Brandon Young v. Kathleen Kenney ( 2020 )


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  •                                  RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
    File Name: 20a0048p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    BRANDON YOUNG,                                              ┐
    Plaintiff-Appellant,      │
    │
    >        No. 20-5027
    v.                                                  │
    │
    │
    KATHLEEN KENNEY, Commissioner, et al.,                      │
    Defendants-Appellees.              │
    ┘
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    or the Western District of Kentucky at Paducah.
    No. 5:19-cv-00135—Thomas B. Russell, District Judge.
    Decided and Filed: February 19, 2020
    Before: MOORE, GILMAN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    PER CURIAM. “Every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself . . .
    of its own jurisdiction . . . .” Alston v. Advanced Brands & Importing Co., 
    494 F.3d 562
    , 564 (6th
    Cir. 2007) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 95 (1998)). Generally, in
    a civil case where neither the United States, a United States agency, nor a United States officer or
    employee is a party, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the judgment or order
    from which the party appeals is entered. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The
    timing requirements to file a notice of appeal are mandatory jurisdictional prerequisites that
    generally may not be waived. See Bowles v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 214 (2007).
    No. 20-5027                            Young v. Kenney                                    Page 2
    On November 8, 2019, the district court entered its judgment dismissing Brandon Young’s
    prisoner civil-rights complaint. Absent any authorized extension of time, a notice of appeal from
    the judgment was due to be filed on or before December 9, 2019. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed.
    R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), 26(a). Young’s notice of appeal, dated December 17, 2019, and filed in the
    district court on December 30, 2019, is late. In the notice of appeal, however, Young offers an
    excuse for his late notice. He states that he did not see the November 8, 2019 judgment until
    November 21, 2019, because “he was placed on dry cell protocol” on October 22, 2019. He states
    that he was transferred from the Kentucky State Penitentiary to the Kentucky State Reformatory
    on October 30, 2019 and placed in the prison’s psychiatric unit “pending a mental health evaluation
    and stabilization.” An exhibit attached to the notice of appeal confirms that the transfer occurred
    on October 30, 2019. Young states that inmates in the psychiatric unit are not permitted to have
    property in their possession.
    Both 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) provide for the
    possibility of an extension of time to file a notice of appeal where the party seeking such an
    extension files a motion in the district court asking for more time. See § 2107(c); Fed. R. App. P.
    4(a)(5); Martin v. Sullivan, 
    876 F.3d 235
    , 237 (6th Cir. 2017). “While ‘no particular form of words
    is necessary to render a filing a motion,’ a simple notice of appeal does not suffice.” Poole v.
    Family Court of New Castle Cty., 
    368 F.3d 263
    , 268 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Campos v. LeFevre,
    
    825 F.2d 671
    , 676 (2d Cir. 1987)). In Pryor v. Marshall, this court refused to allow “[a] late notice
    of appeal which fails to allege excusable neglect or good cause” from “serv[ing] as a substitute”
    to a motion under Rule 4(a)(5). 
    711 F.2d 63
    , 65 (6th Cir. 1983). We ruled similarly in Martin as
    to Rule 4(a)(6), explaining that “merely filing a notice of appeal does not amount to a motion for
    more time to file an 
    appeal.” 876 F.3d at 237
    . However, district courts must liberally construe a
    document that could reasonably be interpreted as a motion for an extension of time to file a notice
    of appeal or a motion to reopen the time to file an appeal. See, e.g., Hall v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr.
    Main Hosp., 
    811 F.2d 605
    (6th Cir. 1986) (table). Here, Young’s notice of appeal effectively reads
    as a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal and will be treated as such.
    No. 20-5027                             Young v. Kenney                                    Page 3
    Accordingly, we REMAND this case to the district court for a determination as to whether
    Young has shown excusable neglect or good cause to warrant an extension of time for filing a
    notice of appeal. While on limited remand, Young’s appeal is held in abeyance. Upon ruling, the
    district court shall return the case to this court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.