United States v. Collins, Jeffrey , 503 F.3d 616 ( 2007 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 07-1532
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    JEFFREY COLLINS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division
    No. 87-CR-105—Larry J. McKinney, Chief Judge.
    ____________
    SUBMITTEDŒ AUGUST 15, 2007—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 25, 2007
    ____________
    Before COFFEY, EVANS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges
    PER CURIAM. Five years after Jeffrey Collins’s plea
    agreement and conviction, the government asked the
    district court to find him in breach of the agreement. In
    this appeal we review whether the district court had
    jurisdiction to do this, and if so, whether the district
    court’s finding of breach was clearly erroneous. We hold
    that the district court had jurisdiction, and that its find-
    ing was not clearly erroneous.
    Œ
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have
    concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the
    appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP.
    P. 34(a)(2).
    2                                              No. 07-1532
    Collins was indicted in 1987 as a leader of a ten-year
    drug operation that smuggled at least 140,000 pounds of
    marijuana into the United States, creating millions of
    dollars in proceeds for Collins. He also set up a series of
    front corporations, which he used to perform fraudulent
    transactions in order to hide the source and movement
    of his drug money. Collins escaped from custody one
    month after the 1987 indictment and remained a fugitive
    until his arrest in 1997. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to a
    Continuing Criminal Enterprise, 
    21 U.S.C. § 848
    , and in
    1999 he additionally pleaded guilty to money laundering,
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (a)(1), and escape, 
    18 U.S.C. § 751
    (a). The
    district court sentenced him to a total of 23 years’ impris-
    onment.
    The plea agreement that Collins made with the govern-
    ment obligated him to disclose his interests in any assets
    that stemmed from his drug transactions, to aid the
    government in the recovery of those assets, to forfeit all
    those assets and interests to the United States, and not
    to contest any action initiated by the government for
    that purpose. In particular Collins agreed to identify and
    assist in the forfeiture of millions of dollars that he held
    through various corporate entities in accounts in the
    Principality of Liechtenstein. In return, the government
    committed to set aside a significant portion of the recov-
    ered funds in trust for Collins’s wife and children. The
    parties also agreed that if the government believed Collins
    was in breach, it would ask the district court to deter-
    mine whether there was a breach before taking any
    “unilateral” action.
    As the government began to pursue these funds in
    Liechtenstein, it sent a letter to Collins’s attorneys stat-
    ing that its resources for this pursuit were limited and
    that Collins “was free” to use his own funds to assist in
    recovering the money. Collins instead retained counsel in
    Liechtenstein to oppose the government’s recovery efforts.
    No. 07-1532                                                 3
    He also testified in the Liechtenstein proceedings that he
    was never a drug dealer and that the money in that
    country’s accounts was legally earned and not subject to
    forfeiture. Additionally, he unsuccessfully attempted to
    have the district court here prohibit the U.S. government
    from documenting to the Liechtenstein courts Collins’s
    crimes and illicit sources of his money. Several years of
    legal proceedings ensued in Liechtenstein, culminating
    in the Liechtenstein court ultimately returning the money
    to Collins after ruling that it was not the product of illegal
    transactions.
    In response to Collins’s efforts to block the forfeiture of
    these funds, in 2005 the government asked the district
    court in Collins’s criminal case to find that Collins had
    breached his plea agreement. The government also re-
    quested that the court issue a preliminary order of forfei-
    ture of Collins’s assets in Liechtenstein and relieve the
    government of its obligations under the plea agreement.
    After considering Collins’s actions recounted above, the
    district court found that Collins had breached the plea
    agreement and awarded the government the relief it
    had requested. But then the court sua sponte amended
    its order, limiting it to a factual finding of breach alone.
    Collins appeals this order.
    We briefly address the issue of appellate jurisdiction.
    The district court’s order is unusual in that it found a
    breach but did not award relief. Nonetheless, the order
    affects legal relationship between the parties, and the
    court made clear after issuing its finding that it was
    finished with the case. Thus, we have appellate jurisdic-
    tion. See United States v. Ettrick Wood Prod., 
    916 F.2d 1211
    , 1216 (7th Cir. 1990); see generally Chase Manhattan
    Mortgage Corp. v. Moore, 
    446 F.3d 725
     (7th Cir. 2006)
    (similar circumstance in the civil context).
    Collins first argues that the district court did not have
    jurisdiction to consider the government’s motion because
    4                                               No. 07-1532
    the motion came five years after the entry of judgment
    and because the court never ordered the forfeiture of his
    assets at sentencing. As to timing, a court always has
    jurisdiction to enforce a defendant’s obligations under a
    plea agreement unless the government too has breached,
    a position that Collins has not developed on appeal. See
    United States v. Kelly, 
    337 F.3d 897
    , 901 (7th Cir. 2003)
    (recognizing defendant’s breach of plea agreement); United
    States v. Sowemimo, 
    335 F.3d 567
    , 570-72 (7th Cir. 2003)
    (same); United States v. Frazier, 
    213 F.3d 409
    , 419 (7th
    Cir. 2000) (same). Though courts have not explicitly
    stated the source of this jurisdiction, we note that it is
    secured by 
    28 U.S.C. § 1345
    , which provides to the federal
    district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions,
    suits or proceedings commenced by the United States.” The
    motion in this case was a proceeding initiated by the
    government to enforce its rights under the plea agree-
    ment. This brings its actions within the ambit of § 1345.
    Contrary to Collins’s arguments, it does not matter how
    many years have passed since the district court issued
    judgment because under § 1345 all that matters for
    purposes of jurisdiction is that the government initiated
    the proceeding. Likewise, Collins’s argument that the
    district court lacked jurisdiction because it never ordered
    a forfeiture of his assets at sentencing is unavailing. The
    government need not specifically seek to enforce an order
    of forfeiture to satisfy the conditions for jurisdiction under
    § 1345; the statute covers all government-initiated pro-
    ceedings.
    We turn, therefore, to Collins’s argument that the
    district court erred in finding that he was in breach of his
    plea agreement. Analogizing to the enforcement of civil
    settlement agreements, the government suggests that we
    review the court’s finding for abuse of discretion. But
    because the court made only a factual finding of breach
    and awarded no relief, we think this factual determination,
    No. 07-1532                                               5
    like factual determinations in general, should be reviewed
    for clear error. See, e.g., Winkler v. Gates, 
    481 F.3d 977
    ,
    882 (7th Cir. 2007). There was no clear error here. In
    exchange for his plea, reduced sentence, and the permitted
    family trust fund, Collins agreed to recover and forfeit the
    funds in Liechtenstein to the government. But instead he
    aggressively prevented the forfeiture. The only evidence
    Collins identifies in support of his argument that he did
    not breach is the letter sent from the government to his
    counsel. He offers this letter without any context to aid in
    its interpretation. Nowhere in the letter does the govern-
    ment tell him that he could contest the recovery of the
    funds and keep them himself without breaching his plea
    agreement. Consequently he has not shown that the
    district court’s finding of breach was a clear error.
    Collins’s final argument is moot. He argues that the
    government was not permitted to seek a preliminary order
    of forfeiture in the district court because it had not
    sought such an order at sentencing. But the district
    court’s final order did not award such relief.
    AFFIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—9-25-07