Williams v. Leatherwood , 258 F. App'x 817 ( 2007 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0875n.06
Filed: December 20, 2007
Case No. 06-6322
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRUCE T. WILLIAMS and )
LILLIAN F. WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
BRIAN LEATHERWOOD and CITY )
OF KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
_______________________________________ )
BEFORE: BOGGS, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge; and COHN,* District
Judge.
AVERN COHN, District Judge. This is a civil rights action based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1988 and various provisions of Tennessee law. Plaintiffs-Appellants Bruce Williams and Lillian
Williams appeal from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants-
Appellees, the City of Knoxville, Tennessee (“Knoxville”) and Knoxville police officer Brian
Leatherwood (“Leatherwood”). The Williamses claim that Leatherwood violated the Fourth
Amendment when he detained Bruce Williams for approximately fifteen minutes during the
investigation of a possible aggravated assault, and that Leatherwood committed the state law
torts of deficient investigation and false arrest and violated the Tennessee Constitution. The
*
The Honorable Avern Cohn, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
premise of the Williamses’s claim against Knoxville is that the Knoxville Police Department had
a policy or custom of encouraging violations of the Fourth Amendment.
For the reasons that follow, the decision of the district court will be affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The following are the facts as gleaned from the record. None are in serious dispute.
On April 4, 2005, Bruce and Lillian Williams were traveling along Interstate 40/75 in
Knox County, Tennessee, when they encountered dense traffic. To avoid the traffic problem,
Bruce Williams drove his white pick-up truck onto the right shoulder of the highway toward the
next exit. The driver of a tractor-trailer apparently took issue with Williams’s maneuver and
pulled onto the shoulder, forcing the Williamses’s vehicle onto the grass. The drivers exchanged
obscene gestures. Williams then continued driving on the shoulder toward the exit until
additional traffic forced him to come to a complete stop.
At this time, the driver of the tractor-trailer exited his cab and approached the
Williamses’s vehicle in what they say was a threatening, aggressive manner. Williams retrieved
a loaded .357 Magnum revolver from the glove compartment of the pick-up truck and placed the
barrel on the edge of the open window. The parties exchanged words, and eventually the driver
of the tractor-trailer retreated to his truck. Several drivers caught in the traffic jam witnessed the
incident and called 911; at least one caller stated that Bruce Williams displayed a revolver. The
reports included a description and the license plate number of the Williamses’s pick-up truck.
Approximately twenty-five minutes later, the Williamses’s pick-up truck was seen in
North Knoxville. Leatherwood responded to a dispatch and stopped the truck using his blue
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lights. By the time he initiated the stop, Leatherwood knew that the truck was registered to Bruce
Williams and that Williams had a license to carry a concealed weapon.
Leatherwood approached the truck with his gun drawn but pointed away from the truck.
He asked Bruce Williams to step out and patted him for weapons. Leatherwood then handcuffed
Williams and placed him in the back seat of his police cruiser. Leatherwood says that he
intended to detain Williams until he could determine whether the victim of what he considered a
potential aggravated assault intended to file charges. Bruce Williams says that Leatherwood told
him that he was being handcuffed and placed in the police cruiser for his own safety.
Within fifteen minutes, Leatherwood determined that the alleged victim would not file
charges. Leatherwood then released Bruce Williams and returned his revolver and ammunition.
Bruce Williams claims that the next day he began to suffer pains in his abdomen, eventually
requiring two surgeries for a double hernia that was allegedly caused by being roughly placed in
the police cruiser with his hands secured behind his back.
Another police officer at the scene spoke with Lillian Williams. It is not clear whether or
not Mrs. Williams exited the pick-up truck. She says that she was humiliated and embarrassed
by the incident.
B. Procedural History
In April 2005, the Williamses filed a complaint against Knoxville and Leatherwood,
seeking damages in excess of $500,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and the
Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, TENN . CODE. § 29-20-101 et seq. They claimed that
Knoxville failed to provide adequate training to its police officers and had an unconstitutional
policy or custom regarding investigatory stops and the handcuffing of detainees. The Williamses
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also claimed that Leatherwood effected a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that he
committed the state law torts of deficient investigation and false arrest, and that he violated the
Tennessee constitution. The district court granted summary judgment to both Knoxville and
Leatherwood, finding that Leatherwood did not violate the Williamses’s Fourth Amendment
rights or commit any tort.
On appeal, the Williamses claim that the district court erred (1) in holding that
Leatherwood’s detention of Bruce Williams was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, (2) in
refusing to apply Tennessee law where it was more advantageous than federal law pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988(a), (3) in holding that the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause did
not provide a basis for liability under § 1983, (4) in declining to rule on Leatherwood’s claim of
qualified immunity, (5) in granting summary judgment on the state law claims, and (6) in
denying the Williamses’s motion to amend their complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. Holloway v. Brush, 220
F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Summary judgment will be granted when the moving
party demonstrates that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c). There is no genuine
issue of material fact when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986).
The nonmoving party may not rest upon his pleadings; rather, the nonmoving party’s
response “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” FED . R.
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CIV . P. 56(e). Showing that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is not
enough; “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party is not
sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 252 (1986). Rather, the nonmoving party must present “significant probative evidence” in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment in order to defeat the motion. See Moore v.
Philip Morris Co., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Additionally, and significantly, “affidavits containing mere conclusions have no probative value”
in summary judgment proceedings. Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 1968).
The court must decide “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a [trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law.” In re Dollar Corp., 25 F.3d 1320, 1323 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
251-52). The court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Petroleum Specialties, Inc., 69 F.3d 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1995).
Determining credibility, weighing evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences are left to the
trier of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Only where there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law may summary judgment be
granted. Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001).
III. SECTION 1983
The Williamses claim that Leatherwood violated their Fourth Amendment rights because
there were no articulable facts to which he could point to justify an investigatory stop of their
vehicle and because the detention of Bruce Williams ripened into an arrest without the requisite
probable cause. We find that these claims are without merit and therefore do not reach the
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subsidiary issues of Leatherwood’s defense of qualified immunity and Knoxville’s potential
municipal liability for an unconstitutional policy or custom.
A. Investigatory Stop
Police may briefly stop an individual for investigation if they have a “reasonable
suspicion” that the individual has committed a crime. United States v. Palomino, 100 F.3d 446,
449 (6th Cir. 1996); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The same standard applies to vehicle
stops. Palomino, 100 F.3d at 449; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). The
Sixth Circuit has explained that the “reasonable suspicion” standard requires that law
enforcement officers possess specific facts tending to indicate criminal activity before initiating
an investigative detention:
“Reasonable suspicion” is more than an ill-defined hunch; it must
be based upon a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
the particular person of criminal activity. It requires specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant an investigatory stop. The
standard outlined in Terry and its progeny is not onerous. The
requisite level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover,
reasonable suspicion can arise from evidence that is less reliable
than what might be required to show probable cause.
Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does, 174 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicion need not arise from an officer’s
own observations; rather, it may arise from informant tips and dispatcher information. Smoak v.
Hall, 460 F.3d 758, 779 (6th Cir. 2006).
Under the totality of circumstances present in this case, Leatherwood had information
sufficient to form a reasonable suspicion that Bruce Williams had engaged in criminal activity.
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At the time he initiated the traffic stop, Leatherwood knew at least that (1) there had been an
incident of “road rage” involving a potential aggravated assault on a nearby stretch of highway
within the past half hour; (2) several persons called 911 to report the incident, and gave a
description of the vehicle and a license plate number matching the Williamses’s vehicle; (3) at
least one caller stated that the driver of the vehicle had displayed a firearm; (4) the owner of the
vehicle was named Bruce Williams; and (5) Bruce Williams had a license to carry a concealed
weapon. These facts were sufficient to raise a reasonable belief that a crime had occurred along
the highway and that Bruce Williams was involved in that crime.
The Williamses argue that under Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), Leatherwood
was not permitted to detain Bruce Williams against his will for any length of time. This is
incorrect. The Royer Court approved of police questioning of individuals in the absence of
reasonable suspicion, in which case the individuals may decline to answer and go on their way.
Id. at 497-98. However, the Court also noted “that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
warrants a temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop.”
Id. at 498. This case is of the latter variety: Leatherwood had a reasonable suspicion of Bruce
Williams’s involvement in criminal activity, and such reasonable suspicion provided a proper
basis for temporarily detaining Bruce Williams for investigatory purposes.
B. Detention
After concluding that the initial basis for an investigatory stop was proper, the court must
determine “whether the degree of intrusion . . . was reasonably related in scope to the situation at
hand, which is judged by examining the reasonableness of the officials’ conduct given their
suspicions and the surrounding circumstances.” United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th
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Cir. 1993). The reasonableness of the detention is judged on two distinct criteria: (1) whether it
was sufficiently limited in time, and (2) whether the law enforcement officials used the least
intrusive investigative means reasonably available. Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810,
825-26 (6th Cir. 2005).
As to the temporal element, an investigative detention that is constitutionally permissible
at the outset may eventually “ripen into a defective seizure that must be based on probable
cause.” United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983)). “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. “There is no
rigid time limitation on the lawfulness of a Terry stop,” United States v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212,
217 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985)), but a court
must “examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the
defendant,” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.
The manner and length of the detention here were reasonably related to the reasons for
which Leatherwood initially stopped the Williamses’s vehicle. The reports that Bruce Williams
displayed a firearm during a road rage incident were sufficient to create a reasonable concern that
the driver of the vehicle was armed and dangerous; therefore, it was reasonably necessary for
Leatherwood’s own protection to approach the vehicle with a weapon drawn and to order Bruce
Williams out of the vehicle. See Garza, 10 F.3d at 1246. Neither the use of handcuffs nor
detention in a police cruiser transform an investigatory stop into an arrest so long as the
circumstances make it reasonable for the officer to take these precautions. Houston, 174 F.3d at
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815; United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1092-94 (6th Cir. 1995). Based on the reports that
Leatherwood had received over his police radio, it was reasonable for him to protect himself and
others by handcuffing Bruce Williams and placing him in the back of the police cruiser.
The Williamses object that, at his deposition, Leatherwood testified that he placed Bruce
Williams in the cruiser to prevent him from fleeing rather than for safety reasons. This argument
is unconvincing since a detainee’s flight obviously affects the safety of the detainee, the detaining
officer, and other citizens. In any case, Bruce Williams admitted in his own deposition that
Leatherwood stated that he was placing him in the patrol car for safety reasons.
As to the length of the stop, detaining the Williamses for fifteen minutes was reasonable
under the circumstances. As an initial point, this is substantially less than the investigative stop
of thirty-five minutes to an hour that this court approved in Houston, 174 F.3d at 815. Moreover,
the record indicates that Leatherwood expeditiously sought to determine whether Bruce Williams
had committed a crime and whether the driver of the tractor-trailer wished to press charges
against him. Upon determining that an arrest was not appropriate, Leatherwood immediately
released Bruce Williams and returned his firearm and ammunition. See Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (“If the purpose underlying a Terry stop – investigating possible criminal
activity – is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the
individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry”).
Because there is no evidence of any undue delay on Leatherwood’s part, the Williamses’s
invocation of United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2005), is unavailing. In Davis,
officers prolonged an investigatory stop for an hour after a drug-sniffing dog had failed to alert
positively to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle in order to allow for a second examination
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by another dog. The court reasoned that, as the first dog had already confirmed that there were
no narcotics present, the continued detention served no investigative purpose and therefore ran
afoul of the Fourth Amendment. In this case, by contrast, Leatherwood released the Williamses
without any delay after determining that an arrest was not appropriate.
C. State Law Standards Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)
The Williamses contend that where a plaintiff cannot prevail on a constitutional claim in
a § 1983 suit, federal courts should “borrow” state law in cases where it affords more robust
protection of the plaintiff’s civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).1 The Williamses read
the statute incorrectly. According to § 1988(a), state law is appropriately considered in a § 1983
claim only where there is no rule of federal law on point and state law is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States. “The express terms of § 1988(a) prevent us from
replacing federal law with more favorable state law, as plaintiffs would have us do.” Wilson v.
Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 701 n.66 (1978) (“42 U.S.C. § 1988 cannot be used to create a federal cause of
action where § 1983 does not otherwise provide one”); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
1
Section 1988(a) provides in relevant part: “The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters
conferred on the district courts . . . for the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws
of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases
where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish
suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by
the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause.”
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693, 703-04 (1973) (“[W]e do not believe that the section [1988], without more, was meant to
authorize the wholesale importation into federal law of state causes of action”).
Here, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and cases decided
thereunder supply the standard for evaluating the Williamses’s claim. As discussed above, the
Williamses do not have a valid claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Section
1988 does not allow the Williamses simply to discard the Fourth Amendment in search of some
more favorable provision of Tennessee law.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Williamses argue that apart from the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment provide an “independent constitutional basis for
Section 1983 liability” based on alleged violations of their “right to liberty.” As this Court made
clear in a recent decision, these claims are unavailing.
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from making
“distinctions which either burden a fundamental right, target a
suspect class, or intentionally treat one differently from other
similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.”
Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 312 (6th Cir.
2005). As in Radvansky, plaintiffs cannot make out an equal
protection claim because plaintiffs merely allege that they were
treated unfairly by defendants, not that they were members of a
protected class or treated differently from others. Likewise, the
plaintiff in Radvansky also argued that the defendants deprived
him of liberty without due process by arresting him without
probable cause. We flatly rejected that theory because “it is the
Fourth Amendment which establishes procedural protections in
this part of the criminal justice area.” Id. at 313.
Wilson, 477 F.3d at 333. As to the Williamses’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, this
case is essentially identical to Wilson and Radvansky. The Williamses cannot make out an equal
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protection claim and may not substitute the standards of the Due Process Clause for those of the
Fourth Amendment.
IV. State Law Tort Claims
A. Deficient Investigation
The Williamses press a claim against Leatherwood for “deficient investigation.” This is a
negligence claim based on the theory that Leatherwood failed to conduct a reasonably prudent
investigation. Knoxville has waived its immunity for claims that its employees committed
negligent torts. TENN . CODE § 29-20-205. Where a city has waived immunity for such acts,
municipal employees are granted immunity from suit. TENN . CODE § 29-20-310(b).
Accordingly, Leatherwood is immune from suit, and the Court will dismiss this claim. See
Robinson v. City of Memphis, 340 F. Supp. 2d 864, 873 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) (dismissing
negligence claim against police officer)
B. False Arrest
For Bruce Williams to prevail on his state law claim of false arrest, he must show that (1)
he was restrained or detained against his will, and (2) the restraint or detention was unlawful.
Coffee v. Peterbilt of Nashville, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tenn. 1990). “The law is well
settled in Tennessee that an investigative detention requires only a showing of reasonable
suspicion rather than probable cause.” State v. Wilhoit, 962 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1997). As discussed above, Leatherwood did have a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been
committed and that Bruce Williams committed it. Williams’s claim for false arrest is therefore
without merit.
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C. Violation of Tennessee Constitution
Tennessee does not recognize a private right of action for violations of the Tennessee
Constitution. Bowden Bldg. Corp. v. Tenn. Real Estate Comm’n, 15 S.W.2d 434, 444-45 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1999); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 180 (6th Cir. 1996). The district court was correct
to dismiss this claim.
V. Denial of Motion to Amend Complaint
The Williamses filed a motion to amend their complaint with the district court after entry
of the order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the case. The
Williamses now attack the district court’s decision to deny the motion for leave to amend.
Denial of a motion for leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wade v. Knoxville
Util. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 459 (6th Cir. 2001).
Undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad
faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and
futility of amendment are all factors which may affect the decision.
Delay by itself is not sufficient reason to deny a motion to amend.
Notice and substantial prejudice to the opposing party are critical
factors in determining whether an amendment should be granted.
Id. at 458-59. “When amendment is sought at a late stage in the litigation, there is an increased
burden to show justification for failing to move earlier.” Id. at 459.
In this case, the district court found that (1) the Williams were aware of the factual basis
of their complaint from the outset of the litigation; (2) they did not offer any reason for failing to
move for leave to amend until after entry of the order granting summary judgment; (3) granting
leave to amend would substantially prejudice defendants by requiring them to engage in new
discovery, prepare new defenses, and file additional motions; (4) the amendments would likely
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be futile in light of the district court’s holding that Leatherwood did not violate the Fourth
Amendment or commit a tort in the course of the investigative detention. Even on appeal, the
Williamses fail to offer any explanation for the lateness of their motion. In the exercise of its
discretion, the district court found that justice did not require that the Williamses be granted
leave to amend. We find no abuse of discretion in this regard.
VI. Conclusion
For all of the above-stated reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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