Kurt Buckner v. Edith Gillilland , 507 F. App'x 522 ( 2012 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a1253n.06
12-3286
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Dec 05, 2012
KURT BUCKNER, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EDITH GILLILAND and RANDY J. ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
PARKER, in their individual capacities, )
)
Defendants-Appellants. )
Before: DAUGHTREY, COLE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The defendants, Edith Gilliland and Randy J. Parker, appeal from
the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiff Kurt
Buckner, based on diversity jurisdiction, that alleged causes of action for defamation,
intentional interference with a business relationship, and negligent investigation. The
district court granted the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the
claim of negligent investigation, concluding that Ohio tort law did not recognize such a
cause of action. See Buckner v. Gilliland, 846 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Ohio 2012). That
ruling is not contested on appeal. However, the defendants seek to have us reverse the
district court’s denial of relief on the remaining two claims, arguing that the pleadings do
not allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible case that the defendants acted with the
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Buckner v. Gilliland
malice, recklessness, or bad faith that would abrogate their right to statutory immunity. We
find no reversible error and affirm.
Buckner’s complaint alleged that the parties fell into a dispute when Gilliland, an
attorney for Richland County Children’s Services, made an inaccurate statement in court
about a case to which Buckner was assigned as a counselor at Family Life Counseling and
Psychiatric Services, which processed virtually all of the Children’s Services cases in
Richland County. When his complaint about the matter to Children’s Services produced
no results, Buckner decided to approach Gilliland directly. When he spotted Gilliland
arriving at Children’s Services as he was leaving, he parked next to her in order to speak
to her about the case. Gilliland told Buckner that she thought it odd that he had
approached her about the matter and, in effect, accused him of stalking her. Buckner
ended the conversation at that pointand drove away, but Gilliland did not leave it there.
Instead, she reported to Parker, her supervisor, that Buckner had “blocked” her in the
parking lot. As a result, Parker decided to prohibit Buckner from working on Children’s
Services cases. In his complaint, Buckner charged that his total lack of access to cases,
coupled with the damage to his reputation resulting from Gilliland’s misrepresentations,
compelled him to resign his position at Family Services. He eventually moved to another
state and, subsequently, filed this action.
The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that they were employees of a
political subdivision of the State of Ohio, as provided by Ohio Revised Code § 5153.01,
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and were therefore immune from suit unless the plaintiff could establish an exception to
statutory immunity under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03(A)(6). Among those exceptions
is subsection (A)(6)(b), which permits suit against a state employee “whose acts or
omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”
Correctly applying the relevant standard, the district court pointed out that to survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint’s factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the
complaint’s allegations are true.” Buckner, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 802 (citing Ass’n of
Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). In other
words, the court noted, “the complaint must contain sufficient factual material to state a
claim Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The
district court then engaged in a detailed analysis of Ohio tort law as applied to the facts of
this case and concluded as follows:
The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for defamation against
Gilliland in that plaintiff alleges Gilliland made a false and defamatory
statement about him to Parker (namely, Gilliland falsely stated to Parker that
plaintiff had “blocked” her in the parking lot which could reasonably suggest
that Gilliland accused plaintiff of stalking her). In addition, plaintiff has
alleged that this statement resulted in plaintiff being compelled to resign from
his position at Family Services. Contrary to the defendants’ position,
plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to overcome any privilege that may apply
to Gilliland’s statement on a motion to dismiss in that plaintiff alleges Gilliland
made the false statement after plaintiff indicated he was going to pursue a
false representation Gilliland made in the “Jane Doe” case. At the pleadings
stage, this is sufficient to demonstrate that Gilliland did not make the
statement in good faith but instead made it intentionally and maliciously in
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Buckner v. Gilliland
order to retaliate against plaintiff for pursuing the “Jane Doe” matter and/or
to protect herself from plaintiff’s pursuit of the matter. . . .
Likewise, plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to withstand dismissal on his claim
against Parker for intentional interference with plaintiff's employment
relationship with Family Services. Plaintiff's allegations (in particular, his
allegations that Parker “used” Gilliland's “defamatory statement” about him
“as an excuse to get rid” of him because of his pursuit of the juvenile court
matter) are sufficient to suggest that Parker knew of the employment
relationship between plaintiff and Family Services and that Parker intended
to interfere with that relationship when he sent the fax to Family Services.
These allegations are also sufficient to withstand dismissal on the basis of
immunity and privilege. Plaintiff's allegations that Parker communicated with
Family Services in order to “get rid of” plaintiff for raising concerns about
Gilliland's representation in the “Jane Doe” matter are sufficient to support
a conclusion that Parker acted with “actual malice, such as: ill will, spite,
grudge, or some ulterior motive.”
Id. at 804-05.
Having studied the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not
persuaded that the district court erred in denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss two of
the three claims contained in the complaint. Because the reasons for the decision have
been fully articulated by the district court, the issuance of a detailed opinion by this court
would be duplicative and would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
decision of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in its published
opinion.
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