Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Systems USA, Inc. , 358 F. App'x 643 ( 2009 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 09a0820n.06
Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420 FILED
Dec 22, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MULTIMATIC, INC., )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, )
)
v. )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
FAURECIA INTERIOR SYSTEMS USA, ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
INC., ) EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. )
)
)
Before: CLAY and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; THAPAR, District Judge.*
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Faurecia Interior Systems USA appeals (1) the district court’s
summary judgment decision that it breached a confidentiality agreement with Multimatic and (2) the
jury’s $10 million damage award. Multimatic cross-appeals the district court’s exclusion of its
damages expert, who claimed Multimatic suffered an additional $28.7 million in damages. Because
the district court properly granted summary judgment on liability, the jury’s verdict is supported by
sufficient, and properly admitted, evidence and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding Multimatic’s damages expert, we affirm.
*
The Honorable Amul R. Thapar, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, sitting by designation.
Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
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I.
In October 2003, DaimlerChrysler selected Faurecia to supply instrument panels for its JS41
vehicle program, which covered the 2007 to 2012 Sebring and Avenger vehicle lines. In early 2004,
Faurecia selected Multimatic to design the instrument panel’s cross-car beam. In connection with
this agreement, Multimatic asked Faurecia to sign a confidentiality agreement, which it did in
February 2004.
With the confidentiality agreement in place, Multimatic and Faurecia began collaborating
weekly on the cross-car beam design. At the same time, Multimatic began working on an alternate
design—dubbed the “mass saving design”—that would meet Faurecia’s requirements but weigh
several pounds less than the current design. By November 2004, Multimatic was ready to focus
solely on the mass saving design. But because the parties had not yet agreed on a price for the cross-
car beams, Multimatic worried (correctly) that Faurecia might switch suppliers. Faurecia signed a
pre-development letter of intent that month to assuage Multimatic’s concerns, and the two parties
shifted their focus to refining the mass saving design.
In April 2005, Faurecia again looked to switch cross-car beam suppliers because the parties
could not agree on a price for the product. It selected Brown Corporation as its new pre-production
cross-car-beam supplier in May 2005 and terminated its relationship with Multimatic. Brown
remained the cross-car-beam supplier once the JS41 program began production in 2006.
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In May 2005, Multimatic filed this lawsuit against Faurecia, alleging that it breached the
confidentiality agreement, breached the November 2004 letter of intent and breached several
prototype purchase orders. The district court granted summary judgment for Multimatic on the
breach-of-confidentiality-agreement claim and summary judgment for Faurecia on the breach-of-
letter-of-intent claim. After a trial, a jury awarded Multimatic $9,381,306 for Faurecia’s breach of
the confidentiality agreement and $600,515 for breach of the purchase orders. Both parties appeal.
II.
We first consider whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to
Multimatic on liability. This aspect of the appeal boils down to two questions: (1) Does the
confidentiality agreement cover information created after Multimatic and Faurecia executed it and
(2) did Faurecia reveal information owned exclusively by Multimatic? In answering these questions,
we must give Faurecia the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences. See Cavin v. Honda of Am.
Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2003).
A.
As to the first question, Multimatic and Faurecia signed the confidentiality agreement so that
they could share “their respective CAD designs, drawings, analysis models and results” concerning
the cross-car beam that “Multimatic will design and supply.” ROA 236. The agreement protects
“sensitive information” that “each of Multimatic . . . and Faurecia possesses,” defined as:
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[P]roprietary confidential information pertaining to its business and customers and
. . . technical information relating to its products, designs and services, including
compositions, raw materials, formulations, additives, components, production
processes, plant layout, engineering concepts and designs, analysis models and
results, know-how, and other intellectual or industrial property, which is generally
not available to the public.
Id. The agreement adds that Multimatic and Faurecia must disclose any sensitive information
“necessary to develop and supply” the cross-car beam during the agreement’s three-year term. Id.
And it provides that neither party may share sensitive information obtained under the confidentiality
agreement with third parties unless they first impose “similar” confidentiality obligations. Id.
Under Michigan law, as under the law of most (if not all) States, courts will enforce the terms
of a contract if they have a “clear, unambiguous, and . . . definite meaning.” Mahnick v. Bell Co.,
662 N.W.2d 830, 832–33 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); see also Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d
23, 28 (Mich. 2005). Courts determine the meaning of unambiguous contract provisions, and juries
generally determine the meaning of ambiguous provisions when there is competing extrinsic
evidence over how to construe them. Mahnick, 662 N.W.2d at 833.
In our view, as in the view of the district court, the confidentiality agreement unambiguously
covers pre-existing and future trade secrets. The preamble looks to the future, contemplating that
Multimatic “will design” the cross-car beam and will share its “designs, drawings” and other
information created during that process. ROA 236. The agreement’s disclosure obligation confirms
this forward-looking perspective, mandating disclosure of sensitive information “necessary to
develop” the cross-car beam. Id. And nothing in the agreement draws a distinction between pre-
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existing and future information. The definition of “sensitive information” does not include the
modifier “pre-existing” or otherwise restrict itself to a discrete time period.
The agreement also confirms that the parties knew how to exclude information from the
compass of protected trade secrets. Immediately after defining sensitive information, it excludes
information in the public domain and information the receiving party lawfully possessed prior to
disclosure. In this context, had the agreement meant to exclude information post-dating its
execution, one would expect to see language to that effect alongside the other carve-out clauses.
Our interpretation also gives effect to “every word” in the definition of sensitive information.
See Associated Truck Lines, Inc. v. Baer, 77 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Mich. 1956). The definition picks
up several types of information created during the design process—many of which necessarily would
occur in the future—such as engineering designs, analysis models and results. If the agreement
covers future information, as we think it does, the inclusion of these types of covered information
in the definition imposes meaningful obligations. Were we to interpret the confidentiality agreement
to cover only pre-existing information, by contrast, that would leave these provisions with no role
to play.
Faurecia offers three rejoinders. First, it notes that the agreement repeatedly uses the present
tense, including the verb “possesses” in the definition of sensitive information, suggesting that the
agreement covers just pre-existing trade secrets. But it is not that easy. All contracts use the present
tense—at least in part. And the parties’ use of the present tense here provides a baseline for creating
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existing and future obligations, and the context of the agreement and its other terms show that the
agreement covers both types of commitments. Proving the point, legal drafters frequently use the
present tense to cover the present and the future. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1; Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 141.602, 141.1162, 206.2, 257.80; Heniser v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 502, 503,
505, 509 (interpreting contract term to cover the future even though it was drafted in the present
tense); Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 939 (2d ed. 1995). Verb tense alone
cannot hold the weight that Faurcia places on it.
Second, the obligation to disclose sensitive information “to the extent necessary to design and
develop” the cross-car beam, Faurecia argues, has no work to do if the agreement includes
information created during the design process. Not so. The phrase still protects pre-existing
information from disclosure to the same extent as an interpretation covering only pre-existing
information.
Third, Faurecia worries that extending the confidentiality agreement to cover future
information—especially the cross-car beam design itself—would give Multimatic the ability to
“shut[] down production of an entire line of vehicles” because the agreement allows either party to
request the immediate return of its sensitive information at any time. Faurecia Br. at 29. But
Chrysler’s policies indicate that it will not incorporate third-party designs into its production vehicles
unless it has an irrevocable right to produce and use that design. The confidentiality agreement thus
was prologue to a supply or licensing agreement, which would address these types of concerns if and
when Faurecia chose to use (and pay for) Multimatic’s design.
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Nor does the promise to protect sensitive information become illusory if the confidentiality
agreement covers future information. Faurecia complains that Multimatic could circumvent its
disclosure obligation by immediately asking Faurecia to return any disclosed design materials. But
the agreement’s implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing alleviates this concern. See Lowes
Home Centers, Inc. v. LL & 127, LLC, 147 F. App’x 516, 523–24 (6th Cir. 2005).
B.
Faurecia separately argues that Multimatic did not exclusively own the information that
Faurecia disclosed to Brown. Yet it is beyond question, as an initial matter, that Faurecia shared the
cross-car beam design and associated engineering documents with Brown in April or May 2005.
Brown needed the information to provide an accurate quote, which it gave to Faurecia on May 18,
2005. Brown’s 2006 three-dimensional cross-car beam models also perfectly match Multimatic’s
2005 models “except for minor revisions . . . resulting from a more mature vehicle package” by
Chrysler. R.84 Ex. 33 at 21, 27. Faurecia offers no evidence suggesting that Brown recreated the
design from scratch.
Once Faurecia transitioned the cross-car-beam project from Multimatic to Brown, it also
disclosed Multimatic’s design-failure mode and effects analysis and its design verification plan and
report. Both represent “core engineering documents” that disclose Multimatic’s quality assurance
processes, such as how to test for and prevent cross-car beam failures. R.84 Ex. 33 at 4, 20. These
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documents by their nature come within the categories of “information pertaining to [Multimatic’s]
business” and “analysis models and results” protected by the confidentiality agreement. ROA 236.
Multimatic exclusively owned this information. All of the record evidence—including
deposition testimony by two Faurecia employees intimately involved in the cross-car beam
development—indicates that Multimatic alone created the 3D models Faurecia shared with Brown
in 2005. Faurecia may well dispute who came up with some of the ideas embodied in the 3D
models, but that does nothing to counter the reality that Multimatic created the models.
In addition, Multimatic solely created and solely owned the engineering documents Faurecia
provided to Brown. Only Multimatic employees are identified as creating and maintaining those
documents. And Faurecia forwarded the Multimatic emails containing those documents to Brown
without any modification or comment.
Copyright law—the legally cognizable form of ownership in 3D models, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(5); Robert B. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 278 (6th Cir. 1988)—
confirms Multimatic’s exclusive ownership of the cross-car beam models. To transfer copyright
ownership, the copyright owner must sign a written instrument acknowledging the transfer. See 17
U.S.C. § 204(a). Faurecia has not produced any writing signed by Multimatic that transfers its
copyright in the 3D models to Faurecia or to Chrysler.
Faurecia disagrees, pointing to a January 2005 email from Lee James, a Multimatic engineer,
who agrees to comply with several of Chrysler’s cross-car beam specification requirements,
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including some in Chrysler’s PS-7000 process standard. In that standard, Chrysler outlines technical
specification requirements for designs created by third-party suppliers. But it also describes two
potential IP ownership arrangements between outside suppliers and Chrysler: either the supplier
retains IP ownership but grants Chrysler a license to use the IP or the supplier assigns IP ownership
to Chrysler.
According to Faurecia, a jury could infer from James’ email that Multimatic agreed to give
Chrysler ownership in the cross-car beam design. That is a stretch. A jury could not reasonably infer
that a Multimatic engineer’s email to Faurecia acknowledging screw-torque testing procedures,
welding specifications and “mill oil and lubricant requirements” simultaneously assigned the
company’s intellectual property ownership to Chrysler—all without mentioning intellectual property
ownership at any point in the email. R.85 Ex. R. The PS-7000 standard itself also acknowledges
that suppliers do not transfer IP ownership until Chrysler and the supplier execute a purchase order
for the supplier’s vehicle component. Multimatic and Chrysler never did so for the cross-car beam.
Faurecia persists that Multimatic assigned ownership of its 3D models to Chrysler by
uploading them to Chrysler’s Virtual Product Manager (VPM) system. By logging into VPM,
Multimatic “acknowledg[ed]” that VPM and its data are valuable DaimlerChrysler assets and that
it could use these assets only in authorized ways. R.91 Ex. LL. A “Confidentiality Agreement” on
the VPM welcome screen also states, “All information and content on the [Chrysler] network is the
confidential and proprietary property of” Chrysler, which VPM users cannot disclose to others. R.91
Ex. LL.
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Yet these statements do not automatically assign ownership over information uploaded into
VPM to Chrysler. To acknowledge that someone owns a book is not the same as acknowledging that
they own the copyright in the book. By logging into VPM, Multimatic likewise acknowledged only
that the data in VPM—not the intellectual property embodied in that data—belong to Chrysler.
Chrysler’s PS-7000 process standard adds force to this conclusion. All 3D models for
Chrysler vehicle components must be uploaded into VPM, so any promise under the PS-7000
standard that a supplier could retain IP ownership over its design would be a dead letter if uploading
information into VPM automatically transferred ownership to Chrysler. Two acknowledgments on
a login screen did not render Chrysler’s carefully crafted contract terms meaningless and deceptive.
In the end, Faurecia fails to offer any reason why the application of a carefully negotiated
confidentiality agreement in this context would implicitly give up what it explicitly protects:
intellectual property rights.
III.
Faurecia separately challenges the jury’s $10 million damage award. Multimatic’s principal
evidence supporting its $10 million lost-profits claim came through the testimony of Lawrence
Simon, one of its damages experts. Simon, a CPA for twenty-four years, testified that Multimatic
lost roughly $9.4 million in profits when Brown, not Multimatic, supplied the cross-car beam for the
JS-41 program. Simon calculated this figure by multiplying the number of cars Chrysler would
produce under the JS41 program (according to publicly available automotive forecasting
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information) by Multimatic’s estimated profits per cross-car beam. See id. at 28. He then estimated
the profits per beam based on a February 2005 Multimatic price quote, which included a pricing
structure similar to the November 2004 letter of intent.
Simon also testified that Multimatic incurred an additional $600,515 in damages from unpaid
purchase orders for cross-car beam prototypes. He arrived at this figure by adding up the invoice
amount on each unpaid prototype invoice that he could tie to a Faurecia purchase order. This
included purchase orders for prototypes that Multimatic produced but did not ship to Faurecia in May
2005.
A.
Faurecia claims the jury verdict cannot stand as a matter of law. We give fresh review to this
claim, apply the law of the forum state (Michigan) in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, see
K & T Enters., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 175–76 (6th Cir. 1996), and view the evidence
in the light most favorable to Multimatic, see In re Brown, 342 F.3d 620, 626–27 (6th Cir. 2003).
According to Faurecia, Multimatic cannot show that the parties contemplated lost-production
profits for breaching the confidentiality agreement. A plaintiff can recover only for damages “that
arise naturally from the breach or those that were in the contemplation of the parties at the time the
contract was made.” Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 52–53 (Mich. 1980). While
we agree that lost-production profits are not an inevitable consequence of breaching a confidentiality
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agreement, the jury had ample evidence to conclude that the parties contemplated such damages at
the time of contracting.
Mark Sullivan, a Multimatic manager who oversaw the cross-car beam project, testified
about the company’s intention in signing the confidentiality agreement: Faurecia remained free to
use any supplier it wished for the JS41 program, but if it used Multimatic’s design, Faurecia had to
permit Multimatic to supply the beam. He pointed to language in the agreement that reflected this
intention. And he testified that he communicated this understanding to Faurecia on several
occasions. Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Faurecia understood that, if it
used the Multimatic design protected by the confidentiality agreement, it would have to use
Multimatic to supply the product.
Faurecia fares no better in arguing that the lost-profit award is unduly speculative. Under
Michigan law, sure enough, a plaintiff cannot recover damages “based on mere conjecture or
speculation.” Sullivan Indus., Inc. v. Double Seal Glass Co., Inc., 480 N.W.2d 623, 632 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991). Yet damages calculations with a “reasonable basis of computation” clear this hurdle
even though the results are “only approximate,” Waskin Dev. Co. v. Weyn, 119 N.W.2d 662, 665
(Mich. 1963), and “speculative to some degree,” Lorenz Supply Co. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 300
N.W.2d 335, 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
The damages evidence satisfies this standard. Simon had a reasoned, non-speculative basis
for projecting profits through 2012. His yearly vehicle production forecasts for the JS41 program
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came from a reliable industry forecaster upon whom the automakers themselves rely. Several
witnesses testified that the automakers rarely, if ever, change production suppliers once production
begins, so the jury had a reasoned basis for concluding that Multimatic would have been the cross-
car beam supplier throughout the JS41 program’s production run.
The jury also had a sound basis for concluding that Faurecia would have selected Multimatic
as its supplier absent a breach of the confidentiality agreement. Sullivan, to repeat, testified that the
confidentiality agreement obligated Faurecia to use Multimatic as its supplier if it used Multimatic’s
design. The jury also heard testimony that, “within a few months” of November 2004, Faurecia
would have no choice but to use Multimatic’s design. ROA Tr. Vol. V at 100. It takes years,
according to Sullivan, to develop a production-ready cross-car beam, and Chrysler was nearing its
design-freeze deadline for the JS41 program, scheduled to hit showroom floors in July 2006. The
jury had a reasonable basis for finding that, by May 2005, when Faurecia breached the confidentiality
agreement and used Brown as its cross-car beam supplier, Faurecia had to use Multimatic’s design.
Taking a different tack, Faurecia argues that a Multimatic quote, which Faurecia never
accepted, cannot establish Multimatic’s lost profits. No doubt, unaccepted offers and preliminary
negotiations generally do not establish the basis for a damages award. See Wisconsin Bridge & Iron
Co. v. City of Alpena, 213 N.W. 93, 95 (Mich. 1927); ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Commc’ns, Inc.,
155 F.3d 659, 670 (3d Cir. 1998). But cf. Pelton v. Pelton, 421 N.W.2d 560, 562 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988) (using an unaccepted offer to value a business during divorce proceedings). And no doubt,
in a mine-run case, this rule makes sense because it approaches conjecture, if not enters that
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forbidden territory, to assume that both parties would agree to one party’s quote or even that both
parties would reach a final agreement. See ATACS Corp., 155 F.3d at 670.
But in this case, the jury had more to go on. The evidence showed that Faurecia had little
choice by May 2005 but to agree to Multimatic’s terms. It took no speculation for the jury to find
that Faurecia and Multimatic would have reached agreement. For if they had not, Faurecia would
have forgone the benefits of—and borne the consequences of breaching—its instrument-panel supply
agreement with Chrysler. In this setting, where there was a reasonable likelihood that the parties
would have consummated a supply agreement but for Faurecia’s breach, Multimatic’s February 2005
quote gives a contemporaneous, non-speculative indication of the price term Multimatic would have
imposed from its superior bargaining position. That is particularly so where Faurecia did not even
offer its own expert on damages.
Faurecia, lastly, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s award of
$600,515 for unpaid prototype parts. Faurecia waived this argument, however, by not raising it in
its Rule 50(b) motion. It makes no difference that Faurecia mentioned that it wished to preserve the
issue for appeal in a footnote in its brief. The point of a Rule 50(b) motion is not to tell the district
court what the losing party might challenge on appeal but to give the district court a first shot at
correcting the mistake—and to give the district court an explanation for doing so. See Bldg. Serv.
Local 47 Cleaning Contractors Pension Plan v. Grandview Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1398–99 (6th
Cir. 1995).
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B.
Faurecia argues in the alternative that the district court abused its discretion in making four
evidentiary rulings. See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005). First, the
district court did not exceed its authority in denying Faurecia’s discovery motion to compel
disclosure of Multimatic’s costs and profit margins on all cross-car beam programs between 2000
and 2005. Faurecia claims that it could have presented “a substantially reduced lost profits
computation” to the jury had Multimatic provided this information. Faurecia Br. at 59. A magistrate
judge denied this motion for two reasons: The request was overly broad in time and scope given that
Multimatic’s damages experts had not relied on any of this financial information in preparing their
reports, and it conflicted with a previous stipulated order withdrawing all of Faurecia’s requests for
historical pricing information. The district court agreed. A district court has broad discretion to
deny unduly broad discovery requests, see Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merchandising, Inc., 538 F.3d
448, 457 (6th Cir. 2008), and this trial judge did not abuse that discretion by denying Faurecia access
to five years of tangential, sensitive financial information.
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Faurecia’s November 2004
pre-production letter of intent. According to Faurecia, the letter ceased having any relevance once
the district court deemed it unenforceable at the summary judgment stage. Rule 401 sets a low
threshold for relevance, however, which is to say, evidence “having any tendency to make the
existence of any” relevant fact “more [or less] probable.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The November 2004
letter clears this threshold because it shows both parties contemplated using the pricing structure
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Simon relied upon when calculating lost-profits damages, thereby making the lost-profits calculation
more plausible. Likewise unavailing is Faurecia’s claim that the letter of intent would confuse the
jury, which might treat it as an enforceable agreement. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The district court
instructed the jury that they could not treat the letter of intent as an enforceable agreement and
indicated it would give that instruction when it admitted the letter.
Third, Faurecia objects under Rule 702 to the admission of Simon’s expert testimony. To
be admissible, expert testimony must be relevant and “have a reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of” the expert’s “discipline.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592
(1993). Simon’s testimony is relevant because it went to the only issue before the jury: the amount
of damages suffered by Multimatic. No evidence shows that Simon’s methodology, or the way he
applied that methodology here, falls outside the range of accepted accounting principles. For the
same reasons that Multimatic’s unilateral price quote is not too speculative to support a jury verdict,
neither is Simon’s testimony based on that quote too speculative to be admissible under Rule 702.
Faurecia separately attempts to incorporate by reference arguments it made in its motion in limine
below seeking to exclude Simon’s testimony. Because Faurecia does not develop these arguments
on appeal, however, it waived them. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th
Cir. 1996); Bldg. Serv. Local 47, 46 F.3d at 1398–99.
Fourth, Faurecia likewise failed to preserve its objection to Sullivan’s testimony about his
understanding of the confidentiality agreement by not objecting in the district court. See Bowman
v. Corrections Corp. of America, 350 F.3d 537, 548 (6th Cir. 2003).
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C.
Faurecia also claims that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting its Rule 60(b)
motion to reduce the lost-profits damage award by roughly $2.2 million. Less than a month after the
district court entered its final judgment in October 2007, Chrysler announced it would eliminate a
shift at the plant producing the JS41 program vehicles, causing industry forecasters to reduce JS41
production estimates through 2012 by thirty-one percent. Faurecia moved for Rule 60(b)(2) and
(b)(6) relief from the judgment based on this information, which the district court denied.
Faurecia does not qualify for Rule 60(b)(2) relief. Under that rule, the district court “may
relieve a party . . . from a judgment” if it uncovers “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The problem is, the newly discovered evidence must relate to facts existing at the time of trial. See
Davis v. Jellico Cmty. Hosp. Inc., 912 F.2d 129, 136 (6th Cir. 1990). Faurecia offers no evidence
that this was so.
Faurecia’s request for Rule 60(b)(6) relief fails as well. District courts may grant relief under
this provision only in “extraordinary circumstances.” See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239
(1997). Events disproving a damages expert’s forward-looking estimates are not such an
extraordinary circumstance, as it is hardly unusual for future events to overtake the reasonable
premises of an estimate. See Davis, 912 F.2d at 136 (“Death of a judgment plaintiff following so
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shortly after a jury award of damages based on an expected life span not realized . . . is not the sort
of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ contemplated by Rule 60(b)(6).”).
IV.
Multimatic cross-appeals the district court’s decision to exclude testimony by its second
damages expert, Dr. Michael Hartzmark. Hartzmark, a PhD economist, would have testified that
Multimatic suffered roughly $28.7 million in additional damages beyond the $10 million Sullivan
calculated. Hartzmark formed the opinion that Faurecia’s breach of the confidentiality agreement
caused three other sources of lost profits: (1) Lost profits from a revamped JS41 program extending
from 2013 through 2018; (2) the loss of an “incumbency benefit[]” by not supplying the cross-car
beam, which reduced Multimatic’s likelihood of being a Chrysler supplier in the future by eighteen
percent, R.144 Ex. A at 4, 21–22; and (3) “price erosion”—requiring decreased profit margins—on
future GM and Ford contracts through 2016 because competitors had access to Multimatic’s designs,
ROA Tr. Vol. VII at 117, 121.
The district court excluded this evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and 403, finding that
Hartzmark’s expert opinion rested on speculation and his methodology had not been scientifically
tested, had not been subject to peer review and was not generally accepted in the economic
community. We review this decision for an abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136, 138–39 (1997). In ensuring that expert testimony is “relevant and reliable” under Rule 702,
Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 152 (1999), district courts must ensure that
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the testimony has a “basis in the knowledge and experience of” the expert’s discipline and that the
expert exhibits “the same level of intellectual rigor” expected of an expert outside the courtroom.
Id. at 149, 152.
Consistent with this gatekeeping requirement, the district court properly excluded
Hartzmark’s testimony about lost JS41-related profits from 2013 through 2017. See McClean v.
988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800–01 (6th Cir. 2000). Hartzmark assumed that Chrysler
would follow standard automotive practice by revamping the JS41 program after five years and then
extend its production run through 2017. He further assumed, without any supporting industry
research, that Chrysler would continue producing JS41 vehicles at the same rate in 2017 as it did in
2007. Simon, in contrast, relied on industry research for his 2007–12 lost-profits calculations. The
district court hit the nail on the head when it characterized this ten-year prediction about the fortunes
of the American automotive industry as utterly speculative.
Hartzmark’s opinion regarding Multimatic’s loss of its “incumbency benefit[]” fares no
better. R.144 Ex. A at 21. His opinion rests on speculation about Multimatic’s profit margins on
yet-to-be-signed contracts years into the future, using Simon’s per-beam profit estimates for the
JS41 program without analyzing Multimatic’s historical profit margins or typical industry profit
margins. As mentioned, however, Simon’s calculations rested on an unaccepted price quote. That
quote did not rest on unacceptable speculation only because Multimatic had Faurecia in a position
where it had no choice but to accept Multimatic’s terms. Multimatic will not have similar bargaining
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys. USA, Inc.
strength for future Chrysler contracts, and in the absence of that reality we cannot fault the district
court for excluding Hartzmark’s testimony.
Hartzmark builds his “price erosion” opinion on an even shakier foundation. According to
Hartzmark, Faurecia’s breach of the confidentiality agreement eroded Multimatic’s future profits on
Ford and GM contracts by eight percent. He derived this number from the same Multimatic quote
as his incumbency-benefit calculation as well as May 2005 quotes from Brown and other suppliers.
His opinion also assumed, relying on Multimatic’s say-so, that Multimatic provides 2.15 million
cross-car beams annually to Ford and GM and that Multimatic would continue to do so through
2016. Experts may not assume facts without some support for those assumptions in their expert
report or elsewhere in the record. See McClean, 224 F.3d at 801.
Beyond being speculative, Hartzmark’s lost profit calculations fall short of the level of rigor
professional economists normally exercise. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. We doubt—and
Multimatic introduced no evidence to the contrary—that an economic projection ten years into the
future would be well-received by professional economists if no historical data backed up the
projection and the economist made no effort to test his model against historical data to confirm its
predictive power. Hartzmark’s price erosion calculation also never attempts to identify or control
for factors beyond the disclosure of Multimatic’s designs that might account for the possibility that
competitors might submit lower bids. (Some of the bidders, for example, were able to obtain steel
at lower prices.)
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys. USA, Inc.
Multimatic bears some of the blame for Hartzmark’s problematic analysis. He asked for
historical data, but Multimatic refused to provide it, likely because the company did not want to
disclose it during discovery. District courts do not abuse their discretion, however, when they
exclude expert testimony whose flaws stem in part from the expert’s efforts to do the best job he
could with the limited data his client would provide.
Multimatic responds that price erosion is a well-accepted economic principle and that
weaknesses in Hartzmark’s opinion go to weight, not admissibility. But the question at hand is the
reliability of Hartzmark’s application of price erosion principles, not the reliability of price erosion
as an economic principle. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. Perceived flaws in an expert’s
opinion go to weight only if they fall within the accepted norms of the discipline and have a non-
speculative basis in fact. See McClean, 224 F.3d at 800–01. Not so here.
V.
For these reasons, we affirm.
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The record before this Court indicates that Defendant,
Faurecia Interior Systems, Inc. (“Faurecia”), has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding
Plaintiff’s, Multimatic, Inc.’s (“Multimatic”), claim that Faurecia breached a confidentiality
agreement between the parties. The record reflects both that the terms of the confidentiality
agreement were sufficiently ambiguous that the district court should have considered extrinsic
evidence in support of Faurecia’s interpretation, and that Multimatic may not have had exclusive
ownership of the intellectual property rights to the designs at issue. I would therefore vacate the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to Multimatic on Count I. Because the court’s summary
judgment ruling as to liability directly affected the scope of issues set down for trial, and thus
improperly narrowed the evidence and questions put to the jury, I would also vacate district court’s
procedural rulings, including the procedural rulings that are the basis for Multimatic’s cross-appeal,
as well as the court’s judgment awarding damages to Multimatic.
I.
Because this case turns primarily on whether there are genuine factual disputes and because
the majority’s recounting of the facts is lacking in some respects, the following factual summary is
presented to frame the discussion. DaimlerChrysler (“DCX” or “Chrysler”)—which is not a party
in this action—contracted with Faurecia to develop and supply the instrument panel for its JS-41
product line, which included DCX’s Sebring, Stratus, and Avenger vehicle lines. Faurecia
subcontracted the design and manufacture of the frame component of the instrument panel assembly,
known as the cross-car beam (“CCB”). One of the companies to which Faurecia considered
subcontracting the design and manufacture of the CCB was Multimatic.
Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
In February 2004, Faurecia and Multimatic executed a Confidentiality Agreement. (ROA
at 236-37.) The confidentiality agreement recognizes that each of the parties
possesses proprietary confidential information pertaining to its business and
customers and possess technical information relating to its products, designs and
services, including compositions, raw materials, formulations, additives, components,
production processes, plant layout, engineering concepts and designs, analysis
models and results, know-how, and other intellectual or industrial property, which
is generally not available to the public (all of such information being herein referred
to as “Sensitive Information”).
(ROA at 236 (emphasis added).) The confidentiality agreement also provides that:
Sensitive Information excludes any information that is in the public domain at the
time of disclosure, any information that has been made available to the receiving
party by third parties not acting on the disclosing party’s behalf and not breaching a
confidentiality obligation to the disclosing party and any information that the
receiving party can establish by documentary evidence was in its possession at the
time of disclosure by the disclosing party.
(ROA at 236.) In addition, the confidentiality agreement states that “[t]he receiving party agrees that
it will use the Sensitive Information of the disclosing party only in connection with the Instrument
Panel Structural Assembly Arrangement and that it will not directly or indirectly otherwise use or
exploit the Sensitive Information of the disclosing party.” (ROA at 236.)
After entering into this agreement, Multimatic worked to develop CCB designs and
prototypes for Faurecia. In April 2004, Multimatic submitted its initial design for the CCB.
Multimatic contends that this initial design iteration, as well as all other designs and prototypes
submitted to Faurecia after the parties entered into the confidentiality agreement, constituted
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
“Sensitive Information” as defined and protected by the confidentiality agreement. Along with its
designs, Multimatic also submitted an initial price quote of approximately $25 per unit, plus
approximately $2.8 million in tooling costs. As the negotiations progressed, Multimatic eventually
increased its estimated per-unit production price from $25 to $41, and increased its estimated tooling
costs to $5.2 million.
Apparently displeased with the price quotes it was receiving from Multimatic, Faurecia
conducted “market tests” to determine if Multimatic’s competitors could manufacture the CCB more
cheaply. As part of those market tests, Faurecia sent the CCB designs submitted by Multimatic to
other prospective suppliers. Faurecia shared Multimatic’s designs with multiple suppliers as part
of multiple rounds of market tests. The parties agree that Faurecia conducted these market tests
without Multimatic’s knowledge or consent.
After several months of negotiations and after Multimatic had submitted at least two CCB
designs to Faurecia, the parties executed a “Pre-Development Letter of Intent” (“LOI”) addressing
issues related to a potential supply agreement pertaining to the CCB. (ROA at 239-40.) The parties
dispute their intent in entering into the LOI. For its part, Multimatic contends that it had developed
an innovative new CCB design and insisted on a firm sourcing commitment before it submitted its
design to Faurecia. Faurecia contends that the LOI was merely an agreement to negotiate in good
faith. After the parties executed the LOI, Mutlimatic submitted its “Mass Savings Design” to
Faurecia.
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
Although Faurecia approved Multimatic’s Mass Saving Design “from an engineering
perspective” in December 2004, the parties continued to disagree over pricing issues. Negotiations
between Faurecia and Multimatic regarding manufacture and supply of the CCB continued until the
end of April 2005. During this time, Faurecia continued to conduct market tests with other
prospective suppliers, again circulating Multimatic’s designs—including the Mass Savings
Design—to at least three prospective suppliers.
After Faurecia obtained a lower price quote for the manufacture of the CCB from Brown
Corporation (“Brown”), Faurecia sought price concessions from Multimatic. When negotiations
with Multimatic failed, Faurecia awarded the JS-41 CCB supply contract to Brown. Faurecia
subsequently provided Brown with additional information submitted to Faurecia by Multimatic,
including “CAD designs, CAE models and analysis, Multimatic’s Design Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis, its Design Verification Plan & Report, and a prototype crossbeam manufactured by
Multimatic.” (ROA at 1508.)
Shortly thereafter, in May 2005, Multimatic filed this action alleging that Faurecia breached
the confidentiality agreement by sharing Multimatic’s designs and other purportedly proprietary
information with other suppliers. Multimatic also alleged breach, anticipatory repudiation, and
specific performance related to the supply “contract” reached between the parties, alleging that
“Faurecia breached the contract by refusing to award the production contract to Multimatic and
quoting or sourcing the part to an alternative supplier.” (ROA at 230.) In response, Faurecia claims
that the confidentiality agreement did not preclude Faurecia from sharing Multimatic’s CCB designs
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
and prototypes with other possible suppliers, despite Multimatic’s demand for such assurances.
Faurecia also denies that the parties ever reached a contractual agreement regarding the production
and supply of the CCB.
II.
Faurecia claims that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of
Multimatic on Multimatic’s claim that Faurecia breached the confidentiality agreement by sharing
Multimatic’s CCB design and prototypes with other potential suppliers. Faurecia acknowledges that
the confidentiality agreement protects “proprietary” information that the parties possessed at the time
they entered into it, but contends that the confidentiality agreement does not address designs and
other information related to the JS-41 program that the parties generated after they executed it.
Faurecia contends that Multimatic did not have exclusive ownership of the designs because Faurecia
had contributed to the creation of the designs and had been billed by Multimatic for those designs.
Faurecia also contends that Multimatic repeatedly uploaded iterations of the its designs to Chrysler’s
information-sharing computer system, and, consequently, Multimatic has disclaimed its “proprietary”
rights to those designs.
As the majority also recognizes, the dispositive question is whether a “genuine fact as to any
material issue” exists with respect to Multimatic’s claim that Faurecia breached the confidentiality
agreement by sharing Multimatic’s designs and prototypes with other suppliers – i.e., whether the
district court properly granted summary judgment to Multimatic on liability. Certain facts are not
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
in dispute. Most importantly, Faurecia does not dispute that it shared Multimatic’s CCB design
iterations and other information with other suppliers in a series of “market tests” in 2004 and 2005.
Faurecia also does not dispute that Multimatic was unaware of these market tests. Instead, Faurecia
claims that summary judgment is improper because the terms of the confidentiality agreement do not
preclude disclosure of these particular designs because the confidentiality agreement does not cover
designs produced after the parties entered into the confidentiality agreement. Alternatively, Faurecia
argues that the designs were not exclusively owned by Multimatic and so would not fall under the
confidentiality agreement even if it did cover later-developed designs. The majority’s conclusory
findings in favor of Multimatic on both issues are ultimately unsatisfactory because the question of
liability should have gone to trial.
Under Michigan law, where the terms of a contract are unambiguous, determining its
meaning is a question of law to be resolved by the court. See G & A, Inc v. Nahra, 514 N.W.2d 255,
256 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (“If a contract’s language is clear, its construction is a question of law
for the court.”). In construing the meaning and scope of contract terms, “[c]ontractual language is
given its ordinary and plain meaning, and technical and constrained constructions are avoided.” Id.
Michigan law also makes clear, however, that “the main goal in the interpretation of contracts is to
honor the intent of the parties.” Mahnick v. Bell Co., 662 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
Therefore, “[i]f a contract is subject to two interpretations, factual development is necessary to
determine the intent of the parties and summary disposition is inappropriate.” Id. at 833.
There is no doubt that the confidentiality agreement precludes the parties from sharing
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
“Sensitive Information,” which expressly includes “engineering concepts and designs.” Faurecia
contends, however, that this provision is worded in the present tense inasmuch as it refers to
proprietary information that each party “possesses” at the time and thus the confidentiality
agreement, when properly construed, relates only to “background information,” that is, information
already possessed by the parties on the date that the parties executed the confidentiality agreement.
On Faurecia’s suggested reading, the confidentiality agreement does not preclude the parties from
sharing “foreground information,” that is, designs related to the JS-41 program that the parties
created while operating under the agreement. Although Faurecia’s suggestion that the confidentiality
agreement unambiguously relates only to “background information” is not particularly convincing,
the terms of the Confidentiality agreement are sufficiently ambiguous to preclude summary judgment
in favor of Multimatic.
The confidentiality agreement does not expressly distinguish between “background” and
“foreground” information. Rather, the confidentiality agreement protects the parties’ “proprietary
confidential information,” including “engineering concepts and designs.” Although the
confidentiality agreement does not specifically include the limitation urged by Faurecia, neither does
its terms specify that its protections relate to all engineering designs. Although Faurecia may not
carry the day with its contention that the present-tense phrasing of the confidentiality agreement
makes this limitation clear, the phrasing is ambiguous.
Additionally, while the confidentiality agreement unequivocally includes “engineering
concepts and designs” within the reach of “Sensitive Information,” the scope of that protection is
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
limited to “proprietary” information. Therefore, if, as Faurecia contends, the JS-41 designs and
engineering plans at issue here were not the “proprietary” property of Multimatic, then those designs
would not be subject to the restrictions of the Confidentiality agreement.
The question then becomes whether the designs created by Multimatic for the JS-41 program
constitute “proprietary” information owned by Multimatic. Faurecia contends that it provided
substantial input to the designs, it was billed for the design work, and that Multimatic had no
intention of claiming ownership over the designs after production had begun. Taking Faurecia’s
claims as true, as this Court must at the summary judgment stage, these factors create a genuine issue
of material fact as to the “proprietary” status of Multimatic’s designs. The terms of the
confidentiality agreement simply do not address ownership of the CCB designs that were produced
after execution of the confidentiality agreement. Absent any such language, this Court cannot simply
read the answer to this question into the parties’ agreement, no matter what the majority sees fit to
do. See Leon v. Detroit Harvester Co., 109 N.W.2d 804, 811 (Mich. 1961) (“This Court may not
vary [a contract] nor read into it some provision that the parties did not see fit to incorporate.”).
This ambiguity also can be seen in other aspects of the confidentiality agreement, including
what Faurecia aptly describes as a “unilateral ‘clawback’ provision.” That provision states:
The receiving party shall immediately upon the request of the disclosing party return
to the disclosing party the Sensitive Information of the disclosing party and all copies
thereof that may have been or may be in the receiving party’s possession upon the
request of the disclosing party or upon termination of the agreement.
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
(ROA at 1085.) If the scope of the confidentiality agreement is given the broad reading that
Multimatic, and the majority, ascribes to it, then this provision would seem to grant Multimatic the
right to clawback any previously shared designs at any time, including information designed for
Faurecia and for which Faurecia already had been billed. According to Faurecia, “[i]f this clause is
read to apply to foreground technology, i.e., the design being developed for the JS41 program, then
the confidentiality agreement would be rendered illusory because either party could claw back the
design under development at any time.” (Faurecia Br. at 28 (citing Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak
Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000).)
This troubling implication of Multimatic’s suggested reading, which also leads the majority
astray, is heightened by the fact that the confidentiality agreement does not speak to whether the
parties could share or disclose the JS-41 designs after a supply and production contract had been
entered into. As a result, Multimatic’s reading of the confidentiality agreement would permit it to
withdraw its design plans at any time without regard for the fact that Faurecia already had paid
Multimatic for its design expenses and regardless of any reliance costs. Multimatic does not respond
to this particular argument, and the majority does not adequately address the concern. The clawback
provision thus renders the confidentiality agreement susceptible to alternative interpretations that
should have been resolved by a jury.
III.
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
Because the terms of the confidentiality agreement are ambiguous and susceptible to multiple
reasonable interpretations, the courts are obliged to give effect to the parties intentions at the time.
See Mahnick, 662 N.W.2d at 833 (“If the meaning of the language [of a contract] is unclear, the trier
of fact must determine the intent of the parties.”). “Where a contract provides little guidance in
interpreting a disputed term,” the courts “may properly look to . . . the standards and practices within
the relevant industry and to how the parties’ actions during the pendency of the agreement have
reflected an understanding of the term.” City of Wyandotte v. Conrail, 262 F.3d 581, 586 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Booth v. N. Am. Aluminum Corp., 423 F.2d 545, 547 (6th Cir.1970), and William C.
Roney & Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 674 F.2d 587, 590 (6th Cir. 1982)); see also Meagher v. Wayne State
Univ., 565 N.W.2d 401, 415 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (“Parol evidence . . . may be admissible to prove
the existence of an ambiguity and to clarify the meaning of an ambiguous contract.”) The district
court should have considered relevant information related to the parties’ understanding of whether
Multimatic’s designs in fact were proprietary given that Faurecia had input into the designs and the
work performed by Multimatic’s design team was billed to Faurecia. (See ROA at 1292, 1301-26.)
Under Michigan law, parol evidence is admissible not only to resolve an ambiguity, but also
to prove that a latent ambiguity exists in the contract when the language of the contract may appear
otherwise unambiguous. See City of Grosse Pointe Park v. Michigan Municipal Liability and
Property Pool, 702 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Mich.,2005) (“Because ‘the detection of a latent ambiguity
requires a consideration of factors outside the instrument itself, extrinsic evidence is obviously
admissible to prove the existence of the ambiguity, as well as to resolve any ambiguity proven to
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
exist.’”) (quoting McCarty v. Mercury Metalcraft Co., 127 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Mich. 1964)); see also
In re Kramek Estate, 710 N.W.2d 753, 758 (Mich.Ct. App. 2005). Extrinsic evidence has been used
to show that common contract terms that appear unambiguous were latently ambiguous because they
were intended to be given a slightly different meaning than they are typically given in the
commercial context. See Staniszewski v. Grand Rapids Packaging Corp., 336 N.W.2d 10, 11 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1983) (“full back pay” typically unambiguously refers to the industry standard 40-hour
work week but parol evidence indicated that the plaintiff’s usual 52-hour work week was intended).
In the instant case, the district court should have considered Faurecia’s contention that the term
“possesses” only referred to the present situation, a plausible use of the ordinary meaning of the
word, rather than to the future, as Multimatic argued and the majority concluded. Faurecia raises
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the intent of the parties was for the confidentiality
agreement to only cover background information, and whether the CCB designs were “proprietary”
under the terms of the agreement, regardless of the temporal scope of the agreement.
The majority claims to be convinced that record unequivocally demonstrates that “Multimatic
exclusively owned” the designs that Faurecia shared with Brown. (Maj. Op. at 8). From that
conclusion, the majority argues that Multimatic did not lose its copyright ownership simply by
uploading its designs to Chrysler’s VPN. If the majority were correct that the record is so clear as
to the ownership of the designs, then its dismissal of Faurecia’s argument regarding Multimatic’s
use of the VPN would be potentially convincing. However, since Faurecia has raised a genuine issue
of material fact as to the proprietary nature of the designs – shared input into the designs and billing
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Nos. 08-1332, 08-1420
Multimatic, Inc. v. Faurecia Interior Sys., Inc.
the costs of the designs to Faurecia are key pieces of evidence as to which company owned the
intellectual property rights to those designs that weigh in favor of Faurecia’s argument – the majority
seems to have missed the forest for the trees. Uploading the designs to the VPN would not impact
Multimatic’s copyright ownership if it were settled that Multimatic was indeed the copyright owner.
Because the record is not so clear, the question of ownership – i.e., whether the designs were
“proprietary” – should have gone to trial.
Because genuine issues of material fact exist, the district court should not have granted
summary judgment and the majority should not have upheld that ruling. See Mahnick, 662 N.W.2d
at 833 (“Because the contract is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, factual
development is necessary to determine the intent of the parties and summary disposition is
inappropriate.”).
I therefore respectfully dissent.
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