Brenda Paz-Martinez v. William Barr ( 2020 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0563n.06
No. 19-4271
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Oct 05, 2020
BRENDA AZUCENA PAZ-MARTINEZ, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Petitioner, )
)
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
v. )
FROM THE BOARD OF
)
IMMIGRATION APPEALS
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, )
)
Respondent. )
)
BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Brenda Azucena Paz-Martinez petitions
for review from a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her motion to
reopen and rescind her in absentia removal order. Finding no abuse of discretion, we DENY the
petition for review.
I.
Paz-Martinez, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without
inspection at or near Hidalgo, Texas, on June 29, 2016. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
issued a notice to appear (NTA) on July 28, 2016, charging Paz-Martinez with removability as an
immigrant who at the time of application for admission was not in possession of a valid entry
document. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
While in custody, Paz-Martinez was served with the NTA, which informed her that she
was required to notify DHS and the immigration court of any change in address and that failure to
No. 19-4271, Paz-Martinez v. Barr
appear for the hearing could result in a removal order in her absence. The next day, DHS served
a notice of hearing setting a hearing date of August 11, 2016, in York, Pennsylvania. Paz-Martinez
was then served with several additional notices of hearing rescheduling her hearing.
On October 14, 2016, Paz-Martinez was released on bond. She provided a Columbus, Ohio
address to DHS, who notified her that she must inform the immigration court of any further change
of address. Due to her relocation, DHS moved to change venue to Cleveland, which was granted.
A notice of hearing was mailed to Paz-Martinez’s Columbus address, setting a master immigration
hearing for February 15, 2017, in Cleveland. Two subsequent notices of hearing were served on
Paz-Martinez rescheduling her hearing.
In April 2017, with the assistance of her former counsel, Paz-Martinez filed a change-of-
address form with the immigration court notifying the court of her relocation to Tampa, Florida,
and moved to change venue on May 8, 2017. The immigration judge denied the motion to change
venue on May 22, 2017, stating as a reason for the denial that a merits hearing was set for June 26,
2017. On June 5, 2017, former counsel moved to withdraw because former counsel could not
represent Paz-Martinez if her hearing was in Cleveland. In that motion, former counsel stated that
Paz-Martinez was aware that her immigration hearing was set for June 26, 2017, in Cleveland, and
confirmed Paz-Martinez’s current address was in Tampa. The motion was not received by the
immigration court until June 13, 2017. On June 9, Paz-Martinez submitted supplemental
documents in support of her application for asylum and withholding of removal, which were also
received by the immigration court on June 13, 2017.
A day before the immigration court received the motion to withdraw and supplemental
materials, on June 12, 2017, a notice of hearing was mailed to former counsel setting a hearing
date of February 8, 2021. On June 15, the immigration court granted the motion to withdraw and
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mailed a copy of the order to former counsel and Paz-Martinez on June 20. Also on June 20, the
immigration court sent a notice of hearing to Paz-Martinez’s Tampa address informing her of a
master calendar hearing scheduled for August 16, 2017 (August 16 hearing). Paz-Martinez moved
back to Ohio in advance of the previously scheduled June 26, 2017, hearing. She did not file a
change-of-address form, so the June 20 notice informing her of the August 16 hearing date was
sent to her Tampa address and returned as undeliverable. Paz-Martinez testified that after she
moved back to Ohio, she was informed by former counsel that her hearing had been rescheduled
for February 8, 2021.
Paz-Martinez failed to appear for the August 16 hearing, and the immigration judge issued
an in absentia removal order at that time. The order was also mailed to Paz-Martinez’s Tampa
address and returned as undeliverable. Nearly two years later, on July 5, 2019, Paz-Martinez
through new counsel filed a motion to reopen and rescind the in absentia removal order. Paz-
Martinez submitted an affidavit explaining why she failed to appear at the August 16 hearing:
I moved back to Columbus, Ohio a week or so before my scheduled hearing on
June 26, 2017. The attorney I had in Florida sent me a new hearing notice that the
court sent her. That notice said my new hearing date was on February 8, 2021. The
attorney told me that was my next hearing. I never got any other hearing notices
from the court or from the attorney.
I first found out that I had a removal order around December 2017 or January 2018.
I found out from my sister-in-law who had received a letter from ICE saying that
she will lose her bond money because I had a removal order and that she had to
surrender me to get the money back. We were both very confused because we
thought my hearing was in 2021, and I had attended all of my previous hearings.
My sister-in-law went to ICE in February 2018 to find out what the letter meant
and what needed to be done. She then sent a letter to ICE to explain that I had
attended all my hearings and that we didn’t get any letters for a new hearing date.
At the time, we did not have an attorney and we thought that was what we needed
to do. I waited but did not hear back, so I started looking for an attorney who could
help us figure out what is going on. My current attorney looked at the paperwork
and explained to me that my sister-in-law tried to file a motion to reopen for me,
but she did the wrong kind.
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My current attorney requested my file and reviewed it with me. She said there was
another hearing notice that was mailed to my Tampa address around the time that I
moved back to Ohio. I was surprised that this was not sent to my Columbus address
because I had believed that my attorney at the time was going to update my address
with the court as the last thing she would do for my case.
AR 88-89.
The immigration judge denied Paz-Martinez’s motion, reasoning that the immigration
court mailed the notice of the August 16 hearing to the address Paz-Martinez provided, and that
she was aware of her obligation to keep the court informed of her current mailing address and the
consequences of failing to do so. The immigration judge also found that Paz-Martinez was not
diligent in filing a motion to reopen based on the delay between when she became aware of the
removal order and when she filed her motion to reopen.
Paz-Martinez appealed to the BIA, which dismissed her appeal. The BIA agreed with the
immigration judge that Paz-Martinez was not entitled to actual notice of the August 16 hearing
because she did not inform the immigration court of her change of address; found that her motion
to reopen was untimely and that she did not follow the procedural requirements for establishing
ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis to reopen; and declined to equitably toll the filing
deadline or reopen the proceedings sua sponte due to her delay in moving to reopen.
This appeal followed.
II.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. I.N.S. v. Doherty,
502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). The BIA abuses its discretion when it fails to provide a rational
explanation for its decision, inexplicably departs from established policies, or rests its decision on
an impermissible basis. Allabani v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2005). We review the
BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence and will not overturn them “unless any reasonable
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adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429,
435 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
An immigration judge may order an alien to be removed in absentia if DHS “establishes
by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the” alien or her counsel was notified of the
removal hearing and that the alien is removable. 8 U.S.C.§ 1229a(b)(5)(A). “Our review of
an in absentia order is limited to: (1) the validity of the notice provided to the alien, (2) the reasons
for the alien’s not attending the proceedings, and (3) whether the alien is removable.” Santos-
Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
To notify an alien of a removal hearing, DHS must serve an NTA either on the alien or her
attorney. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13. The NTA must contain, among other things,
the date and time of the removal hearing, and an explanation of the alien’s obligation to
immediately update the address and telephone number on file with the court in the event of changes
to avoid in absentia removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F), (G)(i). “[I]f immigration authorities
change the time or place of the immigration proceedings[,] . . . another ‘written notice’ shall
‘specify[]’ two things: both ‘the new time or place of the proceedings’ and ‘the consequences’ of
a failure to appear.” Valadez-Lara v. Barr, 963 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2020) (second alteration
in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A)).
Once an alien receives notice of her obligation to provide DHS and the immigration court
with a current address, if she fails to update her address, the immigration court need not provide
further notice to the alien and may conduct the removal hearing in absentia. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(5)(B) (“No written notice shall be required under subparagraph (A) if the alien has
failed to provide the address required under section 1229(a)(1)(F) of this title.”).
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If the alien demonstrates that she did not receive an NTA or notice of hearing consistent
with the statutory requirements, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen and rescind.
Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). An alien may also move to reopen and rescind an in absentia removal
order based on exceptional circumstances if the motion is filed within 180 days after the date of
the in absentia order. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).
Paz-Martinez argues that she established that she did not receive notice of the August 16
hearing and is therefore entitled to rescission of the removal order. However, it is undisputed that
immigration authorities complied with the notice requirements in serving Paz-Martinez with an
NTA and subsequent notices of hearings, which included explanations about her obligation to
notify the immigration court immediately if she changed her address, and that she failed to update
her address with immigration authorities upon relocating from Tampa to Ohio. See Valadez-Lara,
963 F.3d at 565-67 (discussing notice requirements). We have held that “the actual receipt of a
hearing notice is not required if an alien fails to keep his or her address current with the
Immigration Court” because otherwise “aliens could frustrate the notice requirement by simply
moving, not updating their address, and then using the paper trail of the certified-mail system to
prove that they did not receive the notice.” Sanchez v. Holder, 627 F.3d 226, 233 (6th Cir. 2010).
Under these circumstances, aliens may not reopen their immigration proceedings based solely on
lack of notice “because the nonreceipt was caused by the aliens moving without updating their
respective addresses.” Id. (citing Mota-Roman v. Holder, 331 F. App’x 379, 384 (6th Cir.
2009); Ly v. Holder, 327 F. App’x 616, 624 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also Thompson v. Lynch, 788
F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining that to prevail on a claim of nonreceipt, the petitioner
“must overcome the presumption of delivery that arises when a Notice to Appear or notice of
hearing is properly addressed and mailed to the last address provided by the alien” by showing
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“(1) that he provided the court with a correct, current address; and (2) that the notice was never
received” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that the immigration judge could order Paz-Martinez removed in
absentia for failing to appear at the August 16 hearing.
Paz-Martinez also argues that she established exceptional circumstances for her failure to
appear and that the deadline to file her motion to reopen should be equitably tolled because she
exercised due diligence in filing her motion to reopen. Absent equitable tolling of the deadline,
Paz-Martinez was required to file her motion to reopen based on exceptional circumstances within
180 days of the in absentia removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).
The term “exceptional circumstances” is defined as “circumstances (such as battery or
extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious
illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not including less compelling
circumstances) beyond the control of the alien.” Id. § 1229a(e)(1). Paz-Martinez filed her motion
to reopen approximately twenty-two months after the entry of the in absentia removal order, well
beyond the 180-day deadline. She nevertheless argues that she is entitled to equitable tolling of
that deadline because she exercised diligence in filing her motion to reopen.
Ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute exceptional circumstances for purposes of
filing a motion to reopen. See, e.g., Scorteanu v. I.N.S., 339 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2003). The
BIA, however, found that Paz-Martinez failed to establish exceptional circumstances for her
failure to appear because “[w]hile [Paz-Martinez] blames her attorney for her nonappearance at
the hearing, she has not satisfied the procedural requirements for establishing ineffective assistance
of counsel.” AR 4 (citing Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988)). Paz-Martinez does
not argue that she complied with the requisite procedural requirements for an ineffective-assistance
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claim or that she was not required to do so to raise an ineffective-assistance claim, and we have
previously explained that “[s]ound policy reasons support compliance with the Lozada
requirements” and that “failure to comply results in a forfeiture of [an] ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim.” Hamid v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Rather,
Paz-Martinez contends that “[s]he does not file a Lozada claim, but instead contends that her own
failure to file a change of address, and reliance on her attorney to file the change of address with
the Court, is reasonable because she believed her attorney would update the address at the time
she filed to withdraw as counsel.” The BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this argument
as failing to establish exceptional circumstances, as the claim sounds in ineffective assistance but
it is undisputed that Paz-Martinez did not comply with the procedural requirements for raising
such a claim.
Apparently recognizing that she cannot succeed based on her ineffective-assistance
argument, in her reply brief, Paz-Martinez “asks this Court to consider circumstances other than
those involving ineffective assistance of counsel claims and find that the instant matter rises to a
level of exceptional,” relying on the overlapping filings by the immigration court, her attorney,
and her, and the immigration court’s resetting of her individual hearing in February 2021 to a
master hearing in August 2017. Reply Br. at 1-3; see also Petitioner’s Br. at 25-26. Although
unfortunate, Paz-Martinez “has not shown that h[er] mistake as to the correct date for the hearing
was in any way beyond h[er] control or of an extraordinary nature comparable to the exceptional
circumstances specified by statute.” Acquaah v. Holder, 589 F.3d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 2009).
Despite the numerous filings and date changes, had Paz-Martinez informed the immigration
authorities of her change in address as required, she would have received notice of the August 16
hearing and, presumably, attended that hearing. We cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion
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in concluding that these circumstances were not exceptional within the meaning of the statute or
“beyond the control of” Paz-Martinez. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1).
Accordingly, even if Paz-Martinez is entitled to equitable tolling and her motion to reopen
was timely, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that she failed to show that she missed
the August 16 hearing due to exceptional circumstances.
III.
For the reasons set out above, we DENY the petition for review.
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