United States v. Paul Tasain Thomas ( 2024 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 24a0170n.06
No. 23-1706
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Apr 18, 2024
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
)
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
PAUL TASAIN THOMAS, )
) OPINION
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
Before: MOORE, NALBANDIAN, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Paul Thomas pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of
firearms. At sentencing, he asked for a noncustodial term, identifying his troubled childhood as
the root of his criminal history, which he argued was overstated. The district court considered
Thomas’s mitigation arguments and determined that a below-guidelines sentence of 60 months
comported with the relevant sentencing factors. Thomas argues that it should have been lower. But
he does not demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion, so we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As the district court acknowledged, Paul Thomas struggled through a trauma-filled
childhood. Both of his parents physically abused him, and his father went to prison for sexually
abusing Thomas’s sister and female cousin. Thomas began using drugs and alcohol at a young age,
resulting in his severe substance abuse problems.
No. 23-1706, United States v. Thomas
Unfortunately, Thomas’s encounters with the criminal justice system also began when he
was just a child and continued into his adulthood. Prior to the crime at issue in this case, he had
four previous felony convictions, stemming from multiple instances of domestic violence, a
physical incident with a police officer, and use of stolen checks. Most recently, Thomas served
prison time for his third impaired driving offense. After serving that sentence, Thomas seemingly
turned a corner. He began his own roofing company and employed several members of the
community. Between 2015 and early 2022, he avoided any further convictions.
That changed in February 2022, when Thomas was caught selling stolen firearms. On
February 11, Thomas told a government informant that he had firearms for sale and showed that
person a stolen Taurus 9-millimeter pistol. Three days later, Thomas met with the informant and
sold him a stolen Ruger .40 caliber pistol. Also on February 14, Thomas met with the informant
again and sold the same Taurus 9-millimeter pistol he’d shown the informant three days earlier.
On February 22, Thomas sold the informant yet another Taurus 9-millimeter pistol. That same
month, Thomas drove on a suspended license and harassed workers at a gas station that he
frequented.
Thomas pleaded guilty to three counts of possessing a firearm as a prohibited person in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court calculated the Guidelines range as 63 to 78
months. Thomas did not dispute the Guidelines calculation, but he requested a sentence of
probation. Through counsel, he submitted a sentencing memorandum, which the district court
complimented as being “very extensive” and “well-written.” R. 39, PageID 306, 307. He attached
16 exhibits, including eight letters of support, medical records documenting his mental health
struggles, two articles on childhood trauma, and a chart labeled “Noncustodial Sentences for
People Convicted of Possessing Firearms as a Felon.”
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No. 23-1706, United States v. Thomas
In arguing for a noncustodial sentence, Thomas emphasized that his criminal history was
overstated. As an initial matter, Thomas argued that the criminal history points he accrued before
age 25 should not count in calculating his criminal history category because his brain had not fully
matured. Thomas further contended that points from his purportedly non-dangerous convictions
should not count either. He portrayed his firearm offenses as “uncharacteristic.” Additionally,
because Thomas sobered up while on pretrial release, he asked the court to discount his convictions
that occurred while he was using drugs. Thomas’s reconstruction of his criminal history score, if
accepted, would have put him in criminal history category III (instead of VI) and resulted in a
Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months.
Moreover, Thomas asked the court not to apply the stolen firearm enhancement and the
enhancement for conduct involving at least three firearms. Without those enhancements, Thomas’s
offense level would have decreased to 15 (from 19), resulting in a Guidelines range of 24 to 30
months. Thomas’s proposal, if accepted, would have made his request for a probationary
downward variance appear less dramatic.
The district court was not persuaded by Thomas’s arguments for a drastic departure or
variance from the advisory Guidelines range. It varied downward slightly, imposing a sentence of
60 months. Thomas timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Thomas attacks his sentence as both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The
parties agree that Thomas preserved his procedural reasonableness challenge. And Thomas did not
have to object to preserve his substantive reasonableness challenge. See United States v. Vonner,
516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Accordingly, we review both aspects of Thomas’s
appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
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I. Procedural Reasonableness
Thomas claims that the district court summarily rejected his request for a downward
departure based on an overstated criminal history without sufficiently considering his mitigating
evidence. But the sentencing transcript shows that the court reviewed all of Thomas’s mitigation
evidence and adequately explained the sentence, including its reasons for accounting for his entire
criminal history.
In our review, we examine whether the sentencing transcript shows that the court “listened
to each argument, considered the supporting evidence, was fully aware of the defendant’s
circumstances and took them into account in sentencing him.” United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d
794, 804 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387). A district court does not have to “give
the reasons for rejecting any and all arguments by the parties for alternative sentences,” but it must
generally explain its basis for rejecting the defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a lower
sentence. Id. (quoting Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387).
Thomas argues that the district court dismissed his mitigating evidence, including his
childhood trauma, work history, and rehabilitative efforts. But the transcript reveals the opposite.
The first thing the court addressed in its sentencing monologue was Thomas’s background, most
notably his “challenging upbringing.” Sent’g Tr., R. 39, PageID 322. The court went on to credit
Thomas for his positive adjustment to pretrial supervision and excellent work history. And the
court later acknowledged Thomas’s “glowing” letters of support and potential to be a productive
member of society. Id., PageID 327. The court did not, as Thomas claims, “disregard [his]
voluntary participation in treatment for seven months.” Appellant Br., App. R. 11, at 31. To the
contrary, the court acknowledged that Thomas had “done great” on pretrial supervision but in the
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past had “reverted back to drinking and substance abuse”—which “clouded” his mind and led him
to criminal behavior, including the offenses in this case. Sent’g Tr., R. 39, PageID 324–26.
The transcript also reveals the district court’s reasons for rejecting Thomas’s argument that
this mitigation warranted a drastic departure or variance from the Guidelines range. Thomas’s
criminal history was impossible for the court to overlook. To start, the court specifically rejected
the defense’s notion that Thomas’s impaired driving convictions weren’t dangerous, commenting
“it’s a wonder that you didn’t have any accidents or harm or injure someone when you were
drinking and driving.” Id., PageID 323. The court went on to say that Thomas had “multiple
opportunities” to “do the right thing.” Id. In particular, the court faulted Thomas for illegally selling
guns after his prior prison sentence. The seriousness of the offenses played a large role in the
district court’s foreclosing a probationary sentence. Thomas’s conduct would have created a
danger to the community if the guns he sold had fallen into the wrong hands. Cf. United States v.
Jeter, 721 F.3d 746, 757–58 (6th Cir. 2013). Ultimately, the court made clear that Thomas’s
mitigating evidence did not outweigh these aggravating factors. Sent’g Tr., R. 39, PageID 328.
Thomas’s remaining counterarguments are also unavailing. First, Thomas seizes on the
district court’s comment that it “didn’t get to all the articles that were submitted” to argue that it
did not adequately consider his departure request and ignored his mitigation evidence. Id., PageID
306. In context, however, the court’s comment showed a subject-matter familiarity with Thomas’s
articles about childhood trauma, substance abuse, and brain development. In fact, referencing the
articles, the court said, “I’ve seen most of them before.” Id. And the court rejected Thomas’s
probation request with a clear understanding of the relationship between the articles and his
argument. After summarizing Thomas’s background, the court acknowledged that “a lot of it is
very mitigating.” Id., PageID 325. The district court’s explanations reflect an understanding of the
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impact of Thomas’s troubled childhood, brain development, and substance abuse and their
relationship to his mitigation argument. See United States v. McAllister, 491 F. App’x 569, 572
(6th Cir. 2012). Moreover, Thomas also acknowledges that the court studied the individualized
support letters that he submitted. In short, the district court considered Thomas’s mitigation
arguments—including the subject matter of the articles he attached to his sentencing
memorandum—in exercising its sentencing discretion. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
356 (2007).
Second, Thomas argues that the district court failed to address his arguments that the stolen
firearm and multiple guns enhancements shouldn’t apply to his sentence. But nothing in the record
shows that the court needed to elaborate further on its decision to include those enhancements in
Thomas’s advisory Guidelines range calculation. As a factual matter, Thomas’s offense conduct
involved at least three firearms, two of which were stolen. Thomas did not formally object to the
portions of the presentence report stating as much, so the district court was entitled to rely on those
facts as true. See United States v. Geerken, 506 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Stovall, 337 F.3d 570, 574 (6th Cir. 2003).
Lastly, Thomas’s legal arguments against the enhancements fail. Thomas claims the
government did not prove he knew the firearms were stolen, so the corresponding enhancement
cannot apply. But we have never held that the government must satisfy such a knowledge
requirement for this enhancement. United States v. Gibson, 817 F. App’x 202, 205 (6th Cir. 2020)
(collecting cases). Additionally, Thomas never presented evidence that he didn’t know two of the
guns he sold to the informant were stolen. See Geerken, 506 F.3d at 467. Against that backdrop,
Thomas’s argument against the stolen firearm enhancement fails. See id.
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No. 23-1706, United States v. Thomas
Thomas further argues that the number-of-guns enhancement together with the firearm-
trafficking enhancement amounts to impermissible double counting based on the same conduct. A
district court may properly impose two sentencing enhancements for the same conduct if each
enhancement punishes distinct aspects of that conduct. United States v. Hitch, 58 F.4th 262, 264–
65 (6th Cir. 2023). In Thomas’s case, the number-of-guns enhancement punishes Thomas for his
own unlawful possession of more than three firearms, while the firearm-trafficking enhancement
punishes Thomas for unlawfully selling those guns to someone else. U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(1)(A),
(b)(5). There was no double counting, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
applied both enhancements.
II. Substantive Reasonableness
In his substantive unreasonableness challenge, Thomas reiterates his arguments that the
district court failed to give sufficient weight to his mitigating circumstances and gave undue weight
to his criminal history.
A defendant may show substantive unreasonableness if the district court selected the
sentence arbitrarily, considered impermissible factors, failed to consider relevant factors, or gave
an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor. United States v. Mahbub, 818 F.3d 213,
232 (6th Cir. 2016). A defendant challenging a below-guidelines sentence as substantively
unreasonable faces a heavy burden. United States v. Greco, 734 F.3d 441, 450 (6th Cir. 2013).
Thomas’s substantive-reasonableness challenge amounts to a repackaging of his failed
procedural-reasonableness arguments. Thomas disagrees with the district court’s sentence, but
after reviewing the record, we cannot say that the district court gave unreasonable weight to
Thomas’s criminal history or failed to consider any relevant factor. See United States v. Jackson,
466 F.3d 537, 540 (6th Cir. 2006). The court concluded that, even with the mitigation, a 60-month
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sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary for Thomas’s federal firearm offenses after
he was undeterred by his prior prison term. There was no abuse of discretion in the court’s
weighing of the applicable sentencing factors.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s 60-month sentence.
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