Ilkhom Rakhmatov v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 511 F. App'x 522 ( 2013 )


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  •                     NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 13a0066n.06
    No. 12-3079
    FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Jan 15, 2013
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                        DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    ILKHOM RAKHMATOV,                               )
    )
    Petitioner,                           )
    )    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM A
    v.                                              )    FINAL ORDER OF THE BOARD OF
    )    IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,          )
    )
    Respondent.                           )
    )
    Before: MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.*
    PER CURIAM. Ilkhom Rakhmatov, a native and citizen of Uzbekistan, seeks judicial review
    of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from a decision
    by an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    under the Convention Against Torture.
    Rakhmatov entered the United States in June 2006 on a student visa, but he never attended
    school. He timely filed his applications for relief in October 2006 based on his Muslim religion.
    The government initiated removal proceedings in September 2007, and Rakhmatov conceded
    removability.
    After a hearing, the IJ found that Rakhmatov had failed to present credible evidence that he
    suffered from past persecution in Uzbekistan. The IJ determined that, even if Rakhmatov had
    established persecution, he failed to show that it was because of his Muslim religion. The IJ also
    *
    The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
    Kentucky, sitting by designation.
    No. 12-3079
    -2-
    found that Rakhmatov had failed to show a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ denied
    Rakhmatov’s requests for relief and the Board subsequently upheld the IJ’s decision on review.
    We have jurisdiction over the Board’s decision affirming the denial of relief pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1). See Singh v. Ashcroft, 
    398 F.3d 396
    , 400 (6th Cir. 2005). Where the Board
    reviews an IJ’s decision and issues a separate opinion rather than summarily affirming the IJ’s
    decision, as in this case, we review the Board’s decision as the final agency determination. Shaya
    v. Holder, 
    586 F.3d 401
    , 405 (6th Cir. 2009). To the extent that the Board adopted the IJ’s
    reasoning, however, we also review the IJ’s decision. 
    Id.
     We review “factual findings, including
    credibility determinations, under a substantial evidence standard” and uphold these factual findings
    if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered
    as a whole.” Abdallahi v. Holder, 
    690 F.3d 467
    , 472 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). We reverse a factual determination only if the evidence not only supports a contrary
    conclusion, but compels it. Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 
    420 F.3d 551
    , 554 (6th Cir. 2005).
    The resolution of an asylum request involves a two-part inquiry: 1) whether the alien
    qualifies as a refugee; and 2) whether the alien merits a favorable exercise of administrative
    discretion by the Attorney General. Gilaj v. Gonzales, 
    408 F.3d 275
    , 283 (6th Cir. 2005). “Refugee”
    is defined as an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country “because of
    persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
    membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A); Rreshpja,
    
    420 F.3d at 554
    . To prevail on a request to withhold removal, an alien must show that there is a
    clear probability that the alien would be subject to persecution if he or she returned to the country
    in question. Pablo-Sanchez v. Holder, 
    600 F.3d 592
    , 594 (6th Cir. 2010). In order to establish
    entitlement to relief under the Convention Against Torture, an alien must prove that it is more likely
    than not that the alien will be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of public officials if he or
    No. 12-3079
    -3-
    she returns to the country in question. 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c)(2); Khozhaynova v. Holder, 
    641 F.3d 187
    , 197 (6th Cir. 2011).
    Rakhmatov’s primary argument is that his right to due process was denied because of faulty
    translation of his testimony, and he disagrees with the adverse credibility determination that was
    based on the translation. An alien must be afforded a full and fair hearing, but to prevail on a due
    process claim, an alien must show substantial prejudice that materially affected the outcome of the
    case. Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 
    585 F.3d 980
    , 992 (6th Cir. 2009). The alien must show that an
    alleged defect “led to a denial of justice.” Garza-Moreno v. Gonzales, 
    489 F.3d 239
    , 241 (6th Cir.
    2007) (quoting Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 
    237 F.3d 696
    , 699 (6th Cir. 2001)).
    Adverse credibility findings should be “based on the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and take
    into account ‘all relevant factors.’” El-Moussa v. Holder, 
    569 F.3d 250
    , 256 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii)). Under this standard, we must uphold an adverse credibility
    determination if supported by the evidence, even if we would have come to a different conclusion.
    El-Moussa, 
    569 F.3d at 256
    . In addition, “where it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence
    for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should be
    provided.” Lin v. Holder, 
    565 F.3d 971
    , 977 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    The lack of a competent interpreter may form the basis for a due process violation in removal
    proceedings. See Amadou v. INS, 
    226 F.3d 724
    , 726–28 (6th Cir. 2000). However, any differences
    between the original transcript and the translation submitted by Rakhmatov were not material to the
    outcome of the case and, thus, do not establish that injustice took place that would support a due
    process argument. Moreover, the transcripts do not show that the interpreter was “incapable of
    interpreting the language petitioner spoke or that he spoke a different dialect.” See 
    id. at 725
    . The
    IJ had broad discretion in conducting the hearing and took proper action to ensure that the interpreter
    was competent and that Rakhmatov had a full and fair hearing. See Ahmed v. Gonzales, 398 F.3d
    No. 12-3079
    -4-
    722, 725 (6th Cir. 2005). The evidence does not compel a conclusion contrary to the Board’s
    determination that Rakhmatov failed to show prejudice. Therefore, his due process claim is without
    merit. See Warner v. Ashcroft, 
    381 F.3d 534
    , 539 (6th Cir. 2004).
    Rakhmatov’s challenge to the Board’s adverse credibility finding is also without merit. The
    Board set forth several valid reasons for finding Rakhmatov not credible. Contrary to Rakhmatov’s
    argument, the Board made an explicit adverse credibility finding upon which it could rely in rejecting
    his claims of persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution, and this finding was not
    based “solely” upon problems with Rakhmatov’s testimony. The Board noted inconsistencies
    between his oral statements and his written statements, the lack of corroborating documents that
    could have reasonably been expected, the unresponsive nature of Rakhmatov’s answers, and
    Rakhmatov’s tendency to override the interpreter’s questions before they were completed. We will
    not disturb the Board’s adverse credibility finding because it is supported by substantial evidence.
    The petition for review is denied.