Omoniyi Adebisi v. University of Tennessee ( 2009 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 09a0494n.06
FILED
No. 08-5357 Jul 15, 2009
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
OMONIYI Y. ADEBISI, )
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
) TENNESSEE
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, )
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
)
Before: SILER, COOK, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Dr. Omoniyi Adebisi appeals summary judgment in favor of the University
of Tennessee (“UT”) on his claim of employment discrimination based on race and national origin
in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. We affirm.
The district court properly determined that Dr. Adebisi met his initial burden for his national
origin discrimination claim, but failed to make a prima facie showing of race discrimination, because
he failed to show that a similarly-situated, non-protected person was treated more favorably.
To demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must show that “(1) he or
she was a member of a protected class; (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he
or she was qualified for the position; and (4) he or she was replaced by someone outside the
protected class or was treated differently than similarly-situated, non-protected employees.” Wright
v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 2006). To qualify as “similarly-situated,” an
No. 08-5357
individual “must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and
have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that
would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188
F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 1999).
Dr. Adebisi satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case. Because he was not
replaced by another Fellow, to satisfy the fourth prong he needed to show that a similarly-situated,
non-protected employee was treated more favorably. The district court properly identified Dr. Byrd,
the only other Fellow and an African - American, as the only similarly-situated employee. However,
as Byrd is of the same racial group as Dr. Adebisi, he is not a “non-protected employee” for the
purposes of the race discrimination claim. Thus, the district court properly granted summary
judgment to UT on the race discrimination claim.
As for the national origin discrimination claim, the district court correctly concluded that UT
offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to take adverse action against Dr. Adebisi. Soon after
Dr. Adebisi started the Fellowship, the faculty and physicians became concerned about his lack of
knowledge, lack of surgical and outpatient procedural skills, attitude, and treatment of patients,
residents, and staff. These concerns were based on professional judgment after several interactions
with and observations of Dr. Adebisi. See Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 576
(6th Cir. 2003) (providing that an employer’s decision should be “reasonably informed and
considered”). They constitute valid reasons for UT’s actions.
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No. 08-5357
The district court also properly held that Dr. Adebisi failed to meet his burden of establishing
that UT’s articulated reason for taking adverse action was pretext for unlawful discrimination under
the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason
for taking adverse action either: (1) had no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the adverse
employment action; or (3) was insufficient to motivate the adverse action. See Vincent v. Brewer
Co., 514 F.3d 489, 497 (6th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 573 (6th Cir.
2000). A plaintiff’s “conclusory allegations and subjective beliefs . . . are wholly insufficient
evidence to establish a claim of discrimination as a matter of law.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964
F.2d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 1992).
Dr. Adebisi did not present sufficient facts to offset UT’s properly supported summary
judgment motion. His disagreement with UT’s opinion of his competence and general conduct and
his conclusory statements that UT’s reasons were false are insufficient to prove pretext. Although
Dr. Adebisi believes his actions were appropriate, he presents no evidence to show that UT’s adverse
actions were not based on an honestly believed contrary opinion. There is no question that he knew
of the faculty’s and physicians’ concerns, that such concerns were communicated to him on multiple
occasions throughout the Fellowship, and that the decision to remove him from clinical
responsibilities or the Fellowship was communicated to him on the same day. Dr. Adebisi did not
show suspicious timing or that UT faculty believed his skill or surgical ability warranted a certificate
of completion.
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The district court did not err by adopting UT’s proposed statement of the facts. “Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not
be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The court’s factual
findings only included undisputed facts, and there is no indication that it failed to consider additional
relevant or material facts or disputes submitted by Dr. Adebisi.
AFFIRMED.
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