Jerome Davis v. Bob Humphreys , 747 F.3d 497 ( 2014 )

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                                       In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No.  13-‐‑1326
JEROME  T.  DAVIS,
Petitioner-‐‑Appellant,
v.
BOB   HUMPHREYS,   Warden,  Kettle  Moraine  Correctional  Insti-‐‑
tution,
Respondent-‐‑Appellee.
____________________
Appeal  from  the  United  States  District  Court
for  the  Eastern  District  of  Wisconsin.
No.  12-‐‑CV-‐‑680  —  Patricia  J.  Gorence,  Magistrate  Judge.
____________________
ARGUED  MARCH  5,  2014  —  DECIDED  APRIL  1,  2014
____________________
Before   EASTERBROOK,   MANION,   and   HAMILTON,   Circuit
Judges.
EASTERBROOK,   Circuit   Judge.   In   Joseph   Heller’s   Catch-‐‑22,
Yossarian   wants   to   stop   serving   as   a   bombardier   during
World   War   II.   Insanity   is   a   reason   for   being   grounded,   and
Yossarian  tries  to  convince  Doc  Daneeka  that  he  is  insane—
but   to   ask   proves   sanity,   because   an   insane   person   would
want  to  fly  more  missions.  Catch-‐‑22.  Jerome  Davis,  who  is  in
2                                                                 No.  13-‐‑1326
prison  following  a  guilty  plea,  wants  federal  collateral  relief
but   did   not   seek   it   until   the   year   allowed   by

28 U.S.C. §2244

(d)   had   expired.   Equitable   tolling   can   allow   a   belated
application.   Holland   v.   Florida,

560 U.S. 631

(2010). Demon-‐‑
strating entitlement to tolling requires a motion, which Da-‐‑
vis made. He maintains that his mental limitations excuse
untimely filing. A magistrate judge found, however, that an-‐‑
yone able to make such a motion has shown mental compe-‐‑
tence and disqualified himself from tolling. Catch-‐‑22.
The federal judiciary should avoid using Catch-‐‑22. For all
this record shows, Davis could make a motion only because
someone else drafted and mailed it for him. No one doubts
that, if the “someone else” were a lawyer who accepted the
case after the year had passed, then the lawyer’s skills would
not be imputed to Davis and prevent application of a tolling
doctrine. That the “someone else” was a fellow prisoner—as
Davis, now represented by counsel, maintains—should not
make a difference. Tolling depends on the competence of the
prisoner or an agent engaged before the year is up; an agent
of any kind retained after the time has run does not retroac-‐‑
tively prevent tolling. So the ground of the district court’s
decision is untenable.
This conclusion does not itself make the application time-‐‑
ly. We must ask three more questions: First, is mental in-‐‑
competence ever enough to justify equitable tolling of the
time provided by §2244(d)? Second, if the answer is yes, how
incompetent is incompetent enough? Third, does Davis’s
mental condition meet that standard?
At least three circuits have held that mental incompe-‐‑
tence can satisfy the standard for tolling established in Hol-‐‑
land. See Ata v. Scutt,

662 F.3d 736

,  742  (6th  Cir.  2011);  Bills  v.
No.  13-‐‑1326                                                                    3
Clark,

628 F.3d 1092

,   1097   (9th   Cir.   2010);   Riva   v.   Ficco,

615 F.3d 35

,   40   (1st   Cir.   2010).   Before   Holland,   several   other   cir-‐‑
cuits  had  reached  the  same  conclusion.  See,  e.g.,  Bolarinwa  v.
Williams,

593 F.3d 226

,   231   (2d   Cir.   2010);   Hunter   v.   Ferrell,

587 F.3d 1304

,  1309–10  (11th  Cir.  2009).  We  agree,  though  not
because  of  any  language  in  §2244(d)  or  the  rest  of  the  Anti-‐‑
terrorism  and  Effective  Death  Penalty  Act  of  1996  (AEDPA),
of  which  §2244(d)  is  a  part.  The  Supreme  Court  treats  tolling
as  one  of  those  background  understandings  in  American  law
that   applies   unless   a   statute   modifies   or   excludes   the   doc-‐‑
trine.  See  Lozano  v.  Montoya  Alvarez,  No.  12-‐‑820  (U.S.  Mar.  5,
2014),  slip  op.  7–8;  Young  v.  United  States,

535 U.S. 43

,  49–50
(2002).  This  is  as  true  of  details  as  it  is  of  whether  tolling  is
available   at   all.   Thus   we   inquire   whether   mental   incompe-‐‑
tence  supports  tolling  other  federal  statutes  of  limitations.
Although   the   Supreme   Court   has   never   addressed   that
question,   courts   of   appeals   regularly   hold   that   mental   in-‐‑
competence   justifies   the   tolling   of   federal   periods   of   limita-‐‑
tions.   Barett   v.   Principi,

363 F.3d 1316

,   1319–20   (Fed.   Cir.
2004),  collects  decisions  from  most  circuits.  Our  own  leading
decision   is   Miller   v.   Runyon,

77 F.3d 189

   (7th   Cir.   1996),
which  dealt  with  tolling  the  periods  for  federal  employment-‐‑
discrimination   statutes.   That   there   seem   to   be   more   recent
decisions  concerning  mental  incompetence  and  tolling  under
the  AEDPA  than  under  all  other  federal  statutes  put  together
may  reflect  the  fact  that  outside  prison  an  incompetent  per-‐‑
son  often  has  a  guardian,  who  must  adhere  to  statutory  time
limits.  Mentally  incompetent  persons  in  prison,  by  contrast,
usually  do  not  have  the  benefit  of  a  guardian  who  attends  to
their   legal   problems—nor   are   prisoners   who   want   to   seek
collateral   relief   automatically   entitled   to   appointed   counsel.
Davis  did  not  have  a  lawyer  until  this  court  issued  a  certifi-‐‑
4                                                                    No.  13-‐‑1326
cate   of   appealability,   see

28 U.S.C. §2253

(c),   and   appointed
counsel   for   him   under   the   Criminal   Justice   Act,   18   U.S.C.
§3006A(a)(2)(B).  The  likelihood  that  mentally  marginal  pris-‐‑
oners  will  lack  the  assistance  of  guardians  or  lawyers  means
that,   for   them,   it   is   especially   important   to   follow   the   norm
under  which  incompetence  permits  tolling.
What   sort   of   mental   limitations   justify   tolling?   Davis
wants   us   to   hold   that   anyone   whose   shortcomings   play   a
causal   role   in   a   delayed   filing   is   entitled   to   tolling.   If   that
were  the  law,  however,  then  almost  everyone  who  failed  to
meet   a   statutory   deadline   would   be   entitled   to   tolling,   and
statutes   of   limitations   would   be   eviscerated.   Most   people
who   file   too   late   do   so   because   they   don’t   realize   that   they
have   potentially   sound   legal   claims   or   do   not   know   what
deadline   applies   to   those   claims.   Many   persons   of   normal
intellect   are   unable   to   cope   with   the   legal   system.   Yet   deci-‐‑
sions  such  as  United  States  v.  Kubrick,

444 U.S. 111

  (1979),  re-‐‑
ject  arguments  that  to  explain  an  untimely  filing  by  reference
to   the   plaintiff’s   limited   knowledge   or   ability   is   to   excuse   it.
Kubrick  argued  that  he  did  not  know  that  he  had  a  valuable
legal  claim  until  a  physician  told  him  so;  the  Supreme  Court
held  that  this  did  not  justify  an  untimely  suit.  Similarly,  it  is
established  that  prisoners’  shortcomings  of  knowledge  about
the   AEDPA   or   the   law   of   criminal   procedure   in   general   do
not  support  tolling.  See,  e.g.,  Owens  v.  Boyd,

235 F.3d 356

,  359
(7th   Cir.   2000);   Taylor   v.   Michael,

724 F.3d 806

,   811–12   (7th
Cir.   2013).   If   a   deficit   of   legal   or   medical   knowledge   that
causes   an   untimely   filing   does   not   justify   tolling,   then   why
should  a  general  inability  to  cope  with  matters  legal?  Some-‐‑
thing  more  than  but-‐‑for  causation  is  essential.
No.  13-‐‑1326                                                                   5
One  candidate  for  the  “something  more”  in  criminal  law
is  inability  to  understand  the  charges  and  assist  in  one’s  own
defense.   A   person   whose   mental   limitations   disable   him   to
this   extent   can’t   be   tried—though   a   person   who   can   under-‐‑
stand   the   charges   and   assist   counsel   also   can   take   other
steps,   including   waiving   counsel   and   pleading   guilty.   See
Godinez   v.   Moran,

509 U.S. 389

   (1993).   Davis   must   have   had
at   least   this   much   ability   in   years   past,   because   the   state
court  permitted  him  to  plead  guilty.  He  has  never  contended
that  allowing  him  to  enter  a  guilty  plea  violated  the  Consti-‐‑
tution.   (His   argument   in   this   proceeding   is   that   his   lawyer
let   him   down   by   not   showing   up   at   a   plea-‐‑bargaining   ses-‐‑
sion,  leaving  him  to  negotiate  unassisted.)
Another   potential   candidate   for   distinguishing   persons
who  are  entitled  to  tolling  from  other  prisoners  who  are  not
is  the  line  the  Supreme  Court  has  drawn  in  capital  litigation
between   those   who   can   understand   the   charges   and   pro-‐‑
ceedings   well   enough   to   be   executed,   and   those   who   can’t.
See   Atkins   v.   Virginia,

536 U.S. 304

(2002). The Supreme
Court may address this subject again in Hall v. Florida, No.
12-‐‑10882, which was argued on March 3, 2014. It is not clear
how this doctrine differs from one dealing with competence
to be tried (or plead guilty); Hall may say more about that.
Perhaps there are still other candidates for a way to de-‐‑
termine what sorts of mental disability excuse delay in filing
a collateral attack. The parties’ briefs on this appeal do not
cover that subject thoroughly enough for us to be confident
that we understand the range of possibilities—and if we
don’t know what options are available, we cannot choose
intelligently among them.
6 No. 13-‐‑1326
Davis contends that we need not choose, because he is so
limited mentally that he is entitled to tolling under any pos-‐‑
sible rule. A report prepared by Wisconsin’s prison system
in 2007 concludes that he has an IQ of 49, is illiterate and un-‐‑
educable, and cannot cope with any legal subject. Davis
wants us to take it as established that these conclusions are
correct—but if they are correct, then why did the state judici-‐‑
ary let him plead guilty? Perhaps he was feigning incompe-‐‑
tence during the tests but presented himself differently to
the judge. Or perhaps he has limited abstract intelligence but
greater concrete intelligence. We held in Young v. Walls,

311 F.3d 846

  (7th  Cir.  2002),  that  even  persons  with  serious  men-‐‑
tal   disabilities   may   have   enough   concrete   awareness   to   be
able   to   waive   constitutional   rights.   It   is   improper   to   leap
from   one   IQ   test   to   a   conclusion   that   a   particular   person   is
unable  to  understand  and  protect  his  own  legal  interests.
Because   this   case   must   be   remanded   so   that   the   district
court   can   take   evidence   and   determine   just   what   Davis’s
abilities   are,   we   refrain   from   articulating   a   legal   standard.
The  parties  should  brief  that  subject  in  the  district  court,  and
we  then  can  tackle  it  on  the  next  appeal  with  a  greater  likeli-‐‑
hood  of  reaching  a  sound  conclusion.
The   judgment   is   vacated,   and   the   case   is   remanded   for
further  proceedings  consistent  with  this  opinion.