Terri Louden v. Commissioner of Social Security , 507 F. App'x 497 ( 2012 )


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  •                   NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 12a1245n.06
    No. 11-6307                                      FILED
    Dec 04, 2012
    DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    TERRI LOUDEN,                                         )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                           )       ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    )       STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    v.                                                    )       THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
    )       KENTUCKY
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,                      )
    )
    Defendant-Appellee.                            )
    Before: MARTIN and WHITE, Circuit Judges; ECONOMUS, District Judge.*
    PER CURIAM. Terri Louden, who is represented by counsel, appeals a district court order
    denying her application for supplemental security income benefits.
    On July 19, 2007, Louden filed an application for supplemental security income benefits
    alleging that she was disabled due to degenerative disc disease in the lumbar region of the spine;
    migraine headaches; chronic neck pain, secondary to degenerative disc disease in the cervical region
    of the spine; borderline intellectual functioning; illiteracy; depression; anxiety; and pain disorder.
    Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
    Louden then sought review before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Following a hearing,
    the ALJ denied Louden’s application for benefits finding that Louden could perform her previous
    type of work as a parking attendant. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f); Studaway v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    815 F.2d 1074
    , 1076 (6th Cir. 1987). The ALJ also found that Louden could perform
    *
    The Honorable Peter C. Economus, United States Senior District Judge for the Northern
    District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
    No. 11-6307
    -2-
    a substantial number of other jobs in the national economy. The Appeals Council declined to review
    the ALJ’s decision and the district court subsequently affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of
    benefits.
    On appeal, Louden argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the vocational expert at
    the hearing were not supported by substantial evidence and that the vocational expert’s testimony
    conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The district court’s judgment is reviewed de
    novo. Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    594 F.3d 504
    , 512 (6th Cir. 2010). Our review “is limited to
    determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and was
    made pursuant to proper legal standards.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). “If the
    Commissioner’s decision is based upon substantial evidence, we must affirm, even if substantial
    evidence exists in the record supporting a different conclusion.” 
    Id. Consultative psychologist
    Mark Kroger examined Louden on only one occasion for the
    purposes of Louden’s disability application. Because Kroger was not a treating physician, his
    opinion was not entitled to significant weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2). However, the ALJ
    did afford Kroger’s opinion substantial weight. The ALJ explained that he included in Louden’s
    residual functional capacity assessment the mental limitations described by Kroger.
    The applicable regulations also permitted the ALJ to consider the opinions of Drs. Jan
    Jacobson and Edward Stodola. These doctors simply examined the medical evidence before the
    Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e). Although Louden contends that there is no evidence
    that these consulting physicians examined the entire record, references to Kroger’s findings indicate
    that Dr. Jacobson did in fact review Louden’s mental health evaluation.
    The ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the vocational expert considered all of Louden’s
    conditions that were supported by objective medical evidence. Based on the ALJ’s hypothetical
    questions, the vocational expert testified that Louden could perform her previous position as a
    No. 11-6307
    -3-
    parking attendant. The vocational expert also stated that Louden could work as a surveillance
    monitor and as an entry level assembler.
    Louden contends that the vocational expert’s testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of
    Occupational Titles because Louden failed to meet certain requirements of the parking attendant and
    surveillance monitor positions as described by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The ALJ
    satisfied his burden by asking the vocational expert if her testimony was consistent with the
    Dictionary of Occupational Titles. See Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    609 F.3d 847
    , 858 (6th Cir.
    2010). The vocational expert stated that her testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of
    Occupational Titles. Louden has the burden of proving that she is unable to perform her previous
    type of work. 
    Id. at 855;
    Studaway, 815 F.2d at 1076
    . Louden’s attorney had the opportunity, but
    failed to cross-examine the vocational expert regarding her position that her testimony was consistent
    with specific provisions of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Accordingly, the vocational
    expert’s testimony constituted substantial evidence that Louden could perform her past relevant work
    as a parking attendant.
    The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-6307

Citation Numbers: 507 F. App'x 497

Judges: Martin, White, Economus

Filed Date: 12/4/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024