Jose J. Loera, Jr. v. United States , 714 F.3d 1025 ( 2013 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 11-3223
    JOSE J. L OERA, JR.,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
    No. 2:10-cv-00453-PPS—Philip P. Simon, Chief Judge.
    A RGUED JANUARY 15, 2013—D ECIDED M AY 7, 2013
    Before P OSNER, W OOD , and T INDER, Circuit Judges.
    P OSNER, Circuit Judge. The petitioner, Jose Loera, asks
    us to set aside his conviction on the ground that his trial
    lawyer had been ineffective. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . Loera
    had been indicted back in 2005 on drug charges. In re-
    sponse to a motion to suppress, the judge had forbid-
    den the government to offer evidence of what the peti-
    tioner had told DEA agents after he allegedly asked for
    a lawyer. After repeated continuances the judge dis-
    2                                              No. 11-3223
    missed the indictment (though without prejudice), on
    the ground that the delay resulting from the continu-
    ances had violated the Speedy Trial Act, 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3161
    et seq. Loera was reindicted and again sought to sup-
    press his statements to the agents. But this time the
    judge—the same judge—denied the motion on the
    ground that actually Loera had not told the DEA agents
    he wanted a lawyer. So the statements were admitted
    into evidence. The jury convicted Loera and the judge
    sentenced him to 240 months in prison. We affirmed
    the conviction and sentence. 
    565 F.3d 406
     (7th Cir. 2009).
    Loera faults his lawyer first for having failed to argue
    to the district judge that the denial of the motion to sup-
    press in the first round of the criminal proceeding
    should be binding in the second round—the trial—by
    virtue of the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and second
    for having failed to argue in that first round that the
    delay in the proceeding had violated not only the
    Speedy Trial Act but also the speedy trial clause of the
    Sixth Amendment; if so, the dismissal of that pro-
    ceeding should have been with prejudice, Strunk v.
    United States, 
    412 U.S. 434
    , 439-40 (1973); 3B Charles
    Alan Wright & Peter J. Henning, Federal Practice & Proce-
    dure § 803, p. 358 (4th ed. 2013), in which event Loera
    could not be tried subsequently for the same offense.
    Loera had been a passenger in a car that police
    officers stopped because of traffic violations. The driver
    consented to a search of the car and the police
    searched and found cocaine in a hidden compartment.
    Arrested, and questioned by DEA agents in an interview
    No. 11-3223                                            3
    room at the county jail, Loera told them he knew
    nothing about the cocaine; he had simply been asked to
    deliver the car to someone. He also said that he’d been
    visiting family in Atlanta and that the driver of the car
    had driven down and picked him up there. When
    the agents told him he would remain in jail and would
    probably be charged with cocaine trafficking in violation
    of federal law, he said, according to one of the agents,
    that he wanted “to help himself out if he can” by making
    a controlled delivery of the car to assist the agents
    in apprehending the intended recipient of the drugs.
    The agent added: “he just continued to ask what can
    I do to help myself out of the situation.”
    Loera was indicted. His lawyer moved to suppress
    the statements that he had made to the agents. They had
    read him his Miranda rights and he had refused to sign
    a waiver of them. The motion alleged that he had asked
    for a lawyer but that the agents had not stopped ques-
    tioning him. When the government told the judge, in
    response to the motion to suppress, that it “was not
    concerned with the statements,” the judge without
    further ado suppressed “any statements [Loera] made
    after his request for counsel.” But he did not suppress
    all of Loera’s post-arrest statements, as the motion had
    requested. Nor did he rule that Loera had actually
    asked for a lawyer—in light of the government’s lack
    of interest in the statements he had no need to decide
    whether Loera had a legal right to their suppression.
    It’s like when a party moves in limine to exclude some
    piece of evidence and the other party replies that it
    4                                              No. 11-3223
    has no objection and so the judge grants the motion
    without bothering to resolve the factual disputes that
    would have arisen had the party that offered the evi-
    dence objected.
    Months passed without the case going to trial, owing
    to repeated requests for continuances—which the judge
    granted—made by the government, by Loera’s lawyer,
    and by the lawyer for Loera’s co-defendant. In Novem-
    ber 2006—19 months after the indictment had been
    issued—Loera moved to dismiss it on the ground of
    excessive delay, citing constitutional and statutory
    grounds for dismissal. But in support of the motion his
    lawyer argued only the statutory ground.
    The following month the judge granted the motion
    and dismissed the indictment without prejudice, a permis-
    sible sanction for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3162
    (a)(2); Zedner v. United States, 
    547 U.S. 489
    ,
    499 (2006); United States v. Sykes, 
    614 F.3d 303
    , 309-10
    (7th Cir. 2010). Two months later Loera was reindicted.
    The case went to trial two months after that.
    In the resumed proceeding the lawyer again filed a
    motion to suppress all the statements his client had
    made to the DEA agents after his arrest. The judge con-
    ducted an evidentiary hearing. A DEA agent who had
    questioned Loera testified that Loera had not asked for
    a lawyer or sought to stop the questioning. Loera
    testified to the contrary. The judge decided that the
    agent was telling the truth and so ruled that Loera
    had never asked for a lawyer and so the statements
    should not be suppressed. The judge thus ruled on the
    No. 11-3223                                             5
    merits of the motion; for Loera’s lawyer had failed to
    argue that the motion to suppress should be granted
    regardless of its merit, by force of the doctrine of
    collateral estoppel.
    It is doubtful that the refusal to suppress the post-
    arrest statements to the DEA agents, if it was an error,
    was a harmful one. On the one hand the other evidence
    of Loera’s guilt was powerful. The jury heard testi-
    mony from the informant who had linked Loera to
    the drug ring and had told the agents where and when
    he would be traveling. And during the traffic stop Loera
    and the driver had made inconsistent statements about
    the purpose of their trip and Loera had been unable to
    tell the police where his relatives in Atlanta lived,
    even approximately and even though he said he’d been
    staying with them. And on the other hand the state-
    ments he made to the DEA agents, rather than
    amounting to a confession, were consistent with his
    position at trial; for he had denied to the agents knowing
    there was cocaine in the car. It’s true that his offer to
    “help himself out” by making a controlled delivery
    of the cocaine suggested, at the least, a suspicious fam-
    iliarity with the drug scene. But since he didn’t testify
    at the trial, his denial to the DEA agents that he’d
    known there was cocaine in the car at least got before
    the jury a denial of guilt by the defendant. And even if
    he was mixed up in some way in the illegal
    drug scene, that didn’t mean he was involved in drug
    dealing when the car in which he was a passenger
    was pulled over.
    6                                               No. 11-3223
    But we needn’t rely on the doctrine of harmless error
    in concluding that the admission of the statements is not
    a basis for reversing Loera’s conviction.
    The doctrine of collateral estoppel, an offshoot of res
    judicata, teaches that a judge’s ruling on an issue of law
    or fact in one proceeding binds in a subsequent pro-
    ceeding the party against whom the judge had ruled,
    provided that the ruling could have been (or was, but
    unsuccessfully) challenged on appeal, or if not that at
    least it was solid, reliable, and final rather than “intended
    to be tentative.” Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil
    Refinery Co., 
    297 F.2d 80
    , 89 (2d Cir. 1961). And provided
    also that the ruling was necessary to the validity of the
    final judgment in the case, as otherwise there would be
    little incentive to challenge it on appeal, and that it had
    been made only after the party later complaining about
    it had had an opportunity for a full and fair hearing
    (not necessarily oral, however). Taylor v. Sturgell, 
    553 U.S. 880
    , 892 (2008); Dexia Crédit Local v. Rogan, 
    629 F.3d 612
    , 628-29 (7th Cir. 2010); Harris Trust & Savings Bank
    v. Ellis, 
    810 F.2d 700
    , 705 (7th Cir. 1987); Restatement
    (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982).
    The government rightly acknowledges the doctrine’s
    applicability to criminal cases. Ashe v. Swenson, 
    397 U.S. 436
    , 443 (1970); United States v. Oppenheimer, 
    242 U.S. 85
    ,
    87 (1916); United States v. Salerno, 
    108 F.3d 730
    , 741 (7th
    Cir. 1997); United States v. Harvey, 
    900 F.2d 1253
    , 1257
    (8th Cir. 1990). So applied, it operates much like the
    rule against double jeopardy—and indeed has been held
    to be a component of the constitutional protection
    No. 11-3223                                                 7
    against double jeopardy. Dowling v. United States, 
    493 U.S. 342
    , 347 (1990); Ashe v. Swenson, 
    supra,
     
    397 U.S. at
    445-
    46. But it is also a common law principle: “res judicata
    [including collateral estoppel] is very much a common
    law subject.” 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller
    & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4403,
    p. 35 (2d ed. 2002) (footnote omitted). Criminal law is
    suffused with such principles. Think of attempt, conspir-
    acy, aiding and abetting, malice aforethought, reckless-
    ness, entrapment, self-defense, and duress—all being
    common law principles (often renamed) adapted to
    fleshing out terse criminal statutes. Cf. Dixon v. United
    States, 
    548 U.S. 1
    , 13-14 (2006); Morissette v. United States,
    
    342 U.S. 246
    , 250-52 (1952). And so collateral estoppel is
    applicable in a criminal proceeding without reference to
    the double jeopardy clause, though of course in a federal
    prosecution the applicable version of collateral estoppel
    is the federal. See Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
    Corp., 
    531 U.S. 497
    , 507 (2001); Note, “The Due Process
    Roots of Criminal Collateral Estoppel,” 
    109 Harv. L. Rev. 1729
    , 1742 (1996).
    The significance for this case of the distinction
    between common law collateral estoppel and collateral
    estoppel as a component of the double jeopardy clause
    is that Loera can invoke the common law doctrine
    even though the dismissal of the first indictment—the
    order that he says precluded revisiting in the second
    criminal proceeding the admissibility of his post-arrest
    statements—occurred before jeopardy attached. Jeopardy
    doesn’t attach until the jury is sworn or, in a bench
    trial, evidence is introduced. But jeopardy is not a condi-
    tion of collateral estoppel.
    8                                               No. 11-3223
    Still, there must be a final judgment (in some
    sense—a critical qualification, as we’re about to see); and
    it can be argued that the dismissal of the first indictment,
    following the ruling suppressing Loera’s statements,
    wasn’t really a final judgment. It was without prejudice,
    so that the trial following his re-indictment was really
    just the continuation of the aborted first proceeding. But
    Judge Friendly had pointed out the paradoxical effects
    of being picky about the finality of the judgment sought
    to be used as collateral estoppel. See United States ex rel.
    DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 
    528 F.2d 1262
    , 1265-66 (2d Cir. 1975).
    Imagine successive criminal proceedings against the
    same person involving different crimes but a common
    issue dependent on the same evidence of guilt. In the
    first proceeding the judge rules at trial that the evidence
    should be suppressed, and as a result the defendant
    is acquitted. Although the trial ruling would not be
    appealable (nor of course the acquittal), assume that
    the ruling is rock solid and therefore, though unap-
    pealable, entitled to collateral estoppel effect. Now
    suppose the same scenario but the judge makes the
    ruling pretrial, and rather than appeal the ruling, as it
    could, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3731
    , the government, doubtful in
    light of the ruling that it can win a conviction without
    the evidence that the judge has suppressed, withdraws
    the charges it had lodged against the defendant and
    later files a new indictment, hoping for a favorable
    ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress the
    evidence in this second round of litigation. The dif-
    ference in the stage of the proceeding at which the
    judge ruled shouldn’t affect whether the issue can be
    No. 11-3223                                               9
    revisited in the second proceeding. For these purposes,
    then, the dismissal of the first indictment should be
    treated as if it were a final judgment and the evidentiary
    ruling that the judge made in that first proceeding
    should be given collateral estoppel effect.
    Nevertheless the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not
    applicable in this case, and so Loera’s lawyer can’t be
    faulted for not having invoked it. Not every ruling has
    collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent proceeding in
    which the issue resolved by the ruling pops up again.
    Considering the number of rulings that a judge is apt
    to make in a case, whether civil or criminal, we worry
    that to give every ruling collateral estoppel effect would
    make the doctrine proliferate excessively. As in this
    case, many trial rulings are made casually, with little
    attention to the merits of the issue ruled on and in this
    case probably no attention, since the nonmoving party
    had not opposed the motion that precipitated the ruling.
    The government had not opposed the motion not
    because it conceded that the agents had elicited state-
    ments from the defendant after he asked for a lawyer,
    but rather, so far as appears, because it wasn’t (at the
    time) interested in using the statements at trial. So natu-
    rally the judge granted the motion. That was a judicial
    action, but it was not the resolution of a dispute (namely
    over whether Loera had asked for a lawyer before an-
    swering the agents’ questions). See United States v. Bruce,
    
    109 F.3d 323
    , 327 (7th Cir. 1997); Truck Ins. Exchange v.
    Ashland Oil, Inc., 
    951 F.2d 787
    , 792-93 (7th Cir. 1992). And
    finally the grant of the motion to suppress had played
    10                                                No. 11-3223
    no role in the dismissal of the first indictment. The
    only ground for that dismissal had been violation of
    the Speedy Trial Act, a ground to which the motion
    was irrelevant.
    Let collateral estoppel be applicable to a case such as
    this and the government will have an enhanced incentive
    to take an interlocutory appeal from pretrial evidentiary
    rulings in criminal cases, as it is permitted to do, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3731
    , but rarely does. Interlocutory appeals are
    a burden to appellate courts and delay the finality of
    litigation; they are not to be encouraged.
    For completeness we mention a doctrine related to
    collateral estoppel though the parties have not men-
    tioned it: the doctrine of law of the case. Even if a ruling
    is not made after opportunity for a full and fair hearing,
    it is not to be lightly ignored in a later stage of the
    same proceeding, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
    Corp., 
    486 U.S. 800
    , 817 (1988); Tice v. American Airlines,
    
    373 F.3d 851
    , 853-54 (7th Cir. 2004)—and “same proceed-
    ing” is the practical description of a proceeding and of
    its resumption following a dismissal without prejudice
    before the same judge and involving the identical issues
    and evidence. The reason we gave earlier for treating
    the interim dismissal as “final” for collateral estoppel
    purposes—that the stage at which a ruling is made is
    not decisive on whether to give the ruling collateral
    estoppel effect—is not applicable to law of the case.
    But still the judge has to have addressed an issue for
    his resolution of it to be treated as the law of the case.
    FMS, Inc. v. Volvo Construction Equipment North America,
    Inc., 
    557 F.3d 758
    , 762-63 (7th Cir. 2009); Universal Guarantee
    No. 11-3223                                                11
    Life Ins. Co. v. Coughlin, 
    481 F.3d 458
    , 462 (7th Cir.
    2007); Feesers, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., 
    591 F.3d 191
    , 208
    (3d Cir. 2010); 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller
    & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478,
    pp. 649-64 (3d ed. 2005). And, as we have said, the judge
    in this case in granting the motion to suppress in the
    first proceeding had not decided whether the state-
    ments should have been suppressed.
    So there was no procedural violation relating to the
    statements, and we turn to the second issue, concerning
    the failure of Loera’s lawyer to have argued that his
    client’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had been
    violated, in which event Loera could not have been tried.
    Like much of the Bill of Rights, the speedy trial clause
    is cryptic. All it says is that a criminal defendant has a
    right to a speedy trial. The critical question is how
    “speedy.” To give some form to the question courts
    focus on four considerations. They are the length of the
    delay between indictment and trial, the reason for it,
    whether the defendant complained about it, and whether
    he was “prejudiced” by it. Doggett v. United States, 
    505 U.S. 647
    , 651 (1992); United States v. Wanigasinghe, 
    545 F.3d 595
    , 597 (7th Cir. 2008). “Prejudice” in turn can be
    a lesser chance of an acquittal, the indignity and
    discomfort of being jailed for a long period of time await-
    ing trial, or the psychological or financial consequences
    of finding oneself stuck between indictment and trial in
    a limbo of anxiety and uncertainty. The first of these
    three prejudice subfactors is the most important, Barker v.
    Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 532-33 (1972); West v. Symdon, 689
    12                                               No. 11-
    3223 F.3d 749
    , 752-53 (7th Cir. 2012), because it protects against
    the conviction of the innocent. The other two factors
    are really just aspects of the length of delay, and thus
    underscore the primacy of that, the first, factor in the four-
    factor test. But realism requires recognition that given
    the government’s heavy burden of proof in criminal
    cases, delay in bringing a case to trial often works in
    the defendant’s favor: if both prosecution and defense
    witnesses, or a fortiori only prosecution witnesses,
    suffer from fading memories, delay will reduce the like-
    lihood of a conviction.
    As we noted recently in Teed v. Thomas & Betts
    Power Solutions, L.L.C., No. 12-2440, 
    2013 WL 1197861
    , at *3
    (7th Cir. Mar. 26, 2013), “judges tend to be partial to
    multifactor tests, which they believe discipline judicial
    decisionmaking, providing objectivity and predictability.
    But this depends on whether the factors making up
    the test are clear, whether they are valid, whether each
    is weighted so that the test can be applied objectively even
    if the factors don’t all line up on one side of the issue in
    every case . . ., and whether the factors are exhaustive
    or illustrative—if the latter, the test is open-ended,
    hence indefinite.” A model multifactor test—one not
    subject to the criticisms suggested in the Teed case—is
    Judge Learned Hand’s famous three-factor test (the
    “Hand Formula”) for negligence: B < PL. B is the burden
    of taking a precaution that would have avoided the
    accident that injured the plaintiff, P is the probability of
    the accident if the precaution wasn’t taken, and L is
    the expected loss to the victim if an accident occurred
    No. 11-3223                                              13
    because the precaution had not been taken. United States
    v. Carroll Towing Co., 
    159 F.2d 169
    , 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
    Alas, the four-factor test (six-factor, if the fourth is
    replaced by its three subfactors) for a violation of the
    constitutional right to a speedy trial lacks the crispness
    of the Hand Formula. But a usable compressed version
    is “the longer the delay and the more vigorous the de-
    fendant’s demand to be tried speedily, the more reason
    the state must show for the delay and the less harm (of
    whatever type) to himself the defendant need show.”
    United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Fairman, 
    750 F.2d 806
    , 808
    (7th Cir. 1984). The 19-month delay after Loera’s first
    indictment was long, but there is no indication that
    it impaired his defense at trial—no suggestion that evi-
    dence favorable to his defense had become stale. As
    for psychological or other harm from incarceration, the
    relevant period is not 19 but 9 months, because Loera
    was out on bond for 10 of those months; and 9 months
    is not an unusual period of pretrial detention.
    He didn’t complain about the delay, moreover, and
    there is no indication that he was impatient for a trial—not
    all defendants are, as we noted, and especially when
    they’re not in jail. Seven months of the 19-month delay
    were attributable to requests for continuances by Loera’s
    lawyer or his co-defendant’s lawyer. Loera’s lawyer
    objected to none of the government’s requests for con-
    tinuances (and to none of the co-defendant’s requests
    for continuances either) until he moved to dismiss
    the indictment. Loera doesn’t argue that his lawyer ren-
    dered him ineffective assistance in asking for or failing
    to object to continuances.
    14                                             No. 11-3223
    With no prejudice from delay within the meaning
    given “prejudice” by Doggett and other cases (no preju-
    dice in part because of the defendant’s acquiescence
    in the delay, see Doggett v. United States, supra, 
    505 U.S. at 658
    ), and no indication of any invidious or otherwise
    improper ground of or motive for protracted detention,
    there is no justification for vacating a conviction on con-
    stitutional speedy trial grounds, which has the effect of
    acquittal. The Speedy Trial Act, it is true, imposes
    much tighter (though still porous) deadlines. But it
    offsets them by allowing the judge to impose for their
    violation only the mild sanction of dismissal without
    prejudice, thus permitting retrial. Given the availability
    of the Act, there shouldn’t be many cases in which
    federal defendants successfully invoke the speedy trial
    clause. The constitutional clause plays a greater role
    in state prosecutions, to which the Act is inapplicable.
    Loera has not shown that his lawyer was ineffective.
    The denial of his section 2255 motion is therefore
    A FFIRMED.
    5-7-13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-3223

Citation Numbers: 714 F.3d 1025, 2013 WL 1876227, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9214

Judges: Posner, Wood, Tinder

Filed Date: 5/7/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (26)

United States v. Oppenheimer , 37 S. Ct. 68 ( 1916 )

Strunk v. United States , 93 S. Ct. 2260 ( 1973 )

Universal Guaranty Life Insurance Company v. William N. ... , 481 F.3d 458 ( 2007 )

United States v. James William Bruce and Murray A. ... , 109 F.3d 323 ( 1997 )

Ashe v. Swenson , 90 S. Ct. 1189 ( 1970 )

Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 121 S. Ct. 1021 ( 2001 )

Robert H. Tice v. American Airlines, Inc. , 373 F.3d 851 ( 2004 )

United States v. Carroll Towing Co. , 159 F.2d 169 ( 1947 )

Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan , 629 F.3d 612 ( 2010 )

harris-trust-and-savings-bank-as-of-the-estate-of-mary-ellis , 810 F.2d 700 ( 1987 )

United States of America Ex Rel. Leo Anthony Digiangiemo v. ... , 528 F.2d 1262 ( 1975 )

United States of America Ex Rel. Francis A. Mitchell v. ... , 750 F.2d 806 ( 1984 )

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Ashland Oil, Incorporated , 951 F.2d 787 ( 1992 )

FMS, Inc. v. Volvo Construction Equipment North America, ... , 557 F.3d 758 ( 2009 )

Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. , 108 S. Ct. 2166 ( 1988 )

Taylor v. Sturgell , 128 S. Ct. 2161 ( 2008 )

Dowling v. United States , 110 S. Ct. 668 ( 1990 )

Barker v. Wingo , 92 S. Ct. 2182 ( 1972 )

Doggett v. United States , 112 S. Ct. 2686 ( 1992 )

United States v. Wanigasinghe , 545 F.3d 595 ( 2008 )

View All Authorities »