Jay Vermillion v. Corizon Health, Inc. ( 2018 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 18-1517
    JAY F. VERMILLION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CORIZON HEALTH, INC., PAUL TALBOT, and RUBY BEENY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 1:16-cv-01723-JMS-DLP — Jane E. Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge.
    ____________________
    SUBMITTED OCTOBER 19, 2018 — DECIDED OCTOBER 24, 2018
    ____________________
    EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, in chambers. This case came
    to my a[ention, as motions judge, when the appellees
    sought permission to file a brief containing more words than
    the 14,000 permi[ed by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7) and Circuit
    Rule 32(c). Jay Vermillion, the appellant, represented that his
    brief contains fewer than 14,000 words, after excluding the
    portions not counted by Rule 32(f). But appellees reported
    that their count of his brief came to 16,850 words. They
    sought parity and then some: 17,258 countable words for
    their brief.
    2                                                 No. 18-1517
    This court’s staff checked and found 16,522 countable
    words in Vermillion’s brief. Instead of adding words to ap-
    pellees’ brief, I struck Vermillion’s, ordered him to file a new
    brief with fewer than 14,000 words, and directed him to ex-
    plain why he should not be penalized for falsely represent-
    ing that his original brief complied with the word limits.
    Vermillion’s response asks me to reinstate his brief. He
    says that he started with a word count of 15,315, reported by
    the “Properties” panel in Microsoft Word, and subtracted
    the words in the cover, table of authorities, and other por-
    tions that do not count against the total. Finding that the
    count remained over 14,000, “Vermillion then discovered
    that Rule 32(f) does not specifically include the [brief’s] ref-
    erences to the Record and Appendix toward the word-
    count” (Response at 6). He estimated that about 2,000 words
    in his brief cited the record and appendix. With these ex-
    cluded, the count is well under 14,000 words. So, he insists,
    his brief complies with the rules and must be accepted.
    Two problems dog this line of argument.
    First, the “Properties” panel in Microsoft Word is not de-
    signed to count all words in a document. The program’s
    “Word Count” panel includes footnotes, which the “Proper-
    ties” panel omits. Footnotes count toward the word limit, see
    DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 
    185 F.3d 815
     (7th Cir. 1999), and Ver-
    million’s brief contains about 1,000 words in footnotes. There
    may be other differences between the “Properties” panel and
    the “Word Count” panel, but this one big difference shows
    why the count must start with the “Word Count” panel.
    Second, the fact that Rule 32 does not “specifically in-
    clude” any category of words does not imply that they don’t
    No. 18-1517                                                             3
    count toward the limit. Rule 32(f) does not mention citations
    to the record or appendix, but neither does it mention cita-
    tions to judicial decisions and law reviews. Rule 32(a)(7) sets
    a limit on the entire brief—statements of fact, summaries of
    the district court’s or agency’s opinions, substantive legal
    arguments, citations, quotations, footnotes, and everything
    else—with the exception of the items excluded by Rule 32(f),
    which reads:
    In computing any length limit, headings, footnotes, and quota-
    tions count toward the limit but the following items do not:
    • the cover page;
    • a corporate disclosure statement;
    • a table of contents;
    • a table of citations;
    • a statement regarding oral argument;
    • an addendum containing statutes, rules, or regulations;
    • certificates of counsel;
    • the signature block;
    • the proof of service; and
    • any item specifically excluded by these rules or by local rule.
    So the fact that Rule 32(f) does not mention citations hardly
    justifies their exclusion from the word count. Only those
    ma[ers that are mentioned in Rule 32(f)’s list are excluded.
    Everything else counts. (Neither the Rules of Appellate Pro-
    cedure nor the Circuit Rules “specifically” excludes citations
    of any kind.)
    Because Vermillion’s brief did not comply with the rules,
    my order striking it stands. He must file a new brief with
    fewer than 14,000 countable words. The count must start
    with the software’s “Word Count” panel and include foot-
    notes. Only those items listed in Rule 32(f) may be excluded.
    4                                                  No. 18-1517
    Once Vermillion has filed a complying brief, appellees
    too will be subject to the 14,000 word limit. I will not allow
    them any more words than Vermillion receives. Circuit Rule
    32(c), which affords everyone 1,000 more words than the cap
    in Rule 32(a)(7), reflects a view that 14,000 suffices for all but
    the rare cases with lengthy trials, complex administrative
    records, or multiple complex issues. This appeal is not in any
    of those categories.
    Vermillion is litigating without the aid of counsel, and his
    response to my order shows that he tried to comply in good
    faith, although he misunderstood both Rule 32(f) and the
    right place to start in Microsoft Word. No sanction—beyond
    the work needed to prepare and file a compliant brief—is
    appropriate. The order to show cause is discharged.
    By separate order, the court will reset the dates for both
    sides’ briefs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-1517

Judges: Easterbrook

Filed Date: 10/24/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/24/2018