In re: Frank Lawrence, Jr. ( 2022 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 22a0541n.06
No. 21-1426
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Dec 29, 2022
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
In re: FRANK LAWRENCE, JR., ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
Petitioner-Appellant. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
) OPINION
Before: SILER, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Frank Lawrence appeals an order of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan that denied his third petition for admission to
practice law before that court. Finding the district court did not abuse its discretion, we AFFIRM.
I.
Lawrence has a long history with bar admission officials in the state of Michigan. See
Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 F. App’x 442, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2006); Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364,
366–68 (6th Cir. 2008); Lawrence v. Parker, Order at 1–2, No. 17-1319 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017);
In re Lawrence, 761 F. App’x 467, 468–72 (6th Cir. 2019). Relevant to the present application
are facts from his last denied petition for admission to the Western District of Michigan in October
2017. During that application process, Lawrence reported a conviction for interfering with a police
officer. This disclosure prompted the chief judge to send Lawrence a letter seeking additional
facts. Lawrence responded with more than just the requested information: he accused the chief
judge of violating Canon 3(a)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges, which
prohibits judges from engaging in certain ex parte communications. According to Lawrence, the
No. 21-1426, In re Lawrence
chief judge inappropriately directed a court employee to contact an investigator with the State Bar
of Michigan Character & Fitness Department and seek personal information contained in
Lawrence’s confidential files at that department.
After a letter exchange with Lawrence’s attorney, the chief judge referred Lawrence’s case
to a three-judge panel. Lawrence then sent a letter to the panel’s chair requesting the testimony of
the court employee whom he believed the chief judge had used to obtain confidential information.
The panel denied his request, explaining that such testimony would be irrelevant to the issues in
his petition.
Soon after, Lawrence filed a motion for the panel to reconsider their refusal to allow the
court employee to testify. On February 2, 2018, the panel issued a memorandum opinion and order
denying the motion for reconsideration and also denying Lawrence’s petition for admission. It
concluded that the chief judge had not violated any local rules or done anything irregular in
handling Lawrence’s petition. Further, the panel noted Lawrence’s “long history of engaging in
inappropriate and unprofessional conduct that reflects, at the very least, very poor judgment.” In
re Lawrence, 1:17-mc-0098-JTN, Mem. Op. and Order Den. Pet. for Admis., (W.D. Mich., ECF
6, PageID 142). Lawrence’s pattern of mounting “unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct
against those whose decisions he dislikes” had continued through his allegations made against the
chief judge.1 Id. at PageID 140. The panel therefore determined that Lawrence had failed to
demonstrate that he was “qualified to be entrusted with professional matters and to aid in the
administration of justice as an attorney and officer of the Court.” Id. at PageID 142 (quoting W.D.
1
Other allegations that the district court found unsubstantiated include racism on the part of a
board member from the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, misconduct from a trial court judge
handling his case involving interference with a police officer, misconduct from the State Bar of
Michigan President, and misconduct from the Board of Law Examiners.
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No. 21-1426, In re Lawrence
Mich. LCivR 83.1(c)(ii)).2 Lawrence appealed the district court’s order denying his petition for
admission. This court affirmed. See In re Lawrence, 761 F. App’x 467.
In its order denying Lawrence’s 2017 petition, the district court gave him the opportunity
to re-apply for admission after three years. Lawrence took that opportunity three years and a day
later, when he filed yet another petition for admission.
Upon receiving Lawrence’s new petition, the chief judge again referred the matter to a
three-judge panel, which requested that Lawrence provide supplemental information. For
example, the district court asked Lawrence to address previous concerns about his “past tendency
to attack decision makers whose decisions he does not like.” Lawrence gave the panel some of
what was requested but again levied allegations against the chief judge, as well as charges of
wrongdoing by others. In addition to rehashing his previous complaint concerning the chief
judge’s allegedly inappropriate investigation, Lawrence asserted that certain state officials had
engaged in misconduct and that the chief judge may have been responsible for the death of the
court employee who allegedly conducted the improper investigation into Lawrence’s confidential
file. That employee had tragically died in 2018 because of a pulmonary embolism. Lawrence
alleged that job-related stress or anxiety may have caused the employee’s condition. The petitioner
claimed that the employee may have been stressed because of the chief judge’s supposed untoward
use of the employee to investigate Lawrence, as well as other unspecified improprieties. For these
reasons, Lawrence called for a full investigation into the matter.
After denying Lawrence’s investigation request, the district court denied his new petition
for admission. That decision was based on Western District Michigan Local Rule 2.1, which lists
2
The local rules were revised effective January 1, 2019. The rules governing attorney admission
to practice law are now found at W.D. Mich. LGenR 2.1(a).
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No. 21-1426, In re Lawrence
three requirements for bar admission: that the applicant (1) be admitted to practice before a court
of record of a state; (2) be in good standing with that court; and (3) be of “good moral and
professional character.” W.D. Mich. LGenR 2.1(a).
The district court determined that Lawrence met the first two requirements but failed to
satisfy the third. It found that Lawrence continued to exhibit the same problematic tendencies that
had led to his 2018 denial. He remained “obsessed” with his claim that the chief judge had
committed judicial misconduct and continued to research extensively into the matter. This finding
was significant to the panel for two reasons. First, Lawrence offered no evidence to substantiate
his claims against the chief judge; indeed, the record demonstrated that the chief judge did nothing
wrong. Second, both the district court and this court had already determined that the chief judge’s
handling of the petition was irrelevant because he took no part in the earlier panel’s decision to
deny the application. What’s more, the panel found that Lawrence continued “to demonstrate a
penchant for personally attacking officials whose decisions he dislikes, including a willingness to
make baseless, unsubstantiated allegations.” This was evinced by Lawrence’s claim that he
intended to hire private investigative firms to investigate and report on state bar officials, as well
as his new allegations against the chief judge involving the death of a court employee. All of this
evidence led the panel to conclude that Lawrence “has ‘show[n] a propensity to act other than in a
‘fair’ manner. He has not shown that he will exercise good judgment, that he will conduct himself
professionally and with respect for the law.’” In re Lawrence, 1:17-mc-0098, Mem. Op. And
Order Den. Re-Appl. for Admis., (W.D. Mich., ECF 19, PageID 245–46) [hereafter: Denial Order].
Thus, the district court denied Lawrence’s petition for failing “to establish that he possesses the
good moral and professional character required for admission to practice” in the court. Lawrence
timely filed an appeal.
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No. 21-1426, In re Lawrence
II.
We first address Lawrence’s argument concerning the proper standard of review. In
Application of Mosher, this court stated that “a district court’s denial of an application for
admission to practice before the district court is reviewable by this court for an abuse of
discretion.” 25 F.3d 397, 400 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531
(1824)). Lawrence contends that Mosher was wrongly decided because the precedent it relied on
did not address the proper standard for reviewing a denial of admission to practice in a district
court, nor did dicta from those cases compel an abuse-of-discretion standard. He also asserts that
the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the proper standard of review for such cases.
Lawrence also argues that the opportunity to practice law is a fundamental right within the meaning
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v.
Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283 (1985). Therefore, Lawrence argues, this court ought to apply de novo
review in place of the abuse-of-discretion standard.
Lawrence’s argument does not persuade us. Abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard
of review for at least three reasons. First, when there is published Sixth Circuit precedent that
addresses an area of law, that decision “generally binds later panels.” United States v. King, 853
F.3d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 911 (6th Cir. 2016)).
As previously stated, our precedent clearly requires an abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing
a district court’s denial of an application for admission. See Mosher, 25 F.3d at 400.
Second, though Lawrence is correct that the Supreme Court has not formally announced
the proper standard of review for bar-admission cases, longstanding legal authority governing
admission to federal courts favors the abuse-of-discretion standard. In Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 529 (1824), for example, Chief Justice Marshall noted the inherent tension in the
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No. 21-1426, In re Lawrence
individual interest in practicing law vis-à-vis a court’s ability to maintain harmony with those who
practice before it. See id. at 530 (“On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance
to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise . . . On the other,
it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its
harmony with the bench should be preserved.”) Chief Justice Marshall resolved this tension by
stating that discretion ought to reside with the court where the petitioner seeks to practice, but that
such discretion should be exercised with “great moderation and judgment.” Id. He noted that “no
other tribunal can decide . . . with the same means of information as the [c]ourt” where the attorney
wants permission to appear. Id.; see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (“Courts have
long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers . . . This inherent power derives
from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission.”) (citations omitted).
In Mosher the Sixth Circuit followed Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning. We found that
there is great interest in attorneys practicing their profession and litigants having the attorney of
their choosing, but that this interest is countervailed by the public interest that requires the court
to “consider whether the applicant attorney possesses the professional and ethical competence
expected of an officer of the court.” Mosher, 25 F.3d at 400 (citing In re G.L.S., 745 F.2d 856,
860 (4th Cir. 1984)).
Also, the rules governing admission to federal courts support an abuse-of-discretion
standard. District courts have not only inherent authority but statutory power to govern
membership of their bars. Congress has permitted district courts to prescribe rules to conduct their
own business. 28 U.S.C. § 2071; see In re Desilets, 291 F.3d 925, 929 (6th Cir. 2002) (“It is clear
from 28 U.S.C. § 1654 that the authority provided in § 2071 includes the authority of a district
court to regulate the membership of its bar.”) (quoting Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 652 (1987)
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No. 21-1426, In re Lawrence
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Brown v. McGarr, 774 F.2d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[E]very federal
court which has construed [28 U.S.C. §§ 1654, 2071 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 83] has held that they
permit a federal district court to regulate the admission of attorneys who practice before it.”)
(citations omitted). Pursuant to that authority, Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 allows district courts to adopt
and amend rules governing legal practice before those tribunals. See Brown, 774 F.2d at 782.
Third, though Piper characterizes the right to practice law as “fundamental,” we do not
read that opinion as broadly as Lawrence does. Piper involved the New Hampshire Supreme Court
barring a Vermont resident from admission to the bar because the attorney did not have a New
Hampshire residence. 470 U.S. at 276. The Supreme Court held that such refusal violated the
Privilege and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. Id. at 288. Lawrence would
have us read Piper to require a de novo standard of review for federal court bar admission
decisions. But, despite reaching the conclusion that practicing law is a fundamental right, the
Supreme Court explained that the decision was still compatible with the principle that “[s]tates
should be left free to ‘prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the standards of
professional conduct’ for those lawyers who appear in its courts.” Id. at 283 n.16 (quoting Leis v.
Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979)). Essentially, the Piper decision reached only the question of
whether states could bar nonresidents from bar admission; it did not seek to displace the inherent
authority of a court to determine how it will admit lawyers to appear before it. See id. at 283.
For these reasons, we conclude that the abuse-of-discretion standard is the appropriate
standard of review for denied applications for admission to practice in a district court.
III.
We now determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied
Lawrence’s most-recent petition for admission. Abuse of discretion requires “a definite and firm
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No. 21-1426, In re Lawrence
conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.” Davis by Davis v. Jellico Cmty.
Hosp. Inc., 912 F.2d 129, 133 (6th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Abuse of discretion generally
occurs when a district court “relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, uses an erroneous legal
standard, or improperly applies the law.” United States v. Flowers, 963 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir.
2020) (citation omitted).
The district court found that Lawrence lacked the “good moral and professional character”
to be admitted to its bar. In reaching its conclusion, the court cited to Lawrence’s continued
interest in investigating State Bar officials and pursuing baseless claims against the chief judge,
including an allegation of manslaughter. According to the district court, Lawrence “has not shown
that he will exercise good judgment, that he will conduct himself professionally and with respect
for the law.” Denial Order, PageID 245–46.
Lawrence, on the other hand, contends that he has the requisite character to be admitted to
practice in the court. As evidence of this, Lawrence offers that he is admitted to practice in other
federal courts, including this court. In addition, he notes that he has handled pro bono cases for
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.3 He contends that his work
on those matters demonstrates that the district court erred in its assessment of him.
Having reviewed the evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial
of Lawrence’s application based on Local Rule 2.1. It relied solely on the evidence Lawrence
provided in his latest petition for admission. It requested additional information for that
application concerning whether he had been disbarred from other courts and whether he sought
3
Indeed, Lawrence indicated that one of his cases has a motion to transfer venue from the Eastern
District of Michigan to the Western District of Michigan. See Harper v. Arkesteyn, et al., 2:19-
cv-11106-AJT-DRG (E.D. Mich., ECF 44, PageID 192). But that motion to transfer venue was
denied in February of this year. See id. at ECF 90.
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No. 21-1426, In re Lawrence
admission to the State Bar of Michigan since February 2, 2018, along with similar clarifying
questions. Lawrence chose to use that opportunity to not only respond to the questions but rehash
many allegations of impropriety he raised in his 2017 petition, all of which the district court had
already determined were unfounded. The new allegation of the chief judge’s supposed
involvement in the death of a court employee gave only more reason for the district court to
conclude that the same character traits that led to denial of Lawrence’s petition in 2018 continued
to plague him in 2021. As for Lawrence’s argument that he has demonstrated “good moral and
professional character” in other jurisdictions, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
concluded that it must make its own determination concerning Lawrence’s character irrespective
of what other courts have decided. This is a natural extension of a district court’s inherent authority
to govern its own practices. See Burr, 22 U.S. at 530; Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Lawrence did not satisfy its admission
requirements under the local rule.
Lawrence contends, alternatively, that he has a First Amendment right to call for
investigations and to condemn government officials, and that the district court’s decision
effectively requires him to abandon his constitutional rights and lawful activity in exchange for
the ability to practice law before the court. But Lawrence raises this argument for the first time on
appeal. Indeed, when the district court asked him to explain his “past tendency to attack decision
makers whose decisions he does not like,” Lawrence failed to make any First Amendment defense
as to his conduct. Because Lawrence failed to raise properly his First Amendment issue before
the district court, he has failed to preserve it for appeal and we decline to resolve it here in the first
instance. See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 97 F.3d 833, 835 (6th Cir. 1996)
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No. 21-1426, In re Lawrence
(determining that an argument must be first raised and clearly presented before the district court
to be preserved properly for appeal).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Lawrence’s petition
for admission.
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