Nikolay Shvedko v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2011 )


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  •                         NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 11a0030n.06
    No. 09-3980                                            FILED
    Jan 12, 2011
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                 LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    NIKOLAY FRANTS SHVEDKO; and MARIKA
    AVGUSTIN SVEDKO,
    Petitioners,
    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN
    v.                                                                      ORDER OF THE BOARD OF
    IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    /
    Before:              BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
    BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Petitioners Nikolay Shvedko and Marika Svedko1
    filed affirmative2 petitions for asylum, withholding of removal pursuant to section 241(b)(3) of the
    Immigration and Nationality Act, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.3 An
    immigration judge denied their applications, and the denials were affirmed by the Board of
    Immigration Appeals. Nikolay and Marika now appeal the Board’s denial of their withholding
    section 241(b)(3) and Convention claims.4 We DENY Nikolay’s and Marika’s petitions for review.
    1
    Because of the confusing similarity of Petitioners’ last names, they are referred to throughout this opinion by
    their first names.
    2
    W ithholding proceedings had not yet been initiated against Nikolay or M arika.
    3
    Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec.
    10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, p. 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-.18 (2010).
    4
    Marika does not appeal her asylum claim even though it was timely filed and she would meet a lesser burden
    than with her withholding claims.
    No. 09-3980
    Shvedko v. Holder
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    I. BACKGROUND
    Nikolay was born in Soviet Russia, but moved at age eight to Estonia, another Soviet Union
    member state. Marika was born in Estonia, where she and Nikolay met, married, and had two
    children. After serving in the Soviet Army, Nikolay became a member of the KGB to investigate
    criminal cases in Estonia. Unhappy as a KGB agent, Nikolay requested to be discharged from the
    agency. That request was denied and viewed almost as a treasonous act. Nevertheless, Nikolay
    again requested a discharge in 1990 and was granted walking papers.
    When Estonia became an independent nation in 1991, Marika and the two children
    automatically became citizens of the new Republic of Estonia because they were all born there.
    Nikolay, however, did not automatically qualify for citizenship because he was born in Russia, and
    never achieved full citizenship. Instead, he received multiple temporary permits allowing him to
    reside in Estonia, but not to work there, and he obtained a passport from the new Russian Federation.
    Nikolay began commuting to Russia for small jobs after leaving the KGB, but sometime near
    the beginning of 1997, he accepted a position with the Estonian secret police, who contacted him
    because of his old KGB position. He continued working with the secret police until early 1999 when
    he began working in Russia for a man exporting lumber from there to Estonia.
    In 2002, Nikolay arrived in the United States and has remained here since. Marika joined
    him in 2004. Their children, then sixteen and eighteen, remained in Estonia living in the family
    apartment. In 2004, after both Nikolay’s and Marika’s departure times had passed, they filed
    affirmative petitions with the Department of Homeland Security for asylum, withholding of removal,
    and protection under the Convention claiming that they feared future persecution and torture at the
    No. 09-3980
    Shvedko v. Holder
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    hands of the Estonian and Russian secret police. Their petitions were referred to an immigration
    judge, who found Nikolay and Marika to be credible, but denied their petitions on grounds that
    Nikolay’s was untimely, neither established past persecution, and neither established beyond
    speculation that they would be persecuted or tortured when removed. The immigration judge
    ordered Nikolay removed to Russia or alternatively to Estonia and Marika to Estonia. They appealed
    the decisions to the Board of Immigration Appeals, but the Board denied their appeals, finding that
    the immigration judge’s decisions were not clearly erroneous.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Nikolay and Marika assert that, if returned to their countries of removal, they would be
    persecuted and tortured because Nikolay’s past affiliations with the KGB and Estonian secret police
    place them in persecuted social groups, and because membership in those groups imputes to them
    certain political opinions. Also, they cite human rights problems and police and prison brutality in
    both countries as further evidence. However, a series of events occurring between 1992 and 2004
    constitute the bulk of reasons that they fear future persecution and torture.
    The first event occurred sometime between 1992 and 1995 when Marika found crosses
    affixed to their apartment with the initials “KGB” and their names written on them. She also
    suspected that she was being followed, but she does not allege by whom. Additionally, a local
    daycare refused to admit their son, hinting that the reason was the family’s former Soviet affiliation.
    When Nikolay began working with the Estonian secret police around 1997, Nikolay believes
    that their apartment was under audio and video surveillance because bushes and trees were cut down
    in front of the apartment. Additionally, an Estonian secret police agent named Marko Reinhardt
    No. 09-3980
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    contacted the home and knew information that only could have been obtained from listening to
    family conversations inside the apartment. Also, former KGB contacts began visiting the family
    without invitation.
    A few years later, former KGB agents contacted Nikolay asking to be put in contact with his
    employer. Shortly thereafter, in 2002, his employer told him that agents from the new Russian
    Federal Security Bureau had come to his office wanting to “detain” Nikolay in order to “clarify”
    some things. Afraid for his safety, Nikolay fled Russia and came to the United States in 2002.
    The last events cited by Nikolay and Marika occurred around 2004 after Marika had come
    to the United States. While the children lived alone in the apartment, Reinhardt contacted them
    multiple times looking for Nikolay and knew things about them “from their recent past.” Nikolay
    telephoned Reinhardt from the United States at which time Reinhardt told him that Nikolay would
    be back in Estonia within a year and that Reinhardt would know about it and be in touch with him.
    A.     Standard of Review
    We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal issued by the Board. See 8 U.S.C. §
    1252(a) (2006); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 360
    , 364 (6th Cir. 2010). When the Board’s
    decision “adopts the immigration judge’s reasoning and supplements [it],” as the Board did here, we
    review that opinion as supplemented. 
    Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 364
    (citing Zhao v. Holder, 
    569 F.3d 238
    , 246 (6th Cir. 2009)).
    This Court reviews questions of law de novo, but factual findings by the Board and the
    immigration judge are reviewed for “substantial evidence.” Shaya v. Holder, 
    586 F.3d 401
    , 405 (6th
    No. 09-3980
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    Cir. 2009). “These findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
    compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
    B.     Withholding of Removal
    Withholding of removal pursuant to section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
    “is not discretionary, but rather is mandatory if the alien establishes that his ‘life or freedom would
    be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality,
    membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” 
    Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 364
    -65
    (quoting Khalili v. Holder, 
    557 F.3d 429
    , 435 (6th Cir. 2009)). To satisfy this burden, the applicant
    must establish a “clear probability” that he will be persecuted upon return to the country of removal.
    
    Id. at 365
    (quoting Singh v. Ashcroft, 
    398 F.3d 396
    , 401 (6th Cir. 2005)). An applicant may establish
    a threat of persecution by showing past persecution on a protected ground or that there is more likely
    than not a future threat of persecution on a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) (2010); see
    Thap v. Mukasey, 
    544 F.3d 674
    , 681 (6th Cir. 2008). Persecution is “‘the infliction of harm or
    suffering by the government, or persons the government is unwilling or unable to control, to
    overcome a characteristic of the victim.’” 
    Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 365
    (quoting 
    Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436
    ).
    Importantly for purposes of section 241(b)(3), Nikolay and Marika do not allege past
    persecution. Therefore, to establish eligibility for withholding of removal pursuant to section
    241(b)(3), they must show that it is more likely than not that they would suffer future persecution
    if returned to their countries of removal. Although Nikolay and Marika do not allege that the events
    No. 09-3980
    Shvedko v. Holder
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    they experienced in the past were “past persecution,” those events still form much of the basis for
    their fear of future persecution.
    Nikolay believes that he will persecuted by the Russian secret police if returned to Russia,
    but out of all the past events he cites as reasons supporting his fear, the only one that is relevant to
    the Russian secret police is the time that they attempted to “detain” him at work to “clarify” some
    things. Even though he worked in Russia for approximately three years from the time he stopped
    working with the Estonian police until he fled to the United States, this is the lone event from that
    time period to which he points as proof that he will be persecuted in the future. Since that single
    instance in 2002, the Russian secret police have not attempted to contact him or his family.
    Additionally, Nikolay does not know what the police wanted, much less whether they intended to
    harm him. Even though he “guesses” that they are concerned with his past involvement with the
    Estonian secret police, he admits that his work did not conflict with Russian interests.
    The only other bases that Nikolay cites for this fear are country reports stating that Russia
    has problems with human rights as well as police and prison brutality. However, “‘feared
    persecution must relate to the alien individually, not to the population generally.’” Harchenko v.
    I.N.S., 
    379 F.3d 405
    , 410 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). These alleged problems have nothing
    to do with his individualized status as a former member of the KGB and Estonian secret police.
    Therefore, Nikolay has failed to establish that it is more likely than not that he would be persecuted
    if returned to Russia.
    Nikolay’s and Marika’s fear of persecution upon returning to Estonia is based upon the
    remainder of the past events, but they are less compelling. Nikolay and Marika cite evidence of
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    inscribed crosses attached to their apartment, Marika’s belief that she was followed, Nikolay’s belief
    that their apartment was under surveillance, phone calls from the Estonian secret police looking for
    Nikolay, Reinhardt’s assertion that he would know when Nikolay was in Estonia and would be in
    touch with him then, and a daycare’s refusal to admit their son. To be sure, it would be undesirable
    and unfortunate for Nikolay and Marika to return to Estonia and experience similar events.
    However, assuming those types of events would continue, they would more closely resemble
    harassment than persecution. Cf. Haider v. Holder, 
    595 F.3d 276
    , 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
    Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S., 
    146 F.3d 384
    , 390 (6th Cir. 1998)) (“Persecution ‘requires more than a few
    isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment,
    infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty.’”). Furthermore, the nature of these events
    does not indicate that any future events would escalate to persecution. What is more, Nikolay’s and
    Marika’s children have continued to reside in the family apartment without being harmed since their
    parents came to the United States. This fact undercuts Nikolay’s and Marika’s fear of persecution.
    See In re A-E-M, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1157, 1160 (BIA 1998) (noting that the applicant’s fear of
    persecution was undercut by the fact that his family members remained in Peru unharmed for four
    years after he left).
    Nikolay and Marika also cite country reports identifying Estonia as a place where human
    rights problems and police and prison brutality occur, but as with Russia, this generalized evidence
    does not relate to them. See 
    Harchenko, 379 F.3d at 410
    . Therefore, Nikolay and Marika have failed
    to establish that it is more likely than not that they would be persecuted if returned to Estonia.
    No. 09-3980
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    C.     Convention Against Torture
    Eligibility for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture requires the
    applicant “to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to
    the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); see Shkulaku-Purballori v. Mukasey,
    
    514 F.3d 499
    , 503 (6th Cir. 2007). Torture is defined as “‘any act by which severe pain or suffering,
    whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted’ to extract information, punish, intimidate,
    coerce, or otherwise discriminate.” 
    Haider, 595 F.3d at 289
    (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)).
    Relief under the Convention is quite similar to withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3), but
    does not require the applicant to link the harm that he will face with any of the five protected
    grounds for asylum—race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
    opinion. See Castellano-Chacon v. I.N.S., 
    341 F.3d 533
    , 551-52 (6th Cir. 2003).
    Nikolay and Marika base their claims for withholding pursuant to the Convention on the
    same evidence cited for their section 241(b)(3) claims. However, because they have failed to
    establish that it is more likely than not that they would suffer persecution, they have neither
    established that they would more likely than not be tortured. Compare 
    Thap, 544 F.3d at 681
    (definition of persecution), with 
    Haider, 595 F.3d at 289
    (definition of torture).
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Nikolay’s and Marika’s petitions for review.