United States v. Ignacio Torres , 807 F.3d 257 ( 2015 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 14-1538
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    IGNACIO TORRES,
    Defendant.
    APPEAL OF: IGNACIO TORRES, SR. and
    NOEMI LORENZANA
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 1:11-CR-604-1 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED APRIL 9, 2015 — DECEMBER 2, 2015
    ____________________
    Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Ignacio Torres was indicted for
    possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of co-
    caine. He was released on bond, and his parents secured the
    bond with a house they owned. Torres violated a condition
    2                                                    No. 14-1538
    of his release, and the district court revoked his bond. At the
    bond revocation hearing, the district court judge stated that
    Torres should surrender “today.” Torres and his attorney
    left the courtroom and went into the hallway. Torres’s coun-
    sel reentered the courtroom to clarify exactly when Torres
    needed to surrender. When Torres’s counsel returned to the
    hallway, Torres was gone. Efforts to return Torres to custody
    have not been successful. As a result, the district court de-
    clared the bond forfeited. So Torres’s parents lost their
    house. Because it was not unreasonable for the district court
    to find that justice required bond forfeiture with Torres still
    at large, we affirm the district court’s order of default judg-
    ment on the forfeiture agreement.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On October 6, 2011, Ignacio Torres (“Torres”) was indict-
    ed for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more
    of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Torres was
    released on February 23, 2012, on a $200,000 bond secured
    by real property owned by his parents, Noemi Lorenzana
    and Ignacio Torres, Sr. (“Sureties”).
    In connection with the bond, Sureties signed a forfeiture
    agreement. Sureties agreed that “$200,000 of their equitable
    interest in [their] … real property may be forfeited to the
    United States of America, should … Torres fail to appear as
    required by the court or otherwise violate any condition of
    the [district court’s] order of release.” The district court’s or-
    der of release ordered “that the defendant be released on the
    condition that: [Torres] promises to appear in court as re-
    quired and surrender to serve any sentence imposed.” It also
    set forth the following additional conditions of release:
    No. 14-1538                                                         3
    [1] the defendant must not violate any federal, state or
    local law while on release.
    [2] the defendant is placed in the custody of Noemi Lo-
    renzana … who agrees (a) to supervise the defend-
    ant in accordance with all of the conditions of re-
    lease, (b) to use every effort to assure the defend-
    ant’s appearance at all scheduled court proceedings,:
    and (c) to notify the court immediately if the de-
    fendant violates any conditions of release or disap-
    pears;
    [3] the defendant must post with the court … [a] forfei-
    ture agreement and quick [sic] claim deed;
    [4] the defendant must avoid all contact, directly or indi-
    rectly, with any person who is or may become a vic-
    tim or potential witness in the investigation or prose-
    cution;
    [5] the defendant must refrain from use or unlawful pos-
    session of a narcotic drug or other controlled sub-
    stance. Any testing may be used with random fre-
    quency ….
    The conditions also required Torres to wear an electronic
    ankle monitor, although, at Torres’s request, the court later
    removed this condition.
    Torres pleaded guilty on June 27, 2013, but the district
    court continued the issue of acceptance of the plea so that
    Torres could remain out on bond until his sentencing. The
    same day, U.S. Pretrial Services Officer James Wheatley con-
    tacted Lorenzana to inform her that Torres tested positive
    for marijuana and cocaine. At no time did Sureties ask to
    cancel or withdraw from the bond.
    On November 11, 2013, the government filed an emer-
    gency motion to revoke bond after a witness in the case in-
    formed the government that he had contact with Torres. The
    4                                                         No. 14-1538
    next day, the district court held a hearing on the motion.
    Sureties claim they did not receive notice of this court pro-
    ceeding, though the government argues Sureties had to have
    known about the proceeding because Torres lived with Lo-
    renzana. The district court granted the government’s motion
    to detain Torres and revoked his bond. The district court in-
    formed Torres that surrender “should be today.” Torres, de-
    fense counsel, and a Pretrial Services Officer left the court-
    room together. Counsel and the Pretrial Services Officer re-
    entered the courtroom to get clarification on the exact time
    Torres had to surrender to the U.S. Marshals. By the time
    counsel and the Pretrial Services Officer left the courtroom,
    Torres was gone. The district court issued a bench warrant.
    Torres apparently remains at large.
    Two days after Torres fled, the government moved for a
    declaration of bond forfeiture. The government refiled the
    motion on December 10, 2013. Torres and Sureties filed their
    response on December 16, 2013, requesting that the court ex-
    onerate, i.e., release them from responsibility for, the bond
    and set aside the forfeiture. The district court set a hearing
    on the motion for February 18, 2014. On the date of the hear-
    ing, the district court entered an order granting the govern-
    ment’s motion and declaring forfeiture of the bond. It found
    that Torres:
    breached the condition of his pretrial release by: (1) using
    unlawful narcotic drugs in or around June 2013; (2) hav-
    ing contact with a potential witness against him on or
    about November 10, 2013; (3) by violating 18 U.S.C.
    § 1073, which prohibits flight to avoid custody or con-
    finement after conviction for a felony; and (4) by violating
    federal law by ignoring a court order to surrender to the
    U.S. Marshals on November 12, 2013.
    No. 14-1538                                                     5
    The district court also found that Sureties had notice of any
    material changes in the release conditions and did not object
    to any changes, received notice of court proceedings, and
    entered into a forfeiture agreement with the government.
    The district court refused Sureties’ request to set aside the
    forfeiture, finding the interests of justice did not justify such
    an action. On February 26, 2014, the district court entered an
    order of default judgment on the forfeiture agreement. Sure-
    ties, represented by the same counsel as Torres, now appeal.
    II. ANALYSIS
    Sureties argue that the district court erred by refusing to
    set aside the bond forfeiture because (1) bond was revoked
    before Torres’s flight, and (2) Sureties were not given notice
    of material changes in the conditions of Torres’s release. We
    review a decision denying a request to set aside bond forfei-
    ture for abuse of discretion. United States v. Santiago, 
    826 F.2d 499
    , 505 (7th Cir. 1987). “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs only
    when no reasonable person could take the view adopted by
    the trial court.” 
    Id. (citing Lynch
    v. City of Milwaukee, 
    747 F.2d 423
    , 426 (7th Cir. 1984)). Factual findings are reviewed for
    clear error. United States v. Baker, 
    227 F.3d 955
    , 967 (7th Cir.
    2000). Sureties bear the burden of proving that the forfeiture
    should be set aside. United States v. Foster, 
    417 F.2d 1254
    ,
    1256 (7th Cir. 1969).
    “The court must declare the bail forfeited if a condition of
    the bond is breached.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(f)(1). Neverthe-
    less, the court may set aside bail forfeiture if “the surety later
    surrenders into custody the person released on the surety’s
    appearance bond” or “it appears that justice does not require
    bail forfeiture.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(f)(2). Unless a district
    court exercises its discretion to set aside the bail forfeiture,
    6                                                   No. 14-1538
    the district court must enter a default judgment on the gov-
    ernment’s motion. Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(f)(3)(A). Once judg-
    ment is entered, the court also has the discretion to remit the
    judgment in whole or part. Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(f)(4).
    The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also describe
    when the district court must exonerate the surety and release
    the bond. “The court must exonerate the surety and release
    any bail when a bond condition has been satisfied or when
    the court has set aside or remitted the forfeiture. The court
    must exonerate a surety … who timely surrenders the de-
    fendant into custody.” 
    Id. at 46(g).
        A. Torres Was on Bond at Time of his Flight.
    Sureties argue that their property should not be forfeited
    because bond had been revoked before Torres’s flight. Sure-
    ties claim “[o]nce a bond is revoked, a surety’s obligation to
    ensure the continued good behavior of the individual re-
    leased from custody is at an end” because the contract be-
    tween Sureties and the government has terminated. In a
    footnote, the government responds to the crux of Torres’s
    argument by stating that “[b]ond conditions remain in effect
    until the defendant surrenders.” We agree with the govern-
    ment that revocation of a bond does not automatically ter-
    minate a surety’s liability.
    Although a bond proceeding occurs as part of a criminal
    case, it is collateral to the criminal case and civil in nature.
    See United States v. Santiago, 
    826 F.2d 499
    , 502 (7th Cir. 1987).
    A bond agreement is a civil contract between the govern-
    ment and the surety on behalf of a criminal defendant. 
    Id. The government
    and the surety agree that if the government
    releases the defendant from custody, “the surety will under-
    No. 14-1538                                                    7
    take that the [defendant] will appear personally at any speci-
    fied time and place to answer.” United States v. Davis, 
    202 F.2d 621
    , 625 (7th Cir. 1953). So, the purpose of the bond
    agreement and its forfeiture provisions are to ensure that the
    defendant will attend every required court appearance and
    submit to a sentence if found guilty. Stack v. Boyle, 
    342 U.S. 1
    ,
    4–5 (1951). In essence, the defendant is delivered to the cus-
    tody of the surety, whose responsibility is to ensure the de-
    fendant’s actions comply with the terms of his release. See
    Taylor v. Taintor, 
    83 U.S. 366
    , 371 (1872) (“When bail is given,
    the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his
    sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original im-
    prisonment.”). If the defendant fails to appear at the proper
    time and place or violates a condition of release, “the surety
    becomes the absolute debtor of the United States for” the
    bond amount. 
    Davis, 202 F.2d at 625
    .
    The Forfeiture Agreement executed by Sureties incorpo-
    rated the district court’s order outlining the conditions of re-
    lease. As a result, and in accordance with the common law
    principles of bail, Sureties agreed to ensure that Torres
    would “appear in court as required and surrender to serve
    any sentence imposed.“ They also agreed that if “Torres
    fail[ed] to appear as required by the Court or otherwise vio-
    late[d] any condition of the Court’s order of release,”
    “$200,000 of their equitable interest in the … real property,
    may be forfeited to the United States of America.”
    Sureties’ argument has some logical appeal. If the district
    court revoked bond, naturally, one could conclude that the
    action terminated any agreement in connection with the
    bond. This analysis would lead to a rule that when a district
    court orders the defendant to surrender, bond is terminated.
    8                                                  No. 14-1538
    However, this rule misses the point of the bond agreement.
    The government released Torres from custody to Sureties
    because Sureties assured the government that they would
    return Torres to custody. Since the purpose of the agreement
    was to ensure that Torres returned to custody, it follows that
    the bond would not end until Torres was back in custody.
    The district court’s revocation order merely compelled
    Torres to return to custody, as opposed to a voluntary sur-
    render or Sureties bringing him in. The revocation order did
    not end the bond. Rather, it set the procedure for how to re-
    turn Torres to custody.
    This conclusion is supported by the Federal Rules of
    Criminal Procedure. A court is not required to exonerate the
    surety until “a bond condition has been satisfied” or until a
    surety “timely surrenders the defendant into custody.” Fed.
    R. Crim. P. 46(g). The most relevant general bond condition
    was that Torres “promise[d] to appear in court as required
    and surrender to any sentence imposed.” This did not occur.
    Torres failed to appear in court and surrender himself as or-
    dered by the district court. Therefore, the bond condition
    was not satisfied, and it was still in effect. Further, Sureties
    did not surrender Torres to custody after the district court
    revoked the bond, so it was still in force. As a result, the
    court was not required to exonerate Sureties. The mere order
    of revocation does not terminate a bond. It is the defendant’s
    return to custody pursuant to that order that terminates the
    bond. See 
    id. Therefore, a
    surety’s liability does not cease un-
    til the defendant is taken into custody after a district court’s
    bond revocation order. And since Torres was still on bond,
    Sureties were liable when Torres fled.
    Of course, returning a defendant to custody is not the on-
    No. 14-1538                                                   9
    ly way a surety’s liability terminates. Rule 46(g) also requires
    a court to exonerate a surety and its bond: (1) when a bond
    condition has been satisfied, (2) when the court has set aside
    or remitted the forfeiture, or (3) when the surety deposits
    cash in the amount of the bond.
    Lastly, Sureties contend that United States v. Milhelm, 
    834 F.2d 118
    (7th Cir. 1987) and United States v. Castaldo, 
    636 F.2d 1169
    (9th Cir. 1980) compel a different result. But we find
    neither case helpful. In Milhelm, we held that an arrest war-
    rant without more does not terminate bail 
    obligations. 834 F.2d at 123
    . We explicitly avoided “the difficult issue of
    when bail obligations do terminate after a violation.” 
    Id. at 122–23.
       In Castaldo, the defendant appealed his conviction pursu-
    ant to the now-defunct bail jumping statute. Like Torres, Jo-
    seph Castaldo appeared at his bond revocation 
    hearing. 636 F.2d at 1170
    . At the beginning of the hearing, which took
    place on April 30, 1979, Castaldo asked for a continuance to
    substitute new counsel. The court denied the request, but
    continued the remainder of the hearing until the end of the
    court calendar. 
    Id. Castaldo failed
    to appear when the case
    was recalled. 
    Id. Unable to
    locate Castaldo, the court forfeit-
    ed the bail and issued an arrest warrant. 
    Id. The district
    court
    scheduled another hearing in the case for July 31, 1979, and
    Castaldo did not appear at the hearing. 
    Id. Castaldo was
    re-
    captured in October 1979 and indicted for having failed to
    appear at the July hearing. 
    Id. The Ninth
    Circuit held that a
    defendant who had been released on bail, whose bail had
    been forfeited, and who had an arrest warrant issued for his
    arrest cannot be convicted of bail jumping based on his fail-
    ure to appear at a hearing scheduled after the forfeiture of
    10                                                No. 14-1538
    bail. 
    Id. at 1171–72.
    Relevant to this case, the Ninth Circuit
    seems to find that because the bail had been forfeited,
    Castaldo was no longer released pursuant to bail. 
    Id. This makes
    sense. Forfeiture ended the bond agreement just as
    returning the defendant to custody would. See Fed. R. Crim.
    P. 46(g). Even under Castaldo, Sureties’ argument fails be-
    cause the district court here had not forfeited his bond at the
    time he fled. So, Torres was still “on bond.” In any event, be-
    cause the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether bond was
    still in effect after it had been forfeited, and our case deals
    with whether bond was in effect between revocation and for-
    feiture, Castaldo does not help Sureties.
    B. District Court Did Not Clearly Err by Finding Sure-
    ties Had Notice of All Material Changes in Release
    Conditions.
    Although Sureties state there were three material chang-
    es to the circumstances of defendant’s release—removal of
    electronic monitoring, Torres’s guilty plea, and bond revoca-
    tion—they only argue that they failed to receive notice of the
    bond revocation. They cannot claim lack of notice with re-
    spect to the other two material changes because the record
    contains evidence from which one can infer that they had
    notice. Sureties’ primary argument is that the bond revoca-
    tion was a material change in the conditions of Torres’s re-
    lease of which they should have had advanced notice be-
    cause “[i]mminent detention (as opposed to possible deten-
    tion at some indeterminate future point) obviously gives rise
    to a greater risk of flight.”
    We assume, without deciding, that bond revocation is a
    condition of release. But see United States v. DiCaro, 
    852 F.2d 259
    , 265 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that bond revocation is a
    No. 14-1538                                                    11
    sanction for violating condition of release). We hold, howev-
    er, that Sureties were not entitled to notice that the district
    court revoked the bond because it was not a material change
    in the bond that increased their risk. Therefore, Sureties’ po-
    sition is without merit.
    When a material change is proposed to a condition of
    bond, a surety is entitled to notice, an opportunity to be
    heard, and an opportunity to revoke his or her commitments
    if the judge alters the release conditions over the surety’s ob-
    jections. United States v. King, 
    349 F.3d 965
    , 966 (7th Cir.
    2003). Material changes “to a bond made without the con-
    sent or knowledge of the surety may render the obligation
    unenforceable.” 
    Id. (citing Reese
    v. United States, 
    76 U.S. 13
    , 21
    (1869)). A material change is a modification to the bond that
    “significantly augments the risk that the defendant will not
    appear when required.” 
    Id. at 967
    (citing United States v.
    Gambino, 
    17 F.3d 572
    (2d Cir. 1994)); see also State v. Ocampo-
    Navarro, 
    93 P.3d 745
    , 
    2004 WL 1609122
    at *4 (Kan. Ct. App.
    July 16, 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“A modification
    to a bond agreement is considered material when noncom-
    pliance with the new obligation could result in the revoca-
    tion of a defendant’s bond.”). The increased risk must be dif-
    ferent than the original risk the sureties assumed when post-
    ing bond for a defendant. 
    King, 349 F.3d at 968
    .
    This bond revocation is not a material change in the
    bond, so notice was not necessary. See 
    id. at 967.
    Sureties
    agreed to ensure Torres’s appearance as ordered by the dis-
    trict court until he surrendered to serve any sentence im-
    posed. That the bond might be revoked was a risk that Sure-
    ties undertook when they initially agreed to the bond. The
    scheduled hearing and even the revocation itself did not put
    12                                                No. 14-1538
    any new conditions on Torres. For these reasons, the revoca-
    tion of the bond was not a material modification that in-
    creased the Sureties risk and entitled them to notice.
    Also, we note that while Sureties argue that the risk of
    imminent detention created by the bond revocation was dif-
    ferent from the original risk Sureties assumed, Sureties had
    already agreed to assume the risk associated with imminent
    detention. Contrary to Sureties’ contentions, before the revo-
    cation hearing, Torres’s future detention was not a “possible
    detention at some indeterminate future point.” Torres
    pleaded guilty on June 27, 2013. The charge that Torres
    pleaded to carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five
    years’ imprisonment. The district court continued ac-
    ceptance of the plea to allow Torres to remain on bond until
    his sentencing. Sureties do not dispute their knowledge of
    his guilty plea, and they knew Torres would serve time.
    Again, they shoulder the burden of proving facts that sup-
    port their argument that the bond should not be forfeited.
    See 
    Foster, 417 F.2d at 1256
    . By continuing to guarantee the
    bond after Torres’s guilty plea, Sureties assumed the risk for
    Torres in light of imminent detention. The district court did
    not clearly err in finding the Sureties had notice of all mate-
    rial changes.
    To be clear, we do not hold that Sureties were not enti-
    tled to notice of the hearing. Indeed, a surety should be in-
    formed of any judicial proceedings that potentially affect his
    or her interests. See 
    King, 349 F.3d at 967
    . Here, the district
    court determined that Sureties had notice of the hearing.
    This finding was not clearly erroneous in light of the fact
    that Torres’s attorney, who was present at the hearing, rep-
    resented both Torres and Sureties. Torres, who also ap-
    No. 14-1538                                                    13
    peared at the hearing, lived with Lorenzana. There is no evi-
    dence on the record that Sureties did not receive notice of
    the hearing. Sureties carry the burden to establish this fact.
    See 
    Foster, 417 F.2d at 1256
    . Therefore, the court did not clear-
    ly error by finding that Sureties had notice of the hearing.
    C. District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Re-
    fusing to Set Aside the Bond Forfeiture.
    Because Torres was on bond when he fled, and because
    the district court did not err in finding that Sureties had no-
    tice of material changes, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion by refusing to set aside the bond forfeiture. The
    court may set aside a bail forfeiture if it appears that justice
    does not require bail forfeiture. Fed R. Crim. P. 46(f)(2)(B).
    “In most cases, the setting aside of a forfeiture … while the
    defendant is still at large would undermine the purpose of
    bail bonds, i.e., to insure the presence of the accused.” United
    States v. Gutierrez, 
    771 F.2d 1001
    , 1004 (7th Cir. 1985). Here,
    Torres is apparently still at large. So, in light of Torres’s con-
    tinued flight and the circumstances discussed above, it was
    not unreasonable for the district court to refuse to set aside
    bond forfeiture.
    Gutierrez outlines a six-factor test for district courts to
    consider when deciding whether to set aside a bond forfei-
    ture: “(1) the willfulness of defendant’s breach of conditions;
    (2) the participation of the sureties in apprehending the de-
    fendant; (3) the cost, inconvenience and prejudice suffered
    by the government as a result of the defendant’s breach; []
    (4) any explanation of mitigating factors presented by the
    defendant [or surety];” (5) whether the surety is a profes-
    sional bondsman or one of defendant’s friends or family
    members; and (6) the appropriateness of the amount of the
    14                                                 No. 14-1538
    bond. 
    Id. at 1003–04
    (internal citations omitted). The unique
    factors presented by this case do not easily align with the
    Gutierrez factors, so the district court’s failure to consider
    these factors is not unreasonable. The district court handled
    this tough case well. We sympathize with Sureties, but
    Torres’s continued flight weighs heavily in favor of forfei-
    ture and a finding that the district court did not err. Like us,
    the district court seemed sympathetic to Sureties, having
    suggested that forfeiture would not have been necessary if
    Torres were in custody at the time the district court entered
    the forfeiture judgment, which was three months after
    Torres fled. Nonetheless, district courts should fully consid-
    er the Gutierrez factors before ordering bond forfeiture. This
    will ensure that district courts balance the appropriate fac-
    tors in exercising its discretion and aid appellate review.
    We note that the district court’s failure to remand Torres
    to custody immediately does trouble us since Sureties were
    not present to object to continuing their obligation until the
    time and date of surrender set by the district court. This is-
    sue could have been avoided if Torres had been taken into
    custody at the conclusion of the hearing. We suggest that
    district courts consider requesting a representative from the
    U.S. Marshals Service to be present in the courtroom for
    bond revocation hearings, if resources permit. The situation
    here may have been avoided had someone been available to
    take Torres into custody at the time the district court re-
    voked the bond. While the lack of U.S. Marshal presence ar-
    guably led to Torres’s flight, Sureties cannot avoid their con-
    tractual duties because of it.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.