Kelsey v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2006 )


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  •                 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 06a0532n.06
    Filed: July 28, 2006
    No. 05-6703
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    MICHAEL J. KELSEY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    On Appeal from the
    v.                                    United States District Court for
    the Eastern District of Kentucky
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ______________________________/
    Before: KENNEDY and DAUGHTERY, Circuit Judges; ADAMS, District Judge*
    KENNEDY, J. Michael J. Kelsey (“claimant”) suffers from a variety of ailments including
    coronary artery disease, obesity, inflammatory bowel disease (Crohn’s disease), an anxiety disorder,
    and organic brain damage. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 13. He applied for and was denied Social
    Security Benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). He appealed to an
    Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who found that he was not disabled within the parameters of
    the Social Security Act. Claimant appealed to the district court and the district court granted the
    Commissioner's motion for summary judgment. Claimant further appealed to this court, and for the
    following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.
    *
    The Honorable John R. Adams, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
    Ohio, sitting by designation.
    This court must affirm the ALJ’s decision unless the ALJ “has failed to apply the correct
    legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”
    Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 
    375 F.3d 387
    , 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Walters v. Comm'r of
    Soc. Sec., 
    127 F.3d 525
    , 528 (6th Cir. 1997)). See also 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g); Longworth v. Comm’r
    Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    402 F.3d 591
    , 595 (6th Cir. 2005). The substantial evidence standard requires
    only that a “‘reasonable mind might accept’ the relevant evidence ‘as adequate to support a
    conclusion.’” Warner, 
    375 F.3d at 390
     (quoting Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 
    667 F.2d 524
    , 535 (6th Cir. 1981)). See also Longworth, 
    402 F.3d at 595
    . If substantial evidence supports
    the ALJ's decision, this court will defer to that decision “even if there is substantial evidence in the
    record that would have supported an opposite conclusion . . . .” Warner, 
    375 F.3d at 390
     (quoting
    Key v. Callahan, 
    109 F.3d 270
    , 273 (6th Cir.1997)). See also Longworth, 
    402 F.3d at 595
    .
    On appeal, claimant first argues that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial
    evidence. Claimant raised this same argument in the district court. Having carefully reviewed the
    district court’s opinion, the opinion of the ALJ, the arguments made by the parties in their briefs on
    appeal,1 and the evidence in the record, we hold that the district court correctly ruled that the ALJ’s
    opinion was supported by substantial evidence. We further hold that an additional opinion
    addressing this argument would serve no purpose. Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning of the
    district court on this point as our own. The ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.2
    1
    This case was submitted on the briefs.
    2
    Claimant also argues that the errors committed by the ALJ were not harmless. Because we
    agree with the district court that the ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence, and,
    hence that, for the purposes of our review, the ALJ did not commit error, we need not address
    claimant’s arguments on this point.
    2
    Claimant also argues that the ALJ improperly relied on a hypothetical question asked of a
    vocational expert that did not include all of claimant’s deficiencies. Claimant notes that the ALJ
    found that the record established that claimant “experience[s] moderate deficiencies of
    concentration, persistence or pace” but that the ALJ failed to recognize this restriction in the
    numbered findings at the close of his decision. J.A. at 14, 18-19. Claimant also argues that the ALJ
    posed a hypothetical to the vocational expert that did not include these deficiencies, and that the
    failure to include these deficiencies meant that the ALJ believed that claimant was qualified for jobs
    that were beyond his capacity. We disagree.
    First, the failure of the ALJ to list the fact that claimant had moderate deficiencies in
    concentration, persistence or pace in his findings does not mean that the ALJ did not fully consider
    those deficiencies. As claimant points out, the ALJ discussed these deficiencies elsewhere. J.A. at
    14. Furthermore, claimant can point to no evidence that the ALJ failed to take those moderate
    deficiencies into account.
    Finally, the hypothetical question the ALJ asked the vocational expert included the moderate
    deficiencies. The vocational expert was asked to include all of the deficiencies in Exhibit 13F in
    answering the questions posed by the ALJ. J.A. at 301. Exhibit 13F indicates that claimant is
    moderately limited in his “ability to understand and remember detailed instructions,” his “ability to
    carry out detailed instructions,” and in his “ability to maintain attention and concentration for
    extended periods.” Id. at 224. Taking into account the findings in Exhibit 13F adequately
    incorporates moderate deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. Thus, because the ALJ
    explicitly requested that the vocational expert assume that the moderate deficiencies included in
    3
    Exhibit 13F were present in answering the hypothetical questions, the ALJ did not commit error by
    relying on the hypothetical. Claimant’s arguments on this point must fail.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
    4