United States v. Amaris Wyman ( 2020 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0682n.06
Case No. 19-2036
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Dec 04, 2020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
) MICHIGAN
AMARIS MAE WYMAN, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
BEFORE: MOORE, COOK, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
COOK, Circuit Judge. Amaris Mae Wyman challenges the substantive reasonableness of
her below-Guidelines sentence for sexually exploiting her minor daughter. We AFFIRM.
I.
Wyman met Matthew Toole online through a “bestiality group chat.” The pair exchanged
disturbingly graphic messages about Toole engaging in sexual acts with Wyman’s 11-year-old
daughter. Among other things, Wyman discussed drugging her daughter so that Toole could
molest her and mentioned putting her daughter on birth control so that Toole could avoid
impregnating her.
Moving beyond discussion, Wyman filmed three pornographic videos of her daughter and
sent them to Toole. The first two videos depicted Wyman’s daughter urinating in a bathtub; the
Case No. 19-2036, United States v. Wyman
third showed Wyman’s daughter showering. Eventually, police discovered these videos by
searching Toole’s phone and traced them back to Wyman.
A federal grand jury then indicted Wyman on two counts of distribution of child
pornography and two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. Wyman later pleaded guilty to a
single count of sexual exploitation of a minor. On that count, she faced a Guidelines-recommended
sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum. See USSG § 5G1.1(c)(1); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(e).
At sentencing, Wyman’s counsel asked the district court to vary downward from the
Guidelines-recommended sentence to 15 years’ imprisonment—the statutory minimum. Looking
to the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court agreed that “some variance
[was] appropriate” because “the statutory violation never reached the point of physical abuse,”
thus “mitigat[ing] to some extent the seriousness of the offense.” It declined, however, to vary
downward to the statutory minimum sought by Wyman’s counsel. The court reasoned that “the
text messages were startlingly graphic and really disturbing,” that Wyman’s difficult personal
history did not “explain or excuse her behavior,” and that other offenders (including Toole) faced
more severe sentences. It also emphasized the need to deter and punish Wyman and to promote
respect for the law. After weighing all these considerations, the district court imposed a below-
Guidelines sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment. Wyman appeals.
II.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). When the defendant appeals, substantive reasonableness
focuses on whether the sentence “is too long.” United States v. Fleischer, 971 F.3d 559, 567 (6th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). To answer this question, “we consider ‘the district court’s rationale
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for concluding that the sentence imposed is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply
with the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
Thus, “[o]ne way to gauge the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is to ask whether ‘the court
placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others’ in reaching its
sentencing decision.” United States v. Sherrill, 972 F.3d 752, 771 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted).
“[H]ow much weight a judge gives to any § 3553(a) factor is ‘a matter of reasoned
discretion’ to which we owe ‘highly deferential review.’” United States v. Richardson, 960 F.3d
761, 765 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citation omitted). For that reason, this court presumes the
reasonableness of a sentence within the Guidelines range. United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d
868, 890 (6th Cir. 2019). “When a below-Guidelines sentence is imposed, the defendant’s burden,
while not impossible to meet, is ‘even more demanding.’” United States v. Karas, 793 F. App’x
380, 387 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008)).
III.
Wyman attempts to meet her heavy burden by challenging the district court’s balancing of
three § 3553(a) factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics
of the defendant, and the Sentencing Guidelines range. We address each in turn.
Wyman first argues that the nature and circumstances of her offense require a more
significant downward variance. In support of this argument, however, Wyman offers nothing more
than the same mitigating circumstances recited by the district court: the lack of “actual physical
contact with th[e] little girl,” the fact that “[n]either Ms. Wyman nor her daughter ever met Mr.
Toole,” her daughter’s lack of awareness of the videos being taken, and the fact that the videos did
not rise to the level of “depravity that we often see in cases like this.” (Appellant Br. at 14 (quoting
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R. 52 at 280).) Wyman’s “wish that the district court had placed even more weight” on these
mitigating circumstances and imposed the 15-year statutory minimum “is insufficient to justify
our disturbing the reasoned judgment of the district court.” United States v. Smith, 608 F. App’x
395, 397 (6th Cir. 2015) (mem.) (quoting United States v. Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d 409, 413 (6th
Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted)).
Wyman also asserts that the district court erred in considering the text messages she sent
to Toole because they “were not elements of the offense of conviction.” (Appellant Br. at 18; see
Reply Br. at 5.) That contention, which arguably raises a procedural reasonableness challenge
rather than a substantive reasonableness one, lacks merit because § 3553(a)(1) directs sentencing
courts to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” not merely its elements. See also
S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 75 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3258 (“[T]he judge
must consider . . . whether there were any particular aggravating or mitigating circumstances
surrounding the offense.”). The text messages represented “speech and . . . conduct” by Wyman
that “directly related to the § 3553(a) analysis,” and the court’s consideration of them was proper.
United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 2018).
As for Wyman’s argument that the court placed too much weight on the text messages, we
find ample justification for the district court’s focus—treating them “as a serious, but not [the]
sole, consideration” for its sentence. United States v. Darden, 508 F. App’x 387, 392 (6th Cir.
2012). Wyman’s communications with Toole formed the basis for her criminal conduct; the
district court could not have considered the nature and circumstances of the offense without
recognizing that “the text messages were startlingly graphic and really disturbing.” Balancing
those messages against the lack of physical contact with the victim, the district court reasonably
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concluded that the nature and circumstances of Wyman’s offense supported a modest downward
variance.
Wyman’s claims about her history and characteristics likewise fail to satisfy her heavy
burden. She again relies upon factors that the district court considered, including her lack of
criminal history, the “abuse and neglect” that she faced, and her mental health issues and drug
abuse. As the district court reasoned, however, Wyman’s history failed to “explain or excuse her
behavior” because “[a] child has the right to the assurance that the most important person in her
life, her mother, will protect her.”
The district court thus reasonably weighed the mitigating value of Wyman’s history and
characteristics against the § 3553(a) factors supporting a longer sentence—including the nature of
the text messages and videos, the “significant[]” demand for deterrence, the need to protect others
from further crimes, the “obvious[]” need to punish Wyman and promote respect for the law, and
the lengthier sentence received by Toole. It acted “squarely within its discretion” in concluding
that “the present effects of [Wyman’s] past had to give way” to these other sentencing
considerations. United States v. Trotter, 418 F. App’x 482, 484 (6th Cir. 2011). As the
government points out, “[t]he record shows that the court was cognizant of the mitigating factors
Wyman offered on her behalf, but did not find them convincing.” (Appellee Br. at 15.) We find
no abuse of discretion in that determination.
Finally, Wyman claims that the district court gave “too much weight” to the Guidelines,
which “fail[] to distinguish between the most and least culpable offenders convicted under the
statute.” (Appellant Br. at 19.) To begin, it would be odd to conclude that the district court gave
excessive weight to the Guidelines in a case involving a downward variance. And, in fact, the
district court’s focus on the Guidelines range paled in comparison to its lengthy discussion of the
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other § 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 777 F.3d 315, 324 (6th Cir. 2015)
(rejecting argument that “the district court gave the guidelines unreasonable weight” when “the
district court considered the guidelines range in conjunction with the other § 3553(a) sentencing
factors”). To the extent Wyman maintains that the district court should have cast aside the
Commission’s sentencing recommendation on policy grounds, “nothing requires a district court
to disregard the sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Pfister, 806 F. App’x 467, 468 (6th Cir.
2020) (mem.); see also, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2011). The
district court did not accord unreasonable weight to the Guidelines.
IV.
In selecting Wyman’s below-Guidelines sentence, the district court carefully considered
the § 3553(a) factors and reasonably balanced all mitigating and aggravating evidence. “Under
such circumstances, it is not the province of the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that
of the sentencing court.” United States v. Farrell, 233 F. App’x 514, 517 (6th Cir. 2007). We
AFFIRM.
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