Ronald Harris v. Robert Langley , 647 F. App'x 585 ( 2016 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 16a0244n.06
Case No. 15-3861 FILED
May 06, 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RONALD HARRIS, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
ROBERT LANGLEY; PATRICK ) OHIO
PETRANEK; CLEVELAND POLICE )
DEPARTMENT; CALVIN WILLIAMS; )
CITY OF CLEVELAND, )
)
Defendants, )
)
DOMINIK PENDLETON, Individually and as )
an Employee of the Cleveland Police )
Department, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
BEFORE: BATCHELDER and WHITE, Circuit Judges; LIPMAN, District Judge.*
SHERYL H. LIPMAN, District Judge. This appeal addresses whether Defendant
Officer Dominik Pendleton, a Cleveland Police Officer, is entitled to immunity from federal
statutory and state common law claims brought by Plaintiff Ronald Harris stemming from
allegations that Officer Pendleton body-slammed and handcuffed Harris for no apparent reason.
*
The Honorable Sheryl H. Lipman, United States District Judge for the Western District of Tennessee, sitting by
designation.
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Officer Pendleton moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity
and state-law immunity. The district court denied Officer Pendleton summary judgment on
Harris’ claims of excessive force and unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, assault and
battery, and false arrest and imprisonment. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the
district court’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 19, 2013, Harris called 911, twice, to report that his eighty-six year old mother
required evaluation by emergency medical services (“EMS”) for “mental status changes.” R. 26,
Harris Depo., PID 153. Harris, a retired nurse in his sixties, was concerned that his mother’s
unusual speech patterns, “body mechanics,” and behavior were precursors to a stroke. Id. at PID
150, 152, 174. Officer Pendleton, a patrol officer for the City of Cleveland, Division of Police,
and his partner, Officer Langley, arrived at Harris’ residence after receiving a call from dispatch
to conduct a welfare check on an elderly female. The parties disagree about what transpired
next; however, because of the posture of this case – an appeal of a denial of summary judgment
on qualified immunity grounds – we only consider, and recite, the facts in the most favorable
view for Harris. See Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he defendant
must nonetheless be willing to concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff for
purposes of the appeal.”).
According to Harris, when the officers arrived at his door, Harris informed them that he
had asked for EMS, and not for police assistance. R. 26, Harris Depo., PID 153-54. Harris
repeated that sentiment at least once, but the police officers did not acknowledge Harris’
statements. Id. at PID 154, 166. Believing there had been “a problem of communication with
us,” Harris invited each officer to come inside. Id. at PID 155. Both officers declined the
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invitation, stating that it was too hot. Id. at PID 155-56. Harris then began to pull his door
closed and reach for the keys to lock it. Id. at PID 156, 164-65.
At that moment, according to Harris, Officer Pendleton opened the door and was “all in
[Harris’] face.” Id. at PID 156. Officer Pendleton body-slammed Harris and knocked him to the
floor on his back. Id. As a result, Harris hit his head on the back of the wall, stunning him to the
point that he was temporarily unsure of where he was. Id. Officer Pendleton placed his left knee
on Harris’ back, grabbed Harris’ wrist, and handcuffed him. Id. at PID 156-57. Harris asked
Officer Pendleton, multiple times, why he was being handcuffed, and Officer Pendleton replied
that it was because Harris had called him a “motherfucker.” Id. at PID 156, 166. Harris,
however, claims that he did not use that word or any other vulgar or aggressive language with the
officers. Id. at PID 166. Harris was handcuffed for approximately two minutes. R. 27,
Pendleton Depo., PID 217. Shortly after this incident, Officer Langley entered Harris’ home and
said that he would call a supervisor. R. 26, Harris Depo., PID 158. A supervisor arrived at the
scene, and Harris filled out a complaint against Officer Pendleton. Id. at PID 159. Harris
“wasn’t in any shape to seek medical treatment that day,” but at some point he was examined at
the VA hospital for injuries to his back and right wrist, and for general soreness. Id. at PID 188.
At no point did Officers Pendleton or Langley speak to Harris’ mother or attempt to ascertain her
health status. Id. at PID 158.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court has “jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts.” “Denial of summary judgment is usually considered an
interlocutory order, not a final judgment, and thus not appealable to this court. However, denial
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of a motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity may be deemed a final,
appealable order because the qualified immunity doctrine exists partly to protect officials from
having to stand trial, and a defendant wrongly forced to go to trial loses the benefit of the
immunity even if exonerated after trial.” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified
immunity to the extent that the appeal raises questions of law, “notwithstanding the absence of a
final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); see also Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995) (“[C]onsiderations of delay, comparative expertise of trial and
appellate courts, and wise use of appellate resources argue in favor of limiting interlocutory
appeals of ‘qualified immunity’ matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law.”).
“[A] defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district
court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial
record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1995). “Instead, a defendant denied qualified immunity may appeal only if the issue on appeal
is whether the plaintiff’s facts, taken at their best, show that the defendant violated clearly
established law.” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, Officer Pendleton presents three issues for review:
(1) Whether the District Court erred by denying summary judgment as to the excessive
force claim when Officer Pendleton’s alleged conduct would have been objectively
reasonable?
(2) Whether the District Court erred by denying summary judgment as to the unlawful
seizure claim when the alleged detention of suspect was based upon probable cause?
(3) Whether the District Court erred by denying summary judgment as to the state-law
claims when Officer Pendleton’s alleged conduct was not malicious, in bad faith, or
wanton or reckless?
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Pendleton Br. 7. Harris opposes appellate jurisdiction, asserting that Officer Pendleton’s
“statement in support of jurisdiction, as well as the arguments themselves, do not identify the
specific legal issue but only complain of the district court’s weighing of factors . . . .” Harris
Br. 5. The court agrees that Officer Pendleton wastes much of his brief arguing that the district
court did not weigh certain disputed facts properly. See Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit,
408 F.3d 305, 309-10 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Because this court does not have appellate jurisdiction
over factual issues, a defendant must ‘concede the most favorable view of the facts to the
plaintiff for purposes of the appeal.’”) (quoting Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir.
1998)).1 However, “even where, as here, the defendant makes impermissible arguments
regarding disputes of fact, if the defendant also raises the purely legal issue of whether the
plaintiff's facts show that the defendant violated clearly established law, then there is an issue
over which this court has jurisdiction.” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir.
2013). Because Officer Pendleton does at times concede Harris’ version of the facts and argues
that, despite this concession, he did not violate any of Harris’ clearly established constitutional
rights, this court has jurisdiction to hear his appeal. Pendleton Br. 17, 23. Thus we proceed on
Harris’ version of the facts. But “in accepting the district court’s factual determinations and
relying on the plaintiff’s record evidence for the purpose of deciding interlocutory appeal, we do
1
For instance, Officer Pendleton argues that “[t]he District Court . . . incorrectly held that it must
accept Plaintiff’s version and may not weigh different versions. Rather the appropriate standard
calls for determining whether or not an officer’s actions were reasonable under ‘the totality of
the circumstances.’” Pendleton Br. 20 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97
(1989)). This statement is wholly incorrect: Officer Pendleton conflates the burden of proof with
the elements of an excessive force claim. At summary judgment, where there are disputed issues
of material fact, the district court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and then determine whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates
that a use of force was objectively reasonable.
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not ourselves make any findings of fact or inference for purposes of any subsequent
proceedings.” DiLuzio v. Vill. Of Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations
omitted).
B. Qualified Immunity
“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary
functions are shielded from civil liability unless their conduct violates clearly established
constitutional rights. Thus, a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment
unless the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a
reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right
was clearly established.” Bishop, 636 F.3d at 765 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)). “Either step can precede the other as desired.” Gordon v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty.
Metro Gov’t, 486 F. App’x 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2012). We review the district court’s denial of
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, as limited to questions of law, de
novo. Bishop, 636 F.3d at 765.
1. Excessive Force
We first review whether Officer Pendleton violated Harris’ Fourth Amendment right to
be free from excessive force when he allegedly grabbed Harris by the wrist, body-slammed him,
and placed his knee into Harris’ back. We then determine whether that right, if violated, was
clearly established.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from using excessive force. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). When a citizen claims “that law enforcement officials used
excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his
person . . . such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective
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reasonableness’ standard.” Id. at 388. “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. A court must make this determination from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). “Determining whether the force used to effect a
particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
The court must also examine the following factors in this balancing test: “the relationship
between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's
injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of
the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. “Not every push or shove, even if
it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth
Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also
Lopez v. City of Cleveland, 625 F. App’x 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The Court has identified
three non-exhaustive factors for lower courts to consider in determining the reasonableness of a
police officer’s use of force: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed
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an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others; and (3) whether the suspect actively
resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest by flight.”).
Here, conceding the facts in favor of Harris, Officer Pendleton’s actions are sufficiently
excessive to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Harris requested EMS to come to his
home to evaluate his elderly mother’s health. When two police officers arrived on the scene,
Harris explained to them that he had requested EMS and not the police. Both police officers
ignored Harris, at which point Harris invited them to come inside. Both police officers denied
Harris’ invitation. At no point did the police officers inquire into Harris’ mother’s health,
vitiating any argument that the police officers felt compelled to use force for Harris’ mother’s
sake. Moreover, Harris did not exhibit any signs of threatening or at-risk behavior to the police
officers. There was no need for any force in this situation because no crime was being
committed and there was no immediate threat to the safety of anyone; yet, when Harris decided
to close the door to his own home, Officer Pendleton suddenly attacked him without warning.
This unprovoked violence cannot be excused as the consequence of a “split-second judgment.”
The facts, as alleged, portray a patently unreasonable use of force.
The court must next determine whether Harris’ violated rights were clearly established.
For a right to be clearly established, “the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “In deciding whether the right was clearly established, the
Supreme Court has cautioned lower courts ‘not to define clearly established law at a high level of
generality.’” Al-Lamadani v. Lang, 624 F. App’x 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)). “This is not to say that an
official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has
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previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (internal citation omitted). Here,
there is no opacity in the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unprovoked body slams from
police officers, whether this exact scenario has been held unlawful in a previous decision or not.
Because Officer Pendleton allegedly violated Harris’ clearly established constitutional right to be
free from excessive force, Officer Pendleton does not receive the shield of qualified immunity on
this claim.
2. Unlawful Detention
We now determine whether Officer Pendleton’s temporary handcuffing of Harris was an
unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and, if so, whether that right was clearly
established.
There are two prongs to a Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure analysis: first, whether a
“seizure” occurred, and, second, whether that seizure was unreasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 16 (1968). As to the first inquiry, “[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.” Id. at
16; see also Al-Lamadani, 624 F. App’x at 410 (“The Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable seizures, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional
arrest.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Harris was not arrested, it is clear that
Officer Pendleton seized Harris when he placed his knee into Harris’ back and handcuffed him,
restraining his liberty. We next consider the second prong of the analysis: whether that seizure
was unreasonable.
Every arrest must be supported by probable cause to be considered reasonable; however,
in a case such as this one, where there has been a limited intrusion on a person’s liberty but no
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formal arrest, that intrusion may be justified by something less than probable cause. See
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981); see also Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1031, 1037 (2013) (cataloging cases where a less severe intrusion was justified absent probable
cause). “There is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.” Terry, 392 U.S. at
21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, again in the most favorable view for Harris, his
detention was unreasonable because the scale tips uniformly on one side – there was no need to
detain Harris, but his liberty was invaded nonetheless.
In his brief, Officer Pendleton contends that he had probable cause to detain Harris
because Harris obstructed official business in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2921.31 and
Cleveland Codified Ordinance 615.06. Pendleton Br. 18-19. Ohio Revised Code § 2921.31
states that, “no person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay
the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official’s official
capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the
public official’s lawful duties.” The Cleveland Ordinance includes a parallel provision requiring
a purposeful intent to obstruct the performance of a public official’s duty. Harris acknowledged
that he made a call for a welfare check, and that public officials are asked to conduct welfare
checks; however, relying on Harris’ version of the facts, there can be no question that Harris did
not intend to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of the police officers by pulling his door
closed after the police officers had just declined his invitation to enter his home.
Officer Pendleton also lacked probable cause to suspect that Harris pulled the door closed
to commit a crime against his elderly mother. Harris called for emergency medical services,
greeted the police officers when they arrived at the scene, and invited the police into his home –
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there is no reason to believe that Harris was in pursuit of harming his mother. Although there
was no probable cause to believe that Harris had committed or was about to commit any crime,
that does not end the analysis because, in Summers, 452 U.S. at 700, the Supreme Court
enumerated a number of other considerations that may justify a limited intrusion absent probable
cause.
In Summers, the Supreme Court found that a limited intrusion was reasonable when the
police temporarily restrained a person, absent probable cause, while conducting a search in that
person’s home pursuant to a validly executed search warrant. Id. “The rule announced in
Summers allows detention incident to the execution of a search warrant ‘because the character of
the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention
are substantial.’” Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1038, 185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2013)
(quoting Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299 (2005)). The
additional intrusion was considered “slight” because, according to the Supreme Court, a
homeowner may wish to remain in her home during a search and the impaired dignity of a public
detention is absent inside the privacy of one’s own home. Summers, 452 U.S at 700. The Court
also tallied the following justifications for such intrusions: preventing flight, minimizing the risk
of harm to the officers, a suspicion of wrongdoing regarding the detained resident, and
promoting the orderly completion of the search. Id. at 702-703. Ultimately, “[a] determination
of reasonableness hinges on ‘the law enforcement interest and the nature of the ‘articulable facts’
supporting the detention.’” Gordon, 486 F. App’x at 542 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702).
Here, there are no articulable facts or law enforcement interests supporting any detention,
light or otherwise: There was no “interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers,”
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702, because there was no credible threat to the police officers’ safety
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when Harris pulled his door closed after the police officers declined his invitation to enter; there
was no valid search warrant requiring detention for “the orderly completion of [a] search,” id. at
703; there was no viable concern that Harris was engaged in wrongdoing, as discussed supra,
nor was there any “legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that
incriminating evidence is found,” id. at 702, because there was no search warrant and Harris was
the person who called for emergency medical services and even invited the police officers into
his home. Conceding Harris’ version of the facts, Officer Pendleton’s seizure of Harris was
demonstrably unreasonable. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment clearly prohibits an absolutely
unjustified seizure of an individual. As a matter of law, Officer Pendleton is not entitled to the
shield of qualified immunity for this claim.
C. State-law Immunity
The district court denied Officer Pendleton’s state-law immunity defense for the claims
of assault and battery and false arrest and imprisonment. Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03(A)(6)
provides immunity to state employees of political subdivisions for any act in connection with a
government function causing injury, unless the act was “manifestly outside the scope of the
employee’s employment or official responsibilities” or was done “with malicious purpose, in bad
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” When federal qualified immunity and Ohio state-law
immunity under § 2744.03(A)(6) rest on the same questions of material fact, the court may
review the state-law immunity defense “through the lens of the federal qualified immunity
analysis.” Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 n.1 (6th Cir. 2009). As discussed,
conceding the facts in favor of Harris, there is no justification for either the body slam or the
detention; accordingly, there is no state-law immunity from the claims arising out of those
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actions because they were done in bad faith and in a wanton or reckless manner. As a matter of
law, Officer Pendleton is not entitled to state-law immunity from Harris’ state-law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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