United States v. Phil Lamont Trent ( 2017 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 16-3960
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    PHIL LAMONT TRENT,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Central District of Illinois.
    No. 4:15-cr-40026-001 — Sara Darrow, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED MAY 19, 2017 — DECIDED JULY 13, 2017
    ____________________
    Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and KANNE, Cir-
    cuit Judges.
    KANNE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Phil Trent
    distributed heroin that killed Tyler Corzette. He was charged
    in a five-count indictment, which included two counts relat-
    ed to Corzette’s death.
    At trial, Trent objected to testimony of two of the gov-
    ernment’s witnesses: Kyle Hull and Curtis Land. Like Trent,
    2                                                   No. 16-3960
    these witnesses had also been charged with distribution of
    heroin resulting in Corzette’s death, but each pled guilty to
    that charge pursuant to a plea agreement.
    Trent sought to impeach Hull and Land based on their
    plea agreements. Specifically, he wanted to question them
    about the twenty-year mandatory minimum associated with
    the heroin-distribution-resulting-in-death charges. But be-
    cause Trent had also been charged with distribution result-
    ing in Corzette’s death, he faced the same twenty-year man-
    datory minimum if convicted.
    The district court noted that, if the jury became aware of
    the exact length of Hull’s and Land’s mandatory minimum, it
    would also know the minimum penalty that Trent would
    have to serve—which could improperly sway the jury’s deci-
    sion in Trent’s case. To avoid this situation, the court pre-
    vented Trent from asking Hull and Land about the mandato-
    ry minimum’s exact length but permitted him to describe the
    mandatory minimum as “substantial.”
    Trent now argues that this limitation violated his Sixth
    Amendment right to confrontation and was an abuse of dis-
    cretion. We disagree and hold that the court committed no
    error in its ruling.
    Trent also objected to the testimony of Illinois State Police
    Sergeant James Rieck, a government witness who had inves-
    tigated Trent while undercover. During that investigation,
    Sergeant Rieck had communicated with Trent in person and
    by telephone. At trial, Sergeant Rieck identified Trent’s voice
    in the phone calls. Trent objected to this identification, claim-
    ing that the government had not laid the necessary founda-
    tion. He asserts that argument again on appeal. We disagree
    No. 16-3960                                                 3
    and hold that the court also did not err in allowing that tes-
    timony.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Trent was a heroin supplier in Rock Island, Illinois. Hull
    was a heroin addict who often purchased heroin from Trent
    and his dealers. On August 29, 2014, Hull planned to attend
    a local music festival with one of his friends, Corzette, who
    was also a heroin addict. The two decided to purchase hero-
    in before they went to the festival. Hull called Trent and or-
    dered three “bags” of heroin (each of which contained a
    tenth of a gram), one bag for Corzette and two bags for an-
    other friend, Jacob Thompson. Hull did not order any heroin
    for himself because he was already high from using heroin
    earlier that day—heroin that he had also purchased from
    Trent. Trent set the price at $90 for the three bags and told
    Hull to contact Land, one of Trent’s dealers.
    Hull then called Land, and they arranged a meeting.
    Hull, Corzette, and Thompson rode together to that meeting,
    and once they arrived, Hull purchased the bags of heroin
    from Land for the agreed-upon price. After the deal, Thomp-
    son took his two bags of heroin and went home.
    Hull and Corzette then went to a nearby park where Hull
    helped Corzette cook and inject the heroin. Soon thereafter,
    Corzette passed out. Hull, who later testified that he was not
    initially worried about Corzette because he had seen this
    happen before with heroin use, left Corzette in the car and
    attended the music festival.
    After the festival, Hull returned to the car and found
    Corzette still unconscious and with vomit on his clothes.
    Hull checked Corzette’s pulse and, still believing him to be
    4                                                 No. 16-3960
    fine, left Corzette in the car for the night. When Hull re-
    turned the following morning, he found Corzette dead in the
    car.
    Hull panicked. He took the syringe from Corzette’s hand
    and threw it in the grass next to the car. He then went to
    work. But after spending only an hour at work, Hull re-
    turned to the park and called the police. Rock Island Police
    Officer Christopher Sloan responded to the call. When he
    arrived, he spoke with Hull, who claimed that Corzette was
    dead. Officer Sloan called an ambulance and confirmed that
    Corzette was in fact dead. He then discovered the syringe
    that Hull had thrown in the grass. A forensic pathologist lat-
    er concluded that Corzette had died of adverse effects from
    heroin.
    A. Investigation and Arrest of Trent
    Later on August 30, Hull agreed to cooperate with the
    police department in its investigation. In particular, Hull
    agreed to participate in a controlled purchase of three addi-
    tional bags of heroin from Land that same day. This con-
    trolled purchase led to Land’s arrest, after which Land also
    agreed to cooperate. The police department then arranged
    for an undercover officer to make two purchases of heroin
    from Trent. After the second purchase, the police department
    obtained an arrest warrant for Trent, and Trent was arrested
    on October 3, 2014.
    The Rock Island Police Department later learned that the
    Illinois State Police had also been engaged in an undercover
    investigation of Trent in August of 2014. During that investi-
    gation, Sergeant Rieck communicated with Trent both in
    person and by telephone. He also purchased $50 of heroin
    No. 16-3960                                                    5
    from one of Trent’s dealers. Sergeant Rieck attempted to ar-
    range a second purchase of heroin from Trent, but Trent re-
    fused after discovering that Rieck was an undercover officer.
    B. Trent’s Jury Trial
    A grand jury returned a five-count indictment, charging
    Trent with one count of heroin distribution resulting in
    death, three counts of heroin distribution, and one count of
    conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
    heroin resulting in death. These charges stemmed from both
    the Rock Island Police Department’s investigation and the
    Illinois State Police’s investigation of Trent. During a five-day
    jury trial, the government called numerous witnesses, in-
    cluding Hull, Land, and Sergeant Rieck.
    1. Testimony and Impeachment of Hull and Land
    Hull and Land testified about their interactions with
    Trent on and before August 29, 2014—the day that Corzette
    took the drugs that ultimately killed him. Hull said that he
    had been a heroin user since the summer of 2013 and that
    Trent was his regular heroin supplier. He further stated that
    he had used heroin with Corzette on several occasions be-
    fore August 29. Hull then claimed that he called Trent to
    purchase heroin on August 29 and that Trent told him to ar-
    range a meeting with Land. Next, Hull testified that, when
    he met with Land, he saw “what [he] thought was [Trent’s]
    vehicle.” (Tr. 203.) He then recounted his purchase of three
    bags of heroin from Land and his subsequent trip to the park
    to help Corzette inject heroin from one of those bags. Hull
    finally testified about his actions (or, perhaps more appro-
    priately, his inaction) after Corzette began suffering from an
    apparent overdose.
    6                                                 No. 16-3960
    Land testified that he had been a heroin user for over
    twenty years and that he had used heroin with Trent on sev-
    eral occasions since the summer of 2014. He then stated that
    he began selling heroin for Trent shortly after they met. He
    described their relationship in detail, stating that he would
    take six or seven bags of heroin from Trent each day, that
    Trent would set the price for that heroin, and that Land
    would sell those bags to Trent’s customers. Land also
    claimed that he would return to Trent any heroin that he did
    not sell on any particular day.
    Land then corroborated Hull’s story about the August 29
    drug sale. Specifically, Land testified that Trent dropped him
    off at a local gas station that afternoon and that he received
    calls from “a number of customers,” including Hull. (Tr.
    286.) According to Land, he met with Hull at the gas station
    and sold Hull the drugs that eventually killed Corzette.
    Land reiterated that the drugs he sold to Hull came from
    Trent. Land then testified that Trent “came and got the mon-
    ey” after the sale. (Tr. 288.)
    Next, both Hull and Land—who were also arrested and
    charged with distribution of heroin resulting in Corzette’s
    death—testified about their cooperation with the govern-
    ment. They stated that, in exchange for their cooperation,
    their truthful testimony at Trent’s trial, and their pleas of
    guilty to a charge of distribution resulting in death, the gov-
    ernment had agreed to file motions to reduce their sentences.
    During the trial, Trent’s defense counsel sought to im-
    peach Hull and Land based on the details of their plea
    agreements. In particular, he wanted to question them about
    the exact mandatory minimum—twenty years—that they
    faced if they refused to cooperate and about how their coop-
    No. 16-3960                                                  7
    eration could lead to a reduction of their sentences below
    that mandatory minimum.
    The government sought to limit this impeachment to a
    more general questioning: although it agreed that Trent’s
    counsel should be permitted to question Hull and Land
    about their cooperation and about their plea agreements, the
    government argued that Trent’s counsel should be limited to
    discussing a substantial mandatory minimum rather than the
    exact length in years of that mandatory minimum.
    Because Trent had been charged with the same crime to
    which Hull and Land had pled guilty—distribution resulting
    in death—he faced the same twenty-year mandatory mini-
    mum. The government thus sought to limit Trent’s counsel’s
    impeachment of Hull and Land to prevent the jury from
    learning the exact minimum penalty that Trent faced if con-
    victed on the distribution-resulting-in-death charge.
    The district court ruled in favor of the government and
    permitted Trent’s counsel to question Hull and Land about
    the “substantial mandatory minimum” each faced “without
    quantifying the exact amount.” (Tr. 235.) On cross-
    examination, Trent’s counsel did just that: he impeached
    Hull and Land by asking a variety of questions about the
    mandatory minimum without referring to its twenty-year
    term.
    2. Testimony of Sergeant Rieck
    Sergeant Rieck testified about his involvement in the Illi-
    nois State Police’s undercover investigation of Trent. He stat-
    ed that he first met Trent in person on August 12, 2014 at a
    meeting arranged by a confidential informant. At that meet-
    ing, Sergeant Rieck spoke with Trent, seeking to buy $50 of
    8                                                   No. 16-3960
    heroin. According to Sergeant Rieck, Trent answered that he
    could not sell heroin at that time but that he could arrange
    for a sale in the near future. Sergeant Rieck then testified that
    he spoke with Trent on the phone two more times. During
    those conversations, Trent instructed Sergeant Rieck to meet
    one of his dealers to complete the sale. On August 13, Ser-
    geant Rieck followed Trent’s instruction and purchased $50
    of heroin from one of Trent’s dealers.
    Several times during Sergeant Rieck’s testimony, Trent’s
    counsel objected that the government had failed to lay a
    proper foundation for Sergeant Rieck’s identification of Trent
    as the speaker on the phone calls. The district court initially
    sustained that objection and asked the government to lay a
    foundation. The government complied, asking Sergeant
    Rieck, “From the conversation you had with the defendant—
    this person here in the courtroom—in person and when you
    had this conversation over the phone, did you think it was
    the same person?” (Tr. 60.) Sergeant Rieck answered affirma-
    tively. Trent’s counsel continued to object that this founda-
    tion was insufficient, but the district court overruled his ob-
    jections.
    * * *
    At the end of the five-day trial, a jury convicted Trent on
    all five charges. The district court sentenced Trent to an ag-
    gregate term of 300 months’ imprisonment. This appeal fol-
    lowed.
    II. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Trent repeats two arguments that he made at
    trial. First, he contends that the district court abused its dis-
    cretion and violated his Sixth Amendment right to confron-
    No. 16-3960                                                     9
    tation when it refused to permit him to question Hull and
    Land about the specific length of the mandatory minimum
    each faced after pleading guilty. Next, Trent argues that the
    district court abused its discretion when it overruled his ob-
    jections to Sergeant Rieck’s testimony about his phone con-
    versations with Trent. We address each argument in turn.
    A. Limitation on Cross-Examination
    Trent first argues that the court should have permitted
    him to cross-examine Hull and Land about the exact
    length—twenty years—of the mandatory minimum each
    faced on a distribution-resulting-in-death charge. Our stand-
    ard of review when a district court limits the defendant’s
    cross-examination depends on whether the court’s limit “di-
    rectly implicates the ‘core values of the Confrontation
    Clause.’” United States v. Recendiz, 
    557 F.3d 511
    , 530 (7th Cir.
    2009) (quoting United States v. Smith, 
    454 F.3d 707
    , 714 (7th
    Cir. 2006)). If so, we review the limit de novo. If not, we re-
    view the limit only for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. The Sixth
    Amendment “guarantees a defendant an op-
    portunity for effective cross-examination.” 
    Id. But that
    doesn’t mean that the Sixth Amendment requires a district
    court to permit a defendant to question witnesses “in what-
    ever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
    Delaware v. Fensterer, 
    474 U.S. 15
    , 20 (1985). Instead, a district
    court has discretion to place reasonable limits on cross-
    examination, especially when necessary to prevent irrelevant
    or confusing evidence from being presented to the jury. Re-
    
    cendiz, 557 F.3d at 530
    ; see also United States v. Cavender, 
    228 F.3d 792
    , 798 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The district court retains wide
    latitude to impose reasonable limits on the scope and extent
    of cross-examination based on concerns about things like
    10                                                    No. 16-3960
    harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, or interroga-
    tion that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”)
    Federal juries don’t sentence defendants in noncapital
    cases. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (discussing juries’ role in capital
    sentencing). We have thus permitted district courts to pre-
    vent juries from learning information from which they could
    infer defendants’ potential sentences, holding that inclusion
    of this information might confuse or mislead the juries in
    their true task: deciding defendants’ guilt or innocence. See
    United States v. Arocho, 
    305 F.3d 627
    , 636 (7th Cir. 2002), super-
    seded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v.
    Benabe, 
    654 F.3d 753
    , 781 (7th Cir. 2011). That is precisely
    what the district court did here: it limited Trent’s cross-
    examination of Hull and Land to prevent the jury from
    learning the exact penalty that Trent himself faced on convic-
    tion.
    Nonetheless, Trent contends that the term “substan-
    tial”—as the district court permitted Trent to describe the
    mandatory minimum in lieu of using the exact term of
    years—was too “nebulous” to give the jury a full impression
    of the witnesses’ incentives to testify. (Appellant’s Br. at 20.)
    He asserts that, had the precise “magnitude” of Hull’s and
    Land’s potential sentences been made known to the jury,
    “the jury might have received a substantially different im-
    pression of their credibility.” (Id.) Because the district court
    did not permit Trent to question Hull and Land about the
    exact length of the mandatory minimum, Trent maintains
    that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.
    True enough, the “ability to expose a witness’s motiva-
    tion for testifying, his bias, or his possible incentives to lie” is
    a core value of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
    No. 16-3960                                                  11
    Re
    cendiz, 557 F.3d at 530
    . But that value is only offended
    when “the defense is completely forbidden from exposing
    the witness’s bias.” United States v. Sanders, 
    708 F.3d 976
    , 990
    (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Manske, 
    186 F.3d 770
    ,
    778 (7th Cir. 1999)). When the defense is given a reasonable
    opportunity to question witnesses about their biases, the
    Sixth Amendment is not implicated. “In other words, merely
    having the chance to present a motive to lie is sufficient to
    satisfy the core values of the confrontation right.” 
    Id. at 991.
        Here, Trent was not prohibited from cross-examining
    Hull and Land about their potential biases or motives to lie.
    Rather, the district court permitted Trent to vigorously cross-
    examine them. For instance, Trent’s counsel asked Hull the
    following questions:
    •   And you have a rather substantial manda-
    tory minimum sentence, don’t you?
    •   And it’s a pretty long time, isn’t it?
    •   You know that the judge who decides—
    who sentences you cannot give you a sen-
    tence below that substantial mandatory
    minimum unless the prosecutors file a mo-
    tion and ask the judge to go below that
    mandatory minimum?
    •   So, you certainly want one of [the two pros-
    ecutors] to be happy with your testimony
    so they’ll file that motion [reducing your
    sentence], don’t you?
    •   And that’s why you’re here, is to get your
    sentence reduced, isn’t it?
    •   That’s why you entered into the plea
    agreement, so you’d get an opportunity to
    12                                                No. 16-3960
    get your sentence reduced below the man-
    datory minimum, correct?
    • Because you don’t want to serve that much
    time in prison if you can avoid it, correct?
    Trent’s counsel similarly asked Land the following ques-
    tions:
    •    Now, because of the charge that you pled
    guilty to, you are facing a substantial man-
    datory minimum sentence; is that fair? Is
    that correct?
    • And you don’t really want to serve that
    much time, do you?
    • And the only way you can get less than that
    substantial mandatory minimum sentence
    is if one of [the two prosecutors] right here
    files a motion to ask the judge to reduce
    your sentence below that mandatory mini-
    mum; is that correct?
    • And you know that it’s by you cooperating
    with this plea agreement that you signed
    with the government that you can get your
    sentence reduced if they believe that your
    testimony was helpful?
    • And you want them to believe that [your
    testimony was helpful]?
    • Because you told us nobody would want to
    serve that mandatory minimum, right?
    In response to the questioning, Hull and Land admitted
    that they were testifying under plea agreements and that the
    government agreed to file motions to reduce their sentences
    if they agreed to testify truthfully. They also admitted that,
    without the government’s motion, they would have to serve
    No. 16-3960                                                  13
    the duration of the substantial mandatory minimum. (Tr.
    268–69; Tr. 319–22.)
    Because the court allowed Trent to engage in this thor-
    ough cross-examination, which readily exposed any of Hull’s
    or Land’s biases and incentives to testify adversely to Trent,
    the court did not offend the core values of the Confrontation
    Clause. See Re
    cendiz, 557 F.3d at 530
    –31; 
    Sanders, 708 F.3d at 990
    –91. We therefore review the district court’s limitation on-
    ly for abuse of discretion. Re
    cendiz, 557 F.3d at 530
    .
    To determine whether the court abused its discretion, we
    must decide “whether the jury had sufficient information to
    make a discriminating appraisal of the witness’s motives and
    biases.” 
    Sanders, 708 F.3d at 991
    (quoting Re
    cendiz, 557 F.3d at 530
    ). Trent contends that the jury couldn’t make a “discrimi-
    nating appraisal” without knowing the mandatory mini-
    mum’s exact length. We disagree.
    Based on the answers to Trent’s extensive cross-
    examination of both Hull and Land, we hold that the jury
    had ample information to make a discriminating appraisal of
    the motives of those two witnesses.
    Trent’s argument that the court’s limitation precluded
    him from portraying the full magnitude of Hull’s and Land’s
    biases is unavailing. Although the court did not permit Trent
    to mention the mandatory minimum’s twenty-year term, it
    did allow him to describe the term as “substantial.” And
    Trent probed in painstaking detail each witness’s incentives
    to lie.
    Hull admitted to the jury that the mandatory minimum
    was a “pretty long time” (Tr. 268), and Land averred that
    “nobody would” want to serve the entire length of the man-
    14                                                No. 16-3960
    datory minimum (Tr. 319). Moreover, the court instructed
    the jury to consider the overall testimony of Hull and Land
    “with caution and great care.” (Tr. 617.)
    Although “[t]he jury might not have possessed all the in-
    formation [Trent] wanted it to have, … it certainly had suffi-
    cient information to evaluate [Hull’s and Land’s] testimony.”
    
    Sanders, 708 F.3d at 991
    . Given the court’s very real and well-
    founded concerns about misleading or confusing the jury,
    we hold that the court did not err, let alone abuse its discre-
    tion, by limiting Trent’s cross-examination of Hull and Land
    in the manner that it did.
    B. Foundation for Voice Identification
    Trent next argues that the district court erred by permit-
    ting Sergeant Rieck to identify Trent’s voice in phone conver-
    sations. In so arguing, he contends that the government
    failed to lay the necessary foundation for that testimony. We
    review a district court’s evidentiary rulings, including those
    pertaining to foundation, for abuse of discretion. United
    States v. Davis, 
    845 F.3d 282
    , 286 (7th Cir. 2016).
    Rule 901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence discusses the
    authentication or identification of evidence: “[t]o satisfy the
    requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evi-
    dence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to
    support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims
    it is.” Rule 901(b) provides specific examples of “evidence
    that satisfies” Rule 901(a). One of those examples—Rule
    901(b)(5)—provides that a voice identification can be estab-
    lished by “[a]n opinion identifying a person’s voice—
    whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic
    transmission or recording—based on hearing the voice at
    No. 16-3960                                                      15
    any time under circumstances that connect it with the al-
    leged speaker.” “We have consistently interpreted this rule
    to require that the witness [identifying a voice] have only
    ‘minimal familiarity’ with the voice.” United States v. Cruz-
    Rea, 
    626 F.3d 929
    , 934 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
    Neighbors, 
    590 F.3d 485
    , 493 (7th Cir. 2009)).
    Minimal familiarity is not a high bar. United States v. Col-
    lins, 
    715 F.3d 1032
    , 1036 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United States v.
    Mendiola, 
    707 F.3d 735
    , 739–40 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting cas-
    es). For instance, we have held that hearing a voice only once
    during a court proceeding is sufficient. United States v. Man-
    soori, 
    304 F.3d 635
    , 665 (7th Cir. 2002). We have likewise con-
    cluded that a witness who had heard a voice in a recorded
    phone conversation could later identify that voice as the de-
    fendant’s after speaking with the defendant during his arrest
    and post-arrest interview. 
    Recendiz, 557 F.3d at 527
    .
    Here, Sergeant Rieck testified that he had met with Trent
    in person prior to speaking with him on the phone. At that
    meeting, Trent and Sergeant Rieck discussed a possible hero-
    in transaction. This in-person meeting provided Sergeant
    Rieck with the necessary minimal familiarity with Trent’s
    voice such that he could later identify it on the phone calls.
    The government laid the necessary foundation for Sergeant
    Rieck’s identification of Trent’s voice by asking Sergeant
    Rieck if he believed that the person with whom he had dealt
    in person was the same person with whom he had spoken
    on the phone. Sergeant Rieck answered that question affirm-
    atively.
    Furthermore, the government offered significant corrob-
    orating evidence supporting Sergeant Rieck’s identification.
    This evidence included (1) Trent’s phone, which showed that
    16                                                 No. 16-3960
    Trent had saved Sergeant Rieck’s phone number in his con-
    tact list; (2) Trent’s phone records, which showed that Trent
    and Sergeant Rieck had contacted one another on August 13,
    the day of the undercover drug purchase; and (3) Trent’s
    phone number, which was the number Sergeant Rieck, Hull,
    and Land had used to contact Trent. In light of this substan-
    tial circumstantial evidence and Sergeant Rieck’s voice iden-
    tification of Trent, we conclude that the district court did not
    abuse its discretion by overruling Trent’s objections and
    permitting Sergeant Rieck’s testimony.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
    judgment of conviction.