Najiy-Ullah Aziyz v. Cameca, Inc. ( 2022 )


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  •                               NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted January 18, 2022 *
    Decided February 7, 2022
    Before
    DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
    MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
    THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
    No. 21-2550
    NAJIY-ULLAH AZIYZ,                                      Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                               Court for the Western District of
    Wisconsin.
    v.                                              No. 3:20-cv-00896-wmc
    CAMECA, INC., et al.,                                   William M. Conley,
    Defendants-Appellees.                               Judge.
    ORDER
    Plaintiff Najiy-Ullah Aziyz sued Cameca, Inc. for briefly rescinding its offer of
    employment. A week after Aziyz accepted a job offer at Cameca, he was told that,
    because of a previous felony conviction, the job offer was being rescinded. The next
    day, however, Cameca contacted him again to explain that the rescission had been a
    *
    We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately
    present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R.
    App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    No. 21-2550                                                                        Page 2
    mistake and that the job was still his. Despite Cameca’s assurances, Aziyz alleges, he
    still had doubts. On the day of his orientation, he sent an email saying he would not
    work for Cameca. He later filed this suit alleging race and age discrimination and a
    violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. The district court
    dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. We affirm. Even taking Aziyz’s factual
    allegations at face value, he has failed to allege that Cameca took any adverse
    employment action against him.
    Aziyz is African American and over the age of 40. He interviewed with Cameca
    and accepted a job offer conditioned on an acceptable background report. The next
    week, after receiving the report from a third-party vendor called HireRight, Cameca
    told Aziyz that he was cleared to begin work. The company asked him to complete tax
    forms and established his start date. Because the position called for remote work,
    Cameca planned to send a laptop computer and cell phone to Aziyz.
    The background report revealed no issues, but Cameca human resources
    manager Anne Stroud noticed inconsistencies in the report regarding Aziyz’s
    graduation date, age, and work history. Her observations prompted Cameca to perform
    an additional internet search for more information about Aziyz, which revealed that he
    had been convicted of a felony nearly thirty years earlier. Stroud called Aziyz and
    explained that his would-be supervisor had been informed of his conviction and that,
    because of the conviction, his job offer was being rescinded.
    The next day, however, Stroud called back to tell Aziyz that she had been
    mistaken and that the position was still his. Steven Turnbull, Cameca’s vice president of
    human resources, also called Aziyz to apologize. Turnbull followed up with an email to
    Aziyz reaffirming Cameca’s offer of employment and confirming Aziyz’s start date. The
    next day, Aziyz emailed Turnbull expressing reservations about starting the job. Aziyz
    asked how Cameca could ensure that he would not be unfairly targeted and if he could
    have a different supervisor or work in a different department. Turnbull replied that
    Cameca was committed to treating him fairly and that its decision to hire him should
    assure him of that. Aziyz did not respond further that day.
    The next day, on Cameca’s planned start date for Aziyz, Turnbull again emailed
    Aziyz to ask if he intended to start work. Aziyz replied that he did not and that he
    would not work for Cameca. He explained that he feared retaliation and did not believe
    the job offer was in “good faith.” Aziyz had not yet received from Cameca the laptop
    computer and phone. Cameca later hired someone who was younger and not African
    American for the position.
    No. 21-2550                                                                                        Page 3
    Aziyz sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age
    Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. According to
    Aziyz, Cameca’s policy of considering job candidates’ criminal convictions has a
    racially disparate impact on African American applicants. He reasoned that African
    Americans are incarcerated at a higher rate than whites, so searches were more likely to
    uncover prior convictions that disqualify them as candidates. He also asserted that
    Cameca’s decision to hire a younger candidate after Aziyz turned down the job
    amounted to age discrimination. He also alleged that Cameca’s failure to disclose the
    HireRight background report before rescinding the job offer violated the Fair Credit
    Reporting Act. Aziyz also raised several state-law claims. Cameca moved to dismiss
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
    The district court granted the motion to dismiss the discrimination claims,
    finding that Aziyz had failed to plead adequately an adverse employment action. Aziyz
    admitted that he rejected the job offer after repeated assurances from Cameca that the
    job was his. The court also dismissed Aziyz’s claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
    again finding that he had not alleged any adverse action stemming from the
    background report. With no federal claims left, the district court declined to exercise
    jurisdiction over the state law claims. Aziyz appeals only the dismissal of his federal
    claims.
    Aziyz argues that he alleged a sufficient connection between Cameca’s practice
    of investigating and considering old criminal convictions and a disparate impact on
    African American job applicants. Ayziz’s discrimination claims fail because his
    allegations show that he did not suffer an adverse employment action, which is an
    essential element of his race- and age-discrimination claims. See Boss v. Castro, 
    816 F.3d 910
    , 917 (7th Cir. 2016) (Title VII race discrimination); Barton v. Zimmer, Inc., 
    662 F.3d 448
    , 453 (7th Cir. 2011) (ADEA). 1
    Aziyz insists that Cameca had no intention of following through on its job offer
    after discovering his criminal conviction. But speculative future adverse action is not
    adverse action. See Nagle v. Village of Calumet Park, 
    554 F.3d 1106
    , 1121 (7th Cir. 2009)
    (affirming summary judgment for employers; suspension that was never served did not
    amount to adverse action); Ajayi v. Aramark Business Services, Inc., 
    336 F.3d 520
    , 531 (7th
    1
    We do not mean to suggest that a plaintiff must plead the elements of an employment
    discrimination claim. See generally Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., — F.4th —, —, No. 21-1616, 
    2022 WL 168260
     (Jan. 19, 2021) (discussing pleading requirements). But in this unusual case, Aziyz has pleaded
    himself out of court. His own allegations show that he suffered no adverse employment action.
    No. 21-2550                                                                                           Page 4
    Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment for employer in relevant part; announced plan
    to demote plaintiff was never carried out: “An unfulfilled threat, which results in no
    material harm, is not materially adverse.”). Aziyz’s own allegations show that he did
    not confirm his willingness to start work but instead rejected Cameca’s job offer on the
    morning his orientation was to begin.
    Aziyz’s rejection of the job offer also defeats any argument that Cameca’s failure
    to send the laptop and phone showed that it did not intend to follow through on the job
    offer. Moreover, in his email rejecting the job offer, Aziyz did not identify the lack of a
    laptop computer or phone as a basis for his refusal to start work, nor did he allege that
    he ever told Cameca during the numerous conversations leading up to his orientation
    that he had not received them.
    Aziyz’s rejection of the job offer also dooms his age-discrimination claim. To
    state a claim of age discrimination under a failure-to-hire theory, Aziyz must assert that
    he was passed over in favor of a similarly situated younger applicant. See Sembos v.
    Philips Components, 
    376 F.3d 696
    , 700 (7th Cir. 2004). Aziyz admits, though, that Cameca
    persisted in its job offer, and he rejected it. Accordingly, Cameca’s later hiring of a
    younger applicant to fill the position Aziyz turned down cannot rescue this claim. 2
    Finally, Aziyz argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim under
    the Fair Credit Reporting Act because HireRight’s report caused Cameca to revoke,
    temporarily, his job offer. Under the Act, an employer must, before taking any adverse
    action against a job applicant based on a consumer report, provide a copy of it to the
    applicant. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A); see Robertson v. Allied Solutions, LLC, 
    902 F.3d 690
    ,
    695–96 (7th Cir. 2018). Cameca does not dispute that HireRight’s background report
    qualifies as such a report or that Aziyz was entitled to receive a copy of the report if it
    caused an adverse action. But the district court correctly reasoned that the temporary
    rescission of the offer does not satisfy the Act’s definition of “adverse action,” which
    requires “a denial of employment” or a “decision for employment purposes that
    adversely affects any … prospective employee.” § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(ii). Cameca did not
    deny Aziyz employment or otherwise make an employment decision that harmed him.
    2
    Cameca argues on appeal that the absence of an alleged adverse employment action means that
    Aziyz lacks constitutional standing, citing dicta in Melendez v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 
    79 F.3d 661
    , 668
    (7th Cir. 1996). Melendez, however, affirmed a jury verdict for an age-discrimination plaintiff and did not
    blur the line between jurisdiction and merits. More generally, our cases treat adverse action as an element
    of a plaintiff’s claim on the merits rather than as a separate jurisdictional issue. We agree with the district
    court that Aziyz’s claims fail on the merits, not for lack of jurisdiction.
    No. 21-2550                                                                    Page 5
    We also agree with the district court that even if there had been a conceivable harm
    under the Act, it would have stemmed from the independent investigation and not, as
    is required, from HireRight’s report. Aziyz alleges in his amended complaint that the
    background report did not reveal his criminal conviction. The basis of Cameca’s
    temporary rescission was the company’s additional, independent internet investigation,
    not the report itself.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-2550

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/7/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/7/2022