Stamtec Inc. v. Pam Anson , 296 F. App'x 518 ( 2008 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 08a0615n.06
Filed: October 15, 2008
07-6094
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
STAMTEC, INC., )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE
v. ) WESTERN DISTRICT OF
) KENTUCKY
PAM ANSON; FRANKFORT PROPERTIES )
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, KY Limited ) MEMORANDUM
Liability Company, ) OPINION
)
Defendants-Appellants. )
BEFORE: BATCHELDER, CLAY and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Two years ago, in this action to enforce a judgment, we reviewed the
district court’s award of default judgment in favor of plaintiff Stamtec, Inc. and against all of several
named defendants. The default judgment in the amount of $264,880 was entered against defendants
John Anson, Pam Anson, Anson Industries, LLC, Anson Machine & Manufacturing, LLC, Frankfort
Properties, LLC, and Bourbon Country Products, Inc., jointly and severally. The default judgment
was imposed as a sanction for defendants’ willful failure to cooperate in discovery. On review, we
affirmed the default judgment as to defendant John Anson, but vacated the judgment as to the
remaining defendants and remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings, which
could include reconsideration and clarification as to whether and why entry of default judgment was
07-6094
Stamtec, Inc. v. Pam Anson, et al.
appropriate with respect to the “other Anson Defendants.” Stamtec, Inc. v. Anson, 195 F. App’x 473,
482 (6th Cir. 2006). The district court has completed its reconsideration and, in the form of findings
of fact and conclusions of law proposed by the magistrate judge and adopted by the district court
over defendants’ objections, has reaffirmed its original ruling, re-entering default judgment against
the other Anson defendants. Defendants Pam Anson and Frankfort Properties, LLC, have timely
appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On remand, plaintiff Stamtec renewed its motion for sanctions in the form of default
judgment against all remaining defendants. After the motion was fully briefed, it was referred to
the magistrate judge who had overseen much of the earlier discovery proceedings and who had
recommended the original default judgment. On July 6, 2007, the magistrate judge issued
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). In his 38-page
recommendation, the magistrate judge concluded, relevantly, that defendants Pam Anson and
Frankfort Properties, LLC, had failed to comply with the requirements of discovery, that their
noncompliance had been longstanding, pervasive and willful, and that their bad-faith misconduct had
delayed and obstructed discovery. The magistrate judge also found that less drastic sanctions had
been imposed with little effect, that defendants had received fair warning of the possibility of more
severe sanctions if their obstructionist conduct continued, and that their misconduct had resulted in
prejudice to Stamtec. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended that defendants’ answer be
stricken and default judgment be entered.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), defendants filed written objections to the proposed findings
and conclusions, barely three pages in length. In a one-page order, the district court, on de novo
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Stamtec, Inc. v. Pam Anson, et al.
review of the objections, overruled them and adopted the recommended findings and conclusions
in their entirety on August 2, 2007. Default judgment was entered on August 13, 2007.
On appeal, Pam Anson and Frankfort Properties contend the district court abused its
discretion by imposing the most severe sanction. They contend the district court’s ruling is marked
by several clearly erroneous findings of fact, insisting (a) that they did not act willfully, (b) that the
district court did not first impose lesser sanctions, (c) that they could not have reasonably anticipated
that default judgment would be entered against them, and (d) that Stamtec suffered no prejudice.
In response, Stamtec contends, inter alia, that appellants have waived their right to appeal by failing
to preserve their objections in the district court. We agree.
It is well-established that a party must file objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation in order to preserve the issues for appeal. United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976,
984 (6th Cir. 2005). Failure to do so may result in waiver of the objections. Id. Moreover, a
general or non-specific objection to a report and recommendation is tantamount to no objection at
all. Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006). “The objections must be clear enough
to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Id. (quoting
Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)). Objections disputing the correctness of the
magistrate’s recommendation, but failing to specify the findings believed to be in error are too
general and therefore insufficient. Id.When we remanded this matter, both the district court and the parties were on notice that the
manner in which default judgment had first been entered was not entirely satisfactory and that any
renewed proceedings in this vein would be subject to close appellate scrutiny. Accordingly, the
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Stamtec, Inc. v. Pam Anson, et al.
magistrate judge undertook his task of defending his earlier recommendation with painstaking
thoroughness. In the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the magistrate judge set forth
the rationale for his recommendation in explicit detail. The opportunity to object to the
recommendation before the district court actually decided the motion for default judgment was
defendants’ opportunity to specifically identify the errors in both the magistrate judge’s evaluation
of the factual evidence and in his application of the governing law to the facts, knowing that the
district court would have to undertake de novo review of the matters objected to. Inexplicably,
defendants, by failing to cite specific errors of fact or law in the recommendation, forfeited this
opportunity.
Their general objection to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that their history of
noncooperation rose to the level of willfulness and bad faith is simply not effective to preserve their
right to appellate review. In fact, defendants’ seemingly cavalier malfeasance appears to be
emblematic of their approach to this litigation in general, which so exasperated the district court and
culminated in entry of default judgment. We therefore refuse, at this juncture of this tortured case,
to address questions on appeal not properly preserved in the district court.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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