United States v. Jackson ( 2010 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 10a0778n.06
No. 07-3303
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Dec 21, 2010
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE
v. ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
) OHIO
EDWARD JACKSON, )
) OPINION
Defendant-Appellant. )
BEFORE: MOORE, SUTTON and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Edward Jackson was found guilty of attempting
to possess 100 kilograms or more of marijuana with intent to distribute it. Although the evidence
of Jackson’s intent to possess the marijuana was thin—as the police interrupted the transaction and
arrested Jackson before he actually possessed it—the trial court denied Jackson’s motion for
judgment of acquittal. After the jury returned its guilty verdict, the trial court also denied Jackson’s
motion for new trial or judgment of acquittal, notwithstanding newly discovered evidence that an
informant had given false testimony. On appeal, Jackson challenges both of these rulings. For the
reasons that follow, we find no error and therefore affirm the judgment as well as the denial of the
motion for new trial.
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United States v. Jackson
I. BACKGROUND
On March 26, 2005, Arnulfo Quintana, a self-employed truck driver, was en route from
Tucson, Arizona to Cleveland, Ohio with a load of Celotex insulation on his flatbed trailer, when
he stopped at a rest area near Emporia, Kansas. There he encountered law enforcement officials who
were checking an irregularity in his trailer registration number. When his load was subjected to a
dog-sniff inspection, Quintana admitted that marijuana was concealed in the insulation. He
explained that Cleveland was his destination and he agreed to cooperate with the police in
performing a controlled delivery.
Authorities in Cleveland were alerted. Police staked out the identified warehouse area on
Aurora Road in Warrensville Heights (just southeast of Cleveland) on March 27, 2005, Easter
Sunday. In the early evening hours, just before dusk, officers observed two vehicles, a Chevrolet
Suburban and a Chevrolet Trailblazer, arrive together at the warehouse at 20905 Aurora, which was
subdivided into garages. Their drivers, two African-American males, pulled the vehicles into one
of the garages. Approximately fifteen minutes later, they left, each in a separate vehicle. Ten to
fifteen minutes later, officers observed the arrival of Quintana’s red semi-truck and trailer at the
same warehouse. He parked it parallel to the warehouse. Approximately five minutes later, two
additional vehicles arrived, the same Trailblazer and Suburban that had just departed, each driven
by an African-American male. Edward Jackson was the driver of the Trailblazer; the Suburban was
driven by Jackson’s friend, Ernest Matthews. Officers observed Matthews open the door to the
warehouse garage and then both men met briefly with Quintana. Then, as Matthews entered the
garage to look for pliers, Jackson began helping Quintana loosen the canvas straps securing the
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pallets of insulation to the trailer. At this point, because it was getting dark, the observing officers
moved in to arrest the suspects. Matthews and Jackson “moved rather rapidly” or “ran” into the
warehouse garage, where they were apprehended and placed under arrest.
Concealed within the tallest load of insulation, the officers discovered 39 bales containing
749 pounds of marijuana. Upon arresting Matthews, they found over $3,200 in currency on his
person, in addition to some $500 near him. In the Trailblazer, driven by Jackson, officers found a
quantity of two-gallon sized plastic storage bags and three rolls of contact paper. DEA Special
Agent William Leppla, one of the officers who participated in the surveillance and arrests,
recognized, based on his experience in drug trafficking investigations, that such storage bags are
commonly used to repackage quantities of marijuana. Leppla also observed that the contact paper
found in the Trailblazer was similar to that in which the bales of marijuana were wrapped.
Jackson and Matthews were subsequently charged in the Northern District of Ohio with
knowingly and intentionally attempting to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more
of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846. A jury trial commenced on September 13, 2005.
In addition to the above facts, which were essentially undisputed, the government’s case
included Quintana’s testimony (with the aid of an interpreter) explaining that he had been hired in
Tucson by one Martin Guzman to transport the marijuana to Cleveland for $25,000. When Quintana
entered into the agreement in mid-March, Guzman was accompanied by an African-American man,
identified by Guzman as “the boss.” Quintana was told that “the boss,” who Quintana only saw
briefly in the passenger seat of Guzman’s vehicle, would be in Cleveland to meet him. Quintana
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identified this man, who was in fact present to receive delivery in Cleveland, as Ernest Matthews,
Jackson’s co-defendant. On cross-examination, Quintana denied ever having been to the Aurora
Road warehouse before; said he did not know it was a mobile wash business; denied having been
in Cleveland in February or early March of 2005; but admitted being in Cleveland in January 2005,
when his truck broke down on the way to Philadelphia.
Further, DEA Task Force Officer Jamaal Ansari testified that the day after Matthews was
arrested, Matthews acknowledged having been in Tucson, but denied going there to make a deal.
Ansari’s testimony was followed by introduction of a stipulation that America West Airlines records
showed Matthews departing Cleveland for Las Vegas on March 1, 2005 and returning to Cleveland
from Las Vegas in the early morning hours of March 14, 2005.
At the close of the government’s case in chief, the district court denied the defendants’
motions for judgment of acquittal. For the defense, neither defendant took the stand. Gregory
Robitson testified that he had been employed by Jackson at his mobile wash business that operated
out of the Aurora Road warehouse from March 2004 to May 2005. He remembered having once
washed a red semi-truck driven by a man with a strong accent, but Robitson did not know the make
of the truck.
Chantay Robinson, Matthews’ aunt, testified that she had been in Las Vegas with Matthews
and others March 10-13, 2005, having flown back on the same flight as Matthews late on the 13th.
Robinson also testified that she had rented the Trailblazer Jackson had driven to the warehouse from
Enterprise Rent-A-Car in February. Robinson was hosting a family gathering on Easter Sunday;
Matthews and Jackson were both guests. At some point, Robinson told Matthews to take the
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Trailblazer to Jackson’s mobile wash for a thorough cleaning, because it was to be returned to
Enterprise the next day. Robinson explained that she used the plastic storage bags found in the
Trailblazer to store frozen foods. The rolls of contact paper, she explained, were used for various
household projects.
Dartanyan Thompson was the owner of the Suburban. He was at Robinson’s for Easter
dinner, too. He testified that at about 6:30 p.m., he drove over to the Aurora Road warehouse, with
Jackson accompanying him in the Trailblazer, to look at some motorcycle parts and some mobile
wash cleaning equipment that Jackson had there. This took 15-20 minutes; then they returned to
Robinson’s. Later, Thompson testified, Matthews borrowed Thompson’s Suburban and drove away
with Jackson, who drove the Trailblazer again.
Finally, Matthews’ girlfriend Cynthia Harris testified about the trip they had taken, flying to
Las Vegas on March 1, and driving to Los Angeles, Phoenix, Tucson, and then back to Las Vegas,
before returning to Cleveland in the early morning hours of March 14. Apart from a two-and-a-half-
hour period in Phoenix on March 7, when Harris had a job interview with American Express, she
said she and Matthews were constantly together: they arrived in Tucson late on the 7th and left for
Las Vegas on the morning of the 9th. Harris’s testimony tended to impugn Quintana’s testimony that
Matthews was present when he met with Guzman in mid-March.
In his closing argument, Jackson’s counsel argued that Quintana was not a reliable witness
and that the government’s case, short on corroborating evidence, left too many questions
unanswered. He insisted the government had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson
was guilty of the crime charged.
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The jury began deliberating on September 16, 2005, and resumed on September 19, when
they returned their verdicts, finding both defendants guilty as charged. Both defendants moved for
new trial or, in the alternative, for judgment of acquittal. Over the next several months, these
motions were supplemented and fully briefed, before the district court conducted a hearing on the
motions on May 31, 2006, and then received further post-hearing briefs. Finally, on October 23,
2006, the district court issued its opinion denying the motions for new trial or for judgment of
acquittal.
Jackson was sentenced on February 21, 2007. The court imposed the mandatory minimum
prison term of 60 months. On appeal, Jackson challenges the district court’s denials of his motion
for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial, reasserting the same arguments the district court
rejected.1
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of Evidence
1. Standard of Review
The district court’s denial of Jackson’s motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo.
United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 677 (6th Cir. 2008). Yet, to prevail on this claim that the
government’s proofs were insufficient to sustain the conviction, Jackson must bear a “heavy
1
Matthews’ appeal from these very same rulings, implicating issues nearly identical to those
here raised by Jackson, was rejected by another panel of this court on October 21, 2008. United
States v. Matthews, 298 F. App’x 460 (6th Cir. 2008).
Jackson’s appeal, although originally filed at about the same time as Matthews’, was
neglected for two years, having been dismissed for want of prosecution in April 2007, and then
reinstated in March 2009.
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burden.” United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence challenge, we “examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government
and draw all inferences in the government’s favor in order to determine whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 556 (6th Cir. 2008). “This analysis does not require the removal of
every hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.Because the issue is one of legal sufficiency, we are not permitted to independently weigh
the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 460 (6th
Cir. 2010). For the court of appeals to assess witness credibility would be to impermissibly “invade
the province of the jury as the sole finder of fact in a jury trial.” Graham, 622 F.3d at 449. (quoting
United States v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 1039 (6th Cir. 2001)). An attack on witness credibility is
a challenge to “the quality of the government’s evidence and not the sufficiency of the evidence.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 2006)).
2. Merits
In denying defendants’ motions for judgment of acquittal as a matter of law, the district court
explained why the proofs, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, were sufficient to
sustain the convictions:
In short, the Government presented evidence that (1) the defendants appeared at the
garage in preparation for the arrival of the semi-tractor trailer; (2) the semi-tractor
trailer arrived at the destination; (3) the defendants again appeared shortly after the
arrival of the semi-tractor trailer; (4) the defendants held a discussion with the driver
of the semi-tractor trailer; (5) Jackson appeared to assist with the removal of the
marijuana from the semi-tractor trailer; and (6) the defendants had in their possession
items utilized in drug trafficking. Moreover, the Government presented the
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testimony of Quintana that suggested that Matthews had appeared in Arizona with
the alleged source of the marijuana several week earlier.
R. 185, Memorandum Opinion and Order p. 28. The court went on to explain that although
defendants had identified discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of various government
witnesses, “a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson’s and Matthews’s
independent conduct, when viewed objectively, unequivocally corroborates their individual and
subjective intent to commit the crime as charged.” Id. at 29.
Jackson insists the district court erred. He maintains there was no proof that he attempted
to knowingly possess the marijuana and no evidence that he knew the cargo loaded on the trailer
contained marijuana. While acknowledging that the jurors are allowed to draw reasonable inferences
from the circumstantial evidence, Jackson argues that their verdict cannot legitimately be based on
mere speculation.
Jackson is right: his mere presence at the scene of a crime does not establish guilt. See
Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2007). Nor, it must be conceded, is there any direct
evidence that he was aware of the presence of the marijuana on the trailer.
To sustain the charge, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as
the district court acknowledged, that Jackson intentionally took an overt act that constituted a
substantial step toward knowingly possessing marijuana with intent to distribute it. That Jackson
took an overt act toward exercising dominion over the cargo containing the marijuana is
substantiated by Leppla’s testimony that he observed Jackson helping Quintana try to remove the
cargo from the trailer. That Jackson intended to distribute the marijuana may be reasonably inferred
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from the large quantity of marijuana involved. See United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 587
(6th Cir. 2010). Hence, the critical question posed in this case is whether the circumstantial evidence
presented by the government, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is sufficient to
warrant the conclusion by a rational jury that Jackson knew marijuana was concealed in the cargo.
While circumstantial evidence giving rise to reasonable inferences can support a conviction,
“reasonable speculation” is not sufficient evidence. See Newman v. Metrish, 543 F.3d 793, 796 (6th
Cir. 2008); Parker, 506 F.3d at 452. But here, in the rationale quoted above, the district court
identified six items of evidence that support a reasonable inference that Jackson knew the cargo
contained marijuana. Defendants presented evidence tending to offer innocent explanations for their
presence at the garage on Easter Sunday evening when the truck load of insulation happened to
arrive, and for their possession of materials commonly used in drug trafficking. Yet, in reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence, we are obliged to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
government. Moreover, several of the factors pointing toward culpability have not been met by any
innocent explanation. For instance, defendants’ apparently ready willingness to cooperate with a
stranger in receiving delivery of and helping to unload an unexpected truckload of new construction
insulation materials at a mobile wash business on Easter Sunday is unusual and yet unexplained. In
this respect, Jackson’s conduct at the scene appears to be inconsistent with the defense story that he
and Matthews took a break from the Easter celebration at Chantay Robinson’s home simply to do
her the favor of cleaning her rental vehicle. Also unexplained is Jackson’s hasty retreat into the
garage when the police officers came out of hiding. His reaction to the emergence of the police is
inconsistent with his professed innocence. See Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Of course, Jackson has no burden to prove his innocence and no adverse inference can be
drawn from his decision not to testify. Yet, whether the circumstantial evidence supports (a)
“reasonable inference” pointing to guilt, or (b) only “reasonable speculation” about the possibility
of guilt, is a determination that clearly requires a “common sense” assessment—the sort of
assessment the jury was instructed to make—of the plausibility of various inferences that might be
drawn from the known facts. Making this common sense assessment of all the known circumstances
compels the conclusion that the jury’s finding that Jackson knew of the presence of the marijuana
was the product of reasonable inference, not mere speculation. For the reasons clearly set forth in
the district court’s opinion, the jury’s verdict was properly found to be supported by sufficient
evidence. This reasoning was adopted by another Sixth Circuit panel in relation to the conviction
of Jackson’s co-defendant Matthews. See Matthews, 298 F. App’x at 465. Jackson has given us no
persuasive reason to depart from that reasoning in this case. Accordingly, we find no error in the
district court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.
B. Denial of Motion for New Trial
1. Standard of Review
The district court’s denial of Jackson’s motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Olender, 338 F.3d 629, 635-36 (6th
Cir. 2003). Motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence are disfavored and the
district court’s ruling should not be disturbed unless it “clearly abused its discretion.” United States
v. Turns, 198 F.3d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2000). “A district court clearly abuses its discretion when it
‘applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous
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findings of fact.’” Id. (quoting Schachner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 77 F.3d 889, 895 (6th Cir.
1996)). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that “(1) the evidence was discovered after
the trial, (2) it could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence, (3) it is material and not
merely cumulative or impeaching, and (4) it would likely produce an acquittal if the case was
retried.” Id. at 586-87.
2. Merits
In denying defendants’ motions for new trial, the district court acknowledged that newly
discovered evidence strongly suggested that Quintana gave false testimony when he testified (a) that
he met Matthews with Guzman in Tucson in mid-March 2005; and (b) that he had not been to
Cleveland in February or early March 2005. R. 185, Memorandum Opinion and Order p. 36. Yet,
the court observed that Quintana’s credibility in these particulars had already been destroyed. The
court concluded that the newly discovered evidence was “cumulative and impeaching.” Id. at 37.
The court found “there was substantial undisputed evidence linking Jackson and Matthews to the
marijuana such as their timely arrivals to the garage on Easter Sunday.” Id. at 38. The court thus
concluded that the newly discovered evidence did not undermine confidence in the verdict.
Jackson contends the district court failed to properly weigh the significance of the newly
discovered evidence. He insists that Quintana has now been exposed as a perjurer and contends that,
without his testimony, the government cannot meet its burden of proof. The falsity or inaccuracy
in Quintana’s testimony is troubling. But Jackson clearly exaggerates the significance of Quintana’s
misstatements. That is, even assuming Quintana was wrong about the date in March when he met
Guzman and agreed to transport the marijuana to Cleveland, the undisputed fact is that Quintana did
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transport the marijuana to Cleveland and deliver it to Jackson’s garage. And even assuming “the
boss” whom Quintana encountered with Guzman in Tucson was not in fact Matthews, the
undisputed fact is that Matthews and Jackson did arrive at the warehouse, in concert, shortly after
Quintana arrived with the load of marijuana, and did appear to cooperate with Quintana’s attempt
to deliver his cargo. And even assuming Quintana had in fact been to Cleveland in February and/or
early March, instead of or in addition to a visit in January, this inaccuracy would appear to have been
designed only to conceal or diminish Quintana’s own involvement rather than to inculpate Jackson.
That is, the fact that Quintana had previously come to the Cleveland area in February and/or early
March hardly tends to exonerate Jackson in relation to his own conduct as observed by the arresting
officers on March 27, 2005.2
In other words, none of the newly discovered revelations alter or undermine the six
considerations identified by the district court as representing sufficient evidence justifying the jury’s
reasonable inference of Jackson’s guilt. The district court’s assessment that the newly discovered
evidence does not undermine confidence in the verdict thus appears to be sound and has not been
shown to be a clear abuse of discretion. In relation to co-defendant Matthews’ identical new trial
motion, another panel of this court affirmed the district court’s conclusions that the newly discovered
2
Yes, the discovery that Quintana had been to Cleveland in February and/or early March
could be deemed to buttress Jackson’s theory that Quintana had previously been to Jackson’s garage
to have his truck washed. And such a prior visit could have given rise to a familiarity with the area
that Quintana could have relied on to identify the Aurora Road warehouse as the marijuana delivery
destination. Yet, as the district court observed, Jackson’s theory had precious little factual support.
Acceptance of the notion that Quintana falsely identified Jackson’s garage as the delivery destination
would still require pure speculation, which is hardly sufficient to undermine the reasonable inference
that Jackson knew what Quintana’s load contained as he helped unfasten it from the trailer.
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evidence was merely cumulative and impeaching and would not have resulted in an acquittal.
Matthews, 298 F. App’x at 466-67. Again, there is no reason for us to reach a different conclusion
in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we reject both of Jackson’s claims of error. We uphold the district court’s
denial of the motion for new trial and the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.
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