United States v. Gregory Williams, Jr. , 664 F. App'x 517 ( 2016 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 16a0622n.06
Case No. 15-4089
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Nov 22, 2016
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GREGORY WILLIAMS, JR., ) OHIO
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
BEFORE: MOORE, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Gregory Williams challenges the district court’s decisions to
sentence him to a prison term above the recommended guidelines range and to make the sentence
consecutive to state sentences for robbery and drug possession. Because the district court did not
abuse its discretion in either respect, we affirm.
On April 12, 2013, FBI agents attempted to arrest Williams at a home where he had been
staying periodically based on an arrest warrant stemming from a drug-possession charge.
A resident gave the agents permission to search the home, and the agents found a firearm and
ammunition wrapped in a towel in a plastic bag in the bedroom where Williams’ girlfriend slept.
Case No. 15-4089
United States v. Williams
Williams robbed a bank the next day, and FBI agents arrested him soon after. When the
agents asked Williams about the gun they had found, he explained that he was holding it for a
friend whom he refused to name.
A DNA swab of the gun showed major contributions from Eric Gooch, who had
committed three bank robberies in January–March 2013, and at least two other individuals. Text
messages and call logs showed that, on March 13, 2013, Williams called a bank less than one
hour before Gooch robbed it, and that Williams and Gooch communicated after the robbery. The
messages and call logs also showed that Williams communicated often with Shawn Caldwell,
who was later convicted of a different bank robbery. In one message sent two days before the
March 13 bank robbery, Williams told Caldwell, “I need a strap” (slang for “gun”). R. 21-4.
Williams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. See
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), § 924(a)(2). The presentence report assigned Williams a base offense
level of 14 and a criminal history category of V. The government initially objected that
Williams’ offense level should be 20 because his prior conviction for failure to comply with the
order of a police officer qualified as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause.
See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), 4B1.2(a)(2). But it withdrew the objection in light of Johnson
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). After a two-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, Williams faced a recommended sentencing range of 27–33 months.
At the sentencing hearing, Williams’ counsel requested a sentence within the guidelines
range. He noted Williams’ difficult childhood, and Williams himself addressed the court to
apologize for his conduct and to express his commitment to staying sober and parenting his
children.
2
Case No. 15-4089
United States v. Williams
The government asked the court to impose an above-guidelines sentence and to make it
consecutive to Williams’ state sentences for bank robbery and drug possession. The government
observed that this was not a typical felon-in-possession case. The circumstances indicated that
Williams was holding the gun for Gooch, who had been involved in a series of violent robberies,
or perhaps for Caldwell, who was a convicted bank robber. The government added that the
officers found the gun in a room accessible to children and that Williams had an extensive
criminal record, involving crimes of increasing severity.
The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months for the firearm violation, to run
consecutive to Williams’ 30-month state sentence for robbery and 7-month sentence for drug
possession. The court gave these reasons for the sentence: the gun was likely being held for use
in violent robberies, the gun posed a danger to children, and the defendant had an escalating
criminal history. The court also noted that longer sentences like this one were needed to combat
gun violence in Cleveland, and that the sentence was still well below the statutory maximum of
120 months.
On appeal, Williams claims that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a
procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence. We disagree.
Procedural reasonableness requires that a district court “properly calculate the guidelines
range, treat the guidelines as advisory, consider the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” United States v. Presley, 547 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009). Williams first
argues that the court made a procedural error by failing to explain its decision to make a six-level
upward departure under § 4A1.3 of the Guidelines, which provides that a district court may
exceed the recommended range when reliable information “indicates that the defendant’s
criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s
3
Case No. 15-4089
United States v. Williams
criminal history or [risk of recidivism].” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). In making this upward
departure, Williams maintains, the district court effectively granted the government’s earlier
request that Williams be classified as a career offender, even though Johnson (arguably)
eliminated the basis for that classification.
But Williams misapprehends what happened. The district court repeatedly made clear
that it was making a variance under § 3553(a), not a departure under § 4A1.3. See United States
v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2009). By the time of sentencing, the
government had withdrawn its request that Williams be subject to a higher offense level as a
career offender, and the district court did not consider it. Because the district court based its
decision to impose an above-range sentence on § 3553(a), not § 4A1.3, Williams’ argument falls
short of the mark.
Williams separately claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. “[A] sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the record demonstrates that the sentencing court addressed the relevant factors in
reaching its conclusion.” United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2006). No
“rote listing” of the factors is required. Id. at 615. What is required is that the court provide
reasons for the sentence that “sufficiently reflect considerations akin to those enumerated in the
statute.” United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). The court readily met that
standard when it gave a detailed explanation of its decision to impose a sentence above the
guidelines range. It discussed the circumstances of the offense and Williams’ criminal history,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and explained that the sentence was necessary to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to deter gun violence in Cleveland, and to protect the public, see id.§ 3553(a)(2). At the same time, the court considered Williams’ mitigating factors—his
4
Case No. 15-4089
United States v. Williams
experience of childhood abuse, trouble with substance abuse, and desire to maintain a
relationship with his children—but found that an upward variance was warranted nonetheless.
The court “considered the parties’ arguments” and gave “a reasoned basis for exercising [its
sentencing] authority.” United States v. Payton, 754 F.3d 375, 378 (6th Cir. 2014). All in all,
the court imposed a procedurally reasonable sentence.
But was it substantively reasonable? Williams thinks not. Here, too, we must disagree.
“The sentence may be substantively unreasonable if the district court chooses the sentence
arbitrarily, grounds the sentence on impermissible factors, or unreasonably weighs a pertinent
factor.” United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 796 (6th Cir. 2011). When reviewing a sentence
outside the guidelines range, we “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent
of the variance.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Williams argues that the district
court put too much weight on his criminal history and the seriousness of the offense, leading to a
longer-than-necessary sentence. The district court no doubt discussed both factors at length. But
they are important factors, and the court acted well within its discretion in explaining that an
upward variance was necessary to deter future gun violence and to protect the public from the
defendant. Yes, the variance is substantial in relative terms; it doubled the recommended
sentence. But the sentence remains no more than half of the statutory maximum. What matters
is that the court considered and reasonably rejected Williams’ arguments that a lower sentence
was sufficient, and Williams offers no convincing reason to second-guess that decision.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Williams’ federal sentence to be
served consecutively to his state sentence for robbery. Because Williams did not object to his
consecutive sentence when the district court asked if there were any objections to the sentence it
5
Case No. 15-4089
United States v. Williams
had just handed down, we review the district court’s decision for plain error. United States v.
Harmon, 607 F.3d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385–86 (6th
Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2004). When a district
court imposes consecutive sentences, it does not abuse its discretion if it “makes generally clear
the rationale under which it has imposed the consecutive sentence and seeks to ensure an
appropriate incremental penalty for the instant offense.” United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332,
342 (6th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, the district court’s discretion is not “unfettered,” and “the
record on appeal should show that the district court turned its attention to [U.S.S.G.] § 5G1.3[]
and the relevant commentary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Although the district court made no mention of § 5G1.3, it gave a clear rationale for its
decision and its analysis was consistent with the Guidelines’ advice on whether to impose a
concurrent sentence. Williams was not prejudiced by any error as a result. See United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). The Guidelines suggest that concurrent sentences be imposed
when “a term of imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the
instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). But Williams’ state convictions (one for drug possession
and one for the bank robbery that Williams committed with a different gun the day after the
search) did not involve conduct relevant to the federal felon-in-possession charge. When the
underlying conduct is unrelated, the Guidelines advise sentencing judges to choose between
concurrent or consecutive sentences in order to “achieve a reasonable incremental punishment
for the instant offense.” Id. § 5G1.3(d), comment. (n.4). That’s just what the court did.
The commentary to § 5G1.3(d) lists several considerations the district court should weigh
in determining what constitutes a “reasonable incremental punishment,” including the § 3553(a)
factors. We have held that considering the § 3553(a) factors alone suffices to support the
6
Case No. 15-4089
United States v. Williams
decision to impose a consecutive sentence, and that a district court need not repeat the § 3553(a)
analysis it conducted when setting the sentence for the underlying offense. Berry, 565 F.3d at
343. Here, the district court was justified in imposing consecutive sentences for the same
reasons it was justified in making an upward variance: the likelihood that Williams was holding
the gun for Gooch or Caldwell to use in bank robberies, the danger his conduct posed to children,
his escalating criminal history, the need to deter gun violence, and the need to protect the public
from future violent crimes by Williams.
For these reasons, we affirm.
7