Hannah Corbin v. Steak 'n Shake, Inc. ( 2021 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 21a0312n.06
Case Nos. 20-3519/3553
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Jul 02, 2021
)
HANNAH CORBIN, DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
STEAK ‘N SHAKE, INC., ) OHIO
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. )
)
BEFORE: SUTTON, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Hannah Corbin was a minor who worked
as a server at a Steak ‘n Shake restaurant. Corbin filed suit for sexual harassment, alleging a hostile
work environment, gender discrimination, and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and Ohio law. After a five-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Corbin on the
hostile work environment claim, and awarded her $308 in back pay, $1000 in compensatory
damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages. The jury ruled in favor of Steak ‘n Shake on the
gender discrimination claim. Steak ‘n Shake appeals the district court’s evidentiary rulings and
the jury’s award of punitive damages. Corbin cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment to Steak ‘n Shake on the Title VII claim of retaliation, and that it
miscalculated the attorney’s fees. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s
evidentiary rulings and the jury’s award of punitive damages to Corbin. We furthermore AFFIRM
Case Nos. 20-3519/3553, Corbin v. Steak ‘n Shake, Inc.
the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and grant of summary judgment to Steak ‘n Shake on
the retaliation claim.
I.
Hannah Corbin was seventeen years old when she started working as a server at Steak ‘n
Shake, in Newark, Ohio, in July 2015. Steak ‘n Shake is a chain of restaurants serving fast food
across the United States.
In January 2016, Maddie Dean, Corbin’s friend from school, began working as a server at
the same Steak ‘n Shake location as Corbin. Because Dean did not have a car, Corbin and Dean
would ride to work together and try to work the same shifts. When Dean first started working,
Corbin warned her that she may hear inappropriate comments from the “man-boys,” a phrase used
to describe men “who act like boys” at work. Like Corbin, Dean also alleged that co-workers,
including Bubba Travis, harassed her.
In March 2016, Dean alleged that Will McCann, her co-worker, groped Dean in the walk-in
freezer of the restaurant. Dean then told her mother about this incident. Dean’s mother reported
the complaint to Mark Simon, the General Manager of the Newark branch. During the same
month, Corbin indicated that she wanted to be taken off the schedule, but that she would pick up
shifts occasionally. Based on this request, Simon removed Corbin from the system.
When Corbin came to work a shift that she picked up from another employee, on April 2,
2016, she was not able to clock in due to her change of employment status. An altercation ensued
between Corbin and Brandi Genzen, another employee, which resulted in Corbin calling her
mother for help in resolving the conflict. When Corbin’s mother arrived, Corbin told Genzen that
she was sexually harassed by McCann, who happened to be Genzen’s son. Corbin left and told
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Simon that she would not be coming back to work. It was only after this meeting that Simon first
reported Corbin’s sexual harassment complaint to his District Manager and to Human Resources.
Human Resources launched an investigation, interviewing many of Corbin’s co-workers
about the allegations. McCann denied any wrongdoing, and Human Resources was not able to
verify the veracity of the allegations. Separately, Simon gave Genzen a notice of corrective action
due to the altercation with Corbin, but both McCann and Genzen continued to work at Steak
‘n Shake.
In December 2016, Dean’s mother responded to a Facebook post about Steak ‘n Shake’s
undercooked chicken, stating that “the girls go through more than just serving raw chicken[.]” The
comment got flagged by Steak ‘n Shake’s Human Resources Manager, Kelly Seikel, who
contacted Dean’s mother about the allegations. Seikel interviewed McCann and Dean, and
McCann denied touching Dean. Seikel also asked McCann about earlier allegations of harassing
Corbin. McCann again denied any wrongdoing, signed a statement saying he would interact in a
professional manner when working with Dean, and was permitted to return to work.
On November 30, 2017, Corbin brought suit against Steak ‘n Shake and Simon for hostile
work environment, gender discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and Ohio law.
Steak ‘n Shake moved for summary judgment. The district court denied summary
judgment as to the hostile work environment and gender discrimination claims, and granted
summary judgment as to the retaliation claim. Prior to trial, Steak ‘n Shake filed a motion in limine
to exclude allegations of harassment by Dean, who was not a party to the lawsuit. Steak ‘n Shake
argued that the testimony was not probative and was highly prejudicial. Corbin argued that the
testimony was useful to describe the “totality of the circumstances” and the “hostility of [] the
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[work] environment,” and was not unduly prejudicial. During trial, the district court conducted
voir dire of Dean to determine admissibility of her testimony. During the voir dire, the judge asked
Dean if she ever told Corbin about the walk-in freezer incident; Dean replied, “I told Hannah about
it, yes.” The district court concluded that the testimony was admissible and allowed Dean to testify
before the jury. The district court later issued an order denying Steak ‘n Shake’s motion in limine.
Corbin also moved to exclude Steak ‘n Shake’s statements of those interviewed during the
harassment investigation. Corbin maintained that those statements constituted impermissible
hearsay, and that if Steak ‘n Shake did not plan to use the statements for the truth of the matter
asserted, but rather to show that they conducted an investigation, it could be done through
testimony. The district court granted Corbin’s motion orally, without further analysis.
During trial, Corbin testified about the work conditions by describing her initial hiring
interview with the manager, Shawn McLeish. After speaking with McLeish, another server told
her Corbin would get hired because “Shawn only hires pretty blonde females and you are [a] pretty
blonde.” Finding this to be an odd comment, Corbin nonetheless accepted the position. Once
hired, Corbin realized that several other male employees, especially those who later harassed her,
shared managerial duties. Apart from McLeish and Simon, Will McCann shared supervisory
duties as a step-in manager and would cash out his servers at the end of the night and check if their
work sections were clean. Corbin first started experiencing sexual harassment a few weeks after
starting her position. The harassment progressed from untying Corbin’s apron to more aggressive
touching and slapping of her behind. McCann also made comments about her breasts and body,
saying that he would “tap that” and that he would “bend [her] over that table.” On one occasion,
McCann came over behind Corbin and Dean and smacked both of their behinds. The continued
harassment caused Corbin to lose 30 pounds over the course of her employment at Steak ‘n Shake.
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Corbin testified that management turned a blind eye to her complaints about sexual
harassment. McLeish, who was often present at work during these incidents, would ignore the
complaints and walk around with a “creepy smirk.” Simon, on one occasion, seeing Corbin bent
over picking up boxes said, “isn’t that a nice sight?” Corbin reported this incident to McLeish and
called the corporate hotline, but nothing was done. Corbin also reported the harassment to another
manager, Kayla Dehmann, who told Corbin “Will wouldn’t do that.”
Dean also testified that “every shift [they] worked together, there was always a sexual
comment made against [Corbin].” Dean similarly faced harassment from the same male
employees who would place their hands on her and smack her behind. Dean further testified that
around March 2016, McCann “groped [her] breast in the walk-in freezer” when she went there to
grab mac and cheese and got cornered. Dean testified that McLeish was present during most of
the harassment incidents, and that she reported the walk-in freezer incident and the harassment
incidents against herself and Corbin to McLeish. Dean also reported the incidents to Dehmann,
who was allegedly dating McCann at the time, but did not “want to believe it because that was her
boyfriend.”
After a five-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Corbin on the Title VII and
state law claims of hostile work environment, co-worker harassment, and awarded her $308 in
back pay and $1000 in compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress. The jury also
awarded Corbin $50,000 in punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Steak
‘n Shake on the Title VII and Ohio law claims of supervisor harassment and gender discrimination.
Corbin moved for an initial attorney fee award of $273,680.75. Using the “lodestar”
calculation method that allows the attorney’s fee to be multiplied in cases of exceptional success,
Corbin requested a total attorney fee award of $547,361.50, with the multiplier factored. See Blum
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v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984). Steak ‘n Shake moved to alter or amend the judgment to
remit punitive damages. Steak ‘n Shake also argued that the district court should lower the attorney
fee award to $59,937, stating that Corbin was not entitled to the multiplier and the hourly rates
Corbin’s attorneys charged were too high. The district court, exercising its discretion under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), awarded Corbin a total of $92,977.75 in attorney fees and $9,316.41 in
costs, but denied any prejudgment interest. The district court further denied Steak ‘n Shake’s
motion to alter or amend the judgment to remit punitive damages. Steak ‘n Shake timely appealed
and Corbin cross-appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
Steak ‘n Shake argues that the district court erred in admitting Dean’s testimony, excluding
its investigatory statements, and denying its motion to remit punitive damages. On cross-appeal,
Corbin argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Steak ‘n Shake on the
Title VII and Ohio law claims of retaliation. Corbin also disputes the attorney’s fees award.
A. Motions in Limine
First, Steak ‘n Shake argues that the district court erred in admitting Dean’s testimony.
We review the district court’s ruling on a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion.
Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 689 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2012). “An abuse of
discretion occurs if the district court relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, applies the wrong
legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard when reaching a conclusion, or makes a clear
error of judgment.” In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 708 F.3d 704,
707 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir.
2012)). “We accord the district court ‘[b]road discretion . . . in determinations of admissibility
based on considerations of relevance and prejudice,’ and we do not ‘lightly overrule’ those
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decisions.” United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 297, 315 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
White, 563 F.3d 184, 191 (6th Cir. 2009)).
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she was a
member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the charged sexual harassment created a hostile
work environment; and (5) the employer is liable. Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.,
453 F.3d 724, 733 (6th Cir. 2006). If the harasser is a co-worker, to hold the employer liable, the
plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to
take prompt and appropriate corrective action. E.E.O.C. v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498,
518 (6th Cir. 2001).
We have previously held that the factfinder can “consider evidence of other acts of
harassment of which a plaintiff becomes aware during the period [of] his or her employment, even
if the other acts were directed at others and occurred outside of the plaintiff’s presence.” Hawkins
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 335 (6th Cir. 2008). In hostile work environment cases,
we look at the “‘work environment as a whole’ rather than individual instances of harassment.”
Smith v. Rock-Tenn Services, Inc., 813 F. 3d 298, 310 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bowman v. Shawnee
State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Steak ‘n Shake argues that Dean never clarified when she told Corbin about the harassment,
and because there is “no evidence” that Corbin learned about the harassment during her
employment, the testimony was not admissible. Based on the record, Dean confirmed that, as
friends and co-workers, Dean and Corbin shared their sexual harassment experiences. Dean
testified that “after the sexual harassment was going on, [Dean and Corbin] began to confide in
each other” because “[the sexual harassment] was happening to both of [them].” Regardless of
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the walk-in freezer incident, Corbin was aware of other incidents of harassment towards Dean
while she was employed at Steak ‘n Shake.
In Hawkins, the court held that a factfinder could consider acts of harassment against a
third party when deciding whether the work environment was hostile. 517 F.3d at 335. Such
evidence is also probative in establishing whether harassment was based on sex. Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998). Dean’s testimony could also be
“direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a
mixed-sex workplace.” Id. As such, Dean’s testimony was admissible.
Alternatively, Steak ‘n Shake argues that just the freezer incident testimony should have
been excluded. Steak N Shake did not preserve its objection to the specific freezer incident during
trial, and has thus waived the argument on appeal. United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 970
(6th Cir. 1999); Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 623 F.3d 281, 286 n.3 (6th
Cir. 2010).
Second, Steak ‘n Shake argues that the district court erred in granting Corbin’s motion in
limine to exclude investigatory statements. Corbin argues that if the statements were being used
to prove that Steak ‘n Shake investigated Corbin’s complaints, rather than to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, Steak ‘n Shake could testify that it conducted an investigation and could testify
about when the investigation took place. Steak ‘n Shake argues that the statements went to an
essential element of Corbin’s claim—whether Steak ‘n Shake failed to take prompt and appropriate
action to correct the harassment. This argument is without merit. Steak ‘n Shake could have
shown through testimony that it investigated and interviewed other employees. Indeed, Seikel
testified about her conversations with employees. The jury could have properly determined,
without knowing the content of the investigatory statements, that Steak ‘n Shake investigated in
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response to Corbin’s allegations. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the investigatory statements.
B. Damages Award
Steak ‘n Shake argues the district court erred in declining to remit the jury’s punitive
damage award, and that the ratio of punitive damages to back pay and compensatory damages is
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
We review the district court’s denial of remittitur for an abuse of discretion, and we view
the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff since she prevailed at trial. Mid-Michigan
Computer Sys., Inc. v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 416 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2005); Gibson v.
Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 2008). The district court has the discretion to remit the
damages verdict “only when, after reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, it is convinced that the verdict is clearly excessive; resulted from passion, bias,
or prejudice; or is so excessive or inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court.” Am. Trim,
LLC v. Oracle Corp., 383 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
Ltd., 96 F.3d 151, 156 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a trial court should not reduce an award
unless it is (1) beyond the range supportable by proof; (2) so excessive as to shock the conscience;
or (3) the result of mistake). “If there is any credible evidence to support a verdict, it should not
be set aside.” American Trim, 383 F.3d at 475.
Punitive damages are available in a Title VII claim only if the plaintiff shows, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the employer “engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with
malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). The Supreme Court in Kolstad noted that Congress intended “to narrow
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the class of cases for which punitive awards are available to a subset of those involving intentional
discrimination.” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999).
Courts consider the Gore factors to determine if the punitive damages award violated the
Due Process Clause because it was grossly excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
conduct; (2) the ratio of punitive damages to actual, or potential, harm inflicted; and (3) other
possible sanctions, civil or criminal, for comparable misconduct. See BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996); Romanski v. Detroit Ent., L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 643 (6th
Cir. 2005).
Here, the district court issued an order, applying Gore’s three factors. As to
reprehensibility of conduct, the district court described how Corbin was an underage female
working with older, male colleagues who would allow their co-workers to harass her or join in on
the harassment. Dean, another young female, was similarly harassed. The district court
acknowledged that harassment was verbal, physical, and continuous, and that Corbin felt
vulnerable and “scared” to work in such a hostile work environment. The district court found
Steak ‘n Shake’s failure to take appropriate action reprehensible.
As to the second factor, the district court found that the punitive damages award was not
unconstitutionally disproportionate. Lastly, the district court found the punitive damages award
was appropriate when compared to other similar conduct. The district court noted that the award
was below the statutory cap.
The statutory cap for combined compensatory and punitive damage awards, for Steak
‘n Shake, as a defendant with more than 500 employees, is $300,000. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3)(D). The EEOC lists sister circuits that have held that in Title VII cases, punitive
damages within the statutory limit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a comport with due process. See, e.g.,
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Abner v. Kan. City S. R. Co., 513 F. 3d 154, 164 (5th Cir. 2008); Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580,
590 (7th Cir. 2004); Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir. 2001); Arizona
v. ASARCO, LLC, 773 F.3d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The EEOC argues that the
federal statute’s imposed cap is sufficient to comport with due process, and that Gore is
inapplicable where the damages award is below the statutory cap. We disagree.
The Gore factors ensure that punitive damages are only awarded in the most egregious
cases, which is what Congress intended with the federal scheme. The federal cap on punitive
damages addresses only the limit of the awards, but does not determine if the award was
proportionate. The Supreme Court has held that awards under $300,000 may still violate the
Constitution, for example, if the ratio is in the double digits. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424–25 (2003); see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (“[W]e have consistently
rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even
one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award.”). As such, the Gore factors
play a key role in determining whether the punitive damages award is both reasonable and
proportionate to the harm suffered.
In the context of this case, there sufficient evidence to show that punitive damages were
warranted under § 1981a and not unconstitutional under the Gore factors. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that a strong indicium of reasonableness of punitive damages is the degree of
reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. We consider the following factors
to determine the degree of reprehensibility: whether (1) the harm was physical rather than purely
economic; (2) the tortious conduct evinced an “indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health
or safety of others”; (3) “the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident”; (4) and
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the harm resulted from “intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.” State Farm, 538
U.S. at 419.
Here, the harm that Corbin suffered was physical and emotional. The record shows she
was slapped, touched, and subjected to derogatory comments at work. The harassment was not
accidental or an isolated incident. The record also shows that Steak ‘n Shake’s management was
repeatedly made aware of the harassment, but did not address or investigate the complaints. Even
if Simon did not know of the ongoing harassment, McLeish as a step-in manager did, and a jury
could have reasonably concluded that the management’s ignorance of the harassment is the result
of their failure to adequately investigate and respond to the complaints. Analyzing the factors
together, we conclude that Steak ‘n Shake’s conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to justify the
punitive damages award.
As to the ratio of the damages award to the harm inflicted on the plaintiff, again, the record
shows that Corbin suffered emotional and physical harm. Moreover, even where the ratio is high,
“[it] may [] be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of
noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 582. Here, it is
hard to quantify the emotional and physical harm that Corbin suffered.
Lastly, comparing the conduct here to other similar misconduct further shows that the
punitive damages award was reasonable. We have upheld a $300,000 punitive damages award
where an employee alleged a hostile work environment and sexual harassment. See West v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 374 F. App’x 624 (6th Cir. 2010). Likewise, we found a $100,000 punitive damages
award to be reasonable where an employee alleged racial discrimination. Tisdale v. Fed. Express
Corp., 415 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2005). In another race discrimination and retaliation case, we upheld
the jury’s award of $425,000 in punitive damages. Jeffries v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 15 F. App’x
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252 (6th Cir. 2001). We have reinstated a (1) $75,000 punitive damages award where it was
evident that the management of a company was indifferent to the sexual harassment of the plaintiff,
Parker v. Gen. Extrusions, Inc., 491 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2007), and a (2) punitive damages award
up to $300,000 where it was clear that the jury found that the company did not mitigate the
discrimination through training and policies, Fischer v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 390 F. App’x
465 (6th Cir. 2010). Based on the Gore factors, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Steak N Shake’s remittitur motion on the punitive damages.
C. Retaliation Claim
Corbin challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Steak ‘n Shake on the
retaliation claim. To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must
establish four elements: “(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) her ‘exercise of such protected
activity was known by the defendant; (3) thereafter, the defendant took an action that was
materially adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected
activity and the materially adverse action.’” Rogers v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 897 F.3d 763, 775
(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014)). The last
element “requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the
alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).
Corbin states that she was fired because she complained about the harassment to Simon,
and that her termination of employment was an “adverse action.” A Title VII retaliation claim can
be established “either by introducing direct evidence of retaliation or by proffering circumstantial
evidence that would support an inference of retaliation.” Imwalle v. Reliance Medical Products,
Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence, as Corbin
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does here, we analyze Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under this standard, Corbin bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation. If she succeeds in making out the elements of a prima facie case, the burden of
production of evidence shifts to Steak ‘n Shake to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for its actions. If Steak ‘n Shake satisfies its burden of production, the burden shifts back
to Corbin to demonstrate that Defendants’ proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision. Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007).
Based on the record, it is evident that, while it may have been miscommunication, Corbin
initiated the termination herself. Corbin testified that she “was going to be starting to look for
another job, and [wanted to] pick up shifts only.” Corbin sent a message through the restaurant’s
internal messaging system, on March 29, 2016, asking to be taken off the schedule and stating that
she would occasionally pick up shifts. During his testimony, Simon testified that he interpreted
Corbin’s message as a two-week notice and that she would just pick up days until the two weeks
were up. When Corbin then showed up to work on April 2, Simon told her to talk to Genzen
“because she thinks you put your two-week notice in.” Even if we assume that Corbin reported
the harassment and the harassment was known to Simon, Corbin failed to establish that this
reporting of harassment was the but-for cause of removing Corbin from the schedule. As such,
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Steak ‘n Shake on the retaliation
claim.
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D. Attorney’s Fees
Corbin challenges the district court’s lowered attorney fee award. Corbin asserts that the
award should have been $273,680.75, without the multiplier factored in. The total amount
multiplied by two for success obtained equals $547,361.50.
We review the district court’s judgment on attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion.
Cramblit v.Fikse, 33 F.3d 633, 634 (6th Cir. 1994). We affirm the district court’s judgment unless
it was based on an “erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the record.”
Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404, 415 (6th Cir. 2005). “In light of a district court’s superior
understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what
essentially are factual matters, an award of attorneys’ fees . . . is entitled to substantial deference.’”
Wilson-Simmons v. Lake Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 207 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Title VII provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
[in litigation under Title VII] . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k). We rely on precedents involving attorney’s fees without regard to whether they
involved Title VII or some other federal statute, because the same standards are “generally
applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7 (1983).
A district court is required to “begin[ ] by determining ‘the fee applicant’s lodestar, which
is the proven number of hours reasonably expended on the case by an attorney, multiplied by his
court-ascertained reasonable hourly rate.’” Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 821
(6th Cir. 2013). The reasonable hourly rate accords with the “prevailing market rate in the relevant
community.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895. And the reasonable number of hours will not include
“excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
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Here, the district court outlined in detail, applying the “lodestar” factors, why a lower
attorney’s fee is warranted. Corbin submitted 669.52 hours of billing records, stating hourly rates
of $475 and $550 for the two attorneys. The district court, relying on the hourly rates listed by the
Ohio State Bar Association and caselaw, determined that $350 per hour was a reasonable rate for
an experienced attorney in Central Ohio. The district court thus reduced the hourly rate from $550
to $350 for one of the attorneys. The district court also found that a rate of $275 is reasonable for
an attorney with eleven years of practice, and reduced the rate from $475 to $275 for the second
attorney. Applying the adjusted rates to the hours billed, and also factoring in a reduction of hours
related to trial preparation, the district court awarded $92,977.75 in total. The district court also
factored in that the case did not raise “novel or difficult questions, nor did it require exceptional
skill, time or labor on the part of plaintiff’s counsel.” The district court’s judgment is grounded in
a thorough review of the record, and the reduced award was justified. We find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the attorney fee award.
III.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment as to both appeals.
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