United States v. Stone ( 2005 )


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  •                 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 05a0037n.06
    Filed: January 12, 2005
    No. 03-6636
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )
    )
    v.                                               )   ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    )   STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
    NEAL SCOTT STONE,                                )   WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
    )
    Defendant-Appellee.                       )
    Before: NELSON and COOK, Circuit Judges; SARGUS, District Court Judge*
    COOK, Circuit Judge. The United States appeals the district court’s order suppressing
    evidence seized during a no-knock entry. Defendant Neal Stone argues that the search warrant was
    facially invalid and unsupported by probable cause and that the exigency required to justify a no-
    knock warrant was lacking. We hold that the no-knock entry did not require suppression because
    the officer conducted the search in objective good faith.
    I. Background
    Detective Tom Roby suspected Stone of selling cocaine and prepared an affidavit and search
    warrant to present to the local judge. Roby’s affidavit provided information about: (1) Stone’s
    *
    The Honorable Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., United States District Judge for the Southern District
    of Ohio, sitting by designation.
    No. 03-6636
    U.S.A. v. Stone
    recent indictment and outstanding arrest warrant for narcotics trafficking; (2) an anonymous tip that
    Stone was involved in narcotics trafficking; (3) Roby’s personal observations that Stone lived at the
    house to be searched; (4) items discovered in the trash on the curb outside Stone’s residence
    consistent with narcotics packaging, including plastic sandwich bags without corners, an empty
    baking soda box, and a food saver bag that contained white residue and smelled of cocaine; (5)
    Stone’s criminal background, including a drug trafficking conviction from 1995, several narcotics
    trafficking arrests, a concealed weapons charge, and a history of resisting arrest. That history of
    resisting arrest—necessitating pepper spray and a choke hold to subdue him one time and a riot
    baton another—prompted Roby to ask in his affidavit that the judge authorize a no-knock entry “to
    ensure officer safety and evidentiary integrity.”
    Judge Robert Heaton, according to his later-signed affidavit, reviewed and signed Roby’s
    affidavit and warrant after explicitly questioning the basis for the no-knock request. Although
    Judge Heaton’s affidavit confirmed that he indeed authorized a no-knock entry, the warrant itself
    lacks any no-knock notation. The signed warrant—which Roby created by cutting and pasting
    language from a standard form—also lacks other standard language, including statements that the
    issuing judge finds probable cause and authorizes a search.
    II. Analysis
    A. Standard of Review
    This court reviews district court suppression rulings under a hybrid standard, reviewing
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    No. 03-6636
    U.S.A. v. Stone
    findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Bartholomew, 
    310 F.3d 912
    , 919 (6th Cir. 2002).
    B. The district court inappropriately suppressed the evidence.
    Stone argues that the judge issued a facially invalid warrant. Though we recognize the
    obvious shortcomings of the warrant, we decline to address its sufficiency—other than to note that
    the warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit which sufficiently set forth probable cause—
    because regardless of the warrant’s validity, Detective Roby relied upon it in objective good faith.
    Where an officer conducts a search, relying in objective good faith upon an invalid warrant,
    the exclusionary rule does not bar the fruits of that search. United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 905
    (1984). Detective Roby relied in good faith upon the warrant here. Judge Heaton stated in his
    affidavit that he spoke with Roby about his request for a no-knock warrant, that it is not his practice
    to “specifically denominate a warrant . . . as a ‘no-knock’ warrant,” and that he intended the warrant
    here to be no-knock. Given this, Roby reasonably believed in good faith that the warrant was valid.
    This court recently refused to apply the good faith exception where a warrant similarly failed
    to provide no-knock authorization on its face. United States v. Smith, 
    386 F.3d 753
    , 761-62 (6th Cir.
    2004). In Smith, the government attempted to establish good faith through testimony from the police
    officer who had sought the warrant that it was local practice not to declare no-knock authorization
    on a warrant’s face.     The present case, however, more closely resembles United States v.
    Mattison—the facts of which Smith specifically distinguished from its own—in which the Seventh
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    U.S.A. v. Stone
    Circuit upheld a no-knock search, where an assistant state’s attorney corroborated a police officer’s
    testimony regarding the local practice of never indicating no-knock authorization on a warrant’s
    face. 
    153 F.3d 406
    , 409-10 (7th Cir. 1998). Here, similarly, Judge Heaton, a disinterested
    individual with the knowledge of his own routine, stated this was his practice. Therefore the police
    could rely upon Judge Heaton’s warrant in good faith, knowing his intention that it be no-knock.
    Though Smith tempts us to abolish entirely the good faith exception for defective no-knock
    warrants, we recognize that Leon obligates us to consider the circumstances of each 
    case. 468 U.S. at 922-924
    . Still, we note that Smith limits the circumstances under which we will find good faith.
    And we repeat ourselves, and join other courts, in emphasizing that courts would be spared
    considerable resources if judges always indicated no-knock authorization on a warrant’s face. See,
    e.g., 
    Smith, 386 F.3d at 762
    ; 
    Mattison, 153 F.3d at 410
    n.3.
    Because the facts of this case provide sufficient evidence that the police relied upon a
    defective no-knock warrant in objective good faith, we reverse the district court’s decision to
    suppress evidence found in their search.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 03-6636

Filed Date: 1/12/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021