Jeffrey Casey v. State of Tennessee , 399 F. App'x 47 ( 2010 )


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  •                   NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 10a0599n.06
    No. 09-5362
    FILED
    Sep 09, 2010
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    JEFFREY ALAN CASEY,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                           ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
    STATE OF TENNESSEE                                           MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
    Respondent-Appellee.
    /
    Before: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; and KATZ, District Judge.*
    KATZ, District Judge. Petitioner, Jeffrey Casey, appeals from the district court’s denial
    of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Casey was convicted by a Tennessee jury of two counts of
    first-degree murder in 1984 and sentenced to two concurrent life sentences. After losing his direct
    appeal and filing several unsuccessful petitions for post-conviction relief in state court, Casey filed
    this petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 2006. After holding an
    evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1),
    finding that Casey was not entitled to equitable tolling on the ground of “actual innocence.” We
    AFFIRM.
    Admitting that his petition is otherwise untimely, Casey seeks equitable tolling of the §
    2244(d)(1) limitations period on the ground of “actual innocence.” As this circuit has held,
    “equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period based on a credible showing of actual innocence
    *
    The Honorable David A. Katz, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by
    designation.
    is appropriate.” Souter v. Jones, 
    395 F.3d 577
    , 599 (6th Cir. 2005). But “actual innocence means
    factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” 
    Souter, 395 F.3d at 590
    (quoting Bousley v. United
    States, 
    523 U.S. 614
    , 623 (1998)). It is the petitioner who bears the burden of making this showing,
    McClendon v. Sherman, 
    329 F.3d 490
    , 494 (6th Cir. 2003), which requires the petitioner to present
    “new evidence of innocence,” and not merely “new evidence” of a constitutional violation. Schlup
    v. Delo, 
    513 U.S. 298
    , 316 (1995).
    In this case, Casey complains of several defects in the hearing he received before the juvenile
    court that transferred him to be tried as an adult on the murder charges, as well as the juvenile court’s
    resulting order. Specifically, Casey contends that the juvenile court failed to find, as required by
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-234(a)(4) (1983), that there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that Casey
    was “not committable to an institution for the mentally ill” and that “[t]he interests of the community
    require that the child be put under legal restraint or discipline” prior to ordering him transferred for
    trial as an adult. Casey also contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that he had waived his
    statutory right under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-234(3) (1983) to three days prior notice of the transfer
    hearing. In Casey’s view, these errors amount to a violation of federal due process under Kent v.
    United States, 
    383 U.S. 541
    , 562 (1966), which held that a juvenile transfer hearing “must measure
    up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Casey further claims that his lawyer at the
    juvenile court hearing did not provide him with effective assistance of counsel. Citing the transcript
    of the juvenile court hearing as “new evidence,” Casey argues that the invalid transfer order deprived
    him of due process and defeated the jurisdiction of the circuit court that tried him for murder as an
    adult, thus rendering his conviction void.
    2
    But Casey’s attack on the adequacy of the juvenile court proceedings is simply not the sort
    of claim contemplated by the “actual innocence” exception as justifying equitable tolling. Even if
    Casey is correct that the juvenile court’s invalid transfer order entirely deprived the circuit court of
    jurisdiction to try him as an adult, the “new evidence” he adduces in support of that claim in no way
    indicates his factual innocence of the crime charged or his lack of competence to stand trial for that
    charge, bearing instead only on the legal sufficiency of the transfer proceedings. Regardless of
    whether the constitutional errors claimed by Casey are characterized as “procedural” or
    “jurisdictional” in nature, they do not implicate the “concern about the injustice that results from the
    conviction of an innocent person,” 
    Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325
    , that underlies “actual innocence” tolling.
    Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying the petition.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-5362

Citation Numbers: 399 F. App'x 47

Judges: Clay, Cole, Katz

Filed Date: 9/9/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024