United States v. Mario Common , 563 F. App'x 429 ( 2014 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATON
File Name: 14a0296n.06
No. 13-5696
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Apr 21, 2014
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
MARIO COMMON, )
)
OPINION
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Before: MOORE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; and NIXON, District Judge.*
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Mario Common appeals from a jury
conviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
He argues that his conviction should be overturned because the evidence against him was
“incredible as a matter of law” and was insufficient to support the verdict. Because we find
nothing in the testimony supporting the conviction that was physically impossible or against the
laws of nature, we defer to the jury’s factual determinations. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
On April 4, 2012, in the early hours of the morning, four Chattanooga police officers
responded to a 911 call for a domestic disorder involving a weapon. R. 33 (Trial Tr. at 70) (Page
ID #130). The officers were directed to an address on Newton Street, near its intersection with
North Orchard Knob. The officers knew this neighborhood in East Chattanooga as a high-crime
*
The Honorable John T. Nixon, Senior United States District Judge for the Middle
District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
No. 13-5696
United States v. Mario Common
area with significant gun violence. Id. at 23 (Page ID #83). Upon arriving at the intersection,
they parked their squad cars and proceeded on foot up Newton Street. Id. at 17 (Page ID #77).
When they turned onto Newton Street, the officers spotted a man in the middle of the
street with what appeared to be a pistol in his hand. He was pointing the pistol at a woman or a
small group of individuals. Officer Nelson testified that he saw the silhouette of a pistol and
Officers Bramlett and Winbush both recalled that they saw a small silver gun in the man’s hand.
Id. at 19, 45, 71 (Page ID #79, 105, 131). When the woman saw the police arriving, she shouted
to tell them that the man had a gun. Id. at 44 (Page ID #104). The officers instructed everybody
to get on the ground. Instead of immediately complying, the man walked toward the house to the
edge of the yard and then tossed the object he was holding. Id. at 45, 72 (Page ID #105, 132).
He then walked back down the driveway while shouting that he did not have anything, and lay
on the ground. He was taken into custody and later was identified as defendant Mario Common.
While one of the officers took Common into custody, the others searched the yard for the
object they had seen him toss away. They recovered a small, silver gun in the grass behind the
house. The police did not take photographs of the gun before removing it, and the officers’
testimony varies regarding the precise location of the gun. Officer Nelson testified that he and
Officer Young found the gun “[i]n the back of that residence . . . just at the woodline.” Id. at 19(Page ID #79). The distance from the middle of Newton Street, where the officers first observed
Common, to the tree line at the back of the property was 156 feet. Id. at 68 (Page ID #128).
However, Officers Bramlett and Winbush testified that the gun was recovered from the
backyard, about ten feet away from the driveway. Id. at 47, 72 (Page ID #107, 132). Officer
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Winbush testified that when he found the gun, “there was a lot of condensation on the ground,
but the weapon didn’t appear to have any kind of moisture on it. There were no indentions into
the ground where it was, and it didn’t look like it had been there any period of time.” Id. at 73(Page ID #133).
At trial, Common stipulated that he was a felon and that the handgun recovered from the
yard had traveled in interstate commerce. Id. at 11, 88 (Page ID #71, 148). Thus, the sole issue
for the jury to decide was whether Common had knowingly possessed a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g); United States v. Caraway, 411 F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2005). After the government
rested, Common made a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29. R. 33 (Trial Tr. at 89) (Page ID #149). He argued that there were “major
inconsistencies” in the testimony of the witnesses and that the 911 caller was not present to
testify. Id. at 90–93 (Page ID #150–53). The district court denied the motion, explaining that
“what struck [him] about the three witnesses’ testimony was how consistent it was” and that
“any discrepancies . . . in the testimony were easily explained by [the officers’] positional
differences in the way they approached the scene.” Id. at 95 (Page ID #155). Common did not
call any witnesses or present any evidence on his own behalf, and he did not renew the Rule 29
motion after declining to put on a case. The jury convicted Common on a single count of being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). R. 30 (Judgment) (Page
ID #53). The district court then sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment. Id. (Page ID
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United States v. Mario Common
#54). Common filed this timely appeal of his conviction, arguing that the evidence against him
was “incredible as a matter of law.”1
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
At its core, Common’s appeal is a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. He contends that
the testimony used to support his conviction was incredible as a matter of law, and by extension
that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. When an appellant claims that
the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support a conviction, we must determine
whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational
trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979)); see also United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 230 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc). We
may reverse a judgment of conviction only if it was “not supported by substantial and competent
evidence upon the record as a whole.” Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1334 (citations omitted). “It is not
necessary for the evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. In
conducting our review, “we may not reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury.” United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d
317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the defendant faces a “very heavy burden,” United States
v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 589 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), to overcome the “strong
presumption in favor of sustaining a jury conviction.” United States v. Peters, 15 F.3d 540, 544
(6th Cir. 1994).
1
Common does not appeal the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his sentence.
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United States v. Mario Common
Before turning to the merits of Common’s claim, we must address whether he has waived
his sufficiency of the evidence claim by failing formally to renew it at the close of the defense
case. Ordinarily, when “a defendant does not renew his motion for judgment of acquittal for
insufficiency of the evidence at the close of all of the proofs, appellate review is limited to
determining whether there was a ‘manifest miscarriage of justice.’” United States v. Price, 134
F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Cannon, 981 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir.
1993)); see also United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 696–97 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the
waiver rule applies only when the defense presents its own witnesses or other evidence. See
Price, 134 F.3d at 350 (“[W]hen the defendant moves for judgment of acquittal at the close of
the government’s case-in-chief, and defense evidence is thereafter presented but the defendant
fails to renew the motion at the close of all of the evidence, he waives objection to the denial of
his earlier motion absent a showing of a manifest miscarriage of justice.”) (emphasis added);
United States v. Black, 525 F.2d 668, 669 (6th Cir. 1975) (“The rule is settled that when a
defendant introduces evidence, he waives any objection to the denial of his motion to acquit at
the close of the government’s case.”). In United States v. Kubeck, 487 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1973),
we explained:
The rationale of [the waiver rule] was that the presentation of a defense served as
a withdrawal of the acquittal motion, and therefore, a new motion was required at
the close of defendant’s case to preserve the evidentiary point as a ground of
appeal. In our case, however, [the defendant] offered no evidence after he had
rested, and consequently he did not withdraw his original acquittal motion. Thus,
[the defendant] is not now barred from raising the sufficiency of the evidence
point at this time.
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United States v. Mario Common
Id. at 1258. Because Common declined to present any evidence after the government rested its
case, we apply the ordinary standard of review for a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence.
Common argues that the evidence offered against him was insufficient to support his
conviction because the testimony of the officers was “incredible as a matter of law.” Our sister
circuits have cautioned when reviewing similar claims that “it is not our role, when reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, to second-guess a jury’s credibility determinations.” United States v.
Radziszewski, 474 F.3d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d
186, 190 (5th Cir. 1993). Rather, “attacks on witness credibility are simply challenges to the
quality of the government’s evidence and not to the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States
v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 1993). We may reverse a credibility determination only
when it was “‘physically impossible for the witness to observe that which he or she claims
occurred, or impossible under the laws of nature for the occurrence to have taken place at all.’”
United States v. Davis, No. 92-1370, 1992 WL 392974, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1992) (quoting
United States v. Dunigan, 884 F.2d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also Caraway, 411 F.3d at
682 (noting that “courts need not blindly accept implausible stories swallowed by jurors” if the
testimony “defies physical realities”) (citation omitted). Thus, “the test for incredibility of a
witness is an extremely stringent one.” Gadison, 8 F.3d at 190 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Common argues that the officers’ testimony was not credible because it was “impossible
under the laws of nature” for one of two reasons: (1) it was physically impossible for Common
to have thrown the pistol from the middle of the street to the tree line at the back of the property
or (2) it is against the laws of nature that Common could toss the pistol into dewy grass without
getting it wet. First, Common claims that it is physically impossible to toss the small handgun
underhanded from the middle of Newton Street to the tree line at the back of the property 156
feet away. Even if that is true, Common’s argument is without merit because the officers did not
testify that they saw Common toss the gun from the middle of the street, and they were not clear
about where the gun was found. Instead, they testified that Common walked up to the edge of
the yard before he tossed the gun. R. 33 (Trial Tr. at 45, 72) (Page ID #105, 132). Common has
not provided any evidence that it would be physically impossible to toss the gun from the edge of
the yard to the tree line. Furthermore, Officer Bramlett testified that the gun was recovered only
about ten feet away from the driveway. Id. at 47 (Page ID #107). To the extent that the officers
gave inconsistent testimony regarding the precise location of the gun, we must defer to the jury’s
credibility determination regarding which testimony to believe. See United States v. Jefferson,
149 F.3d 444, 445 (6th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Common’s first argument is without merit.
Second, Common argues that Officer Winbush’s testimony was incredible because he
asserted that, although “there was a lot of condensation on the ground,” the gun was dry when he
retrieved it and had not left an indentation in the ground. R. 33 (Trial Tr. at 73) (Page ID #133).
There is nothing improbable about this testimony: The gun landed in the grass only a few
minutes before it was recovered, and it is entirely possible that water would not have collected
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on the gun in that short amount of time. Officer Winbush’s testimony about the gun’s failure to
make an indentation in the ground or to collect condensation supported his inference that it had
only recently landed in the location in which it was found. Even if it were extremely unlikely
that a gun could have landed in a dewy lawn without accumulating any moisture, the sequence of
events described by Officer Winbush is not physically impossible. See Davis, 1992 WL 392974,
at *2 (“Whether the testimony is implausible or difficult to believe is a question for the jury.”).
Therefore, Common’s second argument is also without merit.
The jury did not have to believe testimony that violated the laws of physics in order to
accept the officers’ testimony as credible. From the testimony produced at trial, the jury could
have rationally concluded that Common was in possession of the gun that the officers found in
the yard. Accordingly, the jury’s verdict was supported by “substantial and competent
evidence.” See Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1334.
II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In addition to the claim raised by Common’s counsel on appeal, Common submitted a
supplemental pro se brief arguing that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by 1) the
playing of two 911 calls at trial and 2) the testimony of officers regarding what the 911 caller had
said. Although we ordinarily decline to address pro se arguments when a defendant is
represented by counsel on appeal, see United States v. Morrow, 497 F. App’x 583, 587 (6th Cir.
2012) (citing United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 770 (6th Cir. 2011)), whether or not we
consider Common’s constitutional claims in the instant case makes no difference to the outcome.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
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witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Therefore, testimonial hearsay statements are
admissible only when the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had an opportunity
before trial to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).
Testimony is “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact” which may take the form of a formal statement to law-enforcement officers.
Id. at 51–52 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Statements are nontestimonial when made in
the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis
v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (describing a particular 911 call as a nontestimonial
statement made in the face of an ongoing emergency); see also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct.
1143, 1157–60 (2011); United States v. Ballew, 491 F. App’x 589, 591 (6th Cir. 2012).
Common did not object on Confrontation Clause grounds during trial when the
government played a tape of the 911 calls for the jury. See R. 33 (Trial Tr. at 13–15) (Page ID
#73–75). Accordingly, we review this issue for plain error. United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672,
683 (6th Cir. 2009). The statements made during the 911 call were not testimonial in nature
because they were made to assist the police in responding to a dangerous situation, namely a man
in possession of a gun, while the caller faced an ongoing emergency. Therefore, the
Confrontation Clause was not violated by the statements’ admission, either through the playing
of the tapes themselves or through the testimony of the officers.2 Moreover, any Confrontation
2
Common also appears to argue that the officers’ testimony that they heard the female
victim shout “he’s got a gun” after they arrived at the scene was a Confrontation Clause
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Clause violation would have been harmless under the circumstances. The substantive truth of
the 911 caller’s statements (e.g. that “he’s got a gun”) was not necessary to the government’s
case because other testimony established that Common was in possession of a firearm. See
United States v. Savoires, 430 F.3d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 2005). Importantly, each of the testifying
officers independently described having seen a gun or pistol in Common’s hand. See United
States v. Hearn, 500 F.3d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 2007); cf. United States v. Nelson, 725 F.3d 615,
621 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the admission of a hearsay statement that a man matching
the defendant’s description had a gun was not harmless because “no officer testified to having
seen [the defendant] possess a gun”). Accordingly, there is no merit to Common’s pro se
argument that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Common’s conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm.
violation. At trial, Common’s attorney did not object when the first two officers testified
regarding the victim’s statements. See R. 33 (Trial Tr. at 18, 44) (Page ID #78, 104). She raised
an objection when the third officer gave similar testimony, id. at 71 (Page ID #131), but then
withdrew it after the government argued that the testimony was admissible under the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). As with the 911 statements,
the female victim’s statements after the police officers arrived at the scene of the crime were
nontestimonial in nature. Therefore, the Confrontation Clause was not violated by the officers’
testimony.
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