Montrell Kilpatrick v. HCA Human Resources ( 2020 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0706n.06
Case No. 19-5230
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Dec 17, 2020
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
MONTRELL KILPATRICK,
)
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellant,
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
v.
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
HCA HUMAN RESOURCES, LLC,
)
) OPINION
Defendant-Appellee.
BEFORE: SUTTON, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. After his termination by HCA Human Resources,
Montrell Kilpatrick filed suit in federal district court alleging claims of discrimination and hostile
work environment based on race and sex, retaliation, tortious interference with contract and
business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted
summary judgment in HCA’s favor. We vacate and remand in part and affirm in part.
I.
Kilpatrick worked for HCA Human Resources as a recruitment administrator. On
December 17, 2015, he learned from HCA’s Vice President of Labor Relations, Thomas Beck,
that two women had filed sexual harassment complaints against him. Kilpatrick responded that he
is gay and therefore would not have harassed the women. After the meeting, Beck purportedly
told others in the office about Kilpatrick’s sexual orientation. From that point on, Kilpatrick claims
Case No. 19-5230, Kilpatrick v. HCA Human Resources
he was treated differently. For example, co-workers apparently gifted Kilpatrick pink nail polish,
a nail file, and bath bombs for Christmas, and a pair of pink sunglasses were later left on his desk.
And on multiple occasions, another individual at the office—allegedly Kilpatrick’s director—left
notes on his desk containing Bible verses that he interpreted to mean he was going to hell for being
gay. He also states that his workspace was moved, which isolated him from co-workers.
Shortly after Kilpatrick’s meeting with Beck, HCA denied Kilpatrick’s request for tuition
reimbursement for graduate-school classes he took in the fall of 2015. Because HCA had approved
his requests for such reimbursement in the past, Kilpatrick asked it to reconsider his latest request.
In doing so, HCA also reviewed Kilpatrick’s past requests and identified discrepancies in course
dates and costs. To resolve those newly discovered inconsistencies, HCA requested additional
information from Kilpatrick. HCA deemed his response inadequate—he allegedly submitted
doctored and untimely information. As a result, HCA placed Kilpatrick on an “investigatory
suspension,” and around March 9, 2016, terminated his employment with the company. Kilpatrick
believed his termination was discriminatory, so he filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission on March 15, 2016.
Kilpatrick subsequently found work at Brookdale Senior Living as a corporate recruiter.
Eight months later, Brookdale fired him, allegedly after it received an anonymous phone call
disclosing that his employment dates at HCA did not match those on his Brookdale application.
Believing that this second termination was also discriminatory, Kilpatrick filed a second Charge
of Discrimination with the EEOC on February 16, 2017.
A month later, Kilpatrick filed this lawsuit in federal district court, asserting claims of
discrimination and hostile work environment based on race and sex, retaliation, tortious
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interference, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. HCA filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the district court granted. Kilpatrick appealed.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Younis v. Pinnacle
Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is proper only when there is
“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether that standard is satisfied, we view the evidence
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Younis, 610 F.3d at 361.
On appeal, Kilpatrick argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
HCA because: (1) his sex-based discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims are
cognizable under Title VII; (2) HCA retaliated against him in violation of Title VII after he filed
an EEOC charge; and (3) HCA’s discriminatory conduct constituted intentional infliction of
emotional distress.1 We address each argument in turn.
Sex-based Discrimination & Hostile Work Environment. Title VII prohibits an employer
from “discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The district court held that Kilpatrick did not
present a cognizable claim for sex-based discrimination or hostile work environment because both
claims pertained only to his sexual orientation, which our then-relevant precedent had held was
not a prohibited basis for discrimination under Title VII. About a year later, the Supreme Court
held otherwise. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020). Kilpatrick’s sex-
based discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims relating to his sexual orientation are
1
Kilpatrick also argues in his opening brief that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to HCA
on his tortious interference claim. But in his supplemental brief, he voluntarily abandons that claim, in addition to his
race-based claims of discrimination and hostile work environment.
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thus cognizable under Title VII. Id. We vacate the district court’s judgment to the contrary and
remand so it can address the merits of Kilpatrick’s sex-based Title VII claims in the first instance.
Retaliation. Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because
of that individual’s exercise of protected conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). But prior to filing a
claim of retaliation in federal court under Title VII, an employee typically must exhaust
administrative remedies with the EEOC. See Younis, 610 F.3d at 361. HCA argues that Kilpatrick
failed to do so here and that as a result, the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the claim. But administrative exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement
for a claim of retaliation under Title VII. E.g., Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1846
(2019); Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 726 F.3d 851, 855–56 (6th Cir. 2013). It is more like a
mandatory claim-processing rule, subject to waiver or forfeiture if not properly raised. See George
v. Youngstown State Univ., 966 F.3d 446, 469 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Hamer v. Neighborhood
Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017).
HCA raised the issue at the district court and again on appeal. So the rule is “properly
invoked” and “must be enforced.” See Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 17. To satisfy the administrative
exhaustion requirement under Title VII, an employee “must first file an administrative charge with
the EEOC within a certain time after the alleged wrongful act or acts.” Younis, 610 F.3d at 361.
“The charge must be ‘sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the
action or practices complained of.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)). “The requirement,
however, is not meant to be overly rigid, nor should it ‘result in the restriction of subsequent
complaints based on procedural technicalities or the failure of the charges to contain the exact
wording which might be required in a judicial pleading.’” Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.,
453 F.3d 724, 732 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting EEOC v. McCall Printing Co., 633 F.2d 1232, 1235
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(6th Cir. 1980)). To that end, “the EEOC complaint should be liberally construed to encompass
all claims ‘reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’” Id. (quoting
Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 675 (6th Cir. 1992)).
On appeal, Kilpatrick complains that HCA retaliated against him when it allegedly placed
an anonymous call to his subsequent employer, Brookdale Senior Living, to point out suspected
discrepancies in his work history which led to his termination from Brookdale. But Kilpatrick did
not describe that complaint in the EEOC charge he filed on March 15, 2016. Nor could he have;
he did not start working at Brookdale until May 2016, and the alleged call did not occur until
sometime in or around January 2017. Nevertheless, Kilpatrick filed a second EEOC charge on
February 16, 2017 which alleged a claim of retaliation against HCA and noted that he was “accused
of false allegations” which led to his suspension and eventual termination from Brookdale.
Granting Kilpatrick’s second EEOC charge the liberal construction it is due, we hold that it
satisfies Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement and proceed to the merits.2
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Kilpatrick must establish that (1) he engaged
in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the exercise of his civil rights was known to HCA; (3) HCA
took an employment action adverse to him; and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587,
606 (6th Cir. 2008).
Kilpatrick fails to establish element four. As highlighted above, his retaliation claim is
based on his allegation that sometime after filing his EEOC charge on March 15, 2016, an HCA
representative called Brookdale and shared information about his HCA onboarding and
2
HCA correctly points out that most of the information in Kilpatrick’s February 2017 EEOC Charge pertains to
Brookdale’s alleged discriminatory conduct. Even so, Kilpatrick filed the Charge against HCA, and it can be
construed to cover his retaliation claim now before us. See Randolph, 453 F.3d at 732.
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termination dates, which resulted in his termination from Brookdale. But Kilpatrick admits that
he does not know whether HCA actually called Brookdale, who from HCA might have called, or
even what was discussed during the call. What’s more, Kilpatrick does not point to any facts in
the record substantiating his allegation that the call resulted in his termination from Brookdale.
For those reasons, the district court granted summary judgment against him on this claim. We
affirm that decision. See Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 533 (6th Cir. 2004) (opinion
of Rogers, J.) (“In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must
be able to show sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor on more
than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. To establish a prima facie case of intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee law, Kilpatrick must demonstrate that (1) the
conduct he complains of was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was so outrageous that it is
not tolerated by civilized society; and (3) the conduct resulted in serious mental injury. Fitzgerald
v. Hickman Cnty. Gov’t, 2018 WL 1634111, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018) (citing Rogers
v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 (Tenn. 2012)).
Kilpatrick fails to establish element two. A plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate outrageous
conduct is not easy to meet. Id. “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (quoting Bain v.
Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tenn. 1997)). Kilpatrick fails to allege facts beyond those supporting
his claim of discrimination under Title VII. Without more, he cannot demonstrate outrageous
conduct under Tennessee law. See, e.g., Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza I, L.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 529, 540
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 423 (6th Cir. 2020).
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We vacate the district court’s judgment regarding Kilpatrick’s sex-based Title VII claims
and remand for reconsideration in light of Bostock. As to the remaining claims on appeal, we
affirm.
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