Miguel Fernandez Moreta v. Jefferson Sessions, III ( 2018 )


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  •                 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 18a0408n.06
    Case No. 17-4162
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    FILED
    Aug 14, 2018
    MIGUEL FERNANDEZ MORETA,                         )                        DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    )
    Petitioner,                              )
    )         ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
    v.                                               )         FROM THE UNITED STATES
    )         BOARD   OF  IMMIGRATION
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U.S.                 )         APPEALS
    Attorney General,                                )
    )
    Respondent.                              )
    BEFORE: COOK, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
    COOK, Circuit Judge. Miguel Fernandez Moreta, a native and citizen of the Dominican
    Republic, seeks reversal of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (the “Board”) denial of his motions
    to reopen and to reconsider his application for cancellation of removal. For the following reasons,
    we deny his petition.
    I.
    Since immigrating to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2002, Fernandez
    has lived in Michigan near his parents and three siblings. But he hasn’t always conducted himself
    lawfully, having three times been convicted of possessing controlled substances. Following his
    last arrest, the Department of Homeland Security started removal proceedings against him. See
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(B)(i). And though found eligible for removal, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
    nevertheless granted Fernandez a discretionary cancellation of removal, citing “social and humane
    considerations” for keeping Fernandez’s family together.
    Case No. 17-4162
    Fernandez v. Sessions
    The Board saw it differently. After reweighing the equities of Fernandez’s case, it vacated
    the IJ’s grant of discretionary relief and ordered him removed. In its consideration, the Board
    acknowledged the length of Fernandez’s lawful residency and his extensive family ties to the
    United States.   It nevertheless decided that his criminal record and history of drug abuse
    outweighed those considerations. It also denied Fernandez’s later motions for reconsideration and
    reopening. Those denials occasion this petition.
    II.
    We review the Board’s denial of either a motion to reconsider or to reopen for abuse of
    discretion, Vasquez Salazar v. Mukasey, 
    514 F.3d 643
    , 645 (6th Cir. 2008); Allabani v. Gonzales,
    
    402 F.3d 668
    , 675 (6th Cir. 2005), looking for whether the Board “acts arbitrarily, irrationally or
    contrary to law.” Sswajje v. Ashcroft, 
    350 F.3d 528
    , 532 (6th Cir. 2003).
    A.      Motion to Reconsider
    Fernandez first seeks review of the denial of his motion for reconsideration, alleging that
    the Board impermissibly made its own factual findings in denying him discretionary relief. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
    (d)(3)(iv) (providing that beyond taking administrative notice of certain facts, the
    Board “will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding appeals.”). When the Attorney
    General, acting through the Board, denies an alien’s application for cancellation of removal, we
    lack jurisdiction to review discretionary aspects of the decision. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B); Aburto-
    Rocha v. Mukasey, 
    535 F.3d 500
    , 502 (6th Cir. 2008). We retain jurisdiction, however, to review
    2
    Case No. 17-4162
    Fernandez v. Sessions
    the decision’s non-discretionary features, including “constitutional claims or questions of law.”
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(D); Aburto-Rocha, 
    535 F.3d at 502
    .
    Although Fernandez contends that his appeal of these denials raises questions of law, we
    may assume that it does without deciding, and deny on the merits. Djokic v. Sessions, 683 F.
    App’x 385, 390 (6th Cir. 2017). And to the extent that Fernandez’s claim presents a question of
    law, see Hussam F. v. Sessions, No. 17-3641, 
    2018 WL 3599146
    , at *10 (6th Cir. July 27, 2018)
    (published) (finding jurisdiction to review whether the Board engaged in impermissible fact
    finding), we assume for purposes of argument that we may review it. But even assuming
    jurisdiction, his claim nevertheless fails.
    Fernandez maintains that the Board made its own findings concerning a warning he
    received from an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer. Yet as we read the record, the
    Board’s decision simply described Fernandez’s testimony. It observed––as the IJ had found––that
    the officer warned him about the risk of deportation in the event of further criminal activity. In
    the absence of any evidence of impermissible fact-finding, this court is without a basis to criticize
    the decision, let alone find an abuse of discretion. See Sova v. Holder, 451 F. App’x 543, 547–48
    (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Board did not impermissibly engage in fact-finding when it
    summarized letters in the record).
    B.       Motion to Reopen
    As for the denial of his motion to reopen, Fernandez targets the Board’s refusal to allow
    him to present new evidence of his rehabilitation and the hardship that his removal imposes on his
    3
    Case No. 17-4162
    Fernandez v. Sessions
    family. A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence
    sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or
    presented at the former hearing.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(1). To the extent that the Board’s ruling
    involves a nondiscretionary decision concerning whether the evidence presented was new and
    previously unavailable, we assume for purposes of argument that we have jurisdiction to review
    it. See Ortiz-Cervantes v. Holder, 596 F. App’x 429, 432–33 (6th Cir. 2015) (assuming arguendo
    that we had jurisdiction to review the Board’s determination that the evidence was not new or
    formerly unavailable).
    The Board determined that Fernandez failed to show that his proffered evidence––his
    substance-abuse counseling records and letters from his friends and family––could not have been
    discovered or presented earlier. Indeed, Fernandez’s counseling records predate his February 2017
    merits hearing, and he offered no sufficient explanation for why he could not have submitted those
    records beforehand. And although the letters from his friends and family confirm their support for
    Fernandez, they are not new material evidence. Given the cumulative nature of this evidence, the
    refusal to reopen the case fell comfortably within the Board’s discretion.
    III.
    We DENY the petition for review.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-4162

Filed Date: 8/14/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021