Steve Miner v. Montgomery County, Tennessee , 375 F. App'x 558 ( 2010 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 10a0268n.06
No. 09-5624
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Apr 29, 2010
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
STEVE MINER, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, )
)
Defendant-Appellee, )
)
MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF )
BUILDING AND CODES, )
)
Defendant. )
)
BEFORE: BOGGS, SUHRHEINRICH, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Steve Miner appeals the grant of summary judgment
in favor of his former employer, defendant Montgomery County, Tennessee, on his federal- and
state-law age discrimination claims. Miner was in his mid-fifties and had worked for the County’s
Department of Building and Codes for approximately fifteen years—including eight years as
Building Commissioner—when Mayor Carolyn Bowers terminated his at-will employment in
January 2007. After Bowers chose a substantially younger individual to replace Miner as Building
Commissioner, Miner filed a charge with the EEOC and then filed suit in federal district court,
stating claims under both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Tennessee Human
No. 09-5624
Miner v. Montgomery County, Tennessee
Rights Act. Bowers claims that she terminated Miner because he enforced the building code
inconsistently (a belief based largely on complaints received from builders and developers); dealt
with others arrogantly (a belief based in part on the complaints and in part on Bowers’ own personal
observations); and ran the department’s office inefficiently. Miner contends, by contrast, that
Bowers’ stated reasons were a mere pretext for age discrimination.
The County conceded, for purposes of its motion for summary judgment, that Miner could
make out a prima facie case of discrimination. See Miner v. Montgomery County, Tenn., No. 3:07-
cv-1260, 2009 WL 1046860, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 20, 2009). Applying the burden-shifting
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the district court
concluded that the County had proffered three legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Miner’s
termination. Miner, 2009 WL 1046860, at *4-5. Miner, however, had not presented sufficient
evidence to support an inference that the County’s proffered reasons were a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. Id. at *6. From the district court’s perspective, even though Bowers and her Director
of Administration had testified inconsistently as to whether the complaints about Miner had been
investigated, this inconsistency did not “implicate Bowers’ credibility with respect to whether she
received complaints and basically believed the reports she was hearing.” Id. at *5-6. Similarly,
although Miner challenged the factual basis for Bowers’ conclusion that he had been arrogant, “[t]he
fact remain[ed] that Mayor Bowers herself [had] clearly perceived Miner to have been arrogant and
disrespectful.” Id. at *6. The district court concluded that even if Bowers’ decision to terminate
Miner had been “ill-advised or insufficiently researched, . . . the complaints coupled with [Bowers’]
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No. 09-5624
Miner v. Montgomery County, Tennessee
own observations were sufficient to support the adverse action” for purposes of Miner’s
discrimination claims. Id. Finding that Miner had not created a genuine issue of fact as to pretext,
the district court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment in full. Id. at *6-7.
Miner now appeals, advancing arguments similar to those relied upon in the district court.
Having carefully reviewed the factual record, the controlling case law, and the parties’ appellate
briefs, and having also had the benefit of oral argument, we agree with the district court that Miner
has not created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the County’s proffered reasons for his
termination were a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See id. at *5-6. Because the district court
thoroughly explained its decision, and because our issuance of a more detailed written opinion would
be unnecessarily duplicative and would not enhance this court’s jurisprudence, we affirm for the
reasons stated in the district court’s April 20, 2009, opinion.
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