United States v. Carl Halcomb , 424 F. App'x 447 ( 2011 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 11a0342n.06
FILED
No. 09-6118
May 20, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
v. ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
CARL HALCOMB, )
) OPINION
Defendant-Appellant. )
BEFORE: McKEAGUE and STRANCH, Circuit Judges; and MAYS, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM. Defendant Carl Halcomb pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of
a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On September 10, 2008, he was sentenced to a
prison term of forty-six months. Defendant now appeals, contending the district court abused its
discretion by declining to grant a downward variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range.
Defendant contends the sentence imposed is substantively unreasonable.
There is no dispute that the district court correctly calculated the applicable advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range to be 46 to 57 months. Nor does defendant complain of any procedural
irregularity in the sentencing. Rather, defendant contends the district court erred in weighing the
sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He contends this error resulted in a sentence
*
Honorable Samuel H. Mays, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of
Tennessee, sitting by designation.
No. 09-6118
United States v. Halcomb
greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing. Specifically, defendant argues the
district court failed to give adequate weight to two considerations: his post-offense rehabilitation
efforts and his elderly parents’ dependence on him for care.
The sentence imposed, within the advisory Guidelines range, is presumptively reasonable.
United States v. Haj-Hamed, 549 F.3d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 2008). In determining whether
defendant has rebutted this presumption, we review the sentence under the highly deferential abuse
of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007).
Having duly considered the record, we find no error. It is clear that the district court did not
ignore evidence of defendant’s positive employment situation or of his infirm parents’ need for help.
The court determined, however, that these were not such exceptional circumstances as to warrant
a variance in light of defendant’s criminal history, which included prior convictions for aggravated
robbery and reckless homicide. Considering defendant’s history of violence and the fact that he was
found to be in possession of some fifteen firearms at the time of his arrest (six of which he admitted
owning), the court remained unpersuaded that defendant’s mitigating circumstances placed his case
“beyond the heartland.” The district court nonetheless showed a measure of leniency by imposing
a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range. We find nothing arbitrary or substantively
unreasonable in the district court’s judgment.
Defendant has cited Sixth Circuit rulings affirming lower courts’ imposition of shorter
sentences due to a defendant’s extraordinary family circumstances, United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d
318 (6th Cir. 2007); and due to a defendant’s extraordinary post-arrest rehabilitation, United States
v. Hairston, 502 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2007). In both cases, however, the operative dynamic was
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No. 09-6118
United States v. Halcomb
appellate deference to the sentencing court’s “special competence” in fashioning an appropriate
sentence. See Haj-Hamed, 549 F.3d at 1027-28 (upholding determination that family circumstances
were not so extraordinary as to justify departure or variance, and distinguishing Husein on this
basis); Hairston, 502 F.3d at 385-86 (noting reticence to substitute appellate court’s judgment for
that of district court in review for substantive unreasonableness); Husein, 478 F.3d at 328 (hesitating
to “second-guess” district court’s determination under abuse-of-discretion standard of review).
Indeed, if the district court had granted a downward variance in this case, we would be similarly
constrained to uphold the sentence absent a showing of abuse of discretion. This deference stems
from recognition of the district court’s “institutional advantage” in evaluating the individual case and
individual defendant under the § 3553(a) factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52.
The presumptive reasonableness accorded to a sentence and the highly deferential standard
of review constrain us from substituting our judgment for that of the sentencing court. However, we
are mindful that courts may consider rehabilitation in granting a downward variance and this
defendant showed signs of rehabilitation including success at a skilled career, the support of his
employer, his sobriety, and his rendering of much needed care for his elderly parents. Recent
Supreme Court authority emphasizes the importance of encouraging and rewarding rehabilitation,
with the important goal of restoring offenders to complete freedom and useful citizenship. Pepper
v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1239-43 (2011) (post-sentencing rehabilitation “may be highly
relevant to several § 3553(a) factors” and support downward variance) (relying on Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (in selecting an appropriate sentence, court must possess fullest
information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics)).
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No. 09-6118
United States v. Halcomb
Unfortunately for defendant, the district court in this case, unlike the district courts in Husein
and Hairston, after duly considering the evidence in support of his motion for variance, and after
hearing counsel’s argument and defendant’s allocution, elected to exercise its discretion to deny the
motion and impose a sentence within the advisory range.
Because the sentence imposed has not been shown to be an abuse of discretion, we
AFFIRM.
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