Gabhart v. Cocke County , 155 F. App'x 867 ( 2005 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a0938n.06
Filed: November 29, 2005
No. 04-6330
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
WYNDHAM H. GABHART, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
COCKE COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al. ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
BEFORE: KEITH, SUHRHEINRICH, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Wyndham H. Gabhart (“Gabhart”)
appeals both the district court’s order granting the Defendants-Appellees’ motions to dismiss and
the district court’s finding that Gabhart’s motion for default judgment was moot. For the reasons
set forth below, we DISMISS this appeal.
I.BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The instant appeal arises in the wake of a protracted factual and procedural history that
includes separate, but related state and federal actions. In Gabhart v. City of Newport, No. 98-6181,
2000 WL 282874, *1 (6th Cir. March 10, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (“Gabhart I”), Gabhart
appealed the district court’s order denying Gabhart’s request for a stay of subsequently-filed state
court proceedings involving the same issues and dismissing his federal suit on ripeness grounds.
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This Court affirmed the district court’s finding that Gabhart’s claims were not ripe. Id.The following are the relevant facts in Gabhart I. Gabhart, an attorney and a resident of
Mississippi, purchased ten acres of land in Cocke County, Tennessee, which he planned to subdivide
and sell. Id. Before he could sell the land, however, the City of Newport, Tennessee (“Newport”)
intervened and ordered Gabhart to either make specified improvements upon the land before sale
or pay Newport “a cash bond in lieu of performance.” Id. Gabhart objected to the regulations and
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, to prohibit
Newport from enforcing compliance with their regulations. Prior to answering Gabhart’s federal
complaint, Newport filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Cocke County, Tennessee, on July
2, 1998 (“1998 State Action”). Id. Except for submitting a brief challenging jurisdiction, Gabhart
admits he made no response to the 1998 State Action. Attempting to stay the 1998 State Action,
Gabhart filed a motion in federal district court, which the district court denied. Subsequently,
Gabhart appealed the district court’s order denying his motion for a stay. In Gabhart I, the federal
district court had proper jurisdiction, and thus, this Court’s jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. §
1291, which states in relevant part, “the courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court.”
In 2000, Gabhart filed another complaint in federal district court requesting injunctive relief
and claiming, for the second time, that Newport’s regulations violated his rights under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Gabhart v. City of Newport, 17 Fed.Appx. 268, 269 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2001) (unpublished order)
(“Gabhart II”). Newport filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted on res judicata,
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statute of limitations, and mootness grounds. Id. Gabhart appealed the district court’s order. This
Court affirmed the district court’s decision for the reasons provided by the district court.
On July 16, 2004, Gabhart was representing a client in an unrelated matter before the
Chancery Court of Cocke County, when he was informed by the judge in the case that he could not
practice in the Chancery Court because he owed costs to the court from his failure to respond to the
1998 State Action. Gabhart now requests that this Court quash and expunge both the sanction and
the 1998 State Action.
B. Procedural Background
On July 6, 2004, Gabhart filed a civil complaint against the Defendants-Appellees Cocke
County, Tennessee, Cocke County Chancery Court, and Craig Wild, the Clerk and Master of the
Chancery Court of the Cocke County, Tennessee (collectively “Cocke County”) in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga. In the complaint, Gabhart
petitioned the federal district court to quash and expunge the 1998 State Action. Gabhart argued that
the 1998 State Action violated federal jurisdiction. Specifically, Gabhart alleged that at the time
Newport filed the 1998 State Action there was already a pending federal case in the matter, and thus,
the filing of the state court action by federal defendant, Newport, violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Gabhart argued that the 1998 State Action should have been filed as a compulsory counterclaim in
the federal case. Gabhart requested that the district court expunge the 1998 State Action pursuant
to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
On July 19, 2004, Cocke County, Tennessee and Craig Wild, the Clerk and Master of the
Chancery Court, filed a motion to dismiss Gabhart’s Motion to Quash and Expunge the 1998 State
Action alleging that: (1) Gabhart failed to state a claim against them upon which relief could be
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granted; (2) Gabhart lacked standing to bring the motion before the district court; and (3) Gabhart
did not file a complaint against them.
On August 11, 2004, Gabhart filed a motion for default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55 alleging that Cocke County failed to answer his Motion to Quash and Expunge within the
required 20-day time period as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A). On August 19, 2004, the
Chancery Court filed a motion to extend their time to answer Gabhart’s Motion to Quash and
Expunge by an additional 20 days, which Magistrate Judge Dennis H. Inman granted. In addition,
through counsel, Gabhart supported the Chancery Court’s request for additional time to file their
answer. On August 20, 2004, Cocke County, Tennessee and the Clerk and Master of the Chancery
Court filed their response to Gabhart’s motion for default judgment. They argued that they were not
required to file an answer while their motion to dismiss for failure to state of claim upon which relief
could be granted was still pending.
On August 25, 2004, the Chancery Court filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1) and (6) alleging: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of standing; (3) failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (4) the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. On August 27, 2004, the Chancery Court filed their response to Gabhart’s motion for
default judgment arguing that they were never served with a summons or complaint in the case and
thus did not have knowledge of the case until August 10, 2004. The Chancery Court also pointed
out that they requested and were granted an extension of an additional 20 days to file their answer
to Gabhart’s complaint.
On September 30, 2004, District Court Judge Ronnie Greer issued an order disposing of all
pending motions. Specifically, the district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The
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district court ruled on the ground that:
[P]laintiff [Gabhart] has failed to show that he has availed himself of the available
procedures for addressing the Chancery Court’s award of costs against him, or that
those procedures were somehow a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff
indicates that he simply did not respond in the state proceeding. There is no
indication, had he afforded himself the opportunity to raise claims or defenses in that
action, that it would not have provided him an adequate opportunity to do so.
Gabhart v. Cocke County, No. 2:04-CV-223 at *3 (E.D.Tenn. Sept. 30, 2004). In addition, the
district court concluded that the court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss mooted Gabhart’s
motion for default judgment. The district court also stated that even if the motion for default
judgment was not moot, Gabhart still would not be entitled to relief because the Cocke County
defendants filed motions to dismiss and “the granting of default judgment is not appropriate where
defendants have filed a motion to dismiss.” Id.II.ANALYSIS
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Gabhart challenges the district court’s grant of Cocke County’s motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and he
challenges the district court’s finding that his motion for default judgment was moot. Normally, we
review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). PR Diamonds, Inc.
v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2004). Additionally, we review de novo a district court’s
decision that an action has been mooted. Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 704 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing NAACP v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 530 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also Craft v. United States,
233 F.3d 358, 373 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating, “[w]e review questions of mootness de novo.”).
Before reaching the merits in a case, however, we must first determine whether the district
court properly had jurisdiction to issue the order from which Gabhart appeals. “[E]very federal
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appellate court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that
of the lower courts in a cause under review.’” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534,
541 (1986) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)); see also Cleveland Surgi-
Center, Inc. v. Jones, 2 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, “jurisdiction issues will be
raised sua sponte by a federal court when there is an indication that jurisdiction is lacking . . . .”
United States v. Means, 133 F.3d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
We review de novo questions of subject matter jurisdiction. Bauer v. RBX Indus. Inc., 368
F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Caudill v. N. Am. Media Corp., 200 F.3d 914, 916 (6th Cir.
2000) (“This forum reviews a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”) (citation
omitted)).
B. DISCUSSION
In his complaint and brief to this Court, Gabhart invoked federal diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Gabhart is incorrect on both grounds. Therefore, because neither the district court below nor this
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case, Gabhart’s appeal must be dismissed.
1. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction
In diversity cases, federal courts have original jurisdiction when there exists a controversy
between citizens of different states and a jurisdictional amount of at least $75,000 is at stake. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332. In the instant case, Gabhart seeks only equitable relief, specifically he requests
that the prior 1998 State Action be quashed and expunged. There is no indication in the record that
the amount of costs awarded against Gabhart equals at least $75,000. Therefore, although the
diversity of citizenship requirement is satisfied in this case, the monetary jurisdictional requirement
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is not met, and thus, federal diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case.1
2. Federal Question Jurisdiction
In federal question cases, district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Gabhart
contends that federal question jurisdiction was proper before the district court, and now on appeal
before this Court, because he based his request for relief upon the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
Gabhart’s reliance on this statute as a source of federal jurisdiction for this case is misplaced.
The All Writs Act provides in, relevant part, that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651. The All Writs
Act enables federal courts to issue such commands “as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate
and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise
obtained.” United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 533 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. New
York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977)) (emphasis added).
In the instant case, Gabhart does not rely on the All Writs Act to aid the Court’s jurisdiction
in its “exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained.” Instead, Gabhart attempts to invoke federal
jurisdiction based solely on the All Writs Act. We must reject this attempt. Gabhart’s appeal must
be based on an independent source of jurisdiction, which the All Writs Act could aid.
Even if an independent source of jurisdiction were present in this case, the All Writs Act still
would not be the appropriate remedy. This Court must use its authority pursuant to the All Writs
1
Gabhart’s attempt to attach federal diversity jurisdiction to the instant action based on
the federal jurisdiction present in Gabhart I and Gabhart II is rejected. The instant, separate
action must have its own subject matter jurisdiction.
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Act, “sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 542 U.S. 1305, 1306 (2004) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has characterized the All Writs Act as one of
“the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal . . . .” Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the
Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quotation marks and internal citation omitted).
Additionally, the Supreme Court specified the three conditions precedent to issuance of a writ
pursuant to the statute: (1) “the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate
means to attain the relief he desires . . . a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used
as a substitute for the regular appeals process . . .” id. (quotation marks and internal citations
omitted); (2) “the petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ
is clear and indisputable[]” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); and (3) “even if the
first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be
satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. (citations omitted).
Gabhart cannot meet any of the necessary conditions to authorize this Court to issue the
extraordinary remedy of a writ pursuant to the All Writs Act. First, Gabhart had other adequate
means to contest the 1998 State Action in the Chancery Court, but by his own admission he chose
not to respond to the complaint. Therefore, this Court cannot condone Gabhart’s attempt to
circumvent the state’s appellate process by issuing a writ pursuant to the All Writs Act. Second,
Gabhart certainly has not met the burden of showing that his right to the issuance of the writ is clear
and indisputable. To support his claim that he entitled to this remedy, Gabhart offers nothing more
than an unsupported accusation that Newport’s complaint in the 1998 State Action “was an attempt
to harass him for filing the federal action” and that the All Writs Act gives “[d]istrict courts the
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power to enjoin litigants who abuse the court system by harassing their opponents.” (Appellant’s
Br. at 11.) These naked accusations are insufficient to meet the high standard of “clear and
indisputable” evidence that Gabhart would be entitled to the writ. Third, because Gabhart clearly
does not satisfy either of the first two conditions, issuance of the writ would not be appropriate under
the circumstances. Therefore, because Gabhart cannot meet any of the conditions precedent to
issuance of a writ under the statute, even if jurisdiction was proper in this case, this Court still would
not issue a writ pursuant to the All Writs Act.
iii. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
This Court also lacks authority to grant Gabhart’s request to quash and expunge the 1998
State Action based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the
United States Supreme Court has held that if a state court, acting judicially, has decided a matter,
a federal court is barred as a matter of jurisdiction from reviewing what the state court has done.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (“United States District Courts . . . do not have jurisdiction
. . . over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings
even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Review of those
decisions may only be had in this Court.”). Specifically, the Feldman Court provides that if a
district court is confronted with issues that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state judgment, the
court is "in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision," and thus the district court
lacks jurisdiction, which precludes its review of the state court judgment. Id. at 482, n. 16.
More recently, the Supreme Court restated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as follows: “under
[the doctrine] a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be
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appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s
claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (citations omitted). In essence, “[a]n action framed formally as an appeal,
an extraordinary writ, an injunction directed to a court, or in any other form that would direct action
by the state court is outside federal subject-matter jurisdiction.” Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d §4469.1 (2002) (emphasis added).
This Circuit has held that there are two elements to a Rooker-Feldman analysis: (1) “in order
for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply to a claim presented in federal district court, the issue
before the Court must be [inextricably intertwined] with the claim asserted in the state court
proceeding[,]” Tropf v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002) (quotation
marks and citation omitted); and (2) “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal court
jurisdiction where that claim is a specific grievance that the law was invalidly – even
unconstitutionally – applied in the plaintiff’s particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
In the instant case, Gabhart’s motion to quash and expunge the 1998 State Action is in
essence a challenge to the state court’s decision to award costs against him and the basis of his
argument is that the Chancery Court’s order in the 1998 State Action violated the law, specifically
Fed. R. Civ. P. 13. Therefore, having met the requirements for applying the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, Gabhart’s request to quash and expunge the 1998 State Court Action is barred
by Rooker-Feldman principles. We cannot review the state court’s decision. If Mr. Gabhart has
forfeited possible state remedies by failing to respond to the 1998 State Action and bringing this
federal action, then fault for that forfeiture can only lie with Mr. Gabhart.
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III.CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case and
thus we DISMISS the appeal in its entirety.
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