Thomas Graley v. Comm'r of Social Security ( 2016 )


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  •                 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 16a0219n.06
    Case No. 15-3907                               FILED
    Apr 21, 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    THOMAS ALBERT GRALEY,                                )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                          )      ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    )      STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    v.                                                   )      THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
    )      OHIO
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,                     )
    )
    Defendant-Appellee.                           )
    BEFORE: GUY, BOGGS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
    COOK, Circuit Judge. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Thomas Albert Graley
    not disabled and therefore denied his application for disability-insurance benefits and
    supplemental security income. Unmoved by Graley’s arguments that new and material evidence
    required remand and that the ALJ’s decision lacked substantial evidence to support it, the district
    court upheld the ALJ’s denial of benefits. We affirm.
    I.
    In March 2012, Graley applied for disability-insurance benefits and supplemental
    security income, alleging disability beginning in October 2011. Following the denial of his
    application initially and on reconsideration, Graley requested a hearing before an ALJ.
    Case No. 15-3907
    Graley v. Commissioner of Social Security
    The ALJ applied the Social Security Administration’s familiar five-step test to determine
    whether Graley was disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step two, the ALJ found
    that Graley suffered from the following severe impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the
    cervical spine; obstructive sleep apnea; headaches/migraines; diverticulitis; hypertension; left
    shoulder degenerative joint disease; anxiety disorder . . . ; major depressive disorder; and
    cannabis abuse.” Proceeding to step four, the ALJ concluded that Graley’s residual functional
    capacity allowed him to perform light work, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b), with
    several limitations.   In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ found “the claimant’s statements
    concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely
    credi[ble].” At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert to find that
    Graley could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy so as to
    render him “not disabled.”
    Graley appealed and submitted additional evidence: a new 100%-disability rating issued
    by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) almost six months after the ALJ delivered her
    decision in this case. The Appeals Council denied Graley’s request for review, making the
    ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Sims v. Apfel, 
    530 U.S. 103
    , 107 (2000).
    Graley sued. Adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court
    upheld the ALJ’s decision, and later denied Graley’s motion to alter or amend the judgment.
    Graley appeals.
    II.
    We review the ALJ’s factual findings for substantial evidence and her legal conclusions
    de novo. McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    474 F.3d 830
    , 833 (6th Cir. 2006); see also
    42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
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    Graley v. Commissioner of Social Security
    preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
    support a conclusion.” 
    McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833
    (quoting Besaw v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    966 F.2d 1028
    , 1030 (6th Cir. 1992)). We will not reverse merely because
    substantial evidence supports a different conclusion. 
    Id. (quoting Buxton
    v. Halter, 
    246 F.3d 762
    , 772 (6th Cir. 2001)).
    On appeal Graley argues: (1) new and material evidence requires this court to remand
    the case to the ALJ, (2) the ALJ’s credibility finding regarding the intensity and persistence of
    Graley’s symptoms is not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the ALJ asked the
    vocational expert an incomplete hypothetical question.
    A. The VA’s New Disability Determination Warrants No Remand
    Sentence Six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) allows a court to remand a case to the Commissioner
    to consider new and material evidence when good cause exists for the failure to incorporate the
    new evidence into the record in a prior proceeding. Graley asserts that the VA’s decision finding
    him 100% disabled meets this standard. Because Graley fails to demonstrate a “reasonable
    probability that the [Commissioner] would have reached a different disposition of [his] disability
    claim if presented” with the VA’s decision, he has not demonstrated materiality. Sizemore v.
    Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    865 F.2d 709
    , 711 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
    To begin, “[t]he fact of a subsequent favorable assessment is not itself new and material
    evidence under § 405(g); only the medical evidence that supported the favorable assessment can
    establish a claimant’s right to a remand.” Deloge v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 540 F. App’x 517, 519
    (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    561 F.3d 646
    , 653 (6th Cir.
    2009)). Here, the VA notice that Graley submitted to the Appeals Council conveyed the VA’s
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    decision to increase his disability rating to 100%, but cited no medical evidence to back that
    decision. Graley therefore fails to demonstrate that the VA notice is material evidence.
    Graley attempts to evade this conclusion by arguing that “extensive records from the VA
    medical centers” support the VA’s 100%-disability decision. He cites only the administrative
    record before the ALJ in this case as support. “But remand under sentence six is not meant to
    address the ‘correctness of the administrative determination’ made on the evidence already
    before the initial ALJ.” 
    Allen, 561 F.3d at 653
    (quoting Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 
    501 U.S. 89
    , 98
    (1991)).
    Next, Graley contends that because neither the Appeals Council nor the ALJ ever
    considered his new VA disability rating, his case warrants remand. Yet the Appeals Council did
    consider the VA disability rating Graley submitted and found that this information provided no
    basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. (R. 11, Admin. R. (listing the VA decision as Exhibit
    9F).)
    Graley also posits that our unpublished decision in LaRiccia v. Commissioner of Social
    Security, 549 F. App’x 377 (6th Cir. 2013), compels remand. He contends that LaRiccia requires
    the ALJ to “review . . . and consider[] . . . VA disability rating[s].” True enough. But in
    LaRiccia we faulted an ALJ for failing properly to consider a VA decision available during
    initial consideration. 549 F. App’x at 378, 388. Here, the VA’s 100%-disability decision
    postdates the ALJ’s decision by almost six months. LaRiccia therefore wins Graley no remand.
    B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Credibility Finding
    Graley challenges three aspects of the ALJ’s finding that his testimony regarding the
    intensity and persistence of his symptoms lacked credibility. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1),
    416.929(c)(1) (explaining that when medical impairments from which the claimant suffers could
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    cause the symptoms alleged, the ALJ “evaluate[s] the intensity and persistence of [the
    claimant’s] symptoms” to “determine how [those] symptoms limit [the claimant’s] capacity for
    work”).
    First, Graley quibbles with the ALJ’s statement that to find him disabled “there must first
    be objective medical evidence confirming the existence of a medically determinable impairment
    and resulting limitations,” by suggesting that the ALJ’s finding of severe impairments at step two
    contradicts this statement. But context matters. The ALJ acknowledged Graley’s impairments
    both at step two and in determining whether those impairments could cause his symptoms. She
    then made the criticized statement while rejecting Graley’s intensity-and-persistence testimony
    for want of evidentiary support. Indeed, over the next four paragraphs of her decision the ALJ
    elucidated why the medical evidence failed to support the severity of symptoms to which Graley
    testified. Graley leaves that analysis unchallenged.
    Second, Graley argues that the record corroborates his complaints that it hurts him to
    raise his arms and that he occasionally drops things, and the ALJ wrongly concluded otherwise.
    But the records he cites provide no support. Some records opine on his good grip strength and
    his shoulders’ acceptable range of motion, while others confirm his neck-and-shoulder-pain
    complaints but remain silent on arm-raising pain. Regardless, the ALJ found that Graley was
    limited to “occasional[] reach overhead with the non-dominate left upper extremity,” due to
    Graley’s degenerative disc disease. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding regarding
    Graley’s reaching ability.
    Third, Graley complains that the ALJ’s assessment of his daily activities misleads
    because she omitted facts favorable to Graley—specifically, his reduced motivation to maintain
    his hygiene and his inability to finish his classes during the spring of 2012. But the ALJ
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    accurately recited Graley’s daily activities as he reported them. And his medical records reveal
    that he appeared clean and presentable at his appointments. The ALJ also correctly observed that
    Graley attended university classes, and while she perhaps should have included that Graley
    “didn’t complete” his spring 2012 semester, we are unpersuaded that omitting this fact
    undermines her evaluation of Graley’s daily activities in assessing the severity of his symptoms.
    Though Graley challenges no other specific aspect of the ALJ’s credibility assessment,
    our review of the record confirms that substantial evidence supports her findings regarding the
    intensity and persistence of Graley’s symptoms.
    C. The ALJ Asked the Vocational Expert an Appropriate Hypothetical Question
    Graley asserts that the ALJ asked the vocational expert a flawed hypothetical question
    because that question failed to consider the VA’s 100%-disability decision and relied on the
    ALJ’s “erroneous” credibility findings regarding the intensity of his symptoms. We have already
    rejected these arguments. And because the ALJ’s hypothetical question included the limits that
    she found credible, she could rely on the vocational expert’s testimony to support the finding that
    Graley could perform jobs that exist in sufficient numbers in the economy. See Griffeth v.
    Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 217 F. App’x 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2007).
    III.
    For these reasons, we affirm.
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