Wanda Tubbs v. Jeff Long ( 2022 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 22a0433n.06
No. 22-5127
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
) Oct 24, 2022
WANDA TUBBS,
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JEFF LONG, in his capacity as the Tennessee ) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
Commissioner of Safety; STATE OF ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
TENNESSEE; BRANDON GULLETT; )
BRANDON KING; DARRYL YOUNG; )
CANNON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, OPINION
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
)
Before: MOORE, CLAY, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Wanda Tubbs filed a complaint
alleging that her Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated as a result of a civil
forfeiture proceeding. She appeals the district court’s determination that the court lacked
jurisdiction over her claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that principles of res judicata
bar consideration of her claims. We hold that both the Rooker-Feldman and res judicata doctrines
preclude consideration of her claims. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
Wanda Tubbs owned a home that she leased to her son Terrance Martin and his girlfriend
Shaundra Smith. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 9–10) (Page ID #19). On May 3, 2017, Cannon County Sheriff’s
Deputy Brandon King visited the home to serve Martin with a civil paper relating to child support.
No. 22-5127, Tubbs v. Long et al.
Id. ¶ 8. While serving the paper, King allegedly smelled marijuana. Id. ¶ 11. He returned to
headquarters and reported this information to Investigator Brandon Gullett, who sought and
obtained a search warrant for the property based on the odor. Id. ¶ 11, 13. In the affidavit
supporting his request for a search warrant, Gullett averred that he had uncovered a “large amount
of marijuana” in Martin’s home three months earlier, when investigating a home invasion. Id. ¶ 14
(Page ID #20).
On May 4, 2017, Cannon County Sheriff Darryl Young, Investigator Gullett, and other
officers executed the search warrant. Id. ¶ 17. In the home, they found illegal drugs and
approximately $154,000. Tubbs v. Long, 610 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020), perm. app.
denied (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2020), cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 1750 (2021). Some of that money was in a
Michael Kors purse, which Tubbs alleged she had left at the house prior to the search. She claims
that the purse contained between $95,000 and $97,000. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 23) (Page ID #21). Police
contend that the purse held $93,740. Id. ¶ 24. During the search, police seized the purse, its
contents, and three other containers of money. R. 40 (D. Ct. Mem. Op. at 2) (Page ID #322). They
subsequently sought a forfeiture warrant on the grounds that the money constituted proceeds
traceable to a violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act. Id. Tubbs filed a claim with the
Tennessee Department of Safety seeking the return of her purse and the money inside. R. 1
(Compl. ¶ 27) (Page ID #22).
The Department of Safety held a hearing on her forfeiture claim, with a state administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) presiding. Id. ¶ 28. At the start of the hearing, Tubbs filed a motion to suppress
the evidence gathered as a result of the search, alleging that the police fabricated the odor of
marijuana and falsely claimed that they had recovered a large amount of marijuana from the house
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several months earlier. Id. ¶ 29. The ALJ denied the motion to suppress, finding that Tubbs did
not have standing under the Fourth Amendment to contest the search and that even if she did, the
search warrant was valid. Id. ¶ 39 (Page ID #24). The ALJ then found that Tubbs had not shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that the money belonged to her. Id. ¶ 41 (Page ID #25).
Tubbs sought review of the ALJ’s determination in the Davidson County Circuit Court.
Id. ¶ 42 (Page ID #25). The circuit court affirmed the ALJ. Id. ¶ 43. Tubbs then appealed to the
Tennessee Court of Appeals. Id. ¶¶ 43, 44–46 (Page ID #25–26). The state court of appeals
interpreted Tennessee Code Annotated § 53-11-201(f), which governs civil forfeitures, to require
that a claimant demonstrate a proprietary interest in seized property as a threshold matter. Tubbs,
610 S.W.3d at 12–13. The court of appeals referred to this as “standing to challenge the forfeiture.”
Id. at 13. It then affirmed the ALJ, who had found that Tubbs had not shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that the purse and money were hers. Id. The court did not address Tubbs’s appeal
of the ALJ’s dismissal of Tubbs’s motion to suppress, because her lack of standing to contest the
forfeiture rendered the Fourth Amendment issue moot. Id. at 16–17. The court denied Tubbs’s
petition for rehearing. R. 20-2 (Order Denying Pet. Reh’g at 1) (Page ID #126). The Tennessee
Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court denied further review.
Tubbs filed this action in federal court after the state court of appeals denied her motion to
rehear. She named as defendants the State of Tennessee and Jeff Long in his official capacity as
Tennessee Commissioner of Safety (the “State Defendants”), as well as Cannon County,
Tennessee and, in their individual capacities, Cannon County Sheriff Darryl Young and two
Cannon County Sheriff’s officers, Brandon Gullett and Brandon King (the “County Defendants”).
In her complaint, she alleges two claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against all Defendants. In Count
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I, she alleges that Defendants deprived her of property and liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment “[b]y implementing a forfeiture via administrative procedure that barred the Plaintiff
from suppressing evidence for Fourth Amendment violations . . . .” R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 52) (Page ID
#27). In Count II, she alleges that Defendants committed an uncompensated taking in violation of
the Fifth Amendment by seizing her purse and the money therein and failing to compensate her.
Id. ¶ 57 (Page ID #28–29). She also alleges a state-law trespass claim against King and Gullett,
and a state-law conversion claim against King, Gullett, and Young. Id. ¶¶ 60–63 (Page ID #29–
30). She seeks several forms of relief: injunctive relief against Commissioner Long and the State
of Tennessee, ordering them to return the purse and its contents ($93,740); compensatory damages
from Young, King, Gullett, and Cannon County in the amount of $475,000; punitive damages
from King and Gullett; and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. at 19 (Page
ID #35).
State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit against them. R. 20 (Mot. to Dismiss
Mem. of Law at 1) (Page ID #102). County Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. R. 33 (County Def. Mot. at 1) (Page ID #280). Tubbs responded to both motions. R.
27 (Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 1) (Page ID #236); R. 35 (Resp. to County Def. Mot. at 1) (Page
ID #300). The district court converted County Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. R. 40 (D. Ct. Mem. Op. at 8) (Page
ID #328). The district court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Rooker-Feldman
operated to bar federal-court jurisdiction in the case, and if it did not, that res judicata applied. Id.
at 17, 20, 21–22 (Page ID #337, 340, 341–42). The district court then dismissed the state-law
claims without prejudice, declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 26 (Page ID
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#346). Tubbs timely filed a notice of appeal on February 18, 2022. R. 43 (Notice of Appeal at 1)
(Page ID #350).
II. ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2006). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine arose from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). These cases held
that lower federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction “to review and reverse unfavorable
state-court judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005).
In Exxon, the Supreme Court delimited the scope of the doctrine as “confined to cases of the kind
from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 284. Tubbs brought
two claims against Defendants: a Fourteenth Amendment claim, alleging that Defendants applied
the law unconstitutionally in her case, and a Fifth Amendment claim, alleging that Defendants
took her property without compensation. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 51–59) (Page ID #27–29). For the
reasons explained below, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed both claims under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only “when a plaintiff complains of injury from the
state court judgment itself.” Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 858 (6th Cir. 2006). “If there is
some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent
claim.” McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. To determine the source of the injury, we must look to the
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allegations contained in the federal complaint, Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 299 (6th Cir. 2012),
and to the plaintiff’s request for relief, Isaacs v. DBI-ASG Coinvestor Fund (In re Isaacs), 895
F.3d 904, 912 (6th Cir. 2018).
Tubbs makes one broad counterargument against the application of Rooker-Feldman. She
argues that there is a rule of thumb in the Sixth Circuit stating that Rooker-Feldman should be
applied to parties who were defendants in state court, and res judicata should be applied to parties
who were plaintiffs in state court. Appellant Br. at 21 (quoting Hutcherson v. Lauderdale County,
326 F.3d 747, 755 (6th Cir. 2003)). The rule of thumb she cites is more accurately described as a
“rough guide” to determining whether to apply Rooker-Feldman or res judicata, and “should not
be understood as a per se rule.” Hutcherson, 326 F.3d at 755–56 (quoting Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d
1362, 1365–67 (7th Cir. 1996)). We have never held that whether a party was the plaintiff or
defendant in state court is dispositive of whether to apply Rooker-Feldman or principles of res
judicata.
Tubbs also argues that she was not attacking or appealing the state court judgment but
instead was challenging the law-enforcement officers who physically seized the purse and money
and the Tennessee Department of Safety. We address this argument for each claim below, paying
careful attention to both the source of the alleged injury and the relief requested.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Tubbs’s complaint alleges that the State and County Defendants violated her due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment “[b]y implementing a forfeiture via administrative
procedure that barred the Plaintiff from suppressing evidence for Fourth Amendment violations
. . . .” R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 52) (Page ID #27). Tubbs challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee
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statute governing forfeiture in cases like hers, as applied by the ALJ in her forfeiture hearing and
as interpreted and applied by the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Id. ¶¶ 52–55 (Page ID #27–28).
Specifically, she objects to the procedure required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 53-11-201(f),
as interpreted and applied by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in her own case, under which the
Tennessee Department of Safety ALJ must inquire first whether an individual has standing to
challenge a forfeiture before considering a motion to suppress evidence gathered allegedly in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Appellant Reply Br. at 3, 8. She claims that adjudicating
standing to challenge the forfeiture before considering and ruling on a motion to suppress violates
her Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment rights. R. 27 (Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 5) (Page ID
#240); Appellant Br. at 31. As a remedy, she seeks an injunction ordering Defendants to return
the purse and the money found inside (totaling $93,740), as well as compensatory damages from
the County and individual defendants and attorney fees. R. 1 (Compl. at 19) (Page ID #35).
Although Tubbs sued state administrative actors and the state itself, rather than the
Tennessee Court of Appeals, the source of her injury is clearly the judgment of the state court. She
argues now that State Defendants deprived her of due process by effecting an administrative
proceeding that did not permit her to suppress evidence that was allegedly illegally seized.
Appellant Br. at 31. But State Defendants did not use the process that she argues violated her
rights to due process. At her administrative hearing, the ALJ heard and ruled on her motion to
suppress before determining whether she had standing to contest the forfeiture. R. 1 (Compl.
¶¶ 27–41) (Page ID #22–25); R. 20-1 (Pet. Reh’g at 6–7) (Page ID #122–23). When seeking
rehearing of the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ decision, Tubbs contended that “[t]hat was the right
sequence.” R. 20-1 (Pet. Reh’g at 5) (Page ID #121).
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The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however, did use the sequence to which Tubbs objects,
and declined to reach the merits of Tubbs’s motion to suppress. Tubbs, 610 S.W.3d at 17. The
state court reasoned that, because Tubbs failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
she had a proprietary interest in the seized purse and money, she lacked standing to challenge the
forfeiture, and therefore the court “pretermitted” decision on her motion to suppress. Id.
Tubbs took issue with the process afforded to her in the administrative hearing only after
the state court decision. Her Fourteenth Amendment claim is a clear challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute as applied by the Tennessee Court of Appeals––not as applied by
the ALJ.1 See R. 20-1 (Pet. Reh’g at 7) (Page ID #123) (arguing that “the statute would be
unconstitutional if applied” to require a claimant to show they had a proprietary interest in seized
property as a threshold matter); id. at 8–9 (Page ID #124–25) (“[T]he Court has used evidence
gathered illegally, in order to find that the merits of the case weigh against Ms. Tubbs . . . and then
used those same merits to decline to rule on whether the evidence was gathered illegally in the first
place.”); Appellant Br. at 33 (“[T]he Defendants used a state agency proceeding to take Tubbs’s
life savings, a proceeding whose laws did not allow her to litigate a motion to suppress . . . .”); id.
at 31 (“Only when Tubbs took the matter to the Court of Appeals did the state judiciary announce
a new procedure: Before any claimant may reap the benefits of suppressing illegally seized
1
Tubbs has argued that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to decisions of state administrative
agencies. Appellant Br. at 28–29 (quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md.,
535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine has no application to judicial
review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency.”)).
That question is not at issue here because, despite her pleading, she is not seeking review of just
the decision of a state administrative agency but is also seeking review of the decision of the
Tennessee Court of Appeals. Her claim effectively requests that the federal courts overrule the
state court’s decision as well as the administrative agency’s decision.
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evidence, first the claimant must prove her entire case without suppressing said evidence.”
(emphasis in original)).
This case differs from others in which we have held that lawsuits against other state actors
were not barred by Rooker-Feldman. In both Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Department of
Children and Family Services, 606 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2010), and Pittman v. Cuyahoga County
Department of Children and Family Services, 241 F. App’x 285 (6th Cir. 2007), the plaintiffs
challenged the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services’ underlying
conduct leading up to a juvenile court’s decision to award custody of their children to the County.
Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 306; Pittman, 241 F. App’x at 286–87. In both cases, we determined that the
plaintiffs were not challenging the juvenile court’s decision to award custody to the county but
were instead alleging that their rights had been violated by the Department of Children and Family
Services either during its investigations or during its physical removal of the children from the
home. Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 310–11; Pittman, 241 F. App’x at 288. These constituted “some other
source of injury, such as a third party’s actions,” that make an independent claim that is not barred
by Rooker-Feldman. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. Here, by contrast, Tubbs did not allege in her
complaint that Defendants had engaged in any unconstitutional conduct beyond the application to
her case of what she contends is an unconstitutional state law.
The remedy that Tubbs requested is further evidence that the source of her injury was the
state court judgment. She seeks to recover the purse and money. R. 1 (Compl. at 19) (Page ID
#35). But in order for her claim to succeed and for her relief to be granted, a federal court would
have to conclude that the Tennessee Court of Appeals wrongly decided the issue of her standing
to challenge the forfeiture and effectively reverse the state court judgment by ordering Defendants
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to return the money and purse to Tubbs. Cf. Durham v. Haslam, 528 F. App’x 559, 564 (6th Cir.
2013) (“The relief that [Plaintiff] requested could not be granted without overturning the judgment
of the state court that affirmed her discharge . . . .”). The district court correctly dismissed the
Fourteenth Amendment claim against all Defendants for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
Rooker-Feldman.
B. Fifth Amendment Takings Claim
Tubbs also alleges that the State and County Defendants seized her purse and money
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 57–59) (Page ID
#28–29). This claim too is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Roch v. Humane Society
of Bedford County, Tennessee, Inc., 134 F. App’x 68 (6th Cir. 2005), the plaintiffs filed a Takings
Clause claim in federal court alleging that the humane society had seized and euthanized their dogs
without just compensation. Id. at 70. The plaintiffs in Roch filed that claim after there had been
extensive litigation in state court over the seizure of the dogs. Id. We determined that the plaintiffs
were “attempting to use a federal forum to attack the state court’s judgment,” because the suit
“expresse[d] ‘unhappiness’ with the state court’s decision” to grant the humane society the
authority to seize the dogs. Therefore, we held that Rooker-Feldman applied. Id. at 71. This case
is analogous. Tubbs’s Fifth Amendment claim essentially takes issue with the Tennessee Court of
Appeals’ decision to affirm the decision of the Tennessee Department of Safety ALJ in her
forfeiture proceeding.
For a federal court to rule in Tubbs’s favor, it would have to overturn the determination of
the Tennessee Court of Appeals that Tubbs lacked a proprietary interest in the money and the
purse. Tubbs “would only prevail on [her] claims if the state court were wrong,” so the state court
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judgment is the source of her injury. RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, 4 F.4th 380,
388 (6th Cir. 2021). Our sibling circuits have held similarly; for example, the Tenth Circuit in
Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012), held that a Fifth Amendment claim
challenging a state court forfeiture was “a direct attack on the state court’s judgment because an
element of the claim is that the judgment was wrongful.” Id. at 1284. In that case, the plaintiff’s
allegations resembled Tubbs’s allegations: “that the defendants deprived her of [compensation
and] due process by unconstitutionally using Oklahoma’s forfeiture procedures.” Id. (emphasis
removed) (quotation omitted). But there, as here, the forfeiture proceedings were ratified by the
state courts. In Tubbs’s case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the Tennessee Department
of Safety ALJ’s determination that she did not have standing to contest the forfeiture. We agree
with the district court that Rooker-Feldman bars subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim.
III. CLAIM PRECLUSION
If Tubbs’s claims against State Defendants were not barred by Rooker-Feldman, they
would be barred by principles of res judicata.2 “We review de novo a district court’s application
of the doctrine of res judicata.” Bragg v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 570 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2009).
“Res judicata ‘preclude[s] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate.’” Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 337 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in
original) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). There are two types of
res judicata: issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
State Defendants assert an affirmative defense of claim preclusion. State Appellee Br. at 16.
2
County Defendants did not assert res judicata as a defense below. Consequently, we do
not consider the applicability of res judicata principles with respect to County Defendants.
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“When a case implicates [claim preclusion or issue preclusion doctrines], the full-faith-
and-credit statute tells us to follow the preclusion rules adopted by the courts that adjudicated the
prior proceedings.” CHKRS, LLC v. City of Dublin, 984 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2021); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738. We must look to Tennessee law to determine the effect of claim preclusion principles on
Tubbs’s federal case. In Tennessee, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion bars a
second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same claim with respect to all issues
which were, or could have been, litigated in the former suit.” Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. City of
Memphis, 620 S.W.3d 318, 323–24 (Tenn. 2021) (quoting Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491
(Tenn. 2012)). Claim preclusion is an affirmative defense, and a defendant must demonstrate:
“(1) that the underlying judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) that the
same parties or their privies were involved in both suits, (3) that the same claim or cause of action
was asserted in both suits, and (4) that the underlying judgment was final and on the merits.”
Jackson, 387 S.W.3d at 491 (citations omitted). Here, Tubbs contests only the third element, that
the same claim or cause of action was involved in both suits. Appellant Br. at 36. Tennessee
courts have determined that “[t]wo suits . . . [constitute] the same ‘cause of action’ for purposes of
res judicata where they arise out of the same transaction or a series of connected transactions.”
Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 381 (Tenn. 2009).
Both of Tubbs’s federal claims arise out of the same transaction as her state court forfeiture
case. Tubbs alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation in her petition for rehearing before the
Tennessee Court of Appeals. R. 20-1 (Pet. for Reh’g at 3–4) (Page ID #119–20). The Tennessee
Court of Appeals denied that petition for rehearing, stating that the issues raised in the petition
were “sufficiently addressed” in its opinion. R. 20-2 (Order Denying Pet. Reh’g at 1) (Page ID
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#126). She sought review in the Tennessee Supreme Court, which declined to review the case,
and in the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied her petition for certiorari. The instant complaint
makes the same claim, asserting a violation of Tubbs’s Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result
of the civil forfeiture proceeding in the state administrative agency and state courts. Tubbs’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim would be barred by res judicata if Rooker-Feldman did not apply.
Tubbs’s Fifth Amendment claim is also barred by principles of res judicata. Claim
preclusion “applies not only to issues that were raised and adjudicated in the prior lawsuit, but to
‘all claims and issues which were relevant and which could reasonably have been litigated in a
prior action.’” Davidson v. Bredesen, 330 S.W.3d 876, 884–85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting
Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chattanooga v. Clark, 586 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tenn. 1979)). The
Fifth Amendment claim arises out of the same transaction as the prior litigation in state court, and
Tubbs could have raised her Fifth Amendment claim in the state court litigation. As recognized
by the district court, Tennessee courts have permitted individuals to raise constitutional challenges
in judicial review of forfeiture decisions. R. 40 (D. Ct. Mem. Op. at 23) (Page ID #343); see Stuart
v. State Dep’t of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tenn. 1998) (considering on appeal whether forfeiture
imposes punishment within the meaning of the double jeopardy clauses or is an excessive fine
under the Eighth Amendment); Fisher v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., No. M2018-
02041-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 1932487, at *2, 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2020) (considering due
process claims and Eighth Amendment claims related to a forfeiture action). Tubbs’s Fifth
Amendment claim was clearly relevant and could have been litigated in the state courts. We agree
with the district court that the Fifth Amendment claim, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment
claim, is subject to dismissal based on claim preclusion.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Tubbs’s complaint requests review and reversal of a state court judgment, and thus the
federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Her federal
claims also either were already litigated or could have been litigated in state court, and the
principles of res judicata would bar consideration of her claims if Rooker-Feldman did not.
Because the district court correctly dismissed the federal claims, it properly declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice. See Gamel v. City
of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 2010). We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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