United States v. Dylan T. Flanigan ( 2023 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 23a0238n.06
No. 22-3792
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
May 25, 2023
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
DYLAN T. FLANIGAN, ) OHIO
Defendant-Appellant. )
) OPINION
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Dylan Flanigan pleaded guilty to possessing child
pornography. He appeals his 170-month sentence, arguing that the district court improperly
applied a five-level “pattern of activity” increase to his offense level under United States
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 2G2.2(b)(5), which applies if the defendant “engaged in a pattern
of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.” He contends that a
preponderance of the evidence did not support the conclusion that he engaged in a pattern of
activity because his sister did not give live testimony, and the statements she made to FBI
investigators were uncorroborated and therefore unreliable. Flanigan further argues that because
he was also a minor when the alleged abuse occurred, the pattern of activity enhancement should
not apply. Because the sentencing court properly applied the enhancement, we AFFIRM
Flanigan’s sentence.
No. 22-3792, United States v. Flanigan
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2018, the Brunswick Police Department connected to a computer at
Flanigan’s residence using peer-to-peer software and downloaded digital files containing child
pornography. In February 2019, FBI investigators executed a search warrant, and seized several
devices containing child pornography at Flanigan’s home. As part of the investigation, agents
interviewed Flanigan’s younger sister, who disclosed that from the time she was four or five years
old until she was seven, Flanigan had come into her room at night and molested her. She said that
Flanigan called it “playing pretty,” and that he had touched her vagina with his fingers, and on one
occasion penetrated her vagina with his penis. Flanigan is 11 years older than his sister, so this
conduct was alleged to have occurred from when he was about 15 or 16 years old until he was 18,
at which point Flanigan moved out of the family home.
In 2022, Flanigan pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to one count of
possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He stipulated to a
base offense level of 18 under USSG § 2G2.2(a)(1), and to several special offense characteristic
increases for material involving a prepubescent minor, distribution, material portraying sadistic or
masochistic conduct, use of a computer, and possessing more than 600 images. But he reserved
the right to object to the pattern of activity enhancement, and the Government agreed to
recommend a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1. The
probation office prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR), which it later revised,
calculating a total offense level of 35 after including the pattern of activity increase and the three-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Based on a criminal history category of I and an
offense level of 35, the Guidelines range for imprisonment was 168 to 210 months.
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In a sentencing memorandum, Flanigan objected to the pattern of activity enhancement,
and submitted that his total offense level should be 30, rather than 35, leading to a sentencing range
of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment. Flanigan’s sentencing hearing began on September 2, 2022,
via Zoom, but had to be continued to September 7, 2022, because of technical difficulties.
When the hearing reconvened, the court noted Flanigan’s objection to the pattern of activity
enhancement on the ground that he never engaged in inappropriate or illegal sexual conduct with
his sister. The court then heard argument from the parties, and testimony from the FBI agents who
had interviewed Flanigan’s sister. The Government explained that the sister had first come
forward with allegations of childhood sexual abuse after the search warrant issued in Flanigan’s
case. Summarizing what the sister had told the FBI agents, the Government recounted that she
“did not disclose it at the time it was happening” because Flanigan “was the one of the family who
was actually nice to her. She didn’t want to get him in trouble,” and because she “wasn’t really
sure if she was doing wrong, if it was right or wrong.” She ultimately disclosed the abuse when
she learned Flanigan might live with their mother when he was released from custody. She often
visited their mother with her young children, and she was afraid to bring them around Flanigan
“because she knew what he had done to her as a child.” So, Flanigan’s sister told their mother: “If
you take him in I am not bringing the kids over, because this is what he did to me as a child.” Prior
to that disclosure, Flanigan’s sister had told only a friend about the abuse.
The Government explained that FBI Agent Cappella had interviewed the sister about the
abuse allegations in 2019 after the search warrant had been executed in the case, and that Agent
Cappella and Agent Rao had interviewed her again before the sentencing hearing had reconvened
in September 2022. The agents did not interview Flanigan’s mother about the sister’s disclosure
because she had passed away. At the sentencing hearing, Agent Capella reiterated the sister’s
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allegations that “from the age of 4 or 5 until she was about 7 years old,” Flanigan would “come
into her room and would molest her[.]” Flanigan “would touch her vagina with his fingers, and at
one point he had penetrated her vagina with his penis.” Agent Rao testified that the sister had later
confided in her nephew and her fiancé about the abuse, and also had a “direct conversation with
Mr. Flanigan’s wife . . . where that disclosure was made.”
Flanigan argued that the pattern of activity enhancement should not apply because his
sister’s statements were neither credible nor reliable and because he was a minor at the time of the
alleged conduct. Flanigan contended that, at most, “the evidence [was] 50/50” and “the evidence
in this case doesn’t rise to the level of a preponderance in an effort to apply this enhancement.”
The district court disagreed, holding that there were “many indicators of reliability” as to
the sister’s statements. The court explained that “[m]ost often children of the age 4 to 7 don’t ever
disclose that they’re molested for myriad of reasons,” but “then as time goes on, . . . it comes up
that something occurs that triggers this recollection[.]” The court reasoned:
[I]t makes perfect sense that if your sister had children and they were visiting your
mother and she thought that you were going to be living in the home[,] that she
would tell her mother that she wouldn’t bring her kids over if you were there
because of what happened. And that kind of cascaded into all this information
being out there to other people in your family, your wife and other people that were
told what occurred.
The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Flanigan was responsible for sexually
abusing his sister, applied the five-level enhancement for a pattern of activity, and sentenced
Flanigan to a within-Guidelines sentence of 170 months’ imprisonment. This timely appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
We review sentencing decisions under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “To determine whether a district court abused its discretion,
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No. 22-3792, United States v. Flanigan
we look to whether the sentence is reasonable. Sentences must be both procedurally and
substantively reasonable.” United States v. Walters, 775 F.3d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations
omitted). Whether a district court properly applied a sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines
is “a matter of procedural reasonableness.” Id. With regard to procedural reasonableness, we
defer “to the sentencing court’s factual determinations unless clearly erroneous but review[]
interpretations of the [G]uidelines de novo.” United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir.
2009).
The five-level pattern of activity enhancement applies “[i]f the defendant engaged in a
pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor[.]” USSG § 2G2.2(b)(5).
The application notes add that a pattern of activity means “any combination of two or more
separate instances of the sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor by the defendant, whether
or not the abuse or exploitation (A) occurred during the course of the offense; (B) involved the
same minor; or (C) resulted in a conviction for such conduct.” USSG § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1. “The
applicability of the pattern-of-abuse enhancement is a factual determination that the sentencing
court need find only by a preponderance of evidence.” United States v. Berringer, 393 F. App’x
257, 262 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 2008)).
Flanigan does not dispute that the conduct his sister alleged, if proven, would qualify as
sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor for purposes of the enhancement. Instead, he argues that
the Government failed to prove the alleged sexual abuse occurred by a preponderance of the
evidence. He challenges the district court’s reliance on the sister’s statements because she did not
give live testimony, and he contends the statements were unreliable because they were not
corroborated by another witness or other evidence. He also argues that the enhancement should
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No. 22-3792, United States v. Flanigan
not apply because he himself was a minor at the time of the alleged sexual abuse. We address each
argument in turn.
First, as we explained in Paull—a case involving a challenge to the same pattern of activity
enhancement under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(5)—a sentencing court may consider and rely on hearsay
evidence when deciding whether to apply a Guidelines enhancement.1 551 F.3d at 527-28. “So
long as the information has ‘some evidentiary basis’ to satisfy a ‘minimal indicium of reliability,’
the district court can consider it without regard for the rules of evidence.” United States v.
Armstrong, 920 F.3d 395, 398 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502,
1504 (6th Cir. 1992)). Reliability is a “relatively low hurdle.” United States v. Moncivais, 492
F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Greene, 71 F.3d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1995)).
“And on top of that, we review those reliability decisions under the highly deferential, clearly
erroneous standard.” Armstrong, 920 F.3d at 398.
Thus, in Paull, we upheld the district court’s application of the pattern of activity
enhancement when it relied on a letter written by a friend of the defendant’s son, alleging that the
defendant had molested him in the 1980s, around 20 years earlier. 551 F.3d at 521, 527. Rejecting
the defendant’s argument “that the facts were legally insufficient to support the district court’s
holding,” Paull explained that the letter made “specific allegations, including when the activity
started, the time of day and year (evenings during football and basketball season, when Paull would
be free from his other family members), and was corroborated by family members of the victim.”
Id. at 527. The district court determined the letter was reliable, and credited its “specifics over
1
Although we have definitively ruled that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit the
admission of testimonial hearsay at a sentencing hearing, we have left open the question of whether the Confrontation
Clause gives a defendant the right to cross-examine a testifying witness at a sentencing hearing. See, e.g., United
States v. Martin, 526 F. App’x 643, 646 (6th Cir. 2013). We need not resolve this question here.
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No. 22-3792, United States v. Flanigan
Paull’s generalities.” Id. We affirmed, explaining that “disputed facts do not make evidence
insufficient,” and the defendant’s denial of the allegations did not make it clear error for the district
court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he did molest the victim. Id.Here, the district court did not clearly err in determining that the statements of Flanigan’s
sister were reliable or in crediting her version of the events. The sister’s allegations remained
unchanged, consistent, and specific over the course of two separate interviews with FBI
investigators—one in 2019 and one in 2022. Although her allegations were not corroborated by
other family members, that is because she never disclosed Flanigan’s abuse to anyone in her family
until after the FBI began investigating Flanigan. The district court reasoned that “[m]ost often
children of the age 4 to 7 don’t ever disclose that they’re molested for myriad of reasons,” and that
it made “perfect sense” that the sister decided to come forward when she did, because she was
concerned that if Flanigan moved in with their mother, her children would interact with him when
they visited. “[W]e will reverse the district court’s finding of reliability only if it leaves us ‘with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Armstrong, 920 F.3d at 398(quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003)). The district court did not
clearly err in this case.
Second, Flanigan argues that testimony or other corroborating evidence is required to
support the application of the pattern of activity sentencing enhancement, citing cases in which
more than one witness testified about the defendant’s past sexual abuse. See, e.g., United States
v. Wright, 464 F. App’x 475, 478, 482-84 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming pattern of activity
enhancement where two witnesses testified about the defendant’s abuse 40 years earlier). But
Flanigan provides no authority suggesting that corroboration of this nature is required. Indeed,
Paull affirmed the application of the enhancement based on a letter and the probation officer’s
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No. 22-3792, United States v. Flanigan
summary of interviews with family members corroborating its contents. 551 F.3d at 521, 527.
While it would have been preferable for the record before the sentencing court to have included
further corroboration, we cannot say that the court clearly erred in finding that the sister’s
statements to the FBI agents about Flanigan’s past abuse were reliable.
Third, we address Flanigan’s argument that the pattern of activity enhancement should not
apply because he was a minor when the alleged abuse is said to have occurred. The plain language
of USSG § 2G2.2(b)(5) does not exclude minor-on-minor conduct. It provides only that “[i]f the
defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,
increase by 5 levels.” Id. (emphasis added). “Sexual abuse or exploitation” is defined in the
Guidelines’ application notes as including conduct described in nine federal statutes, state law
offenses that would qualify as offenses under those federal statutes had they occurred within a
federal jurisdiction, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of those offenses. Id. cmt. n.1. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 2241 criminalizes “aggravated sexual abuse,” which includes actual or
attempted sexual acts with minors under 12 years old. But none of these enumerated federal
statutes limits coverage to offenders that are over 18.2
The other circuits that have considered the question of whether USSG § 2G2.2(b)(5)
excludes minor-on-minor conduct have concluded that it does not. For example, the Second
Circuit held “that sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor undertaken by a defendant who was a
juvenile at the time of the incident is properly considered in applying the § 2G2.2(b)(5) pattern
enhancement.” United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 225 (2d Cir. 2013). The Eleventh Circuit
2
As another example, 18 U.S.C. § 2243 provides penalties for (among other things) the sexual abuse of a minor,
which includes actual or attempted sex acts with minors over the age of 12 but under the age 16 when the victim is
four or more years younger than the offender. This provision would apply, for example, to a 17-year-old who
“knowingly engages in a sexual act” with a 12- or 13-year-old.
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No. 22-3792, United States v. Flanigan
agreed, holding that “[n]othing in § 2G2.2(b)(5) limits its application to adult conduct. Our
analysis therefore leads us to conclude that acts committed by defendants when they were minors
may support a ‘pattern of activity’ enhancement under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(5).” United States v.
Alberts, 859 F.3d 979, 984 (11th Cir. 2017). And the Third and Eighth Circuits have summarily
affirmed the application of this enhancement based on the defendant’s conduct as a minor against
other minors. See United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Woodard, 694 F.3d 950, 953-54 (8th Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Gauld, 865 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2017). We find these decisions persuasive, and Flanigan
does not point to any authority supporting a contrary position or offer a viable basis for
distinguishing the facts of his case. The district court did not err in applying the pattern of activity
enhancement to conduct that occurred when Flanigan himself was a minor.
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we AFFIRM Flanigan’s sentence.
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