Janice Brown v. Andrew Knapp ( 2023 )

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 23a0160p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐
JANICE BROWN,
│
Plaintiff-Appellee, │
> No. 22-1973
│
v. │
│
ANDREW KNAPP; KEN SHINGLETON; BRYCE │
WILLOUGHBY; THOMAS DHOOGHE, │
Defendants-Appellants. │
┘
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint.
No. 4:20-cv-12441—Shalina D. Kumar, District Judge.
Argued: June 13, 2023
Decided and Filed: July 28, 2023
Before: KETHLEDGE, STRANCH, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Adam R. de Bear, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Austin Porter, Jr., PORTER LAW FIRM, Little Rock,
Arkansas, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Adam R. de Bear, John G. Fedynsky, OFFICE OF THE
MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Austin Porter, Jr.,
PORTER LAW FIRM, Little Rock, Arkansas, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. In September 2018, Michigan State Police officers
arrested Janice Brown without a warrant for alleged witness intimidation. She was jailed for
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 2
approximately 96 hours and was not brought before a judge for a probable cause hearing during
that time. None of the officers involved in her arrest requested a warrant or took any other action
relating to her detention. Brown sued the officers for unreasonably seizing her without probable
cause and detaining her without due process of law, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied
their motion, and they appealed. We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In 2017, Michigan State Police (MSP) detectives Kenneth Shingleton and Thomas
Dhooghe were assigned to investigate a cold case, the 2011 killing of LeAnn Bates. The two
learned that, the night of her murder, Bates was in her home with a woman named Sheneen
Jones, along with both of their boyfriends. At the time, Bates was dating Jones’s cousin, who
was best friends with Jones’s boyfriend, Dale Reed Jr. Jones told the detectives that she and
Bates had argued, then Bates grabbed a gun. Jones ran out of the house to get away and heard
gunshots behind her. She did not see who had fired, but Reed rushed outside and told her to get
in the car. Jones said that, in the following days, she received a threat that she would be killed
by Reed’s family. Jones’s cousin identified Reed as Bates’s shooter, and in July 2018, Reed was
arrested and charged with homicide and related weapons charges. Reed and Jones have a
daughter together.
Plaintiff Janice Brown is Reed’s mother. In September 2018, she traveled from her home
in Arkansas to Michigan to attend a court hearing in Reed’s pending homicide case, which was
scheduled for September 11, 2018. Brown and the two MSP detectives who had been assigned
to the case, Shingleton and Dhooghe, all attended the hearing. Jones had been named as a
witness in the state’s case against Reed and received a subpoena but did not appear to testify, and
her cousin also recanted his identification of Reed as the shooter. The court continued the
hearing until September 14, 2018. After the hearing ended, Dhooghe overheard Reed’s defense
attorney tell Brown that “someone needs to talk to her.” Dhooghe and Shingleton interpreted the
statement as the attorney directing Brown to speak with Jones; Brown says that the attorney was
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 3
explaining that someone needed to tell Jones she needed to retain an attorney after failing to
appear at the hearing.
Later that same day, Shingleton and Dhooghe visited Jones’s home to serve a subpoena
on her for the September 14 hearing. When they arrived, Brown was there. The MSP detectives
asked Brown why she was at Jones’s house, and Brown said she was visiting her granddaughter.
Brown left, and the detectives asked Jones whether Brown was bothering her or had offered her
money not to testify. Jones denied both but said she did not want to testify, and she continued to
express fear that “they” would kill her if she did, although she did not identify who “they” were.
Brown remained in Michigan for the next few days, spending more time with Jones and her
granddaughter.
On September 14, Brown, Jones, and Jones’s daughter arrived at the courthouse. Brown
took her granddaughter into the courtroom while Jones went into the prosecutor’s office, where
she said she would not provide testimony implicating Reed. As Jones left the prosecutor’s office
and Brown exited the courtroom, Brown followed behind Jones. The assistant prosecutor
assigned to Reed’s case, Karen Hanson, testified that, at this time, she saw Brown following
closely behind Jones as Jones cried. According to Hanson, Brown was yelling at Jones that she
“couldn’t go testify and she better not go in there.” Hanson claims it was the most aggressive
attempt to get someone not to testify that she had ever seen. Hanson yelled that Brown was
bothering Jones, and Brown went back into the courtroom.
Hanson called over the officer in charge, described what she had seen, and said that there
was probable cause to arrest Brown. She does not remember whether she instructed an officer to
arrest Brown, but Dhooghe testified that she told him to do so. The district court found it unclear
whether Dhooghe and Shingleton were both involved at this point, or only Dhooghe. Brown
says Hanson discussed the alleged intimidation with Dhooghe and Shingleton; the MSP
Defendants say Hanson spoke with Dhooghe only; and Hanson testified that she did not
remember who she spoke to.
The parties similarly disagree as to which detective was present in the courtroom that
day: Brown claims that Shingleton approached her, whereas the MSP Defendants claim Dhooghe
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 4
was present and Shingleton was not. Brown remembered Shingleton from her earlier interaction
with him at Jones’s house on September 11 because he had been “hostile” towards her, and she
believed him to be the person who approached her in the courtroom on September 14. Brown
noted that Shingleton had authored a supplemental incident report about her arrest, dated
September 19, 2018, “as if he was there” when she was arrested. Brown also testified that, on
September 14, she saw only one of the two detectives who she had met on September 11, and
that she would not be able to tell Shingleton and Dhooghe apart if they were sitting next to each
other. For his part, Dhooghe testified that he was the detective present at Brown’s arrest, which
MSP officers Bryce Willoughby and Andrew Knapp confirmed, and Shingleton similarly
testified he was not present in court on September 14.
The district court did not resolve this question. It found that one or both of the two MSP
detectives confronted Brown in the courtroom and told her they thought she had not been visiting
her granddaughter the day they saw her at Jones’s home because the granddaughter had been at
school. Dhooghe (who was scheduled to testify that morning) was in civilian clothes and lacked
handcuffs, so he called his supervisor, Detective Willoughby, for help. Approximately five
minutes later, Willoughby and Knapp entered the courtroom and arrested Brown for witness
intimidation.
Willoughby and Knapp transported Brown to the Flint Police Department and filled out
booking paperwork. Brown was booked into the Flint City jail, then transferred to the Genesee
County jail. At the time, the State of Michigan had an agreement to house people arrested by
MSP at that jail because MSP does not itself maintain any jail or other institution to incarcerate
people pre-trial. After her arrest, Dhooghe (and potentially Shingleton) returned to Jones’s home
and asked if Brown had been intimidating her, but Jones did not wish to speak to them.
Brown was in jail for approximately 96 hours; during that time, she was not brought
before a judge for a probable cause hearing, and the MSP Defendants never requested a warrant
for her arrest or took any other action relating to her detention. Hanson testified that her
prosecutor’s office typically waits for the arresting officers to submit a prosecutor’s packet, and
without that packet, the prosecutor will not prepare a warrant or proposed complaint needed for
the probable cause hearing. While Brown was incarcerated, the Genesee County jail sent reports
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 5
to MSP employees indicating that Brown had remained in custody without a warrant or probable
cause hearing for over 48 hours. Brown claims that Shingleton received those reports; the MSP
Defendants claim they went only to commanding officers, not the arresting officers. Shingleton
was not personally listed as an addressee of the report that was emailed on September 15, 2018,
though other MSP recipients were. Brown was released on September 18, 2018, “pending
further investigation” under Shingleton’s orders.
As relevant to this appeal, Brown sued the MSP detectives and troopers (collectively, the
MSP Defendants) for violating her Fourth Amendment rights by unreasonably seizing her
without probable cause and detaining her without due process of law.1 The MSP Defendants
moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity; Brown moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of whether her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by being
held for over 48 hours without a probable cause hearing. The district court denied both motions,
finding that the MSP Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had
collectively violated Brown’s clearly established right to a prompt probable cause determination
within 48 hours of her arrest. But because of the “complicated factual scenario” surrounding
Brown’s arrest, the court could not determine at the summary judgment stage which MSP
Defendant or Defendants bore legal responsibility for violating her rights. The MSP Defendants
appealed.
II. JURISDICTION
A district court’s denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine. See Rafferty v. Trumbull County, 915 F.3d 1087, 1092 (6th Cir. 2019).
But circuit courts can generally review a denial of qualified immunity “only ‘to the extent that it
turns on an issue of law’—the appeal cannot be from a district court’s determination that there is
a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)). Put another way, “a determination that
1
Brown also named Jason Gould, the jail administrator, Mackenzie Rose, a jailer at Genesee County Jail,
and Genesee County, Michigan, in her complaint (collectively, the Genesee County Defendants), and alleged a
malicious prosecution claim against Shingleton and Dhooghe. The district court granted the Genesee County
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Brown’s malicious prosecution claim. Brown does not
appeal either ruling.
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 6
a given set of facts violates clearly established law is reviewable, while a determination that an
issue of fact is ‘genuine’ is unreviewable.” See v. City of Elyria, 502 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir.
2007) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995)).
We can “ignore the defendant’s attempts to dispute the facts,” Est. of Carter v. City of
Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2005), as long as the issues on appeal are purely legal and
the defendant is “willing to concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff,” Barry
v. O’Grady, 895 F.3d 440, 443 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 298 (6th
Cir. 2002)). “The upshot is that, in most appeals of denials of qualified immunity, we must defer
to the district court’s determinations of fact” and any inferences drawn therefrom. Barry, 895
F.3d at 443. We are not, however, categorically “limited to only the facts, evidence, or
inferences that the district court has stated expressly”; if the district court denies a summary
judgment motion without indicating its rationale for doing so, we may undertake a “review of the
record” to determine the facts assumed. DiLuzio v. Village of Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 611 (6th
Cir. 2015); Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319. We may review a district court’s factual determination
only if it is “blatantly and demonstrably false,” Barry, 895 F.3d at 443 (quoting Austin v. Redford
Twp. Police Dep’t, 690 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2012)), for example, if a videotape of the events
at issue so contradicts the nonmoving party’s version of the record that “no reasonable jury could
believe” the nonmovant, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
The MSP Defendants explicitly concede the facts in the light most favorable to Brown
and claim to raise only purely legal issues. They argue that: (1) they did not violate Brown’s
right to be free from an arrest without probable cause; (2) they did not violate Brown’s right to a
prompt probable cause determination; and (3) there was no clearly established law governing
their conduct with respect to Brown’s detention. Broadly speaking, these appear to be legal
questions properly raised on appeal.
One last note before proceeding to the appeal’s merits. The MSP Defendants would have
us disregard the district court’s conclusion as to one factual issue and resolve it instead, namely,
that it was disputed whether Shingleton was present at the hearing or arrest on September 14,
2018. The MSP Defendants argue, as they did below, that Shingleton did not witness Brown
allegedly intimidating Jones, was not physically present at the time of her arrest, and became
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 7
aware of her arrest only on September 18, 2018, when the jail contacted him and he ordered
Brown’s release. The MSP Defendants describe Brown’s position that Shingleton was present
for and involved in her arrest as supported only by “groundless belief.”
To be sure, the record on this question is mixed at best. Brown says Shingleton was there
on September 14, Shingleton and the other MSP Defendants say he was not, and Hanson does
not remember whether she spoke with him that day. It is unsurprising that the parties’
recollections differ. But such differences do not render the record so one-sided as to make the
district court’s conclusion “demonstrably false,” as is required for review on appeal. Barry, 895
F.3d at 440. There is no videotape or other evidence “blatantly” contradicting either party’s
version of events. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-81; Austin, 690 F.3d at 496-97 (where videotapes
were inconclusive as to events, district court properly concluded that factual dispute existed). At
bottom, the MSP Defendants’ argument is about the sufficiency of the evidence: they “challenge
directly the plaintiff’s allegations (and the district court’s acceptance) of ‘what actually occurred
. . . ,’ who did it, or ‘nothing more than whether the evidence could support a jury’s finding that
particular conduct occurred,’” DiLuzio, 796 F.3d at 609 (brackets omitted) (quoting Ortiz v.
Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 190 (2011); then quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996)).
It is not within our jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. We proceed with deference to the district
court’s determination of facts.
III. ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo, LaPlante v. City of
Battle Creek, 30 F.4th 572, 578 (6th Cir. 2022), and a district court’s refusal to address the merits
of a defendant’s motion asserting qualified immunity is equivalent to a denial for purposes of
appellate review, Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 2004). “When, as here, a
defendant raises qualified immunity as a defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that the defendant is not entitled to immunity.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir.
2009). And when more than one officer is involved, “the court must consider each officer’s
entitlement to qualified immunity separately.” Smith v. City of Troy, 874 F.3d 938, 944 (6th Cir.
2017) (per curiam). We address each of Brown’s claims below.
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 8
A. Brown’s Arrest
The district court did not address the MSP Defendants’ qualified immunity arguments as
to Brown’s claim that they violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without
probable cause. It noted only that Brown “contest[ed]” the existence of probable cause to arrest
her. Nevertheless, the district court denied the MSP Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
in its entirety, implicitly addressing the issue of whether the MSP Defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity on Brown’s probable cause claim and making it reviewable on appeal. See
Freed v. Thomas, 976 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2020).
“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where
there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). The existence of probable cause depends upon
“the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time
of the arrest.” Id. When there is “reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing” that an offense had been or was being committed, there is generally
probable cause. Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265, 279 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in Gardenhire). An
officer must “consider the totality of the circumstances,” and “cannot look only at the evidence
of guilt while ignoring all exculpatory evidence when assessing probable cause.” Id. (quoting
Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318). “In general, the existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action
presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible.”
Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 315.
It is clearly established that “[a]n eyewitness identification will constitute sufficient
probable cause unless, at the time of the arrest, there is an apparent reason for the officer to
believe that the eyewitness was lying, did not accurately describe what he had seen, or was in
some fashion mistaken regarding his recollection of the confrontation.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188
F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A person does
have a right to be free from arrest “based solely on an eyewitness account that is in some way
untruthful or unreliable.” Ouza, 969 F.3d at 282. “At most,” an “unreliable and uncorroborated”
eyewitness account alone “gives an officer reasonable suspicion of criminal activity such that the
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 9
officer would be justified in investigating further pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.” Id. But where such
an account is corroborated by other evidence, the officer may properly conclude that there is
probable cause for a warrantless arrest. Cf. id.
Brown was arrested for violating Michigan law, which provides in relevant part that a
person shall not, by threat or intimidation, “[d]iscourage or attempt to discourage any individual
from attending a present or future official proceeding as a witness, testifying at a present or
future official proceeding, or giving information at a present or future official proceeding.”2
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.122(3)(a). The following facts are undisputed: Jones had told
Dhooghe and Shingleton that she received threats from Reed’s family; at the September 11
hearing, Dhooghe overheard Reed’s lawyer telling Brown that “someone needs to talk to her”;
Dhooghe and Shingleton saw Brown at Jones’s home just after they saw her at the September 11
hearing; and Hanson told the officer in charge on September 14 that she had witnessed Brown
intimidating Jones and telling her not to testify, and that there was probable cause to arrest
Brown. Brown’s retort is that Dhooghe and Shingleton blamed her for the case against Reed
“falling apart,” that they wanted to “punish her” for interfering, and that Hanson was lying.
Brown offers no evidence to support her claim. Given the events and behavior Dhooghe and/or
Shingleton knew about, there was no reason for them to believe that Hanson was lying or
mistaken when she told the officer in charge what she had seen and said that there was probable
cause for Brown’s arrest. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers therefore had
probable cause to arrest Brown for witness intimidation.
Alternatively, the MSP Defendants argue that an officer should generally be entitled to
rely on a prosecutor’s independent judgment that probable cause exists. In their view, Hanson’s
conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest Brown was enough on its own. In support, they
cite Steiger v. Hahn, 718 F. App’x 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2018), and Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle,
622 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2010). Both these cases are readily distinguishable. In Steiger,
detectives gathered extensive evidence, conferred repeatedly with the Michigan Attorney
2
Brown also cites another potentially relevant subsection: “A person shall not willfully impede, interfere
with, prevent, or obstruct or attempt to willfully impede, interfere with, prevent, or obstruct the ability of a witness
to attend, testify, or provide information in or for a present or future official proceeding.” Mich. Comp. Laws §
750.122(6).
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 10
General’s office to review the evidence, then applied for an arrest warrant for Steiger based on
the conclusion of the Attorney General that the evidence was sufficient to establish probable
cause. 718 F. App’x at 387-89. We held that, given the thorough and deliberate process of the
investigation into Steiger’s behavior, which allowed sufficient time for the Attorney General to
review the pertinent evidence, the detectives could rely on the Attorney General’s judgment that
probable cause existed to charge Steiger and were entitled to qualified immunity as to Steiger’s
false arrest claim. Id. at 391-92. The circumstances here were quite different; there was no
deliberative, collaborative process between the MSP Defendants and the prosecutor’s office to
review the evidence of Brown’s alleged crime, only a conversation between Hanson and the
officer in charge.
In Kelly, the Third Circuit held that “a police officer who relies in good faith on a
prosecutor’s legal opinion that the arrest is warranted under the law is presumptively entitled to
qualified immunity from Fourth Amendment claims premised on a lack of probable cause.” 622
F.3d at 255-56. But the “reliance must be itself objectively reasonable” and “a plaintiff may
rebut this presumption by showing that, under all of the . . . circumstances surrounding the arrest,
a reasonable officer would not have relied on the prosecutor’s advice.” Id. at 256. The Kelly
court reversed a district court’s finding that it was objectively reasonable for an officer to rely on
a prosecutor’s advice regarding probable cause where the officer had observed conduct that he
thought constituted a crime, then called the prosecutor to verify that the conduct was a crime
sufficient to justify probable cause for arrest. Id. at 251, 255-59. The court held that additional
fact-finding was necessary to assess whether the officer’s reliance on the prosecutor’s advice was
reasonable. Id. at 258-59.
Kelly, of course, is not binding. See Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 278 (6th
Cir. 2010). Moreover, the Kelly court determined that the reasonableness of relying on a
prosecutor’s advice depends on the circumstances. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 258-59. Here too, there
may be factual questions about the reasonableness of relying upon Hanson’s assessment of
probable cause, e.g., whether the officers present could have reasonably questioned her ability to
neutrally assess that there was probable cause to arrest Brown. We decline to endorse the MSP
Defendants’ position as to the dispositive nature of Hanson’s legal conclusion. Regardless,
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 11
under the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest Brown. See Cox v.
Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (situating pre-arrest consultation with a prosecutor in the
“totality of the circumstances” and collecting cases from other circuits). The MSP Defendants
did not violate her Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause and are
entitled to qualified immunity on Brown’s false arrest claim.
B. Brown’s Detention
“Individuals arrested and detained without a warrant are entitled to a ‘prompt’ judicial
determination of probable cause.” Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975)). In the absence of exceptional
circumstances, the government must generally provide a probable cause determination within 48
hours for the determination to be considered sufficiently prompt. County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991). A failure to do so violates the individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights and is known as a Riverside violation.3 See id. Where the arrested person
does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the government bears the
burden of demonstrating “the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary
circumstance” that would justify the delay. Id. at 57.
There is no dispute that Brown was detained without a probable cause hearing for
approximately 96 hours, and that she was entitled to such a hearing absent extraordinary
circumstances. But although the MSP Defendants cursorily assert that the circumstances here
were extraordinary, they fail to support that assertion or develop that argument. Instead, the
MSP Defendants argue that (1) they “personally” did not intentionally violate Brown’s right to
receive a prompt determination of probable cause; and (2) it was not clearly established at the
time that the MSP Defendants’ conduct was a violation of Brown’s rights given the
circumstances.
3
Brown also asserted that her detainment without a hearing violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. “[I]t is the Fourth, rather than the Fourteenth,
Amendment that applies to this case because ‘the Fourth Amendment governs the period of confinement between
arrest without a warrant and the preliminary . . . determination of probable cause,’” whereas “due process regulates
the period of confinement after the initial determination of probable cause.” Drogosch, 557 F.3d at 378 (quoting
Vollanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1992)).
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 12
1. The MSP Defendants’ Violation of Brown’s Rights
We “look to state law to determine who is responsible for ensuring that a judicial
determination of probable cause takes place within 48 hours” of an arrest. Drogosch, 557 F.3d at
378-79 (quoting Cherrington v. Skeeter, 344 F.3d 631, 644 (6th Cir. 2003)). Michigan state law
provides that it is the duty of “[a] peace officer who has arrested a person for an offense without
a warrant” to take the person arrested before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay.” Mich.
Comp. Laws § 764.13. Thus, the officer or officers who arrested Brown had the legal obligation
to ensure she received a probable cause hearing within 48 hours. In Michigan, an arrest is “the
taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by touching or putting hands on him,
or by any act which indicates an intention to take him into custody and subjects the person
arrested to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.” People v. Gonzales, 97
N.W.2d 16, 19 (Mich. 1959) (quoting 4 Am. Jur. Arrest, § 2); see also Skousen v. Brighton High
Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2002).
Under Michigan law, Willoughby and Knapp were arresting officers with a Riverside
obligation because they arrested Brown by handcuffing her, physically taking her into custody,
and transporting her to jail. The MSP Defendants acknowledge as much.4 See Appellants’ Br. at
31. The parties disagree vociferously, however, as to Shingleton and Dhooghe’s obligations.
Taking the facts as found by the district court and in the light most favorable to Brown, Dhooghe
was physically present at the courthouse, potentially spoke with Hanson, and directed Knapp and
Willoughby to arrest Brown. Although Dhooghe did not physically arrest Brown because he did
not have his handcuffs on him, he still took actions that “indicate[d] an intention” to take Brown
into custody and subjected Brown to his will by directing other officers to take her into custody.
Gonzales, 97 N.W.2d at 19. Dhooghe was an arresting officer for purposes of the Riverside
analysis. As for Shingleton, the district court found it was unsettled whether he was physically
present when Brown was arrested. Assuming, in the light most favorable to Brown, that he was,
4
The MSP Defendants suggest that Willoughby and Knapp are not responsible because § 1983 actions are
limited to deprivations of federal statutory and constitutional rights and do not encompass violations of state law.
This is shadowboxing: Brown does not claim that Knapp and Willoughby violated state law. Rather, she alleges that
they violated her Fourth Amendment rights. As the MSP Defendants’ own brief notes, we look to state law merely
to define those rights.
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 13
Shingleton was one of the detectives in charge of the Reed case that Hanson contacted to report
Brown’s intimidation and discuss her arrest. Additionally, he authored a report about Brown’s
arrest and was aware of her incarceration such that he eventually authorized her release.
Shingleton was thus part of the decision to arrest Brown and direct Knapp and Willoughby to
physically take her into custody. By so doing, he took actions indicating intent to take Brown
into custody and was therefore also an arresting officer.
The MSP Defendants contend that they “lacked the power to convene a probable cause
hearing on their own,” and that it was objectively reasonable for them to assume that Hanson
would secure Brown’s arrest warrant. Although Michigan law requires the arresting officer to
bring a person arrested without a warrant before a magistrate for their probable cause hearing,
other parties must act as well: the prosecutor requests the warrant and a magistrate makes a
finding of reasonable cause and ultimately issues the warrant. See Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 764.1a(1), (2)(d), (4). The MSP Defendants claim that not one of them observed the factual
allegations supporting Brown’s arrest or had the personal knowledge needed to author an
affidavit. In their view, only Hanson could have sworn out a complaint and requested a warrant,
and they cannot be held liable for any failure to do so.
This position ignores the undisputed fact that the MSP Defendants did not even attempt
to ensure that Brown received a probable cause hearing. Hanson herself testified that the
prosecutor’s office typically waits for the arresting officers to submit a prosecutor’s packet
before preparing a warrant or proposed complaint. Nothing in the record indicates that the MSP
Defendants could not have followed this routine procedure by preparing a prosecutor’s packet
and contacting Hanson to collect an affidavit from her. This is particularly true if Hanson could
not investigate and prosecute the case, given that she was a witness to the alleged crime. The
MSP Defendants “essentially contend[] that ‘someone screwed up, but it wasn’t me.’” Drogosch,
557 F.3d at 378. Under Michigan law, however, they were responsible for bringing Brown
before a magistrate for a prompt probable cause determination. See id. at 379. The MSP
Defendants cannot skirt this duty by pointing fingers elsewhere. In sum, all four MSP
Defendants had a Riverside obligation.
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 14
The MSP Defendants maintain that they did not intentionally violate that obligation,
citing the general requirement for § 1983 liability that a defendant must have acted “knowingly
or intentionally to violate [a plaintiff’s] constitutional rights such that mere negligence or
recklessness is insufficient.”5 Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 373. In the context of a Riverside claim, we
have held that, where the “undisputed record” establishes a violation of the Riverside 48-hour
rule and the defendant fails to “identify any emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” as
justification, the plaintiff “can withstand the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry by
virtue of the violation of her Fourth Amendment right to a judicial determination of probable
cause within 48 hours of her arrest.” Cherrington, 344 F.3d at 644. So, the question is whether
the MSP Defendants can establish an emergency or extraordinary circumstance to merit Brown’s
prolonged detention.
The MSP Defendants’ only answer is that “the alleged offense happened in the presence
of an assistant prosecutor who directed one police officer to arrest Brown and who in turn
referred that request to another officer who happened to be in uniform and with handcuffs.”
Appellants’ Br. at 26. This proposed “extraordinary circumstance” does not take Brown’s case
“outside the usual 48-hour rule.” Cherrington, 344 F.3d at 643. Regardless of the precise
mechanics of Brown’s arrest, the bottom line is that multiple officers were involved in her arrest
and subsequent transport to custody. The MSP Defendants offer no reason that the involvement
of multiple officers—an everyday occurrence in arrests across the country—would prevent or
excuse them from complying with their Riverside obligations. The presence of a witness to the
alleged crime during an arrest is similarly common and of no moment. The MSP Defendants
therefore violated Brown’s right to receive a prompt determination of probable cause.
5
The cases the MSP Defendants cite to support their desired rule both analyzed conceptually distinct Fourth
Amendment claims that used their own particularized standards. See Butler v. City of Detroit, 936 F.3d 410, 418
(6th Cir. 2019) (“In the context of a Fourth Amendment claim that a police officer lied in a search warrant, we have
distilled a specific inquiry.”); Caminata v. County of Wexford, 664 F. App’x 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2016) (intentional or
reckless action is a “necessary element of both” Fourth Amendment claims of “fabrication of evidence and
malicious prosecution”).
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 15
2. Whether Brown’s Rights Were Clearly Established
A constitutional right is clearly established when, “at the time of the officer’s conduct,
the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Existing law must put the “constitutionality of the
officer’s conduct ‘beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
The Supreme Court has “stressed that courts must not ‘define clearly established law at a high
level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted
reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.’” Id. at 590 (quoting Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)). That said, a “plaintiff need not always put forth ‘a case
directly on point’” to show that her rights “were indeed clearly established at the time of the
conduct.” Shumate v. City of Adrian, 44 F.4th 427, 449 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rivas-Villegas
v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2021) (per curiam)). A“[p]laintiff need not show that ‘the very
action in question has previously been held unlawful, but . . . in light of pre-existing law, the
unlawfulness [of the official action] must be apparent.’” Id. at 449-50 (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (second alteration in Shumate).
The parties focus their attention on four relevant cases: Cherrington v. Skeeter, 344 F.3d
631 (6th Cir. 2003) (denied qualified immunity); Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372 (6th Cir.
2009) (same); Rayfield v. City of Grand Rapids, 768 F. App’x 495 (6th Cir. 2019) (granted
qualified immunity); and Roberson v. Wynkoop, No. 21-1240, 2021 WL 5190902 (6th Cir. 2021)
(per curiam) (same). We summarize each.
Cherrington was arrested in Ohio early on a Saturday morning in the late summer of 1996
and was not arraigned until the following Tuesday. 344 F.3d at 635. She was arrested without a
warrant and was not provided with a probable cause hearing for over 72 hours while detained.
Id. at 642-43. The defendant officers argued that their failure to present Cherrington for a
probable cause determination should be excused because her arrest occurred over the Labor Day
holiday weekend and because she was cooperating in an undercover investigation in the days
following her arrest, which would have been jeopardized by a probable cause hearing. Id. at 643.
We held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity given Riverside, which put
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 16
officers on notice of defendants’ Fourth Amendment right to a probable-cause hearing within 48
hours, and which “expressly caution[ed]” that intervening weekends and holidays did not qualify
as “extraordinary circumstances” “permit[ting] relief” from that requirement. Id. at 643-44.
Next, in 2004, officers randomly searched Drogosch’s Michigan home, recovering a
firearm. 557 F.3d at 375. He was on probation at the time but was not disqualified from owning
a firearm under the terms of his probation order. Id. Drogosch tried to explain the situation to
the officers, but they arrested him anyway. Id. at 376. When Drogosch was brought to jail, the
arresting officer completed a parole detainer form, not a probation detainer form, even though he
was aware that detained parolees were not entitled to an immediate hearing, while detained
probationers were. Id. Drogosch was then imprisoned for more than 48 hours (in fact, for over a
week) without a probable cause hearing. Id. at 376-77. The arresting officer argued that he “had
no legal obligation to physically bring Drogosch before a judge for a probation-violation
hearing,” and that he had done what was required of him by bringing Drogosch to jail, filling out
the paperwork, and contacting Drogosch’s probation officer. Id. Here, too, we held that the
officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 380. Under Michigan law, he failed to
fulfill his duty to ensure Drogosch received a probable cause hearing—and even if he was not
“technically” responsible for bringing Drogosch before a judge, it was his decision to use an
inapplicable detainer form that was “the root cause” of the constitutional violation. Id. at 378-79.
Furthermore, Riverside preceded Drogosch’s arrest by over a decade and “would have alerted a
reasonable official” to his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable hearing.6 Id. at 379.
Then, in 2014, Rayfield was arrested in Michigan after a domestic dispute with his
neighbor. 768 F. App’x at 499. At some point after his arrest, Rayfield was transferred from the
City of Grand Rapids Police Department to the County of Kent pursuant to an agreement
between the City and the County that the County would house people arrested by the Grand
Rapids Police Department. Id. In total, Rayfield was detained for more than 48 hours without a
6
We also discussed the objective reasonableness of the officer’s actions, finding that his “act of
imprisoning Drogosch involved nothing like split-second decisionmaking” and that he had “plenty of time to ponder
the decision of whether to lodge Drogosch in the jail using the incorrect detainer form.” Id. at 379-80. The officer
“would have known that Drogosch was not in violation of his probation and was not even a felon if he had bothered
to look at the probation paperwork that Drogosch tried to show him before the arrest.” Id. at 380.
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 17
probable cause hearing; it is unclear how much time he spent in the City’s custody as opposed to
the County’s. Id.; see id. at 508-09. We found that it was “admittedly arguable that when [the
Grand Rapids defendants] transferred custody of Rayfield to the County facility, they should
have alerted the County officials regarding the length of time that they had previously detained
Rayfield, to ensure that Rayfield was not detained for a total of more than 48 hours before a
hearing.” Id. at 508-09. We nevertheless affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the
arresting officers’ motions to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity. Id. at 508-10. We
reasoned that, even if the officers had violated Rayfield’s constitutional rights by detaining him
for more than 48 hours without a probable cause hearing, Cherrington had not addressed “the
factually and legally distinct situation presented by Rayfield’s case, namely when two
municipalities, both of which have authority to process a detainee, jointly manage the custody of
a pre-hearing detainee.” Id. at 509-10. Although we could “plausibly conceive of a situation in
which City and County officials would violate a detainee’s rights under County of Riverside by
failing adequately to inform the other municipal authority regarding the status of the individual’s
detention,” it was not clearly established that any failure by the officers to do so had violated
Rayfield’s constitutional rights. Id. at 510.
Finally, in 2016, Roberson was arrested at his Michigan residence by MSP troopers after
a domestic dispute. 2021 WL 5190902, at *1. The arresting officer completed the incident
report and paperwork requesting an arrest warrant over 24 hours after Roberson was arrested;
once the report and warrant packet were submitted, the situation was “out of [the officer’s]
hands.” Id. The prosecutor processed the paperwork quickly, but the judicial officer did not
hold the probable cause determination until the next morning, more than 48 hours after Roberson
was arrested. Id. We found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because, even if
he had violated Roberson’s constitutional rights, “Riverside and its progeny [did] not clearly
establish that an officer in [the trooper’s] position [was] liable in particularized circumstances
like these.” Id. at *2. MSP “troopers rely on other agencies and actors in the criminal justice
system to ensure that arrestees receive their probable cause determination” because the MSP
does not own or operate its own jails, and it was not objectively unreasonable for the arresting
officer “to expect the process to occur in a timely manner as it normally does” given that he had
completed the requisite paperwork. Id. at *3.
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 18
The MSP Defendants argue that Rayfield and Roberson (which both granted qualified
immunity) demonstrate that their conduct was lawful, and that neither Cherrington nor Drogosch
(which both denied qualified immunity) is sufficiently particularized to put them on notice that
their actions were unlawful. We disagree on both points.
Rayfield and Roberson are distinguishable, as well as non-binding. In Rayfield, the issue
was a lack of communication between two municipalities jointly managing a person’s pretrial
detention: Rayfield was in Grand Rapids custody for some time, then transferred to the County
of Kent’s custody without notification to the County officials of how much time he had spent in
City custody. See 768 F. App’x at 508-10. Here, the problem is not the MSP Defendants’ and
Genesee County’s communication (and, in fact, it seems that Genesee County did flag Brown’s
ongoing detention to MSP employees). There is no evidence that the MSP Defendants took any
steps at all to facilitate a timely probable cause hearing for Brown.7 Roberson is distinguishable
for that same reason. The arresting officer there completed the necessary paperwork to secure
Roberson a probable cause hearing. 2021 WL 5190902, at *1.
Cherrington established in 2003 that officers are assumed to be aware of an individual’s
right to a probable cause determination within 48 hours. Cherrington, 344 F.3d at 644. And
Drogosch confirmed almost a decade before Brown was arrested that, in Michigan, arresting
officers have an obligation to try to secure a probable cause hearing for the person they arrest,
including by filing appropriate paperwork. Drogosch, 557 F.3d at 379-80; see also Cherrington,
244 F.3d at 644. It was therefore clearly established at the time of Brown’s arrest that her
arresting officers had a duty to take her before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing. The
MSP Defendants made no efforts to do so, and they are not entitled to qualified immunity on
Brown’s Riverside claim.
7
The MSP Defendants’ reliance on Rayfield is troubling for another reason: the MSP does not own or
operate its own jails, so it must coordinate with municipalities to house detainees on its behalf. Under the MSP
Defendants’ theory, the agency could always be entitled to qualified immunity for Riverside claims because MSP
arrests and pretrial detentions necessarily involve multiple municipalities and agencies.
No. 22-1973 Brown v. Knapp, et al. Page 19
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment as to Brown’s
Riverside claim and REVERSE the district court’s judgment as to Brown’s false arrest claim.
We REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.