United States v. Daniel Silva ( 2023 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 23a0173n.06
No. 22-5954
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Apr 19, 2023
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
DANIEL SILVA, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Defendant-Appellant. )
) OPINION
)
Before: BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Daniel Silva appeals
the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment against him or to order his
hospitalization within seven days as relief for his having been waiting more than four months to
be hospitalized for his competency-restoration evaluation. Silva has now been hospitalized and
argues that his appeal is moot and that we should vacate the district court’s order denying the relief
he sought. We dismiss this appeal as moot but decline to vacate the district court’s order.
I. Background and Procedural History
A federal grand jury indicted Silva for making threats to injure the person of another
through interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Both the prosecutor and defense counsel
questioned Silva’s competency immediately and agreed to a forensic evaluation. At Silva’s
competency hearing, the district court considered the doctor’s conclusion that Silva met the
standard for legal incompetence, as well as Silva’s demeanor, and found Silva incompetent. On
No. 22-5954, United States v. Silva
May 23, 2022, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1), the district court ordered the government to
hospitalize Silva in a suitable facility for up to four months to see if Silva’s competency can be
restored.
On September 28, 2022, four months after the district court entered that order, Silva was
still in jail awaiting hospitalization. So he filed a motion either to dismiss the charges or to order
his hospitalization within seven days because the government had failed to “make a determination
of competence restorability within four months, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).” Silva
argued that the plain text of the statute requires the four-month time clock to begin when the district
court orders hospitalization. He also argued that the Speedy Trial Act and the Due Process Clause
support this interpretation. Silva proposed as alternative remedies that the court: (1) dismiss the
indictment, without prejudice, (2) find that his mental condition had not improved and commit him
civilly, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246, 4248, or (3) order the government to hospitalize him within
seven days, as happened in United States v. Donnelly, 41 F.4th 1102 (9th Cir. 2022).
The district court denied the motion, holding that the four-month time period in
§ 4241(d)(1) does not begin to run until the defendant is actually hospitalized. Because the clock
had not yet started, the court held that it was “without the power to expedite this process or to grant
the further relief requested by the defendant.”
Silva appealed and sought expedited briefing and an expedited decision. We granted the
motion to expedite briefing. The government then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
arguing that this court had no jurisdiction because the ruling was neither a final decision under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, nor subject to the collateral order doctrine. The government informed the court
that the United States Marshals Service estimated that Silva would be hospitalized by the end of
December 2022. On January 5, 2023, the government informed the court that Silva was now
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projected to be placed in the hospital in February or March 2023. On February 17, 2023, the
government informed the court that Silva was hospitalized on February 7, 2023.
We then asked the parties for supplemental briefing addressing the following two
questions:
1. Does Silva’s now being hospitalized moot his request for the remedy of
“hospitalization within 7 days”? Does it moot his request for the remedy of dismissal
of the indictment?
2. Does Silva’s now being hospitalized affect our exercise of jurisdiction under the
collateral order doctrine over the appeal of the denial of the motion to dismiss the
indictment?
The parties’ supplemental briefs are before us now. Both parties agree that the two
remedies Silva sought from us—dismissal of the indictment without prejudice or, in the alternative,
an order to hospitalize Silva within seven days—are moot because Silva is now undergoing the
competency restoration evaluation. But the parties do not agree on whether the district court’s
order denying Silva’s requested relief should be vacated.
II. Discussion
A. Mootness
We agree with the parties that this appeal is moot. An appeal is moot and this court lacks
jurisdiction over it “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.” Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 898 (6th Cir.
2014) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)). It must become “impossible
for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Id. (quoting Chafin v.
Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)). Here, neither of Silva’s requested forms of relief is available
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to him anymore because he has been hospitalized, and he has otherwise disclaimed any interest in
any other form of relief. The goal of his appeal has been achieved.
Nor does the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine
apply here because Silva will not be subject to detention under a § 4241(d)(1) order again. A
dispute qualifies for this exception “only if (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to
be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.” United States v. Sanchez-
Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). While other defendants
may face the same issue that Silva did, Silva himself must be the one who would suffer the same
action again. But he will not be, because once his initial examination is complete, the results of
that examination will determine whether his hospitalization will continue. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2).
Silva will not be subject to detention under § 4241(d)(1) again. This exception to the mootness
doctrine is inapplicable.
There is no longer a live controversy before us and Silva lacks a legally cognizable interest
in the outcome of this narrow appeal. We therefore dismiss this appeal as moot and do not need
to consider the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
B. Vacatur
We do not agree with Silva that, based on the Munsingwear rule, we should vacate the
district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss. The “Munsingwear rule is an equitable one
that is employed where necessary ‘to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from
spawning any legal consequences.’” United States v. City of Detroit, 401 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir.
2005) (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950)) (emphasis omitted). This
rule ensures that a party is not harmed by “the precedential and preclusive effects of the adverse
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ruling without having had a chance to appeal it.” Teamsters Local Union No. 1199 v. Coca-Cola
Consolidated, Inc., 854 F. App’x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). But vacatur is an
“extraordinary remedy,” and the party seeking vacatur must demonstrate its “equitable
entitlement” to vacatur. Id. at 677 (quoting Blankenship v. Blackwell, 429 F.3d 254, 258 (6th Cir.
2005)).
Silva has not demonstrated that the equities favor vacating the district court’s order. As an
initial matter, the Supreme Court has never applied Munsingwear in a criminal case, so it is not
clear that its general principles apply in this context. See United States v. Flute, 951 F.3d 908, 909
(8th Cir. 2020) (order). But even if Munsingwear’s general principles are applicable in criminal
cases, Silva fails to explain why vacatur should apply here.
Silva does not explain why it is unfair for the district court’s order to remain in effect. All
the order says is that Silva is not entitled to the relief he sought. This does not have any long-
lasting legal consequences for Silva, as he has now been hospitalized. Nor is it clear that this order
is unreviewable. If Silva wants to appeal the decision at the conclusion of his case or argue that
his due process or Sixth Amendment rights were violated during his pre-hospitalization time in
jail, he is free to do so. Neither is the public interest served by vacating the order. U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994). Finally, the principle in U.S.
Bancorp that “vacatur must be granted where mootness results from the unilateral action of the
party who prevailed in the lower court” does not apply here. Id. The government was not acting
unilaterally when it hospitalized Silva, but instead acted pursuant to the court’s order. We
therefore deny Silva’s request to vacate the district court’s order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal as moot.
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