United States v. Quinney , 238 F. App'x 150 ( 2007 )

File Name: 07a0517n.06
Filed: July 19, 2007
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
No. 07-3190
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
SHAWN QUINNEY, COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO
Defendant-Appellant.
/
OPINION
Before: MARTIN and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; GREER, District Judge.*
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Shawn Quinney appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress, a decision largely adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate
judge. Because the district court applied the incorrect standard of review in considering the report
*
The Honorable J. Ronnie Greer, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Tennessee, sitting by designation.
No. 07-3190
United States v. Quinney
Page 2
and recommendation, we now VACATE the decision of the district court and REMAND for further
proceedings as articulated below.
I.
In the fall of 2005, the United States Secret Service identified Quinney as potentially
involved in the passing and printing of counterfeit United States currency. Pursuant to their
investigation, on September 27, 2005, Secret Service agents went to his home in Toledo, Ohio and
he consented to talk with them outside.1 During the interview, Quinney admitted to passing the
counterfeit currency, but denied any involvement in printing it. Following this discussion, the agents
obtained Quinney’s consent to search his upstairs bedroom. The agents also obtained consent to
search from Quinney’s stepfather, Chris Jacobs, who was the owner of the house. (Quinney was
nineteen years old at the time of the suppression hearing. Although it is not entirely clear from the
record, one can assume that he was either eighteen or nineteen at the time of his encounters with the
agents and their seizure of his printer.) The search of Quinney’s bedroom revealed a
printer/scanner/copier machine, but the agents did not seize it at this time. No sooner had the agents
departed, however, they received a radio communication from another agent who told them he had
just interviewed someone who said that Quinney was the “printer” of the currency. Thus the agents
returned to Quinney’s home approximately two hours later to re-interview him. Upon learning from
1
Perhaps not surprisingly, the parties dispute just how “consensual” this encounter really was.
Quinney testified at the suppression hearing that he did not feel free to get out of the agents’ car
during the interview. In contrast, the agents testified that they had in fact offered to conduct the
interview in Quinney’s house in the presence of his mother and stepfather, yet Quinney “didn’t want
his parents to know what was going on” and thus requested that the interview be conducted outside
the house in the agents’ car.
No. 07-3190
United States v. Quinney
Page 3
Jacobs that Quinney had stepped out, the agents told Jacobs they “would have to seize” the
printer/scanner/copier from Quinney’s bedroom. Jacobs consented to the seizure, although he later
testified that he did not feel as if he had much of a choice in the matter because the agents made a
command, not a request, for the printer. The agents then looked for Quinney in the neighborhood,
found him, and re-interviewed him in their car. During this second interview, when confronted with
the agents’ newly acquired information, Quinney admitted to having printed counterfeit currency,
both orally and in a written statement. Quinney was not Mirandized at either of these first two
interviews.
On October 4, 2005, Quinney was interviewed for a third time. The interview took place at
the agents’ office. According to the government, Quinney was Mirandized despite being told, as he
had been during the two prior interviews, that he was not under arrest. Quinney contests this
assertion, arguing that at no time during the third interview was he read his Miranda rights. During
the third interview, Quinney wrote out a one-page supplement to his written statement of September
27, and he also identified the particular counterfeit notes that he had manufactured.
On December 7, 2005, Quinney was charged in a two-count indictment for: (1)
manufacturing counterfeit currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471, and (2) uttering counterfeit
currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who held an
evidentiary hearing on Quinney’s motion to suppress the printer/scanner/copier as well as his oral
and written statements. On June 2, 2006, the magistrate judge issued a report recommending denial
of the motion to suppress. Quinney objected to the magistrate’s ruling, but the district court adopted
the magistrate’s ultimate conclusions. Quinney then entered conditional pleas of guilty to each count
No. 07-3190
United States v. Quinney
Page 4
of the indictment, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On February
16, 2007, Quinney was sentenced to a term of five months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three
years’ supervised release. He now appeals.
II.
It is well-settled that upon proper objection by a party, a district court must review de novo
a magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress. See United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a magistrate judge’s ruling on “dispositive” motions, such as those for
summary judgment or the suppression of evidence, must be reviewed de novo by the district court);
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (providing that a district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made”). Quinney argues that the district court, rather than conducting de novo
review of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, reviewed it under the clearly erroneous
standard. Quinney believes this panel should therefore vacate his sentence and remand to the district
court for further consideration under the appropriate standard.
In support of his argument, Quinney points to the opening two paragraphs in the district
court’s opinion and order, which read in full as follows:
This action is before the Court on Defendant Shawn Quinney’s objections to the June
6, 2006, Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (“R &
R”) and the Government’s response thereto. When a magistrate judge’s finding is
challenged in district court, the district court shall apply a “clearly erroneous or
contrary to law” standard of review for “nondispositive” preliminary matters, while
“dispositive motions” are governed by the de novo standard. 28 U.S.C.A. §
636(b)(1)(A, B). United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001). In this
instance the Court has conducted a clearly erroneous review. For the following
No. 07-3190
United States v. Quinney
Page 5
reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections are not well taken and the same are
denied.
The R & R issued by Magistrate Judge Armstrong concluded that Defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence (Doc. No. 9) be overruled. This Court has reviewed the
finding in the R & R and the memoranda filed by the parties both initially and in
connection with objections to the R & R under the standard set forth above. The
Court has also reviewed a transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress, which
evidentiary hearing was held on February 28, 2006. After such review, this Court
will adopt in full the Magistrate Judge’s R & R and overrule Defendant’s motion to
suppress.
Joint App’x at 51-52 (emphasis added and internal references to court documents omitted).
The government does not dispute that the district court clearly misstated its standard of
review. It suggests, however, that this was a mere slip of the pen, because the district court went on
to conduct what was in effect a de novo review of the suppression issue “by re-examining the entire
record.” Gov’t Br. at 9. The government’s position appears to be as follows: because the district
court stated it had “reviewed” both the memoranda filed by the parties before the magistrate judge
and the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court’s review was necessarily
de novo. We find this argument unconvincing. After all, even when a reviewing court applies the
more deferential clearly erroneous standard, it must still “review” the lower court proceedings for
it to gauge whether the lower court’s conclusions derived from those proceedings were clearly
erroneous. Thus while it is possible that the district judge in this case actually applied one standard
of review but mistakenly told his readers that he was applying a different one, it is equally possible
that the district judge not only wrote down the wrong standard but also applied that wrong standard
as well. Indeed, both the deferential language used by the district court (noting several times that
it “agrees” with the magistrate judge’s conclusions), as well as the court’s cursory treatment of the
No. 07-3190
United States v. Quinney
Page 6
legal issues (one short paragraph on inevitable discovery, and one even shorter paragraph on alleged
Miranda violations), tend to indicate that the district court did what it said it would do: namely,
conduct a clearly erroneous review of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. And
because the proper standard of review in such a case is indisputably de novo, see Curtis, 237 F.3d
at 603, the district court applied the incorrect standard in reviewing the magistrate judge’s report.
In light of this error, we cannot simply bypass the district court’s decision and review directly
the magistrate judge’s denial of Quinney’s suppression motion. Rather, several on-point precedents
clearly hold that vacatur and remand to the district court is the proper approach. For example, in
Flournoy v. Marshall, we stated as follows:
[B]y failing to review the magistrate’s report under the appropriate “de novo”
standard, the district judge has failed to fulfill his duties as an Article III judge.
Although Congress did intend the magistrates to lend assistance to the overburdened
district courts when appropriate, the carefully drafted statutory standards for review
of the magistrate’s findings are meant to insure that the district courts will not
abdicate their responsibility. Due to the great importance of adherence to the express
provisions of section 636(b), we VACATE the decision of the district court in all
three of these cases and REMAND to the district court for a “de novo” review of the
record for at least those objections set forth by the parties and for further proceedings
consistent herewith.
842 F.2d 875, 878-79 (6th Cir. 1988). See also id. at 878 (“[A]s the statutory design and legislative
history of the Federal Magistrates Act [codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636] makes evident, Congress
intended the standards for review of a magistrate’s findings to be taken seriously and applied in
accord with the express language set forth in that statute.”); Powell v. United States, 37 F.3d 1499,
1994 WL 532926, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994) (Table) (“In this case, the district court expressly
stated that the magistrate judge’s report was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we vacate the
No. 07-3190
United States v. Quinney
Page 7
district court’s order and remand the case so that the district court may apply the proper standard of
review to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation regarding [defendant’s] motion.”). Our
decision in Curtis is also consistent with the approach taken in Flournoy, despite the fact that Curtis
presented this court with the converse of what has happened here — i.e., in Curtis the district court
applied de novo review to an issue in the magistrate judge’s report, when it should have applied
clearly erroneous review. See Curtis, 237 F.3d at 604 (“Remand is necessary to allow the [district]
court to examine the magistrate court’s findings under the proper standard [of review] . . . .”).
III.
For all of the reasons stated above, we VACATE the decision of the district court and
REMAND for its re-examination of the magistrate judge’s conclusions as to Quinney’s motion to
suppress, this time applying the proper de novo standard of review.