United States v. Curtis Dodson , 450 F. App'x 505 ( 2011 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 11a0825n.06
No. 08-6297
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Dec 12, 2011
)
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) On Appeal from the United States
) District Court for the Western
CURTIS DODSON, ) District of Tennessee
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
Before: BOGGS and STRANCH, Circuit Judges; and THAPAR,* District Judge
BOGGS, Circuit Judge. A federal jury convicted Curtis Dodson of conspiracy to
possess at least five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846,
and aiding and abetting in the possession of more than 500 grams of cocaine with the intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Dodson appeals, claiming first
that the government did not produce enough evidence to convict him of either charge, and second
that the district court erred by admitting law-enforcement officers’ opinion testimony on drug
dealers’ behavior, without giving a contemporaneous dual-role instruction. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
*
Hon. Amul R. Thapar, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
sitting by designation.
No. 08-6297
United States v. Dodson
I
Lucio Sandoval and Francisco Abernathy ran a large drug-dealing operation.
Sandoval arranged to send drugs, initially by UPS and later through private couriers, from California
to a “stash-house” that Abernathy owned in Memphis, Tennessee. Sandoval would then fly to
Memphis, help Abernathy process and sell the drugs, and receive payment.
Dodson met Abernathy through motorcycle racing, and met Sandoval through
Abernathy. Initially, Dodson did not participate in any illegal activity. Eventually, however, he
began to help Sandoval with drug-related tasks, including unloading drugs from the trucks Sandoval
arranged, delivering drugs to local clients, and unwrapping, weighing, and re-packaging drugs,
including the cocaine found in this case.
On March 13, 2006, a state officer, Jason Randolph, discovered approximately five
kilograms of cocaine during a traffic stop. The driver was arrested and cooperated with police. He
explained that he was a hired courier and led officers to Abernathy’s stash-house, where he had
acquired the drugs.
The police did not enter immediately. Instead, a number of Tennessee officers,
accompanied by two federal agents, returned later in the evening. Officer Randolph and colleague
John Birch attempted a ‘knock and talk,’ a noncustodial procedure “where a police officer knocks
on the front door of a home for purposes of speaking to the occupants or asking for consent to search
the premises,” Pritchard v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 424 F. App’x 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2011),
while the other law-enforcement personnel waited outside. As the officers approached the house,
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they encountered Abernathy, who was leaving, and they saw through an open door that several
people were gathered in the living room. They escorted Abernathy back inside. There, Officer
Randolph patted him down, removing a gun, two cell-phones, and a set of car keys from his person.
The officers then ordered all the people in the house to gather in one room. Once all the occupants
were in one place, the officers asked who owned the house. No one answered. Officer Randolph
remained in the living room, while Officer Birch proceeded to the back of the house. There, he
found Dodson and Sandoval in a small bedroom. Both men denied knowing who owned the house.
Birch escorted both to the living room.1
Birch next called for the officers who had been waiting outside. Because no one
admitted to owning the house, the officers decided it was not possible to conduct a search based on
consent. They therefore duly obtained a warrant and began to search the house. In the bedroom
where, according to Sandoval, Dodson stayed, one of the federal agents found a stack of mail in
Dodson’s name. Officers also found a shotgun that Sandoval claimed belonged to Dodson, and
drug-dealing equipment, including digital scales and a vacuum-sealer system.
Officer Dave McGriff, a supervisor, spoke with Dodson twice over the course of the
evening. During the first conversation, Dodson told McGriff that he did not live at the stash-house
or know whose house it was. Later in the evening, Dodson asked McGriff for his car keys—the
same keys Randolph had taken from Abernathy earlier. Along with keys to Dodson’s car, the key-
ring held a key to the stash-house. Still, Dodson denied knowing who owned the house, claiming
that Abernathy must have put the key on the ring.
1
Dodson does not challenge the propriety of the officers’ search of the stash-house.
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United States v. Dodson
The investigation continued after March 13, with Sandoval’s cooperation. Sandoval
used the directory feature in his cell phone to identify phone numbers belonging to Abernathy and
Dodson. Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Abe Collins obtained phone records for the numbers
Sandoval identified and performed a “link-analysis,” which indicates how frequently one cell-phone
user contacts another based on cell-phone records. Agent Collins’s analysis showed that Dodson
contacted Sandoval fourteen times, and Abernathy 122 times, during the period from January 1, 2006
through March 13, 2006.
At trial, both Officer Randolph and Agent Collins testified. On cross-examination,
Dodson’s counsel asked Randolph whether, based on his training and experience, it was common
for drug dealers to register cars in others’ names. Randolph answered that it was. On re-direct-
examination, Randolph testified that drug dealers followed the same practice with cell phones and
firearms. Agent Collins testified about the nature and purposes of stash-houses, drug dealers’ use
of weapons and other equipment, and the street value of cocaine.
The court did not identify either law-enforcement officer as an expert. After the
prosecution asked a series of foundational questions, however, the court did state, in front of the jury,
that Collins could give opinion testimony on “narcotics dealers.” At no point did defense counsel
object to either Officer Randolph or Agent Collins’s opinion testimony. In its jury charge, the trial
court gave an instruction on opinion evidence, providing:
You have heard the testimony of Jason Randolph, Raul Morales2 and Abe Collins
who rendered opinions in this case. A witness who is allowed to render an opinion
has special knowledge or experience that allows him to give an opinion. You do not
2
Morales is a forensic chemist, employed by the DEA.
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United States v. Dodson
have to accept the opinion of such a witness. In deciding how much weight to give
it, you should consider the witness' qualifications and how he reached his
conclusions. Remember that you alone decide how much of a witness' testimony to
believe and how much weight it deserves.3
The jury convicted Dodson of conspiracy to possess at least five kilograms of cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846, and aiding and abetting in the possession
of in excess of 500 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. R. 271.4 Dodson appealed, claiming: (1) the evidence was insufficient
to support conviction on either count; and (2) admission of police testimony on drug dealers’
behavior without a jury instruction on officers’ dual role as lay witnesses and experts was so
prejudicial that it constituted plain error.
II
“[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction . . . [is] whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). “A defendant making
such a challenge bears a very heavy burden.” United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 424 (6th Cir.
2000). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
3
This instruction is nearly identical to Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 7.03.
The only differences were that the court: (1) added: “A witness who is allowed to render an opinion
has special knowledge or experience that allows him to give an opinion,” and (2) omitted: “Also
consider the other factors discussed in these instructions for weighing the credibility of witnesses.”
Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, 7.03 (2009).
4
The district court’s entry of judgment form states that Dodson was convicted on both counts
of the indictment, but incorrectly labels the first count as aiding and abetting, rather than conspiracy.
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to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). Although this court’s
review is de novo, United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 579 (6th Cir. 2009), “[w]e draw all
available inferences and resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the jury's verdict, and it is not
necessary for us to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but guilt.” United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d
966, 971 (6th Cir. 1997).
A
“To sustain a conviction for drug conspiracy under [21 U.S.C.] section 846 the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) an agreement to violate drug laws; (2)
knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy.” United
States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 710 (6th Cir. 2007). “Once a conspiracy has been proven, only
slight evidence is necessary to implicate a defendant as a participant in that conspiracy if the
evidence shows the connection beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tocco, 200 F.3d at 424.
The record below amply supports the jury’s verdict. According to Sandoval, Dodson
helped unload, deliver, weigh, and package drugs. Indeed, Dodson worked with Sandoval to unpack
and re-pack the very cocaine found in this case. Other evidence in the record also supports the jury’s
verdict. The DEA’s investigation showed that Dodson was in frequent phone contact with both
Abernathy and Sandoval; officers searching the stash-house found Dodson’s mail along with a
shotgun that Sandoval claimed belonged to Dodson; and Dodson kept a key to the stash-house with
his car keys—which were found in Abernathy’s pocket. Finally, Dodson lied about his living
situation. There was mail addressed to him at the stash-house and he had a key to the house on his
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key-ring. Nevertheless, he denied living there and claimed he did not know who owned the property.
“[I]t is today universally conceded that the fact of an accused's . . . concealment . . . and related
conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.” United States
v. Griffin, 172 F.3d 874, 1999 WL 71602, at *5 (6th Cir. 1999) (table) (quoting United States v.
Serio, 440 F.2d 827, 832 (6th Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We hold that, in light of Sandoval’s testimony, physical evidence from the stash-
house, and Dodson’s evasive demeanor about his living situation, a reasonable jury could have
inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Dodson knowingly or intentionally agreed to possess, and
participated in possessing, at least five kilograms of cocaine.
Dodson’s contrary arguments—that Sandoval’s testimony does not establish that he
knowingly agreed to participate in the conspiracy, and that Abernathy’s testimony exonerates
him—are unavailing.5 “When deciding whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime, this court does not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of
witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” Gardner, 488 F.3d at 710 (internal
citations omitted). To accept Dodson’s arguments would be to flout this principle. Although
Abernathy flatly denied that Dodson had any role in the drug enterprise, Sandoval expressly stated
that Dodson was an active participant. Which of these witnesses to credit and how much weight to
ascribe to their testimony is the province of the jury.
5
Dodson also suggests that evidence of the drug transaction between him and Sandoval is
insufficient to support his conviction. He appears to ignore the rest of the evidence presented against
him in making this claim.
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Dodson, therefore, has failed to meet his “very heavy burden,” United States v. Tocco,
200 F.3d 401, 424 (6th Cir. 2000), of demonstrating that, “after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, [no] rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
B
“[T]o establish a violation of [21 U.S.C.] § 841(a)(1), the government must prove the
following elements: (1) knowing (2) possession of a controlled substance (3) with intent to
distribute.” United States v. Bonas, 434 F. App’x 422, 430 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States
v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Dodson claims that no evidence exists that he knowingly possessed a controlled
substance, either directly or constructively. He was charged, however, under an aiding-and-abetting
theory. To prove aiding and abetting, the government need only show that Dodson knew that
Abernathy and Sandoval possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it and that he assisted in their
plan to deliver it. See United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 641 (6th Cir. 1994). Sandoval testified
that Dodson worked with him to unload, deliver, weigh, and package drugs. Further, there was mail
addressed to Dodson at the stash-house, where drugs were often in plain view, and he had a key to
the house on his key ring. This evidence easily supports a rational inference that Dodson knew
Abernathy and Sandoval possessed cocaine, with the intent to distribute it, and assisted in their plan
to deliver it. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
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III
Dodson’s final argument is that admission of Officer Randolph and Agent Collins’s
testimony on drug dealers’ habitual behavior, without a contemporaneous dual-role instruction,
requires reversal of his conviction. Plain-error analysis applies to this claim because Dodson did
not object to admission of the officers’ testimony at trial. See United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 656,
658 (6th Cir. 2008). Under plain-error analysis, this court overturns a conviction only if: “(1) there
was error that (2) was plain, (3) affected a substantial right, and (4) seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Ibid. (internal quotation omitted).
Because the court did not err in this case, we need not proceed beyond the first step
of plain-error analysis. A trial judge’s instructions on opinion witnesses are designed to “ameliorate
the risk of jury confusion regarding dual role testimony.” United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d
724, 744 (6th Cir. 2006). At the same time, however, trial courts are not to call attention to a
witness’s expert status, since such a designation risks giving the witness’s opinion the court’s
imprimatur. See United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 697–98 (6th Cir. 2007). Only if a
defendant objects to opinion testimony should the trial court allow voir dire and then decide whether
the witness may offer an opinion. Id. at 698.
The district court in this case did not identify either law-enforcement officer as an
expert, although it did allow Collins to give opinion testimony, after the prosecution asked a series
of foundational questions. In its jury charge, the court gave an instruction substantially identical to
Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 7.03, explaining how the jury should weigh opinion
testimony. See supra note 3.
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The court’s approach was not error. By declining to draw special attention to the
witnesses’ status as law-enforcement officers, then giving this circuit’s pattern instruction on opinion
testimony when charging the jury at the end of the case, the court appropriately balanced the need
to “ameliorate the risk of jury confusion regarding dual role testimony,” Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d
at 744, with the danger of “‘putting some general seal of approval on an expert after he has been
qualified but before any questions have been posed to him.’” Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury
Instruction 7.03, Committee Commentary (2009) (quoting Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342,
1351 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Dodson’s contrary argument rests primarily on analogy to Lopez-Medina, where this
court found that admission of law-enforcement personnel’s testimony as both fact and expert
witnesses, without a dual-purpose instruction and without any clear demarcation between fact and
expert testimony, was plain error. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 742–45. This court, however, has
“declined to extend the holding in Lopez-Medina to circumstances in which there were no other
evidentiary errors.” United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Martin,
520 F.3d at 659–60). Dodson makes no other evidentiary claims. Thus, Lopez-Medina does not
control. Furthermore, the trial court’s jury instruction—while not contemporaneous—was nearly
identical to the instructions the Lopez-Medina court suggested would be sufficient. Compare R. 355
at 768–69 (jury instructions, as recorded in trial transcript), with Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 743.
The only material difference was that, instead of using the term ‘expert witness,’ the trial court used
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the term ‘witness.’6 Thus, unlike the court in Lopez-Medina, the court here “guard[ed] against the
risk of confusion inherent when a law enforcement agent testifies as both a fact witness and as an
expert witness.” Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 744.
We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not commit error, much less plain error,
by admitting law-enforcement officers’ opinion testimony in evidence, then giving an instruction
substantially identical to Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 7.03 in its jury-charge.
IV
The government presented evidence sufficient to convict Dodson on both counts of
the indictment, and the district court did not commit plain error in admitting the officers’ opinion
testimony without a contemporaneous dual-role instruction. We therefore AFFIRM Dodson’s
conviction.
6
This court’s decision in Johnson, 488 F.3d at 697–98, required such an alteration.
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