Taimi Megivern v. Glacier Hills Incorporated ( 2013 )


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  •             NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 13a0494n.06
    No. 12-1330                                   FILED
    May 16, 2013
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    TAIMI MEGIVERN,                                           )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                               )        ON APPEAL FROM THE
    )        UNITED STATES DISTRICT
    v.                                         )        COURT FOR THE EASTERN
    )        DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
    GLACIER HILLS INCORPORATED                                )
    )
    Defendant-Appellee.                                )
    )
    BEFORE: COOK, WHITE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
    HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge.                  Following the termination of her
    employment, Plaintiff-Appellant Taimi Megivern (“Megivern”) sued her former employer,
    Defendant-Appellee Glacier Hills, Inc. (“Glacier Hills”), alleging that her employment was
    unlawfully terminated on the basis of her pregnancy and that Glacier Hills interfered with
    benefits due her under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Employee
    Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Megivern appeals the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment to Glacier Hills on all of her claims. We AFFIRM.
    I.
    Megivern worked at Glacier Hills from August 14, 2007 until her employment was
    terminated on May 26, 2010. Glacier Hills is a non-profit senior-living facility in Ann Arbor,
    Michigan with approximately 500 employees, of whom approximately 90–95% are women.
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Megivern worked as a Recreational Therapy Programmer, and her duties included planning
    and supervising activities for Glacier Hills residents, completing resident assessments, and
    attending care conferences. On August 13, 2009, Megivern’s department changed names
    from the “Recreational Therapy Department” to the “Life Enrichment Department,” and
    Megivern’s title was changed to “Life Enrichment Coordinator” (“LEC”). As a LEC,
    Megivern’s responsibilities remained substantially the same, but instead of working to
    coordinate resident activities for the entire Care and Rehabilitation Center, she was assigned
    a specific unit.
    Megivern received her first performance evaluation on February 21, 2008. Her
    supervisor at the time, Marcia Kirk (“Kirk”), rated her as “meets standards” in all categories
    of the evaluation with the exception of two categories related to Megivern’s interactions with
    residents where Kirk rated her as “consistently exceeds standards” and “far exceeds
    standards.” Megivern received positive comments from Kirk such as, “Taimi is very giving
    to the residents,” and “[d]ocumentation with assessments . . . is excellent.”
    Megivern’s next performance evaluation was completed on June 4, 2009. Although
    Megivern continued to receive a “meets standards” evaluation in most categories, she
    received a “partially meets minimum standards” under “positive ambassador” to co-workers.
    Kirk noted that “Taimi is influenced by others and allows peer pressure to create negative
    attitudes tow[a]rds co-workers. When Taimi’s attitude becomes negative it impacts her
    relationships with her co-workers and supervisor,” and listed “remove personal feelings and
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    attitudes towards co-workers when working as a team player” as a goal for Megivern in the
    upcoming year. The remainder of Kirk’s comments were positive, expressing that “Taimi
    is an asset to the Recreational Therapy Department” with “excellent skills for planning” and
    “creative” ideas.
    Megivern did not agree with Kirk’s evaluation, and wrote responses in many of the
    evaluation categories. For example, in the box marked “Provides a caring, respectful
    environment,” Megivern wrote “It is sometimes difficult in a non-harmonious atmosphere.”
    Megivern spoke to her co-workers about her evaluation and asked them for their impression
    of her performance, “kind of” hoping to prove Kirk wrong. Megivern met with Kirk to
    discuss the evaluation and described the meeting as “like a little storm” that “wasn’t
    necessarily a happy [discussion].” Megivern also wrote her own evaluation and sent it
    directly to Ray Rabidoux, CEO of Glacier Hills, Gerie Greenspan, Director of Advancement,
    and Kim Thompson (“Thompson”), Executive Director of the Care and Rehabilitation
    Center.
    In August 2009, Glacier Hills removed Kirk as Megivern’s supervisor and replaced
    her with Stacy Kudlak (“Kudlak”). At her deposition, Kudlak testified that Thompson hired
    her because she was dissatisfied with the department, and told Kudlak that she would
    “probably have to get rid of the whole department.” Kudlak elaborated that although this
    was Thompson’s expectation for the department, Kudlak wanted to give each of the
    employees a chance.
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    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    As part of the departmental change, Megivern was moved to the “Two South” unit
    where she was responsible for 45 residents. This was the largest unit, and Megivern had
    more resident assessments to complete than any other employee. Glacier Hills required that
    LECs complete state-mandated resident assessments within two to three days of the
    resident’s admission into the facility. These resident assessments covered the resident’s
    interests, personal history, and hobbies, and LECs used them to complete a care plan for each
    resident. The time it took to complete an assessment varied from half an hour to slightly
    more than an hour, depending on the resident. LECs were also responsible for running two
    group activities for their residents each day, and for recording which residents participated
    in the activities.
    Megivern began having trouble with her job as soon as she moved to the Two South
    unit. She felt that she could not complete all of her work each day, had blisters on her toes
    from walking, and fell behind in completing her assessments. Megivern testified that other
    LECs felt that they did not have enough time to complete the assessments. She disagreed
    with Kudlak’s management approach, considered herself more qualified to manage the
    department, and began keeping a “log” of Kudlak’s practices that she found objectionable.
    Kudlak was dissatisfied with Megivern’s performance as well. Kudlak testified that
    Megivern “moped around,” did not have much “purpose to her step,” “took lots of smoke
    breaks,” was “lazy,” avoided accountability for her actions, and could be argumentative.
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Shortly after she started working in the Two South unit, Megivern told Kudlak that
    her workload was unmanageable. On October 23, 2009, Kudlak emailed Megivern to remind
    her to enter each resident’s activities into the computer because she noticed that one of
    Megivern’s residents was never entered. Megivern apologized and expressed that she
    constantly felt behind in her work, writing: “I am only one human and sometimes it feels
    like I would need 10 or 11 hours in a day in order to feel like I’m ‘on top of things.’”
    Megivern asked Kudlak if it was possible to hire two new LECs in order to more evenly
    distribute the workload. Kudlak responded by offering Megivern five hours of overtime each
    week until the department was fully staffed. Kudlak asked Megivern how many assessments
    she was completing each week and told Megivern that “I don’t want you to feel overwhelmed
    and am open to working together to solve the issue.” She suggested that Megivern prioritize
    her daily resident activities first, with assessments coming second, and all other activities as
    a last priority. Kudlak expressed a willingness for future communication: “Let’s just keep
    the lines of communication open and do our best. I appreciate ALL of your efforts, and I
    know the resident[s] do too.”
    In mid-October 2009, Kudlak began requiring the LECs to send daily emails
    reporting the number of participants in each of their activities. Megivern followed this
    directive for awhile, but came to believe that she was the only one sending daily reports to
    Kudlak. She decided to stop sending her numbers to Kudlak and wrote her an email
    declaring her intent. Kudlak never replied to Megivern’s email, but on November 11, 2009,
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    wrote Megivern to express her discontent with the resident participation level for Megivern’s
    activities. Kudlak directed Megivern to schedule two specific resident events, and gave her
    instructions to “help . . . with ideas.” Kudlak told Megivern that obtaining resident
    participation was “all about approach, planning and energy” and told her to “[s]ee me if you
    need tips.”
    Kudlak conducted an audit of each LEC’s assessments and held a team meeting with
    the LECs on February 11, 2010. At this meeting, Kudlak told each team member areas that
    they needed to change or correct. Kudlak testified that Megivern was not the only LEC with
    deficiencies in her paperwork, and it was a “common occurrence” to find incomplete care
    plans for other LECs. She instructed Megivern to complete a new assessment and care plan
    for a resident who had not had a new care plan since 2006, however, Megivern did not
    complete this new care plan as directed.
    On February 22, 2010, Megivern applied for a transfer within Glacier Hills to a
    position as a “Resident Centered Care Program Manager.” Megivern asked Kudlak to
    complete a section of the application that called for supervisor comments on Megivern’s job
    performance. Kudlak wrote: “Taimi’s job performance is average. During her work day she
    presents as sullen and unenthusiastic. Her attendance is good. I hear positive responses from
    residents about her interactions with them.” Megivern’s application was rejected.
    Megivern sent Kudlak an email on April 3, 2010 expressing dissatisfaction with her
    pay and holiday schedule. Megivern told Kudlak that she was scheduled to work four
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    holidays over the upcoming year, and that many other employees were only working two
    holidays. She further told Kudlak that given her seniority at Glacier Hills, it was not fair for
    her to work more holidays than other employees. Megivern told Kudlak that she had heard
    from a departing employee that the employee was paid more than Megivern. Megivern asked
    Kudlak to “assure” her that “everyone in our department is paid equitably and fairly,
    considering their amount of time here.”
    On April 2, 2010, Megivern learned that she was pregnant and announced the news
    to her coworkers on April 5, 2010. Megivern testified that Kudlak was present when she
    announced the news of her pregnancy, but Kudlak claims that she learned about Megivern’s
    pregnancy from another LEC shortly after Megivern announced her news. Everyone
    congratulated Megivern, and when she discussed her pregnancy with Kudlak, Kudlak
    congratulated her, gave her a hug, and told Megivern stories about her own pregnancies and
    the difficulties that she had. Megivern testified that Kudlak seemed happy and expressed
    excitement on the surface, but that in hindsight she believes that Kudlak was unhappy and
    foresaw Megivern’s upcoming absence as a “big burden.” Megivern does not recall ever
    telling Thompson about her pregnancy in person or over the phone. At some point
    Thompson learned of the pregnancy from Kudlak, but never discussed Megivern’s pregnancy
    with her because she does not “do that for any employee.” Megivern learned that she was
    pregnant with twins and told Kudlak on April 27, 2010. Kudlak responded, “TWINS! That
    is so exciting!” and communicated the news to Thompson in early May.
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Megivern left for vacation from April 7 to April 15, 2010. During this time, Kudlak
    took over Megivern’s responsibilities and noticed that Megivern had not completed certain
    tasks. Kudlak audited Megivern’s charts and discovered numerous errors, prompting her to
    talk with Thompson about the issue and send Megivern an email on April 13 outlining her
    concerns. Kudlak listed the following problems: (1) there was no assessment or care plan
    for four residents, (2) the care plan and assessment that Kudlak had requested in February
    had not been completed, (3) there was no quarterly progress note for one long-term resident,
    and (4) there was no system in place for notifying Megivern when a long-term resident’s
    quarterly reports were due. Kudlak expressed frustration that Megivern had not followed
    through with the directive she had given her in February, writing: “I noted that this needed
    to be done on February 11th at the team meeting. What happened with this? I count on you
    to follow through with job responsibilities I outline. I normally don’t check to assure things
    I ask for are completed but from now on, please just give me a copy so that I know follow
    through has been completed.” Two days later, Kudlak responded to Megivern’s questions
    about pay and holidays, suggesting they meet to discuss Megivern’s concerns.
    Megivern responded to both emails on April 15. Megivern began her email by noting
    that she was “trying to catch up on lots of paperwork” and expressing that she would prefer
    if Kudlak would only correspond with her via email because she did not “feel like I have
    ANY spare time to discuss those things.” Megivern explained that she had completed some
    of the tasks Kudlak mentioned in her email and that for others, circumstances beyond her
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    control (such as the health of a resident) made completing the assessment an impossibility.
    She conceded that she made a mistake on the chart from February by “not doing it exactly
    how you wanted,” but explained: “Sometimes, when information is given to us a while ago
    and I haven’t had reason to use it very often . . . it falls in the cracks.” Megivern cautioned
    that “with fewer hours than ever, *mistakes are bound to happen*.” (emphasis in
    original). She further conceded that she had not given any thought to instituting a reminder
    system for long-term residents, but explained:
    It may take me some time to figure out a good system, and frankly, I don’t
    feel often that I have *time* to think about these things!! . . . please know
    that if everything takes priority (especially after just getting back and having
    a lot to catch up on), some things will naturally take the back burner until I
    can find the time.
    (emphasis in original). Megivern sent a second email to Kudlak on April 16 re-emphasizing
    that she preferred to be communicated with by email “so that there is no misunderstanding
    later about what was communicated.”
    On April 19, 2010, Kudlak met with Megivern, issued her a written “Employee
    Warning Notice,” and placed her on a “Performance Improvement Plan” (“PIP”). The
    warning notice specified “Inadequate Job Performance” as its motivating reason, and noted
    that an audit of Megivern’s charts on April 15, 2010 revealed a 70% paperwork completion
    percentage. Kudlak further noted that Megivern’s paperwork was “out of compliance with
    State guidelines” and that Megivern had made “no attempt to complete [a certain assessment]
    at all,” despite Megivern’s assertions to the contrary.
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    The PIP specified three job duties that Megivern “performed below acceptable
    standard[s]:”   “Completion of Initial Recreation History and Assessment Forms,”
    “Completion of Recreation and Assessment Forms and [C]are [P]lans on an [A]nnual
    [B]asis”, and “Care Plans.” The PIP advised that “an average of 2 assessment[s] must be
    completed each work day. When you are not running a scheduled activity, your next priority
    should be your paperwork.” Further, the PIP directed Megivern to “Watch number of breaks
    (each employee is to have 2 15 minute breaks per day), and to “watch time spent talking with
    colleagues.” Kudlak instituted the PIP for one month, during which time Megivern would
    meet with Kudlak weekly to discuss her progress.
    Kudlak’s notes from this meeting reflect that Megivern raised other issues. Megivern
    voiced her concerns about working on holidays and whether she was being paid a fair wage
    for her work. Kudlak responded by referring her to human resources and reviewing the
    coming year’s schedule to ensure that Megivern was not working more holidays than other
    employees. Megivern raised other concerns with Kudlak, including that volunteers in the
    department took up too much of her time, that Megivern was “running” all the time and had
    a blister on her toe, and that she did not have enough time to complete her daily tasks.
    Megivern told Kudlak that she had been keeping “extensive notes” on Kudlak’s behavior and
    threatened to share them with Ray Rabidoux, the CEO of Glacier Hills. Megivern told
    Kudlak that she was more qualified than Kudlak and that she should have been hired for
    Kudlak’s job.
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Megivern wrote an employee’s statement responding to her written warning and sent
    this statement to human resources on April 19, 2010. She expressed the view that Kudlak’s
    warning was “retaliation against me for daring to speak my mind to her.” Megivern wrote
    that Kudlak ignored her frequent protestations that the workload was too much, and that
    many other LECs were also behind on their paperwork. Megivern disputed Kudlak’s
    assertions that certain assessments were missing from residents’ files and reiterated that
    “mistakes are bound to happen.” She argued that:
    A simple verbal warning would have sufficed in this situation, but it seems
    that every little mistake is needed in order to make me look like a bad
    employee. . . . Stacy’s goal is clearly to fire me, and she is looking for every
    available opportunity to do so, and it’s frankly unfair. . . . The Human
    Resources Department should expect to see more about me from Stacy, I am
    sure, as she spends valuable company time micro-managing me and seeking
    out any and every opportunity to make me look like a substandard employee.
    I urge Human Resources to take note of such people, as they are not good for
    the organization’s morale.
    The following day, Megivern wrote a lengthy email to Thompson raising similar
    complaints. After noting that she understood that Kudlak and Thompson were “connected
    . . . on a personal level,” Megivern continued:
    Though you have not bothered to ask me how things are going under
    [Kudlak’s] direction (after promising our department we would “love” her),
    I feel the time has come for me to highlight only a few (of many) issues that
    I have witnessed under her leadership. I have been keeping ongoing notes
    about her performance as Life Enrichment Manager over the past several
    months, with the assumption that it would be passed along to you at some
    point.
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Megivern repeated her understanding that Kudlak was retaliating against her for complaining
    about Kudlak’s management style and performance. The email is divided into sections
    addressing the following areas of concern: “Lack of concern for residents and family,”
    “Budget,” “Professionalism,” “Scheduling,” “Fairness,” and “Incompetency.” For example,
    Megivern raised concerns regarding Kudlak’s professional skills:
    Her written skills are questionable. For time’s sake, I will not try to quote her
    here, but I have saved emails which show that she lacks basic understanding
    of the English language. Examples would include putting a question mark
    where a period belongs and vice-versa, not to mention basic spelling errors.
    Given that it can be hard to believe that somebody lacking such basic written
    skills could make it through graduate school, Stacy’s credentials should be
    posted for all to see and read.
    Megivern “evaluate[d]” Kudlak as a “very poor manager” and, although she thanked
    Thompson for taking the time to read her concerns, she noted again that Thompson was
    likely to sympathize with Kudlak given their close relationship. Megivern ended her email
    by requesting that Thompson only respond via email for two reasons: (1) Megivern is very
    busy at work, and (2) email leaves no room for miscommunication. Megivern noted that she
    made this same request to Kudlak, but that Kudlak did not honor the request.
    Kudlak held her first progress meeting with Megivern on April 26, 2010. Kudlak’s
    notes reflect that Megivern still had not updated a resident’s progress notes as asked of her
    at the February 11, 2010 meeting and as reflected in Megivern’s PIP. Megivern responded
    that she “really didn’t have time to review the PIP.” When Kudlak found numerous “holes”
    in two residents’ paperwork, Megivern responded that “things fall through the cracks.”
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    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Megivern and Kudlak met again on May 3, 2010. Kudlak noted that Megivern was
    three assessments behind and had failed to complete an annual assessment that was due on
    March 4, 2010. Megivern responded that she did not have enough time to complete the
    assessments. Kudlak also discussed new job responsibilities that Megivern would have to
    take on because of another LEC’s departure. Megivern responded that she would “do her
    best” but that “time is a factor.” Kudlak reminded Megivern that on May 1, she had
    decreased Megivern’s responsibility for daily resident activities to one per day, and that this
    should give her additional time to catch-up on her work.
    Kudlak’s next meeting with Megivern was May 11, 2010. Megivern was now eleven
    assessments behind schedule. Megivern gave Kudlak an assessment and care plan for a
    resident, but Kudlak returned it to Megivern because she had not drafted a new plan as
    required, rather she had updated an old plan from 2006. Megivern announced that her due
    date was November 18, 2010 and that she would not be able to work on Thanksgiving.
    Kudlak responded that she would reschedule Megivern accordingly. Kudlak believed that
    Megivern had not successfully completed the PIP, but had not made a decision regarding
    whether to terminate her at this point.
    During the May 11 meeting, Megivern asked about disability and FMLA benefits, and
    Kudlak referred her to human resources. The next day, Kudlak emailed Thompson and Kim
    Cybart, a manager in the human resources department, to tell them that she offered to
    increase Megivern’s hours and that Megivern responded, “Well, it depends on my energy,
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    it takes all I can to get here every day but I’ll do my best.” Cybart replied to Kudlak and
    Thompson:
    We may need to suggest she start using FMLA if she can’t meet the full-time
    schedule. If she comes back to you and says she ‘doesn’t have the energy to
    work 80 hours,’ let me know. We may have her meet with HR to discuss
    FMLA and how it will be applied to her schedule.
    On May 13, 2010, Megivern met with Trisha Schauer, a human resources
    representative, to discuss short-term disability benefits and her FMLA rights. Megivern
    asked Schauer about short-term disability benefits and FMLA leave and told Schauer that she
    was pregnant with twins and would need to utilize maternity leave at some point in the
    future. Megivern testified that she was investigating what her options were and “was putting
    my feelers out . . . to try to plan.” Megivern did not specifically request to use her FMLA
    benefits or identify a date on which she wanted to start her leave. Schauer testified that her
    meeting with Megivern was informational in nature and that she did not anticipate Megivern
    taking leave until a “very futuristic date . . . five, six, seven months down the road.”
    The next day, Thompson approached Megivern and told her that she needed to see
    her. Thompson testified that she wanted to talk with Megivern about her PIP, the email that
    Megivern sent following her warning, and how Megivern felt about her progress. Megivern
    and Thompson scheduled a meeting for after lunch; however, after thinking about her
    schedule, Megivern emailed Thompson to tell her that she was too busy to meet. Megivern
    also reiterated her preference for email communication:
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    Kim,
    After giving it a second thought, I will not be able to meet with you this
    afternoon as you had requested today. You may recall that I had mentioned
    in my previous email that I would prefer to keep our dialogue email-based
    because I am extremely busy trying to keep up with my workload and it
    leaves no room for miscommunication. Also, Two South is a large unit, and
    it takes me quite some time to bring the Activity Cart around. I am worried
    that I would not have time for a break, which is crucial to me given that I am
    pregnant with twins and need to eat frequently and cannot bypass my breaks
    as I have often done in the past.
    I look forward to communicating with you on email, preferably my home
    email address, so that we are not infringing upon valuable work time[.]
    Thompson did not consider this an acceptable response and went looking for Megivern to
    discuss the email. Thompson claims that she was told that Megivern was on her smoke
    break. Thompson waited for her to return, but she did not do so. When Thompson asked
    Kudlak where Megivern was, Kudlak looked at the time clock and saw that Megivern had
    gone on her lunch break despite the fact that she had an activity scheduled at that time. At
    this point, Thompson decided to suspend Megivern for insubordination for a week with pay,
    pending an investigation.
    Megivern disputes that she missed a scheduled activity in order to take a lunch break.
    She claims that she had to postpone the activity to take her lunch break, that she informed
    Kudlak of this, and that she conducted the activity immediately following her break. Further,
    she contends that she could not have been on a smoking break when Thompson came looking
    for her because she did not smoke while she was pregnant.
    Thompson directed Kudlak to conduct a full investigation. Thompson testified:
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    I was aware that she was pregnant . . . I don’t take ever letting an employee
    go lightly, they all have families to take care of, so I wanted to make sure that
    if this was the decision we were making, it was the right one based on the
    facts and the evidence and nothing else.
    When asked by Kudlak whether Megivern could be fired given that she was pregnant,
    Thompson replied: “Everyone is held to the same standard regardless of their condition, so
    you just need to treat her and any other employee just as they’re an employee, regardless, so
    it shouldn’t matter whether she’s pregnant or not, do not let that prevent you from doing your
    job.” The investigation revealed that five assessments had not been completed at all; eleven
    of thirteen assessments were not completed within three days of the resident’s admission;
    Megivern had not visited a certain resident who required one-on-one visits three times a
    week as specified in her care plan; May attendance logs contained no documentation of any
    family visits to residents; and that Megivern was using volunteers to compile records of
    family visits. The report also discussed Megivern’s “insubordination issues with direct
    supervisor [Kudlak] and Executive Director of the Care and Rehabilitation Center
    [Thompson],” noting that Megivern refused to meet in person to discuss any issue and
    insisted that all communication be done in writing.
    Glacier Hills terminated Megivern’s employment on May 26, 2010. Thompson
    prepared and signed a termination notice, specifying the reason for termination as
    “performance,” elaborating, “Employee placed on performance improvement plan 4/19/2010.
    Her performance did not improve to satisfactory status.” Megivern’s termination notice
    included a performance evaluation. Megivern was rated “unsatisfactory” in the following
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    categories: quality of work, quantity of work, promptness in completing assignments,
    attitude, acceptance of responsibility, and initiative. Thompson noted that Megivern “resisted
    or failed each of the significant components of the [PIP].” Thompson testified that
    Megivern’s employment was terminated because of her performance, not her
    insubordination, but that the “entire picture of her prior work experience,” including her
    adversarial behavior, was considered as part of the decision to fire her.
    II.
    Megivern filed an amended complaint against Glacier Hills on September 22, 2011,
    alleging FMLA interference, ERISA interference, and sex discrimination on the basis of
    pregnancy under Title VII, Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), and Ann
    Arbor’s City Code. Glacier Hills moved for summary judgment on October 7, 2011, and on
    October 11, 2011, Megivern filed a motion to compel Glacier Hills to produce “any
    performance evaluations, discipline, warnings, performance improvement plans, exit
    interviews, or termination notices for any person who requested leave or became pregnant
    during the time Kim Thompson was Director.” After a conference with the district court,
    Glacier Hills agreed to produce limited responsive discovery and the motion was terminated
    as moot. Megivern renewed her motion to compel on January 9, 2012, arguing that the
    materials received from Glacier Hills warranted full compliance with her original motion to
    compel. The district court granted summary judgment to Glacier Hills on all counts of
    Megivern’s complaint and denied Megivern’s motion to compel. Megivern timely appealed.
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    III.
    A. Standard of Review
    A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Risch v. Royal
    Oak Police Dept., 
    581 F.3d 383
    , 390 (6th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate
    where the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
    the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When
    reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view all facts and inferences in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
    
    475 U.S. 574
    , 587 (1986).
    B. Single-Motive Discrimination
    Megivern alleges that Glacier Hills discriminated against her on the basis of her sex
    under Title VII, the ELCRA, and the Ann Arbor City Code by terminating her because of her
    pregnancy. Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
    discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
    Sex discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 42
    U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The ELCRA provides similar protections, see 
    Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.2202
    ; 37.2201(d), and ELCRA claims are analyzed in the same manner as an analogous
    Title VII claim. See Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 
    344 F.3d 603
    , 614 n.4 (6th Cir.
    2003). The Code of the City of Ann Arbor provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate in
    employment . . . or termination of employment of any person.” Ann Arbor, Mich., Code ch.
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    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    112, § 9:151. The Code defines “discriminate” to include “mak[ing] a decision . . . on the
    actual or perceived . . . sex . . . [or] condition of pregnancy . . . of another person.” Id. at
    § 9:151(4). The Code further allows individuals to bring a civil action for injunctive relief
    and damages against any individuals who have violated these provisions. Id. at § 9:164. The
    parties have analyzed the discrimination claim under the Ann Arbor City Code under the
    same framework as Title VII.
    In order to survive summary judgment on a sex discrimination claim:
    First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the
    evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff
    succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
    ‘to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s
    rejection.’ Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must
    then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
    legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were
    a pretext for discrimination.
    Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 
    450 U.S. 248
    , 252–53 (1981) (citing McDonnell
    Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802 (1973)).
    1. Prima facie case
    In order to state a prima facie case for pregnancy discrimination, Megivern “must
    show that (1) she was pregnant, (2) she was qualified for her job, (3) she was subjected to
    an adverse employment decision, and (4) there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the
    adverse employment decision.” Asmo v. Keane, Inc., 
    471 F.3d 588
    , 592 (6th Cir. 2006)
    (citing Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 
    206 F.3d 651
    , 658 (6th Cir. 2000)) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Glacier Hills does not contest the first three elements of this test,
    - 19 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    but argues that Megivern is unable to establish a nexus between her pregnancy and her
    termination.
    Citing Asmo, the district court rejected this argument and found that Megivern’s
    announcement of her pregnancy in early April, 2010 was sufficiently close in time to her
    termination on May 26, 2010 to satisfy the nexus requirement. In Asmo, the defendant
    selected the plaintiff for lay-off within two months of learning that she was pregnant. Asmo,
    
    471 F.3d at 594
    . This court held that the temporal proximity between the announcement of
    the plaintiff’s pregnancy and her termination was sufficient to establish a nexus between the
    two events for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case. 
    Id. at 594
    . Megivern was
    terminated less than two months after announcing her pregnancy to her co-workers. Thus,
    the district court did not err in concluding that Megivern stated a prima facie case of
    pregnancy discrimination.
    2. Legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination
    Megivern argues that Glacier Hills has not articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for
    her termination. The district court did not consider whether Glacier Hills offered a
    legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination, as it found that Megivern did not
    dispute that Glacier Hills terminated her employment because of her performance.
    On appeal, Megivern argues that Glacier Hills never clearly articulated its reasons for
    her termination. The termination notice prepared by Thompson lists “Performance” as a
    “Reason Code” for Megivern’s termination. Thompson described the events resulting in
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    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Megivern’s termination: “Employee placed on performance improvement plan 4/19/2010.
    Her performance did not improve to satisfactory status.” The second page of the notice
    provides a performance evaluation at the time of termination. Thompson rated Megivern’s
    performance as “unsatisfactory” in the following areas: (1) quality of work, (2) quantity of
    work, (3) promptness in completing assignments, (3) attitude, (4) acceptance of
    responsibility, and (5) initiative. Thompson further noted that Megivern “resisted or failed
    each of the significant components of the [PIP].” Megivern does not dispute that these
    comments comprised part of her termination notice; rather, she points to testimony by
    Thompson that Megivern was fired solely for performance issues, and suspended solely for
    insubordination. However, this assertion requires a selective reading of the facts; Thompson
    also discussed numerous issues with Megivern and testified that these issues were part of the
    “entire picture of her prior work” that resulted in Megivern’s termination. Further, the
    termination notice indicates that Megivern’s “performance” was partly based on the quality
    and quantity of her work, but also based on factors such as attitude, acceptance of
    responsibility, and initiative. Thus, Megivern is incorrect in arguing that Glacier Hills failed
    to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination.
    3. Pretext
    Pretext may be demonstrated if “the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did
    not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant
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    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    the challenged conduct.” Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 
    231 F.3d 1016
    , 1021 (6th Cir. 2000). At
    all times, “[t]he plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.” Burdine, 
    450 U.S. at 256
    .
    Megivern argues that she has shown Glacier Hills’s proffered reasons for terminating
    her employment were pretextual because: (1) Glacier Hills shifted its rationale for
    terminating Megivern, (2) the temporal proximity of Megivern’s pregnancy to her
    termination weighs in favor of finding pretext, (3) Thompson did not congratulate Megivern
    on her pregnancy, warranting an inference of discrimination, and (4) pattern or practice
    evidence suggests a pattern of discrimination based on pregnancy at Glacier Hills.
    a. Whether Glacier Hills employed shifting rationales for Megivern’s
    termination.
    “An employer’s changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can
    be evidence of pretext.” Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 
    90 F.3d 1160
    , 1167 (6th Cir.
    1996). “Shifting justifications over time calls the credibility of those justifications into
    question.” Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 
    280 F.3d 579
    , 592 (6th Cir. 2002). When a
    plaintiff is able to show that the defendant’s justification for firing him changed over time,
    this can demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that the proffered reason for termination
    is not only false, but that the falsity is a pretext for discrimination. 
    Id.
    Megivern argues that Glacier Hills’s primary critique of Megivern’s performance was
    her failure to complete initial assessments on time. She points to her PIP as specifying three
    areas where she performed below acceptable standards: completion of initial recreation
    history and assessment forms, completion of recreation and assessment forms on an annual
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    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    basis, and care plans. Megivern further points to her affidavit as demonstrating that at the
    time of her termination, she was up-to-date on her long-term resident assessments and care
    plans. Megivern argues that she was not the only LEC who completed late initial
    assessments, yet she was the only LEC terminated for this reason. To the extent that Glacier
    Hills’s reason for termination extends beyond Megivern’s late assessments, Megivern argues
    that this is a shifting rationale that warrants a finding of pretext as Thompson testified that
    Megivern was terminated for “performance.” Further, Megivern argues that Kudlak testified
    that she believed the decision to terminate Megivern was caused by Megivern’s refusal to
    meet with Thompson—not Megivern’s late assessments.
    Glacier Hills responds that its reasons for terminating Megivern have consistently
    remained the same: Megivern was terminated in part because of her failure to complete her
    work on time, and in part because of her poor attitude and behavior, and all of these reasons
    are reflected in Megivern’s termination notice. Further, Glacier Hills argues that although
    it is true that Thompson testified that Megivern was terminated for performance reasons, she
    also testified that Megivern’s work history and previous argumentative behavior were taken
    into account as part of the decision to fire her.
    The district court determined that Megivern was unable to show pretext on the
    asserted grounds. The court noted that the termination notice specified numerous reasons
    for Megivern’s termination and that Thompson elaborated on all of the ways that Megivern’s
    performance fell short of Glacier Hills’s expectations.
    - 23 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    In contrast to the cases relied on by Megivern,1 the rationale given for terminating
    Megivern’s employment was clearly articulated in the termination notice prepared by
    Thompson and has remained the same since.             Megivern’s termination notice notes
    “unsatisfactory” performance in several areas, including attitude, acceptance of
    responsibility, and initiative. Thompson elaborated at her deposition that Megivern’s entire
    work history was taken into account when determining whether to terminate her, and she
    pointed to Megivern’s argumentative past as part of that decision. Further, the report
    prepared as part of the investigation into Megivern’s performance indicates that
    insubordination issues were taken into account as part of her pre-termination evaluation.
    Megivern has failed to show that Glacier Hills employed shifting rationales for her
    termination.
    To the extent that Megivern argues that she was singled out for discipline because of
    her pregnancy, her argument is without merit. Megivern’s transfer to the Two South unit
    occurred months prior to the announcement of her pregnancy. She concedes that she had
    trouble completing her assessments as soon as she was transferred, and acknowledges that
    Kudlak held a meeting with all of the LECs in February, 2010 to discuss the late assessment
    issue. Megivern does not contest that Kudlak was hired to restructure the LEC department
    1
    Asmo, 
    471 F.3d at 591
     (shifting rationales where the two reasons a supervisor
    initially offered the plaintiff as reasons for the termination of her employment were false and
    eliminated at the commencement of the plaintiff’s lawsuit); Thurman, 
    90 F.3d at 1167
    (shifting rationales where initial explanation of a failure to hire changed during discovery).
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    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    and admits that of the five LECs employed at Glacier Hills when she worked there, only two
    remain. Further, Megivern testified that it is her understanding that her former supervisor,
    Kirk, was fired for turning in late assessments—a fact confirmed by Glacier Hills at oral
    argument. Megivern has not shown that she was singled out for adverse treatment.
    b. Whether the temporal proximity of Megivern’s termination to the
    announcement of her pregnancy supports a finding of pretext.
    Megivern claims that the timing of the disciplinary actions taken against her warrant
    an inference that Glacier Hills’s proffered reason for termination is pretextual. Specifically,
    Megivern argues that within two weeks of announcing her pregnancy she was placed on a
    PIP, and that she was suspended and her employment terminated a day after meeting with
    human resources to discuss FMLA and short-term disability benefits. Megivern argues that
    although her paperwork deficiencies began as soon as she was reassigned to work the Two
    South unit, she was only disciplined for late assessments after she announced her pregnancy.
    She clarifies that she is not arguing that the timing of her discipline is sufficient to warrant
    a finding of pretext, but rather that the temporal proximity of her discipline supports a
    finding of pretext.
    Glacier Hills responds that although it is true that Megivern was only formally
    disciplined after announcing her pregnancy, she had a history of turning in late assignments.
    When Kudlak took over Megivern’s duties once she went on vacation in April, she noticed
    that Megivern’s problems were worse than she had realized and that Megivern had not
    followed through on directives Kudlak had given her in February.
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    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Temporal proximity alone cannot prove pretext, but it can be used as indirect
    evidence to support a claim of pretext. Asmo, 
    471 F.3d at 598
    . A view of the evidence in
    the light most favorable to Megivern suggests that Glacier Hills’s timing is suspect;
    however, this evidence must be accompanied by other, independent evidence of pretext for
    Megivern to succeed.
    c. Whether Thompson’s failure to congratulate Megivern on her pregnancy
    supports a finding of pretext.
    Megivern argues that Thompson’s complete failure to congratulate Megivern on her
    pregnancy is significant evidence showing pretext because Thompson was the final decision-
    maker in the termination of Megivern’s employment. Megivern relies on Asmo for this
    assertion. However, as Glacier Hills points out, Asmo is factually distinct as the supervisor
    in Asmo was directly told of the plaintiff’s pregnancy during a conference call. 
    Id. at 591
    .
    In that case, the supervisor’s conspicuous silence warranted an inference of discrimination.
    In contrast, Megivern never had a face-to-face meeting or phone conversation with
    Thompson to tell her about her pregnancy, thus making Asmo distinguishable.
    d. Whether Megivern’s pattern or practice evidence supports a finding of
    pretext.
    Megivern points to evidence regarding three employees, Alicia Carey, Karen Klee,
    and Tabatha Smith, to argue that Glacier Hills has a practice of discriminating against
    employees who seek medical leave. Megivern argues that this evidence raises a triable issue
    of fact regarding pretext.
    - 26 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Evidence that an employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination “may
    be relevant to proving an otherwise-viable individual claim for disparate treatment under the
    McDonnell Douglas framework.” Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 
    370 F.3d 565
    , 575 (6th
    Cir. 2004). “The question whether evidence of discrimination . . . is relevant . . . is fact
    based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the
    plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn,
    
    552 U.S. 379
    , 388 (2008). Among the factors to be considered in assessing “other acts”
    evidence are: whether the same actors were involved in each alleged retaliatory decision, the
    “temporal and geographical proximity” of the alleged other acts, “whether the various
    decisionmakers knew of the other decisions, whether the employees were similarly situated
    in relevant respects, or the nature of each employee’s allegations of retaliation.” Griffin v.
    Finkbeiner, 
    689 F.3d 584
    , 598–99 (6th Cir. 2012).
    Alicia Carey worked as a certified nurse assistant at Glacier Hills for nine years. She
    received excellent evaluations during this time. According to Carey, in September 2009,
    Thompson set off an emergency alarm during a state inspection, Carey retrieved the keys to
    shut off the alarm, and Thompson “grabbed the keys” from her hand. The next day, Carey
    was asked to meet with Thompson and the director of nursing. The director of nursing asked
    Carey why she had been “rude” to Thompson, and Carey apologized for her behavior, began
    crying, and explained that she was emotional because she was two months pregnant.
    Thompson told the director to “get rid of her” and left the office. Carey was removed from
    - 27 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    the weekend schedule and told to go home. Thompson called her on Monday and told her
    that her employment had been terminated because of her insubordination. Carey believes she
    was dismissed because of her pregnancy.
    Karen Klee worked at Glacier Hills for seven years as a unit secretary. Klee believes
    that everyone in the building was overworked, but only some employees were targeted for
    discipline. Klee announced that she was pregnant in July 2010. After she announced her
    pregnancy, her supervisor, Celia Williams, began “hounding” her and disciplining her for
    small performance issues. Klee believes that these actions were directed by Thompson as
    retaliation for Klee’s pregnancy, though she does not specify the reason for her belief that
    Thompson was involved. In September 2010, Klee suffered a miscarriage and received six
    weeks of medical leave under the FMLA. When she returned, she continued to be subjected
    to discipline for “petty things,” including work that had not been done while she was on
    leave. In November 2010, Klee suffered another medical emergency and was absent from
    work for one week. When she returned, she was fired for performance reasons, despite the
    fact that her PIP had not been completed. Klee believes the true reason for her dismissal was
    her pregnancy and the medical leave she took.
    Tabatha Smith was the LEC who replaced Megivern. She started working for Glacier
    Hills in June 2010, but began experiencing medical difficulties in 2011. Smith fainted at
    work twice during the summer of 2011, and she began seeing a doctor for tests to diagnose
    her condition. Smith was diagnosed with shingles and placed on medical leave from August
    - 28 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    4 to August 10. Although her supervisor was aware of her condition, Smith was given a
    “Final Written Warning” for unreliable attendance on August 25, 2011. The warning cited
    specific times when she had come to work late following her medical leave and criticized her
    professionalism and behavior at work. Smith was placed on a PIP and had a meeting with
    Thompson where she told Thompson that she believed she was being harassed and targeted
    for termination. Smith is “certain” that Thompson planned to terminate her in advance of
    her medical leave. Smith was on medical leave at the time she wrote her affidavit, although
    she had been informed that Glacier Hills would not hold a position open for her as she had
    exhausted the twelve weeks of medical leave she was allowed under the FMLA.
    The district court rejected Megivern’s assertion that these affidavits supported a
    finding of pretext, and we agree. Carey testified that she was terminated following an
    interaction that she had with Thompson during a state inspection. Carey interjected her
    pregnancy during the meeting with Thompson as an excuse for her behavior during the state
    inspection. The meeting had already been scheduled based on Carey’s behavior and before
    Thompson knew she was pregnant.
    Klee’s and Smith’s experiences are also distinct. Klee testified that she was only
    placed on a PIP after she took medical leave for a miscarriage. Klee returned to work and
    was placed on a PIP for performance reasons, and took another medical leave in November,
    2010. She was fired after returning from this second medical leave. Although Klee
    expresses her belief that her alleged harassment was instigated by Thompson, she does not
    - 29 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    explain her reason for this belief and her allegation appears to be purely speculative.
    Similarly, Smith has also failed to establish that Thompson was involved in her alleged
    harassment. She recounts a meeting with Thompson at which she believes Thompson
    planned to fire her, but concedes that she was not fired at this meeting. Indeed, Smith was
    never fired by Glacier Hills—she took a second medical leave and exhausted the amount of
    leave she was allowed under the FMLA. Neither affidavit supports Megivern’s theory of the
    case—that she was placed on a PIP and fired in order to prevent her from taking medical
    leave. Klee’s and Smith’s affidavits fail to establish that Thompson was involved in their
    alleged harassment, and Carey’s affidavit is factually distinct as Thompson was unaware of
    Carey’s pregnancy prior to her disciplinary meeting.
    Further, as part of Glacier Hills’s discovery disclosures to Megivern, Megivern was
    given a log of all employees terminated since 2008; the names and addresses of all
    employees who had taken medical leave since Thompson became executive director of the
    Care and Rehabilitation Center in 2009, together with the dates of their personal leave, their
    job title, current employment status with Glacier Hills, and whether the termination of their
    employment was voluntary or involuntary (if applicable); the personnel records of twenty-
    two employees identified by Megivern; and a list of twenty-one employees who had
    requested leave and their current employment status with Glacier Hills. From these
    disclosures, Megivern identified the three employees discussed above, all of whom present
    - 30 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    factually distinct circumstances from Megivern’s case. We agree with the district court that
    Megivern’s pattern or practice evidence does not support her claim.
    Considering Megivern’s evidence as a whole, the district court did not err in
    concluding that Megivern does not present enough evidence to warrant a finding of pretext.
    The only evidence that weighs in her favor is the temporal proximity of her dismissal to the
    announcement of her pregnancy. However, this evidence alone is insufficient to warrant a
    finding of pretext. See Asmo, 
    471 F.3d at 598
    . We affirm the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment on Megivern’s single-motive discrimination claims.
    C. Megivern’s FMLA and ERISA Interference Claims
    Megivern argues that because Glacier Hills terminated her employment shortly after
    she met with the human resources department to discuss short-term disability benefits and
    FMLA leave, Glacier Hills unlawfully interfered with the exercise of rights and benefits due
    her under the FMLA and ERISA.
    As with Megivern’s single-motive sex discrimination claims, we apply the
    McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework because Megivern presents indirect evidence
    of discrimination. Donald, 667 F.3d at 762; Humphreys, 966 F.2d at 1043. Because
    Megivern is unable to prove pretext under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
    framework, she cannot succeed on either claim. We affirm the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment on these claims.
    D. Mixed-Motive Discrimination
    - 31 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Megivern argues that even if she has not demonstrated pretext, she has presented
    enough evidence to demonstrate a mixed-motive claim of pregnancy discrimination. Under
    Title VII, an “unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
    demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating favor for any employment practice, even
    though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
    In White v. Baxter, this court held that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
    framework does not apply to the summary judgment analysis for Title VII mixed-motive
    claims. 
    533 F.3d 381
    , 400 (6th Cir. 2008). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff
    asserting a mixed-motive claim “need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury
    that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) race,
    color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis in original)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). “This burden of producing some evidence in support of
    a mixed-motive claim is not onerous and should preclude sending the case to the jury only
    where the record is devoid of evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the
    plaintiff’s claim.” 
    Id.
     This lenient summary judgment standard “is counterbalanced by
    potential restrictions on a plaintiff’s recovery for a mixed-motive claim.” Spees v. James
    Marine, Inc., 
    617 F.3d 380
    , 390 (6th Cir. 2010). Under a mixed-motive theory of
    discrimination, Megivern can only recover declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s
    fees and costs directly attributable to the mixed-motive claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
    - 32 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    The district court granted summary judgment to Glacier Hills on Megivern’s mixed-
    motive claim, reasoning that although Megivern argued that other LECs who were behind
    in their paperwork were not disciplined or fired, Megivern was fired for more than just her
    failure to complete initial assessments.
    Aside from the temporal proximity of the termination of Megivern’s employment to
    the announcement of her pregnancy, Megivern has not presented any evidence that the
    termination of her employment was motivated in part by discriminatory animus. Megivern’s
    2009 review suggested that her attitude at work was a problem. Further, she admits that she
    began having trouble completing her workload as soon as she was assigned to the Two South
    unit, months before she became pregnant. Thompson testified that Megivern’s entire work
    history, including her argumentative and insubordinate behavior, was taken into account as
    part of the decision to terminate her. Despite the lenient summary judgment standard for
    mixed-motive claims, Megivern has not provided evidence that her termination was based
    in part on her pregnancy. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
    E. Motion to Compel
    Lastly, Megivern argues that the district court erred by denying her renewed motion
    to compel the production of certain employees’ disciplinary files. We review a district
    court’s decision regarding discovery requests for abuse of discretion. Dortch v. Fowler, 
    588 F.3d 396
    , 400 (6th Cir. 2009). We reverse only if “we are firmly convinced of a mistake that
    affects substantial rights and amounts to more than harmless error.” 
    Id.
    - 33 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    Megivern moved to compel production of “any performance evaluations, discipline,
    warnings, performance improvement plans, exit interviews, or termination notices for any
    person who requested leave or became pregnant during the time Kim Thompson was
    Director.” At the time Megivern first brought this motion, Glacier Hills had already
    disclosed two logs to Megivern: the first listed every employee who had been terminated
    since 2008, and the second listed the names and addresses of every employee who had taken
    leave since Thompson began working for Glacier Hills in 2009. This second log also
    contained the job title of each employee, their current employment status with Glacier Hills,
    and whether their employment was terminated voluntarily or involuntarily if they were no
    longer employed at Glacier Hills. Megivern also requested and received the personnel
    records of twenty-two employees. Following her motion to compel, the court met with the
    parties and devised a plan for Glacier Hills to provide some of the additional information
    Megivern sought. The parties compiled a survey that Glacier Hills presented to ten of its
    supervisors, asking them to identify any employee who asked about leave or disability
    benefits, disclosed a pregnancy or serious health condition, or requested maternity or medical
    leave.   Glacier Hills identified twenty-one employees through this survey and these
    employees’ files were given to Megivern as well. From this information, Megivern claimed
    to have identified two employees who were treated unfairly (Tabatha Smith and Glenna
    Barnes). Megivern renewed her motion to compel, arguing that complete fulfillment of the
    - 34 -
    No. 12-1330
    Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc.
    discovery request was justified. The district court disagreed, noting that the burden imposed
    on Glacier Hills was unlikely to outweigh the benefit sought by Megivern.
    It was not unreasonable for the district court to reject Megivern’s request for broader
    discovery, given that she was unable to unearth relevant evidence after Glacier Hills provided
    her with the names of all persons whose employment was terminated, as well as employee
    leave information and the personnel files of employees specifically identified through this
    information. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Megivern’s motion to
    compel.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment to Glacier Hills on all of Megivern’s claims.
    - 35 -