s assurance that Collins was in the trailer, the officers had authority to enter the
trailer in order to execute the warrant.
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IV.
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the district court, perhaps in an abundance of
caution, apparently did not consider whether the officers lawfully entered Morefield’s trailer
solely because they had a presumptively valid warrant for Collins’s arrest and probable
cause to believe Collins was inside. Instead, the district court held that the officers had
obtained consent and that there were exigent circumstances for the entry, which are two
exceptions to the prohibition against warrantless entries. But this was not a case of a
warrantless entry; it was one made pursuant to an arrest warrant, supported by probable
cause to believe that Collins was inside the trailer.
We may affirm a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress for any proper
reason, including one not considered by the district court. Hardin, 539 F.3d at 417.
Accordingly, for the reasons we have explained, we find that the district court correctly
denied Collins’s motion to suppress.
V.
We AFFIRM the district court’s order.