United States v. Richard Derringer ( 2021 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 21a0070n.06
Case No. 19-6427
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Feb 03, 2021
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v.
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
RICHARD EUGENE DERRINGER,
)
Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION
)
BEFORE: ROGERS, DONALD, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Richard Derringer was convicted of several child-
pornography offenses stemming from his sexual assault of an eleven-year-old girl that his then-
girlfriend recorded. He was sentenced to 100 years’ imprisonment. Derringer challenges his
convictions, the district court’s denial of his request to substitute counsel during sentencing, and
his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Because those challenges fail to
show error, or show only invited or harmless error, we affirm.
I.
In August 2019, Derringer was tried before a federal jury. Trial testimony established that
in March 2018 he was supposed to chaperone, along with his then-girlfriend, Jacquolyn Walls-
Land, at a children’s sleepover birthday party. The victim, D.M., testified that the sleepover party
was at a hotel. She was eleven years old at the time of the sleepover. During the night, D.M.
Case No. 19-6427, United States v. Derringer
decided that she wanted to go home. Derringer said that he would drive her, but instead of taking
her home, he stopped at a gas station then drove back to the hotel to pick up Walls-Land. They
resumed the trip, but Derringer drove past the turn for D.M.’s home and eventually pulled onto a
gravel road “in the middle of nowhere.” Then, according to D.M.’s testimony, Derringer sexually
assaulted her while she cried, trembled, and thought she “was going to die.” At one point during
the assault, D.M. looked back and saw Walls-Land holding her phone by the headrest of the
passenger’s seat pointed at them. D.M. wondered whether Walls-Land was recording but did not
think that Derringer knew that Walls-Land was recording. After the assault, D.M. described
Derringer smoking “little white crystals” in a clear pipe before having her do the same.
Walls-Land also testified. She explained that she took videos of the assault because
Derringer asked her to do so, both in person and by text message. Walls-Land recounted past
conversations in which Derringer had spoken “quite a bit” about wanting “to be” with a young
girl. She testified that those conversations provided the context for her text message to Derringer
that he did not have to take D.M. home, and which stated, “I just know how much you want her.”
A few messages after that one, Walls-Land told Deringer: “Take your time, have fun. It’s not that
hard to remember to push record this time,” to which he responded, “10-4.” A few messages later,
Derringer asked Walls-Land whether she wanted to go with them. Although she messaged
Derringer that she had “four other girls [in the hotel] logically probably not wise, you take her
alone,” Derringer told her to “come down,” and then to “[g]et in and act cool.” She replied, “Yes,
sir,” and then joined them in the car. She further described herself as the person recording the
videos that were introduced at trial.
Walls-Land described the content of those videos as they played at trial. They showed
Derringer sexually assaulting D.M in the driver’s seat of the car. They also depicted several
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interactions between Derringer and Walls-Land while she recorded from behind the passenger’s
seat with her phone positioned on the passenger’s headrest, on the armrest, and “[r]ight next to”
Derringer’s hand. Those interactions included Derringer’s handing a meth pipe to Walls-Land,
instructing Walls-Land to move her phone from the headrest to the armrest for a better shot, and
looking back at Walls-Land. Walls-Land testified that Derringer looked back at her after she had
exited and reentered the van, telling her that “it appears that [D.M.] likes it in her butt more than
her vagina, and to make sure that [Walls-Land] got that.”
Walls-Land also testified that she did not attempt to send any of those videos from her
Facebook Messenger account to Derringer’s account and that Derringer was the only other person
who could have attempted that. She testified that she specifically recalled him taking her phone
the morning after the assault, that she left it on a table by the pool, and that she did not get it back
until a few days later.1 Other testimony established that the phone was found in a shed at Walls-
Land’s parents’ house where Walls-Land and Derringer had been staying, that Derringer kept his
property in the shed, that the keys to the shed were missing, and that those keys were returned a
few days later by Derringer’s mother.
Based on all of that information, the jury found Derringer guilty of four child-pornography
offenses: conspiring to produce, producing, aiding and abetting another to produce, and
possession. And it found him guilty of distributing methamphetamine. But it acquitted him of
attempting to distribute child pornography.2
Several months after trial, Derringer filed a motion requesting new counsel, which the
district court received the day prior to sentencing. It scheduled a hearing on the motion for the
1
Walls-Land had two phones. She testified that she remained in possession of the phone she did not use to record the
assault during the time when the other phone with the incriminating videos was missing.
2
Walls-Land was also charged with crimes connected to the assault. She pleaded guilty to production of visual
depictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
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next day. At that hearing, the court asked Derringer to explain his motion and why his counsel
could not represent him at sentencing. Derringer explained that he was dissatisfied at trial with
his counsel advising him not to testify and stated: “He doesn’t believe in my innocence. He
believes I should go to prison.” The court noted that his guilt was not an issue at sentencing and
again asked why Derringer’s counsel could not effectively represent him moving forward. To that,
Derringer stated: “I don’t know how to tell you.” After continuing to discuss the issue with
Derringer and his counsel, the district court denied the motion, finding that Derringer did not offer
any cause for substituting counsel, that there was not a breakdown in communication, and that
Derringer raised “the issue in an attempt to delay [the] proceedings.”
The district court then continued to sentencing. Over Derringer’s objection, it applied a
two-level Sentencing Guidelines increase for attempted distribution of child pornography, finding
that Derringer did attempt to distribute by clear-and-convincing evidence even though the jury
acquitted him of that charge. Combined with the other enhancements, that resulted in an adjusted-
offense level of 44 for each of the child-pornography offenses. The court similarly determined
that the methamphetamine-distribution offense resulted in an adjusted-offense level of 44 because
it applied an enhanced-base-offense level of 38 for serious bodily injury before adding other
enhancements. The court then specifically asked the parties to address that offense. The
Government agreed with the court’s calculation, stating that the serious-bodily-injury
enhancement was appropriate. Derringer’s counsel responded: “I acknowledge what the Court has
stated. I have nothing to disagree with that. . . . But it appears to be -- the probation officer’s
recitation in the report appears to be correct.” Having noted the parties’ comments, the district
court found the total offense level to be 43, the maximum under the Guidelines.
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That offense level, along with Derringer’s criminal history category of six, resulted in a
Guidelines sentence range of life imprisonment. But the statutory maximum for each offense made
the Guidelines sentence 100 years. Derringer requested a total sentence of 30 years, and the
Government a total of 50 years. The district court exceeded both requests. It found the nature and
circumstances of the offense “horrendous” and found Derringer’s history and characteristics
favored a longer sentence. In fact, it had a “hard time finding any positive characteristics” in
Derringer and determined that his expressed remorse was not heartfelt. The court then expressly
considered the need to impose a sentence that would account for the seriousness of the offense,
promote respect for the law, provide a just punishment, deter similar conduct, and protect the
public from future crimes by Derringer, whom the court found to be a “continuing threat to the
public.” In considering those factors, the court determined that neither Derringer’s nor the
Government’s requests were sufficient; instead, it imposed a Guidelines-length sentence with the
counts running consecutively, producing a total term of 100 years’ imprisonment.
II.
Derringer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his child-pornography convictions,
the district court’s denial of his motion to substitute counsel, and his sentence as procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. We consider each in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We review de novo whether the evidence was sufficient. United States v. Alebbini, 979
F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2020). That review considers “whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493, 498 (6th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 715 (2016)). Here, Derringer
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makes two sufficiency challenges: first, to the jury’s finding that he acted “for the purpose of
producing” a visual depiction of D.M. being sexually assaulted, as required under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a); and second, to the finding that he possessed those visual depictions. Neither challenge
has merit.
Viewing the evidence in the required light, there was more than enough to conclude that
Derringer acted for the purposes of producing the videos of D.M. D.M. testified that she did not
believe that Derringer knew Walls-Land was recording. But there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to find otherwise. Walls-Land testified of past conversations with Derringer saying he wanted
“to be” with young girls, and she suggested that Derringer “push record this time.” The jury could
have construed Derringer’s response—his “10-4” and his telling Walls-Land to “come down,”
“[g]et in[,] and act cool”—was his directing her to come along for the purpose of recording the
assaults on D.M. And the jury could have believed Walls-Land’s testimony that she recorded the
assaults at Derringer’s request.
In addition, the videos themselves and Walls-Land’s commentary on those videos support
the finding that Derringer acted for the purpose of producing the recordings. The videos showed
numerous interactions between Derringer and Walls-Land: handing a meth pipe to her, telling her
where to hold the phone for a better shot, looking back at her, and making sure that she “got that”—
that she recorded a specific part of the assault. And they were recorded by Walls-Land’s phone
positioned next to Derringer, at one point “[r]ight next to” his hand. The jury easily could have
credited that evidence over D.M.’s speculation that Derringer did not know Walls-Land was
recording. In sum, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Derringer
acted for the purpose of producing the videos.
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There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Derringer possessed those
videos. Possession of child pornography may be actual or constructive and may be shown by
direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Richards, 301 F. App’x 480, 483 (6th Cir. 2008). Here, viewing the evidence in
the required light, the jury could have found either. It could have found credible Walls-Land’s
testimony that Derringer took her phone with the videos on it the morning after the assault when
she left it on a table by the pool and did not see it again until it was retrieved from the shed a few
days later. Derringer would then have had actual possession of the child pornography. Or it could
have used other circumstantial evidence—that the phone was found locked in the shed where
Derringer kept his property, that the keys to the shed were missing, and that those keys were
returned a few days later from Derringer’s mother—to conclude that he had constructive
possession.3 Richards, 301 F. App’x at 483 (“Constructive possession of an item can be the
dominion over the premises where the item is located.”). In short, the evidence was sufficient that
Derringer possessed the videos.
B. Motion to Substitute Counsel
Derringer also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to substitute counsel for
his sentencing hearing. We review that denial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Marrero,
651 F.3d 453, 464 (6th Cir. 2011). That review considers four factors: (1) the motion’s timeliness,
(2) the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the motion, (3) whether the conflict with
3
That the jury acquitted Derringer of the attempted-child-pornography-distribution charge does not change this
conclusion. One can possess without distributing; here, the jury could have found the evidence insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Derringer attempted to distribute the videos by sending them to his Facebook
Messenger account, perhaps having a reasonable doubt that he had the phone at that specific time. But the jury still
could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually possessed the phone before placing it in the shed or
that he constructively possessed it while it was in the shed. In any event, even if there is some tension in the jury’s
findings, a “jury may announce logically inconsistent verdicts in a criminal case.” United States v. Lawrence, 555
F.3d 254, 261 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Clemmer, 918 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1990)).
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counsel prevented an adequate defense because it “resulted in a total lack of communication,” and
(4) considering the accused’s right to counsel of choice against the public’s interest in a “prompt
and efficient” resolution. Id. A balance of those four factors fails to show an abuse of discretion.
First, Derringer’s motion was untimely. Trial concluded in mid-August 2019; Derringer’s
motion was received by the district court in mid-December 2019, the day before the scheduled
sentencing hearing. Even if Derringer submitted his motion in late-November, as it was dated,
that was over three months after the conclusion of trial, during which Derringer’s problems with
his counsel arose, and only two weeks before the sentencing hearing. We have held similar
timeframes untimely. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2009)
(finding a motion made two weeks before trial untimely); United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d
438, 447 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a motion made a month and a half prior to trial untimely when
the complained of conduct had occurred almost a year prior). Derringer provides no reason for
the delay in making his motion. Therefore, this factor favors the district court’s decision.
Second, the district court adequately inquired into Derringer’s motion. It asked him
repeatedly to explain his issues with counsel and attempted to determine how those issues impacted
counsel’s ability to represent him at sentencing. Derringer had every opportunity to explain his
conflict. See Marrero, 651 F.3d at 465 (“[T]o meet this requirement, the district court simply must
allow a defendant the opportunity to explain the attorney-client conflict as he perceives it.”).
Therefore, this factor too favors the district court’s decision.
Third, the conflict did not prevent an adequate defense by causing a total lack of
communication. Derringer’s chief complaints were that his counsel advised him not to testify at
trial when he desired to do so and that his counsel did not believe in his innocence, thinking instead
that he should go to prison. The district court found that those conflicts did not amount to a
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breakdown in communication. That finding is not clearly erroneous. See id. at 466(“[A] defendant’s differences of opinions with his attorney do not create a complete breakdown of
communication that compromises his defense.”). Differences of opinion as to whether Derringer
should have testified at trial were not relevant to the sentencing hearing. And, although the
perceived correct level of punishment could, in theory, impact a counsel’s ability to represent his
client at sentencing, here, there was no suggestion of that possible effect. Believing Derringer to
be guilty or that he should go to prison did not mean that counsel could not effectively argue for a
favorable sentence. Nor was there an indication that attorney-client communication was affected
by any differences of opinion on whether Derringer should go to prison and for how long.4 This
factor, therefore, also favors the district court’s decision.
Finally, the fourth factor—balancing Derringer’s request for counsel of his choice with the
public’s interest in a prompt and efficient resolution—was at most neutral. There had not been a
long delay following trial and nothing indicates that Derringer caused any prior delays. But
granting Derringer’s request would have “necessitate[d] a last-minute continuance.” Vasquez, 560
F.3d at 468 (quoting United States v. Whitfield, 259 F. App’x 830, 834 (6th Cir. 2008)). And after
conducting the inquiry into Derringer’s request, hearing his reasons, and observing him in person,
the district court found that Derringer raised “the issue in an attempt to delay [the] proceedings.”
4
Indeed, counsel’s actions at the sentencing hearing support the district court’s earlier determination. At that hearing,
Derringer’s counsel requested a sentence of 30 years instead of the 25 years Derringer asked him to request. He
further requested that the counts not run consecutively so that 30 years would be total term. His strategy recognized
the crimes’ magnitude while arguing that 30 years accounted for that magnitude. Although that strategy was ultimately
unsuccessful, nothing in the record indicates that counsel did not zealously attempt to secure Derringer a favorable
sentence. Derringer points to counsel’s noting, in that attempt, that where he and Derringer “have a big difference” is
the federal sentences for child-pornography cases and stating: “You know, child porn basically is the murder of your
senses. Your country cannot survive if you don’t punish these offenders.” But that statement was made in the context
of trying to convince the district court to impose the 30-year sentence. It does not indicate that Derringer’s counsel
could not effectively represent him or that any differences in opinion resulted in an inability to communicate. Again,
Derringer’s counsel argued for a sentence 5 years greater than Derringer requested, 20 years less than the Government
sought, and 70 years less than the court imposed.
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Even if that was not the case, this factor is at most neutral. Accordingly, balancing the four factors
shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Derringer’s request.
C. Procedural Reasonableness of the Sentence
Derringer next challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. He advances two
arguments: first, that the district court erred in applying the enhanced-base-offense level for the
methamphetamine-distribution offense because that level applies only if “the offense of
conviction” establishes that serious bodily injury resulted from using the substance. USSG
§ 2D1.1(a)(2). He contends that the jury never found that D.M. sustained serious bodily injury
from using the methamphetamine, making the enhanced level inapplicable. Second, Derringer
argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level Guidelines increase for attempted
distribution of child pornography. He asserts that the court improperly applied that increase
because the text of USSG § 2G2.1(b)(3) requires a defendant to “knowingly engage[] in
distribution” and, as we held in United States v. Havis, the commentary cannot add offenses
unsupported by the text. 927 F.3d 382, 386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam).
1. Enhanced-Base-Offense Level
Before reaching his first argument, we must determine whether Derringer invited the
alleged error. An invited error is one that a party causes or influences the court to commit. United
States v. Sharpe, 996 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The doctrine of ‘invited error’ refers to the
principle that a party may not complain on appeal of errors that he himself invited or provoked the
court or the opposite party to commit.” (quoting Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 923 F.2d 59,
60 (6th Cir. 1991))). It is part of the waiver doctrine. Harvis, 923 F.2d at 61. But, although
waived arguments are typically unreviewable, we will consider invited errors when they “result in
manifest injustice.” United States v. Demmler, 655 F.3d 451, 458 (6th Cir. 2011). Such injustice
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occurs when the government was as much at fault as the defendant for the error and the defendant
claims that the error resulted in a constitutional-rights violation. United States v. Howard, 947
F.3d 936, 945 (6th Cir. 2020).
We have held an error to be invited in a variety of contexts, including sentencing under the
wrong Guidelines’ provision. In United States v. Ruiz, we held that a challenge to the application
of a particular guideline was waived because the defendant agreed that it applied to him.5 777
F.3d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2015); accord United States v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d 1084, 1088 (6th
Cir. 2002) (“[A]n attorney cannot agree in open court with a judge’s proposed course of conduct
and then charge the court with error in following that course.” (quoting United States v. Sloman,
909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir. 1990))). But, in United States v. Mabee, we found no waiver because
the defendant did not agree that a specific enhancement applied. 765 F.3d 666, 672 (6th Cir. 2014).
Although the defendant indicated a general belief that the presenting report was accurate, he did
not note that belief as to the specific enhancement. Id. And the admissions he did make about that
enhancement “did not demonstrate the sort of plain, positive concurrence with the district court’s
conclusions needed to establish a waiver or to invoke the principle of invited error.” Id.Accordingly, if a defendant agrees with the application of a specific sentencing provision, then the
defendant has invited any error as to application of that provision. That agreement can be
expressed by various affirmative representations. See United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 529
(6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the defendant waived objection to a jury instruction when, after
initially objecting, he later stated, “I’m getting more comfortable with it”); United States v. Parker,
No. 19-3909, 2020 WL 6793333, *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2020) (holding that invited error precluded
a claim when counsel stated that an action was “appropriate”).
5
Ruiz characterizes the action as waiver, but as noted, invited error is a subset of the waiver doctrine and the particular
label here makes little difference.
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Here, the district court asked the parties to address the court’s calculation of the
methamphetamine-distribution offense after specifically noting the enhanced-base-offense level
for the serious-bodily-injury enhancement. The Government agreed with the calculation and that
the enhancement was appropriate. Derringer’s counsel then responded: “I acknowledge what the
Court has stated. I have nothing to disagree with that. . . . But it appears to be -- the probation
officer’s recitation in the report appears to be correct.” In addressing the specific enhancement of
which he now complains, Derringer indicated his agreement. The statement that it “appears to be
correct” is an affirmative indication of agreement, on par with counsel’s saying he is “getting more
comfortable” with something or saying that it is “appropriate.” Budd, 496 F.3d at 529; Parker,
2020 WL 6793333, at *5. The invited-error doctrine therefore precludes Derringer’s challenge to
the enhanced-base-offense level unless the manifest-injustice exception applies.
That exception does not apply here because, though the Government was similarly at fault
for the possible error by also endorsing it, Derringer only challenges it “as incorrect—not as a
serious breach of his constitutional rights.” United States v. Nicholson, 716 F. App’x 400, 418
(6th Cir. 2017); see also Howard, 947 F.3d at 945 (noting that the exception requires equal fault
by the government and a constitutional-rights-violation assertion). Derringer therefore invited any
error regarding the enhanced-base-offense level for the methamphetamine-distribution offense.
2. Two-Level Enhancement
Because Derringer invited any error as to that offense, his offense level for it was 44, which
the district court dropped to 43 as the Guidelines’ maximum. As a result, even if the district court
erred regarding Derringer’s other procedural-reasonableness challenge—that the Guidelines’
commentary improperly added the offense of attempted distribution—his highest offense level was
still 43. Because each offense involved the same victim and transaction, and therefore grouped,
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43 would still have been the offense level applicable to the group even if the attempted-distribution
enhancement to the child-pornography offenses was in error. See USSG §§ 3D1.2, 3D1.3(a). That
makes any such error harmless. United States v. Faulkner, 926 F.3d 266, 275 (6th Cir. 2019)
(“Errors that do not affect the ultimate Guidelines range or sentence imposed are harmless and do
not require resentencing.”). We therefore need not determine whether the district court did in fact
err in applying the enhancement under USSG § 2G2.1(b)(3). Accordingly, the alleged errors
affecting the procedural reasonableness of the sentence were invited or harmless.
D. Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence
Lastly, Derringer challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable. He notes that the
district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum for each offense and ran those offenses
consecutively, resulting in a sentence twice as long as the Government requested. At core, he
argues that the sentence “is just too long.”
We review whether a sentence is substantively reasonable for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Fleischer, 971 F.3d 559, 567 (6th Cir. 2020). In determining whether that abuse
occurred, we consider why the district court found the sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, in accord with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 572. A within-Guidelines sentence
has a presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 567.
Here, Derringer’s Guideline sentence was the statutory maximum of 100 years. See USSG
§ 5G1.1(a). The district court sentenced him to that maximum. In so doing, it discussed and
applied the § 3553 factors, specifically noting how the sentence was necessary to reflect the
seriousness of the offenses, promote respect for the law, provide a just punishment, deter similar
conduct, and protect the public from future crimes by Derringer, whom the court found to be a
“continuing threat to the public.” It further considered its findings that Derringer’s offenses were
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horrendous, his history and characteristics favored a longer sentence, and his expressed remorse
was not heartfelt. All of those factors led the court to conclude that neither the Government’s nor
Derringer’s sentence recommendation was sufficient. Nothing indicates that the district court
abused its discretion in reaching that conclusion, and Derringer points to nothing to overcome the
within-Guidelines sentence’s presumption of reasonableness.
To be sure, Derringer’s sentence is long. But its length is consistent with the Guidelines.
As we have noted before: “Congress, in conjunction with the Sentencing Commission, has decided
to impose significant penalties for child pornography offenses.” Faulkner, 926 F.3d at 274. The
district court, after thoroughly considering the relevant factors, sentenced in accord with those
significant penalties. “[W]e cannot say that his sentence is substantively unreasonable when
considered against this framework.” Id. Nor is it our role to substitute our judgment for that of
the district court, even if we might have made a different call in its place. See United States v.
Christman, 607 F.3d 1110, 1117 (6th Cir. 2010). Derringer’s sentence therefore was substantively
reasonable.
III.
Accordingly, we affirm Derringer’s convictions, the denial of his motion to substitute
counsel, and his sentence.
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ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur with the judgment and join the majority
except for parts II.C.1 and II.C.2. In my view, it is clearer that Derringer’s Havis argument fails
than that an error was invited by Derringer’s counsel with respect to the enhancement for the
causing serious bodily injury. Ruling on the Havis question avoids the need to address the invited
error question.
A direct application of the language of the two-level Guideline enhancement for knowingly
engaging in distribution shows that Derringer’s conduct meets that definition. Under U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.1(b)(3), the court shall apply a two-level increase if the defendant “knowingly engaged in
distribution.” To engage in conduct means “to do or take part in something.”1 “Distribution”
means the “act or process of distributing,” that is, “giv[ing] out or deliver[ing] especially to
members of a group.”2 Here, there was evidence that Derringer attempted to send the files to
himself through Facebook messenger from Ms. Wall-Land’s phone. The government introduced
testimony indicating that because the videos were queued up, an attempt at delivery had been
made; the videos were thus ready to send “pending . . . startup.” Derringer thus took part in the
act or process of delivering the videos depicting the sexual assault. Nothing about the definition
of “engaging in distribution” requires that a single actor complete each and every step necessary
to perfect the delivery. It is enough that Derringer took meaningful steps in the distribution
process.
1
Engage, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/engage (last visited Feb. 3, 2021); see
also Engage, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“To employ or involve oneself; to take part in; to embark on.”).
2
Distribution, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/distribution (last visited Feb. 3,
2021); Distributing, Merriam-Webster, https://www merriam-webster.com/dictionary/distributing (last visited Feb. 3,
2021).
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This interpretation also accords with the Commentary, which defines “distribution” as “any
act . . . related to the transfer of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor.”3 U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.1(b)(3), comment. (n.1). As the district court reasoned, this definition includes attempted
distribution. Here, Derringer’s conduct—possessing a phone with contraband and queuing up the
videos to send on the phone’s startup—easily falls under that definition.
Our decision in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc)
(per curiam), does not undercut the district court’s reliance on the Commentary in this case. In
Havis, we held that where the Commission’s Commentary adds to, rather than interprets, the
Guidelines, the Commentary “deserves no deference” and the “text of [the Guideline] controls.”
Id. at 386–87. There, the enhancement involved a “controlled substance offense,” which was
already defined in the Guidelines submitted to Congress. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2; Havis, 927 F.3d
at 385–86. The Commentary modified the existing definition of “controlled substance offense”
by adding attempt offenses. Id. Here, in contrast, the Commentary simply clarifies what it means
to “engage[] in distribution”—an undefined phrase that encompasses a broad range of conduct.
Since Havis, we have upheld Commentary definitions as authoritative where, as here, the
Guidelines left a term undefined and the Commentary was consistent with the Guidelines. In
United States v. Buchanan, for instance, we relied on the relevant application notes for
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.3, which applies where a defendant’s offense was “part of a pattern of criminal
3
Application note 1 states:
“Distribution” means any act, including possession with intent to distribute,
production, transmission, advertisement, and transportation, related to the transfer
of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. Accordingly, distribution
includes posting material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor on a website
for public viewing but does not include the mere solicitation of such material by
a defendant.
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3), comment. (n.1).
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Case No. 19-6427, United States v. Derringer
conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” 933 F.3d 501, 514 (6th Cir. 2019). We distinguished Havis
as follows:
[F]ederal courts are to treat commentary to a particular Guidelines
provision as an authoritative interpretation of that provision as long
as the interpretation “does not violate the Constitution or a federal
statute” and is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with” the
provision’s text. . . . Havis stated that “commentary binds courts
only ‘if the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear the
construction.’” Havis, 927 F.3d at 386. Because application note 2
to § 4B1.3 explains the meaning of “engaged in as a livelihood” in
a way that the text of the Guidelines provision will bear, rather than
adding to a list or definition given in the text of the Guidelines
provision, the application note is binding on federal courts under
[Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993)] and Havis.
Id. at 514 n.2 (brackets and some internal citations omitted). More recently, in United States v.
Murphy, 815 F. App’x 918, 924 (6th Cir. 2020), we applied the Commentary’s definition of
“intended loss,” and in United States v. De Leon, 810 F. App’x 384, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2020), we
upheld the Commentary’s definition of “expunged.” As in those cases, because the text of the
enhancement will bear the Commentary’s construction, the district court did not err in applying
the enhancement.
This means that we need not address whether the district court’s decision to apply the
serious bodily injury enhancement was invited error. Even if the district court erred in that respect,
Derringer’s highest offense level is still 43. Because each offense involved the same victim and
transaction and they are grouped together, 43 would still have been the applicable offense level
even if the serious bodily injury enhancement was in error. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2, 3D1.3(a).
That makes any such error harmless, along the lines of the majority’s harmless error analysis. See
maj. op. at 12–13.
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