Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2006 )

File Name: 06a0578n.06
Filed: August 11, 2006
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
No. 05-6540
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DENNIS ANDERSON, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
v. ) WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
) OPINION
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
Before: GILMAN and COOK, Circuit Judges; DOWD, Senior District Judge.*
DOWD, J., Senior District Judge. Dennis Anderson (“appellant”) brought an action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. He now appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits. Appellant claims that the decision is not supported by
substantial evidence and that the Commissioner failed to supply a complete administrative record
to the district court. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part the
*
The Honorable David D. Dowd, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District
of Ohio, sitting by designation.
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district court’s decision, and REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to REMAND
to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Appellant was born on December 8, 1954. He has a sixth grade education and, as of the
administrative hearing on October 3, 2001, had not obtained a GED although he had been attending
classes for 18 months.
Appellant filed his application for SSI on November 9, 1999, alleging a disability onset date
of September 15, 1992 and disability as a result of limited eye sight, neck, elbow, shoulder and knee
problems, and stress. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Appellant sought
a hearing, which was conducted before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) John P. Garner on
October 3, 2001. Appellant, represented by counsel, testified at the hearing, as did Lisa Courtney,
a vocational expert (“VE”).
An unfavorable decision was issued on January 25, 2002. With respect to the DIB
application, the ALJ determined that since there was no new and material evidence to warrant
reopening the application, the doctrine of res judicata precluded revisiting the period of September
15, 1992 to June 28, 1996.1 The ALJ declared that the sole issue was “whether the claimant is entitle
[sic] to Supplemental Security Income benefits beginning November 9, 1999.” He concluded at step
two of the five-step evaluation that appellant did not suffer a severe mental impairment and, at step
1
Appellant had filed the application for DIB on August 4, 1994. After denial initially and
on reconsideration, he requested a hearing. On June 28, 1996, his disability application was denied
by the ALJ. His appeal was denied on September 25, 1999 on the ground that it was untimely filed.
No further action was taken. Instead, in his November 1999 SSI application, appellant simply
alleged the same disability onset date of September 15, 1992.
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four, that “[t]he claimant’s past relevant work as auto mechanic did not require the performance of
work-related activities precluded by his residual functional capacity.” Therefore, appellant’s SSI
application was denied. A timely appeal was also denied by the Appeals Council on March 26,
2004, making the ALJ’s ruling the final decision of the Commissioner.
On May 24, 2004, appellant filed his lawsuit seeking judicial review of the administrative
action. The district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision on July 21, 2005 and appellant
timely appealed arguing that the ALJ’s findings at step two and step four of the five-step process
were not supported by substantial evidence and that the Commissioner erred in failing to include in
the administrative record documentation within its possession necessary for the district court to
determine whether or not he had been represented by counsel in his 1994 claim for benefits.
II.
A.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the ALJ’s findings are conclusive if they are supported by
substantial evidence. Duncan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 851 (6th Cir. 1986)
(this court’s review “is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the findings”). “ ‘Substantial evidence’ means ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Kirk
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
We “may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions
of credibility.” Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Foster v. Halter, 279
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F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001) (the court should defer to the agency’s decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence, “even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported
an opposite conclusion”) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)).
B.
1.
Appellant argues that substantial evidence was lacking to support the ALJ’s decision that res
judicata constituted a barrier to reopening his 1994 application. He makes this argument because
the Commissioner failed to include in the record before the ALJ any documents relating to that prior
application, even though the ALJ’s decision suggests knowledge of the earlier denial. Appellant
argues here that he was “penalized” by this failure to supply a proper record because he did not have
access to “the pertinent information showing whether or not [he] was represented” at the time of the
1994 decision. He asks this court to remand with directions that the Commissioner be required to
provide the ALJ with the decisions and supporting documents relating to the 1994 application “in
order to determine whether and at what stage Appellant did and/or did not have representation.”
As pointed out by the district court, ordinarily federal courts do not have jurisdiction to
review an ALJ’s decision not to reopen a prior application. The exception is where a claimant raises
a colorable constitutional claim. See Willis v. Sec’y, Health and Human Servs., 802 F.2d 870, 873
(6th Cir. 1986) (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1977)). In this Circuit, a colorable
constitutional claim is established and judicial review is proper where the claimant’s mental capacity
prevented him or her from pursuing administrative remedies. Id. However, under Social Security
Ruling (“SSR”) 91-5p, a colorable mental incapacity claim is established only when the fact of
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mental incapacity is coupled with a showing of lack of anyone legally responsible for prosecuting
the claim.
Appellant argues in his opening brief that, lacking the full record, the ALJ could not have
determined whether or not he was represented by counsel at the time of the decision denying the
1994 application. In his reply brief, appellant adds to the argument that, due to his sixth grade
education and third grade reading level, along with his deficient logic, increased paranoia and
feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, he lacked the mental capacity to pursue his claim when
he missed the deadline for filing his appeal following the denial of his 1994 application.
The district court acknowledged that the ALJ did not apply the standard articulated in SSR
91-5p, but further concluded that “plaintiff has failed to show that he had no one legally responsible
for prosecuting his claim at the time of the prior application and thus has failed to raise a colorable
constitutional claim.” (District Court Opinion, at 16).
While it is true that the ALJ is limited to the record and that the Commissioner has the
burden of providing that record, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), it is a plaintiff’s burden to show mental
incapacity and the lack of counsel.2 In Cottrell v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1992), the court
rejected an argument similar to our appellant’s, stating as follows:
The suggestion that the plaintiff might have been able to demonstrate a violation of
his constitutional rights if the Secretary had provided him a transcript is not
persuasive. The plaintiff knew perfectly well what evidence had been submitted to
the agency, and there is no constitutional requirement that the Appeals Council have
2
In fact, SSR 91-5p, does not require legal counsel; it merely requires a showing that there
was “no one legally responsible for prosecuting the claim (e.g., a parent of a claimant who is a
minor, legal guardian, attorney, or other legal representative) at the time of the prior administrative
action[.]”
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a complete transcript before deciding whether to grant an application to reopen. See
Blacha v. Secretary of HHS, 927 F.2d 228, 231-32 (6th Cir.1990).
Id. at 345.
During the administrative hearing conducted on October 3, 2001, Anderson was represented
by counsel who stated that “there’d been a previous Decision resulting from a hearing of February
23, I’m not sure if it’s ‘95 or ‘96, Your Honor. I don’t think I can go back behind that. I don’t have
any new evidence to support re-opening.” (Record at 579-80, emphasis added). Clearly, there was
an opportunity at that time to either present independent evidence or to ask that the Commissioner
produce a more complete record. Since Anderson failed to do so, he has not met his burden.
The court finds no error in the district court’s ruling with respect to the ALJ’s decision not
to reopen the earlier application and, to that extent, we affirm the district court.
2.
We turn next to the remaining arguments of the appellant, all relating to whether there is
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination.
Appellant challenges the ALJ’s determination that he failed to establish a severe mental
impairment. There is substantial evidence in the record that appellant’s mental impairment, if any,
is slight and has only minimal, intermittent effect on his daily activities. Therefore, we reject this
argument.
Appellant also challenges the ALJ’s determination that he retained the capacity for a full
range of medium level work. In particular, appellant argues that, in evaluating his residual
functional capacity, the ALJ failed to give good reasons for crediting the opinions of consulting
sources over those of his treating physicians. We reject this argument, finding that the ALJ did give
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reasons for discounting the opinion of Dr. DeSouza, appellant’s treating physician. The ALJ
concluded, properly in our view, that the doctor’s overall treatment notes did not support and were
inconsistent with his conclusory assertion that appellant was disabled.
Finally, turning to appellant’s remaining argument, we must agree that substantial record
evidence is lacking to support the ALJ’s determination that appellant’s “past relevant work as auto
mechanic did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by his residual
functional capacity.” The evidence as to his past relevant work is conflicting. Although a
typewritten Work History Report indicates that he was a “mechanic” and that he did “automotive
repair,” his testimony at the administrative hearing was that he did “body work.” Since appellant
has a sixth grade education and reads at a third grade level, it is not surprising that he did not detect
any error in his Work History Report, if he ever saw it. That form was probably completed by his
attorney. This Court suspects that the hearing testimony, not the Work History Report, is accurate;
however, at the very least, this is a significant conflict in the evidence. The ALJ failed to
acknowledge this conflict in the evidence or offer any explanation for the conclusion that Anderson
previously worked as an “auto mechanic” rather than an auto body repairman. See Peabody Coal
Co. v. Hill, 123 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 1997) (“In deciding whether the substantial evidence
requirement is satisfied, we consider whether the administrative law judge adequately explained the
reasons for crediting certain testimony and evidence over other evidence in the record . . . .”). All
of the VE’s testimony at the hearing was based on the possibly incorrect assumption that appellant
had been an auto mechanic. This Court is in no position to determine whether the VE’s conclusions
would be any different had they been based on past relevant work as an auto body repairman. That
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matter must be resolved administratively. Therefore, due to this conflict in the record, we conclude
that substantial evidence is lacking to support the ALJ’s determination that appellant could return
to his past relevant work.
III.
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part the district
court’s decision, and REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to REMAND to the
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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