United States v. Ryan Gaston ( 2020 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0673n.06
No. 20-3769
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
)
FILED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nov 23, 2020
)
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE
RYAN GASTON, ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
) OHIO
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
BEFORE: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Ryan Gaston seeks review of the denial of
his motion for compassionate release filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We AFFIRM.
In 2016, appellant Ryan Gaston pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, and possession of a firearm in relation
to a drug trafficking offense. The district court sentenced Gaston to the mandatory minimum of
120 months in prison. Gaston currently resides at FCI Elkton. The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
lists his release date as August 10, 2024.
On April 22, 2020, Gaston applied to FCI Elkton’s Warden for compassionate release. The
Warden denied his request on May 5, 2020. Gaston then petitioned the district court for
compassionate release on May 22, 2020. He made several claims regarding how FCI Elkton
handled the pandemic, pointing, as proof of the poor conditions, to a court order that the BOP
No. 20-3769, United States v. Gaston
either release or transfer all medically vulnerable inmates from the prison. The Government
responded late.
The district court denied compassionate release in a form order released on July 6, 2020.
The court explained its decision in four sentences:
No extraordinary and compelling reason presented; as Defendant admits, he
presents no prior medical risks, and family history is not compelling reason. The
presence of COVID-19 at facility by itself is insufficient to justify release. Court
previously considered all mitigating circumstances at Sentencing and adopted the
agreed upon sentence. As to the Government’s untimely Response, Defendant was
not prejudiced by the delay.
United States v. Gaston, No. 1:16-cr-64, Slip Op. at 2–3 (N.D. Ohio July 6, 2020). Gaston appeals,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by referring to the situation at FCI Elkton as
“[t]he presence of COVID-19 at facility,” and by ignoring Gaston’s post-sentencing rehabilitative
efforts and the court’s previously-expressed concern about the length of Gaston’s sentence.
Neither argument succeeds.
I
A defendant-initiated motion for compassionate release must pass four statutory steps for
the defendant to obtain relief: (1) the defendant must exhaust all administrative rights to appeal as
set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), (2) the district court must analyze the motion against the
factors set forth in Section 3553(a) “to the extent that they are applicable,” (3) the court must find
extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting compassionate release, and (4) the court
must find that release is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see also United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000,
1003–05 (6th Cir. 2020). District courts may deny relief on any one of these factors alone. See
Ruffin, at 1003–06.
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Rather than challenging the district court’s Section 3582(c)(1)(A) analysis, Gaston
challenges its interpretation and application of facts. We review for abuse of discretion. Id. at *4.
“Abuse of discretion is defined as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a
clear error of judgment.” Burrell v. Henderson, 434 F.3d 826, 831 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
A.
Gaston argues that the district court abused its discretion by downplaying the Covid-19
outbreak at FCI Elkton. He acknowledges that his presence at a facility dealing with an outbreak
would not by itself justify finding extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. Instead,
Gaston claims that “the district court’s failure to discuss [his] particularly dire situation at FCI
Elkton calls into question its exercise of discretion.”
The district court referred to the outbreak as the “presence of Covid-19 at the facility,”
which Gaston says shows that the court improperly treated FCI Elkton the same way it would a
prison with “one or two confirmed cases.” “Presence” means “the fact or condition of being
present.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary Unabridged 1793 (1981). And that is an accurate
description: Covid-19 is present at FCI Elkton. Although the word “presence” might not
contextualize the pandemic’s toll on FCI Elkton in the context of other, less-stricken prisons, no
other prisons are relevant to this case. Gaston fails to show that the district court abused its
discretion by using the word “presence.” Nor do we believe that a district court abuses its
discretion by accurately describing a fact. This argument is wholly meritless.
B.
Gaston also argues that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring his post-
sentencing rehabilitative efforts and that assessing prisoners based on who they were at sentencing
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contradicts the compassionate release statute. But district courts may consider the record from a
defendant’s initial sentencing when considering modifying his sentence. Chavez-Meza v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1967 (2018). The district court here acted well within its discretion by
standing by its prior consideration of Gaston’s mitigating factors.
Also, “Congress has made clear that rehabilitation ‘alone’ does not provide a proper basis
for relief.” Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1009 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)). Gaston asks this panel to remand
because the district court, in his estimation, did not properly weigh his rehabilitation. He points to
no evidence other than his rehabilitation that might favor relief. Therefore, Ruffin forecloses
remand on this argument.
C.
Finally, Gaston argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to acknowledge
its concern, expressed at sentencing, that Gaston’s ten-year mandatory minimum sentence was too
long. District courts need not elaborate on all of their reasons for modifying a sentence, they need
only to give a sufficient explanation that allows for meaningful appellate review. Chavez-Meza,
138 S. Ct. at 1965. The district court’s explanation met this requirement, and went beyond it—the
Supreme Court has previously approved a sentence modification in which the court used a form
that merely “certified the judge had ‘considered’ petitioner’s motion and ‘tak[en] into account’ the
§ 3553(a) factors and the relevant Guidelines policy statement.” Id. at 1965; see also United States
v. McGuire, 822 F. App’x 479, 480 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem) (“Because it is clear that the judge relied
on the record when declining to modify [a] sentence, even a ‘barebones form order’ could have
sufficed.” (citing Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1968)). Here, the district court’s order referred to its
having “previously considered all mitigating circumstances at Sentencing,” showing that, in ruling
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No. 20-3769, United States v. Gaston
on this motion, it had considered those past arguments. Therefore, the court acted within its
discretion in omitting specific mention of its past concerns about the length of Gaston’s sentence.
II
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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