Dallas Robertson v. Commissioner of Social Security , 513 F. App'x 439 ( 2013 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0091n.06
No. 12-5783
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jan 25, 2013
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
DALLAS RAY ROBERTSON, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
BEFORE: BOGGS and WHITE, Circuit Judges; MCCALLA, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM. Dallas Ray Robertson appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits.
In 2004, Robertson filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits, alleging that he became disabled in July 2000. After the Social Security
Administration denied the applications, Robertson requested a hearing. An administrative law judge
(ALJ) conducted a hearing and denied Robertson relief. The Appeals Council declined to review
the case. Robertson sought review in the district court. A magistrate judge recommended denying
Robertson relief and, over Robertson’s objections, the district court adopted the recommendation and
entered judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security.
*
The Honorable Jon P. McCalla, Chief United States District Judge for the Western District
of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
No. 12-5783
Robertson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
On appeal, Robertson argues that: (1) the ALJ erred by concluding that he did not meet the
regulatory listing for recurrent cardiac arrhythmias; and (2) the ALJ erred by failing to obtain the
medical evidence necessary to properly assess his claim of disability. “Our review of the ALJ’s
decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings
of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399,
405 (6th Cir. 2009). “The substantial-evidence standard is met if a reasonable mind might accept
the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 406 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “We give de novo review to the district court’s conclusions on each issue.” Id.Robertson first argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that he did not meet the regulatory
listing for recurrent cardiac arrhythmias. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 4.05. “[T]o be
found disabled based upon a listed impairment, the claimant must exhibit all the elements of the
listing.” Elam ex rel. Golay v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003). “It is
insufficient that a claimant comes close to meeting the requirements of a listed impairment.” Id.The requirements of section 4.05 are met where a claimant has a recurrent arrhythmia that is not fully
controlled and that results in uncontrolled recurrent episodes of syncope or near syncope, and there
is a documented association between the recurrent arrhythmia and the syncope or near syncope. See
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 4.00F(3)(a), (c), 4.05. “Syncope” is defined as “a loss of
consciousness or a faint,” while “near syncope” is defined as “a period of altered consciousness.”
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 4.00F(3)(b).
The ALJ’s determination that Robertson did not meet the regulatory listing for recurrent
cardiac arrhythmias was supported by substantial evidence. Robertson has identified no evidence
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No. 12-5783
Robertson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
in the record demonstrating that, during his alleged period of disability, he had a recurrent arrhythmia
that was not fully controlled. Further, there is no evidence establishing an association between
Robertson’s alleged episodes of syncope or near syncope and a recurrent arrhythmia.
Robertson also argues that the ALJ erred by deciding his case without obtaining the medical
evidence necessary to properly assess his claim of disability. Robertson asserts that the ALJ should
have either ordered a consultative examination with a cardiologist or obtained the medical records
concerning the replacement of his pacemaker and his cardiac catheterization for consideration by the
consulting physicians.
The ALJ did not err by failing to obtain the evidence at issue. Given the considerable amount
of medical evidence in the record concerning Robertson’s cardiovascular problems and his resulting
functional capability, including test results, physicians’ notes, and opinion evidence from multiple
physicians, and the lack of any significant inconsistencies in the evidence, the ALJ was not obligated
to order a consultative examination with a cardiologist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a. Further, the
ALJ did not err by failing to obtain the medical records at issue because the record contained
sufficient evidence documenting the replacement of Robertson’s pacemaker and its impact on him
and the ALJ made a reasonable effort to obtain the records concerning Robertson’s cardiac
catheterization by granting his counsel extra time to obtain the records, see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.
P, app. 1, § 4.00C(15)(a).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
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