United States v. William Mabie ( 2017 )


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  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    WILLIAM J. MABIE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Illinois.
    No. 14-CR-30076 — Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge.
    No. 15-CR-30158 — Richard Mills, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 24, 2017 — DECIDED JULY 7, 2017
    ____________________
    Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    KANNE, Circuit Judge. This consolidated appeal involves
    two criminal cases from the Southern District of Illinois. In
    the first case—which we call the “threat case,” numbered 15-
    1899 on appeal—William Mabie was convicted of sending
    threatening letters through the mail. In the second case—
    which we call the “assault case,” numbered 16-2432 on ap-
    peal—Mabie was convicted of assaulting a deputy United
    2                                              Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    States marshal. Mabie received lengthy prison terms in both
    cases.
    Mabie brings multiple challenges on appeal. Specifically,
    he contends that, in the threat case, the district court im-
    properly admitted evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
    404(b). He also argues that, in the assault case, the district
    court erred by refusing to allow him to proceed pro se and by
    forcing him to attend trial after he had waived his right to be
    present in the courtroom. Finally, he claims that he received
    unreasonable sentences in both cases. We reject these argu-
    ments and affirm Mabie’s convictions and sentences. 1
    I.    BACKGROUND
    Mabie received 340 months’ imprisonment for his
    crimes—crimes that involved speech and letters riddled with
    scurrilous language directed at state and federal officials and
    their families. Throughout this opinion, we repeat his lan-
    guage to highlight the severity of his crimes and to illustrate
    why the district judges who sentenced him felt compelled to
    imprison him for what may be the better part of his life.
    We start with some background facts involving a prior
    conviction Mabie received in the Eastern District of Missouri
    for threatening a police officer. Although that conviction is
    not before us, the facts underlying it are necessary to pro-
    vide context for the convictions and sentences subject to this
    appeal.
    1 Citations to the record of the threat case are abbreviated “R1.” Citations
    to the record of the assault case are abbreviated “R2.”
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                      3
    A. The Eastern District of Missouri Case
    We begin in 2007 in St. Louis, Missouri. Then and there,
    Mabie worked as an auto-body repairman, renting space
    from Steven Reisch at Reisch’s business called Affordable
    Auto. In August 2007, the two had a falling out, causing Ma-
    bie to look for new space to rent. Because Mabie had paid his
    rent through the end of the month, he left his work equip-
    ment at Affordable Auto as he conducted his search.
    At some point, Mabie’s equipment—purportedly worth
    $25,000—was stolen in a burglary. Reisch reported this bur-
    glary to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department. Of-
    ficer Joshua Wenstrom and others investigated, but they
    were unable to identify the thief or uncover other incriminat-
    ing evidence. Thus, much to Mabie’s chagrin, the police de-
    partment cancelled the investigation and put the case on in-
    active status.
    Paranoia ensued. Mabie became convinced that Reisch
    was in on the burglary. Mabie contacted Officer Michael
    Deeba, whom Mabie had met before: Deeba was one of
    Reisch’s customers who occasionally had work done on his
    cars at Affordable Auto. Mabie was frustrated with
    Wenstrom’s inability to solve the case, so he wanted Deeba to
    investigate. But Deeba declined to help because he was a
    SWAT commander who did not investigate property crimes
    and because he knew Reisch through business dealings and
    did not want to create a conflict of interest.
    Because Deeba refused to investigate, Mabie concluded
    that Deeba too was in on the burglary. Between May and
    August 2008, Mabie called Deeba numerous times and left
    him several voicemail messages. In one message, Mabie
    4                                       Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    called Deeba a “prick eater” and accused him of taking kick-
    backs. (R1. 216 at 66.) In another message, Mabie said, “I
    think somebody should check on [Deeba]. He might be up in
    his office hanging himself or committing suicide. I mean, I
    don’t know that would be a bad thing, but maybe you
    should check on him.” (Id. at 67.)
    It got worse from there: the messages grew darker and
    showed Mabie growing angrier as time went on. For in-
    stance, in one message, he said,
    [W]here’s this investigation fag? Come on you gut-
    less son of a bitch. Let’s have the investigation and
    find out what a crooked cock sucker you are and
    what a thieving bunch of crooked bullshit opera-
    tion Affordable [Auto] is … . See ya Mikey.”
    (Id. at 72.) And in another message, Mabie commented that
    the next day was Deeba’s deceased uncle’s birthday, and
    concluded, “Funny how I know things like this, isn’t it?
    Have a super day. See you in Greenville.” (Id. at 68.) Deeba
    lived in Greenville, Illinois.
    Mabie was also able to reach Deeba at the police station.
    During one call, Mabie told Deeba, “Why don’t you have
    your wife suck my dick and we’ll be even.” (Id. at 70.)
    Deeba wasn’t Mabie’s only target: Mabie also sent nu-
    merous letters to Officer Wenstrom, accusing Wenstrom of
    conducting a shoddy investigation. Wenstrom received a fi-
    nal letter in May 2013—almost six years after the burglary.
    That letter stated,
    Dear Josh, I know you are used to things being up
    your ass, [Officer] Anderson[’s] tongue, Deeba’s
    fist[,] [Reisch’s] cock, but what of something not so
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                                    5
    tangible like 07-078733. 2 Yes, yes, that was a while
    ago. As I sit here as direct link to your never getting
    of your ass, I’m still concerned. In fact, I do not
    have a statute of limitations. … But wait, could it be
    you did not want to catch Reisch? AUSA says the
    DEA is well aware of what goes on at 4108 Hoff-
    meister and a Freedom of Information request to
    DEA, they will not deny Reisch assistance. Hmm.
    … I don’t give a fuck if he’s the best snitch out
    there. I want my property. … Well, asswipe, check
    this. Reisch can make reparation now, 25K for Sa-
    ble, S A B L E, 25K for equipment, 25K for lawyer
    fee and the rest can quit lying or I deal with every
    lying maggot all the way through.
    (Id. at 35–37.)
    Eventually, internal affairs opened an investigation. On
    June 18, 2008, Officer Al Klein called Mabie. During that
    conversation, Mabie claimed that Deeba challenged him to a
    gun fight, which Mabie said would end badly for Deeba.
    Specifically, Mabie claimed that he “can hit what [he’s] ai-
    min’ at from 400 fuckin’ yards” and even went so far as to
    comment on how blue Deeba would look if Deeba were
    dead. (R1. 214 at 59.)
    Shortly after, Officer John Anderson of the intelligence
    division began investigating to determine whether Mabie
    posed a credible threat to Deeba. On July 29, 2008, Anderson
    warned Mabie to stop threatening police officers. But Mabie
    persisted. On August 4, 2008, Mabie called Officer Anthony
    Brooks of the Greenville Police Department, claiming that
    Deeba challenged Mabie to a gun fight and that Mabie was
    2   This was the complaint number on the burglary-investigation report.
    6                                      Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    “up for it.” (Id. at 133.) Mabie further commented that St.
    Louis police officers think a gun fight is at 15 yards, but Ma-
    bie was good from 300 yards. After this call, Deeba asked the
    Bond County Sheriff’s Office to patrol his property in
    Greenville. The sheriff’s office complied with this request.
    After Anderson learned of Mabie’s call to Brooks, Ander-
    son called Mabie again. During their conversation, Mabie
    explained that he had an M1, a 30 aught 6, and a 30 aught 8;
    he claimed that he could shoot and hit Deeba at 600 yards
    with these guns.
    Police officers arrested Mabie on August 4, 2008. At that
    time, he was living at his sister’s house in Festus, Missouri.
    The officers searched the house. Although they did not find
    any weapons, they found a map to Greenville along with
    some Google Earth photos of the town. They also found a
    letter on Mabie’s printer. The letter was addressed to Dee-
    ba’s wife Deborah and purported to be from Reisch’s wife
    Kim. Deborah received a copy of this letter, which read,
    Dear Debbie, As you know, your crooked piece of
    crap husband (Lieutenant Michael Deeba) and
    Thieving pothead husband (Steve Reisch) have
    quite an enterprise what with Steve paying kick-
    backs to Mike so he can do every crooked low life
    thing that there is. As you may have heard, Steve
    and Mike are trying to muscle Bill Mabie out of his
    equipment. Already stole one car and working on
    stealing a ’67 Camaro. One little problem, Bill Ma-
    bie knows about their arrangement. And Mikey
    and Steve’s employees made the mistake of chal-
    lenging him to a gun fight. Given SLMPD … record
    of poor marksmanship, the neighbor must be
    warned. (Don’t worry, I’ll let everyone possibly
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                       7
    know what is coming.) It might be best if you
    move. I know you think why not just give it back.
    What would be the point of being a scumbag cop if
    you acted legally. Sincerely, Kim Reisch. P.S. Good
    luck with the federal investigation.
    (R1. 216 at 84.)
    The government charged Mabie in the Eastern District of
    Missouri with three counts of mailing threatening communi-
    cations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) and one count of in-
    terstate communication of a threat in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 875(c). The government used the above facts as evidence at
    Mabie’s trial. In December 2008, a jury convicted Mabie of
    the charged crimes. See United States v. Mabie, 
    663 F.3d 322
    ,
    328 (8th Cir. 2011). The court sentenced Mabie to 88 months’
    imprisonment. As the officers escorted Mabie out of the
    courtroom, Mabie yelled, “[F]uck you, Deeba, I’m gonna get
    you.” (R1. 216 at 90.)
    B. The Threat Case (15-1899)
    Apparently undeterred by an 88-month sentence, Mabie
    continued sending threatening letters, doing so from prison.
    One letter, dated January 29, 2012, was to Sheriff Jeff Brown
    of Bond County, Illinois. At Mabie’s sentencing hearing in
    the Eastern District of Missouri, the government introduced
    an email from Brown in which he claimed that police officers
    had spent roughly 210 to 220 man hours searching and pa-
    trolling Deeba’s property in response to Mabie’s threats. In
    Mabie’s letter to Brown, Mabie questioned the legitimacy of
    Brown’s accusation and threatened Brown. Specifically, Ma-
    bie wrote,
    220 hours? How about 5 minutes of legitimate in-
    vestigation – of 07-078733 ALL I’VE EVER
    8                                         Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    ASKED.....NOPE. Because it would no doubt send
    your boy + Reisch (UNDISPUTABLE BOGUS
    REPORT) to prison – MUCH EASIER TO COME
    AFTER ME, except………what happens when I’m
    released – OH NO!! and seek justice – please,
    please NOT THAT! I asked [United States Attorney
    Richard] Callahan [of the Eastern District of Mis-
    souri] if he would prosecute all you lying cock-
    suckers, or if he preferred kick your teeth in – NO
    RESPONSE Could be all you maggots should look
    for a dentist – GROUP RATES[.]
    (R1. 106-1 at 5.)
    Mabie sent two additional letters to Deeba’s wife Debo-
    rah. In the first letter, dated January 21, 2012, Mabie accused
    Deeba of misconduct. Regarding that conduct, Mabie wrote,
    I asked Richard Callahan – US ATTORNEY if he
    preferred to prosecute, or have these people’s teeth
    kicked in down their throat—WELL, have you seen
    anyone prosecuted lately? ME EITHER. So there
    will be justice done.
    (R1. 106-2 at 3.)
    In the second letter, dated March 11, 2013, Mabie again
    accused Deeba of misconduct. Mabie also suggested
    a ménage à trois with him, Deborah, and the wife of a de-
    ceased St. Louis police officer whom he (erroneously) as-
    sumed Deborah knew. He sent this letter using a stamp de-
    picting a Purple Heart. Regarding that stamp, he concluded
    his letter by writing,
    P.S. Did you notice the stamp? Ya know, my dad
    got a purple heart, actually eligible for 3. Did he do
    that, come back so that Reisch could steal his chain
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                        9
    come along, threaten his son’s life, have the US
    ATTY lie so Reisch can get away with it? probably
    not. If you think the old boy fought hard, wait till
    you see the length I’ll go to, to get his property
    back.
    (R1. 106-3 at 5.)
    On April 23, 2014, the government obtained a three-count
    indictment against Mabie in the Southern District of Illinois,
    charging him with mailing threatening communications in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). The case was assigned to
    Chief Judge Reagan.
    Later, on October 22, 2015, a grand jury returned a super-
    seding indictment, adding to each count of the original in-
    dictment the allegation that Mabie mailed the threatening
    communications “with intent to convey a threat to injure the
    person of another.” (R1. 132.) Through this superseding in-
    dictment, the government acknowledged that a § 876(c) vio-
    lation is a specific-intent crime.
    To prove the specific-intent element, the government
    sought to introduce under Rule 404(b) some of the evidence
    at issue in the Eastern District of Missouri trial. This evi-
    dence included Mabie’s voicemail messages to Deeba; Ma-
    bie’s recommendation that Deeba have his wife Deborah
    perform oral sex on Mabie; Mabie’s letter to Officer
    Wenstrom; Mabie’s calls to Officers Klein, Brooks, and An-
    derson; Mabie’s letter to Deborah purporting to be from Kim
    Reisch; and Mabie’s “I’m gonna get you” statement to Deeba
    after the sentencing hearing.
    The purpose of introducing this evidence was to provide
    background and context to the charged conduct and to show
    10                                    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    Mabie’s knowledge and motive in making true threats. The
    court admitted this evidence over Mabie’s objection.
    The trial lasted four days. Mabie proceeded pro se
    through pretrial and the first day of trial. During the second
    day, at the court’s urging, Mabie agreed to have standby
    counsel step in. In the end, the jury convicted Mabie on all
    counts.
    On April 3, 2015, Judge Reagan sentenced Mabie to the
    statutory maximum—60 months’ imprisonment—on each of
    the three § 876(c) counts for a total of 180 months. This sen-
    tence not only exceeded the sentencing guidelines recom-
    mendation but also was set to run consecutively to the 88-
    month sentence Mabie received in the Eastern District of
    Missouri. Judge Reagan acknowledged that this sentence
    was “a breathtaking departure” from the guidelines recom-
    mendation and that he had never imposed a statutory-
    maximum sentence before. (R1. 251 at 115.) Even so, after
    taking into account the trial evidence and additional evi-
    dence of noncharged bad acts—including Mabie’s assault of
    Deputy Marshal Berry—the court determined that an above-
    guidelines sentence was warranted.
    C. The Assault Case (16-2432)
    On March 12, 2015, Judge Reagan held a hearing to ad-
    dress Mabie’s motion to proceed pro se during sentencing in
    the threat case. After the hearing, Mabie met with standby
    counsel in one of the interview rooms. When counsel left,
    Mabie remained in the room. A couple of hours passed, and
    Mabie became agitated. So he started kicking and banging
    on the door. Eventually, Deputy United States Marshal Don
    Berry moved Mabie to a holding cell with another detainee.
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                       11
    As Berry turned to walk away, Mabie called him a “punk
    ass” and spat on him. (R1. 251 at 48; R2. 100 at 85.)
    At that point, Berry deemed Mabie to be a threat to the
    other detainee. So he called over two other deputy marshals
    to move Mabie to a different cell. As the deputy marshals
    attempted to do so, Mabie got into a fighting stance with
    “his fists clenched and head down.” (R2. 100 at 86.) When
    Mabie stepped forward, breaking the plane of the cell door,
    Berry punched him. Consequently, Berry injured his hand;
    Mabie suffered facial wounds.
    On October 20, 2016, the government obtained a second
    indictment against Mabie in the Southern District of Illinois,
    charging him with one count of forcibly assaulting, resisting,
    opposing, impeding, intimidating, and interfering with a
    United States officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). The
    case was assigned to Judge Mills.
    Mabie proceeded pro se for most of pretrial, but he even-
    tually asked the court to appoint counsel. The court acqui-
    esced to this request. Later on, after jury selection and open-
    ing statements, Mabie became frustrated with his counsel
    and demanded to proceed pro se for the rest of the trial. The
    court denied this request, concluding that the appointed at-
    torney would continue to represent Mabie.
    Mabie then said that he was going to leave the courtroom
    and that the trial could proceed without him. The court de-
    nied this request, too, ordering Mabie to remain in the court-
    room during trial.
    But Mabie’s presence at trial was short-lived: Mabie went
    on a tirade during the government’s first witness’s testimo-
    ny, causing the deputy marshals to remove him from the
    12                                       Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    courtroom. Mabie was then excused for the rest of the trial,
    except that he returned briefly to testify. During that testi-
    mony, Mabie explained that, upon his release, he would
    “hunt down” Berry, “handcuff him,” and “return the favor.”
    (R2. 102 at 99.) And by “return the favor,” Mabie meant,
    I’m going to beat the shit out of him … . [T]hat’s
    going to be a hell of an assault. I may just kill the
    bastard. How do you like that? Under oath. How
    about tying him to the bumper and drag his ass
    around … .
    (Id. at 99-100.)
    The jury convicted Mabie. Mabie requested a new trial,
    arguing that, because he was forced to attend his trial on the
    first day, he engaged in bad conduct that prejudiced him.
    The court acknowledged that Mabie’s conduct was prejudi-
    cial, but not unfairly prejudicial given that Mabie was capa-
    ble of “behaving in a manner that respects the decorum of
    the courtroom and the legal process” but he “chose not to
    behave in such a manner in front of the jury.” (R2. 101 at 2.)
    On June 9, 2016, Judge Mills sentenced Mabie to 72
    months’ imprisonment. Like the sentence in the threat case,
    this sentence exceeded the sentencing guidelines recom-
    mendation. Moreover, the court ran the sentence consecu-
    tively to Mabie’s sentences in both the threat case and the
    Eastern District of Missouri case. The court explained that
    this was necessary; “otherwise it would almost be like [Ma-
    bie] isn’t even being punished for this offense. That would
    be an egregious result given Mr. Mabie’s lack of remorse and
    continued threats, including the threats to kill a Deputy U.S.
    Marshal.” (R2. 130 at 38.)
    * * *
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                      13
    Mabie has appealed both his convictions and sentences.
    II.   ANALYSIS
    Mabie raises several issues on appeal. He first argues
    that, in the threat case, the district court improperly admit-
    ted Rule 404(b) evidence. He next contends that, in the as-
    sault case, the district court erred by denying his requests to
    represent himself and by forcing him to attend his own trial.
    Finally, he claims that his sentences in both cases were un-
    reasonable. We address each issue in turn.
    A. Admission of Rule 404(b) Evidence (15-1899)
    In the threat case, the government charged Mabie under
    18 U.S.C. § 876(c), which provides that whoever sends mail
    to another person that threatens to injure that person shall be
    guilty of a crime. On October 22, 2014, the government ob-
    tained a superseding indictment, adding a specific-intent el-
    ement to the original charges. In so doing, the government
    conceded that § 876(c) is a specific-intent crime, requiring
    proof that Mabie sent his letters “for the purpose of issuing a
    threat, or with knowledge that the communication [would]
    be viewed as a threat.” See Elonis v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 2001
    , 2012 (2015) (considering 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)); United
    States v. Crawford, 
    665 F. App'x 539
    , 541 (7th Cir. 2016) (not-
    ing that Elonis applies to § 876(c), too).
    As noted earlier, to prove Mabie’s intent to issue threats,
    the government sought to introduce under Rule 404(b) some
    of the evidence offered in the earlier Eastern District of Mis-
    souri trial to provide background and context for Mabie’s
    14                                             Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    crimes. 3 Indeed, the government’s stated purpose for intro-
    ducing this evidence was “to explain the nature of the dis-
    pute between [Mabie] and Reisch and Deeba that has led to
    the charges in” the indictment. (R1. 18 at 8–9.) On appeal,
    Mabie contends that the district court improperly admitted
    this evidence.
    We have held that, depending on the case, background
    and context evidence may be relevant to proving intent to
    convey a threat. See United States v. Parr, 
    545 F.3d 491
    , 501
    (7th Cir. 2008). That certainly is the case here. Consider Ma-
    bie’s letter to Sheriff Brown, in which Mabie wrote,
    220 hours? How about 5 minutes of legitimate in-
    vestigation – of 07-078733 ALL I’VE EVER
    ASKED.....NOPE. Because it would no doubt send
    your boy + Reisch (UNDISPUTABLE BOGUS
    REPORT) to prison – MUCH EASIER TO COME
    AFTER ME, except………what happens when I’m
    released – OH NO!! and seek justice – please,
    please NOT THAT! I asked [United States Attorney
    Richard] Callahan [of the Eastern District of Mis-
    souri] if he would prosecute all you lying cock-
    suckers, or if he preferred kick your teeth in – NO
    RESPONSE Could be all you maggots should look
    for a dentist – GROUP RATES[.]
    3 Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
    not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
    particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”
    Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). It does, however, allow this evidence “for another
    purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
    knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R.
    Evid. 404(b)(2). This is not an exhaustive list. United States v. Taylor, 
    522 F.3d 731
    , 735 (7th Cir. 2008).
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                     15
    (R1. 106-1 at 5.) Without context, this letter and the threat
    imbedded in it make no sense. To what does 220 hours refer?
    Why has Mabie allegedly been deprived of an investigation
    of 07-078733? What does 07-078733 even mean? Who is
    Reisch? Why is he Sheriff Brown’s boy? Why does Mabie
    need to seek justice? And who are the “lying cocksuckers”
    and “maggots” that Mabie speaks of? To make sense, we
    need the evidence from the Eastern District of Missouri trial,
    which provides answers to these questions.
    Mabie admitted as much during pretrial, conceding that
    “we do have to have some background in there or the jury
    won’t even know. Basically the content is the context so
    they’ll have to have something.” (R1. 221 at 53.) Thus, the
    admitted evidence was necessary for the government’s case.
    What remains is whether the district court admitted this
    evidence through the proper procedure. Our opinion in
    United States v. Gomez establishes that procedure. 
    763 F.3d 845
    (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). There, we held that, to over-
    come an objection to Rule 404(b) other-act evidence, “the
    proponent of the evidence must first establish that the other
    act is relevant to a specific purpose other than the person’s
    character or propensity to behave in a certain way.” 
    Id. at 860.
    This does not mean, however, that evidence is excluded
    whenever a propensity inference is possible. But in such a
    case, the relevance of the evidence to a proper purpose
    “must be established through a chain of reasoning that does
    not rely on the forbidden inference that the person has a cer-
    tain character and acted in accordance with that character on
    the occasion charged in the case.” 
    Id. Moreover, if
    and when
    the proponent makes this showing, the district court must
    then “assess whether the probative value of the other-act ev-
    16                                    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    idence is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prej-
    udice and may exclude the evidence under Rule 403 if the
    risk is too great.” 
    Id. There is
    no credible argument that the government failed
    to comply with Gomez’s requirements. As the proponent of
    Rule 404(b) evidence, the government began by filing two
    notices identifying the evidence it sought to admit.
    The government then filed a detailed, 32-page memoran-
    dum explaining that the purpose of the evidence was to pro-
    vide background and context and to prove knowledge and
    motive. Regarding background and context, the government
    asserted that the evidence was necessary to explain why
    Mabie’s letters to Sheriff Brown and Deborah Deeba consti-
    tuted true threats: as shown above, without this evidence—
    which showed Mabie’s frustration over the failed burglary
    investigation and his animosity toward Deeba and many
    others—the letters for which the government charged Mabie
    would lack meaning. Regarding knowledge, the evidence
    showed that Deeba knew Reisch, which was necessary for
    Mabie to draw the conclusion that Deeba and other police
    officers were incentivized not to investigate the burglary.
    And regarding motive, the evidence revealed that Mabie
    sent letters as an attempt to get his tools back.
    The government’s memorandum also rejected the notion
    that the evidence was offered for propensity purposes—
    essentially, that Mabie has a knack for threatening people.
    But insofar as one could draw that propensity inference, the
    government argued that, under Rule 403, the resulting prej-
    udice did not substantially outweigh the evidence’s proba-
    tive value—which, as noted above, was extremely high.
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                        17
    The government contends that its memorandum linked
    all of the evidence to a proper, nonpropensity purpose,
    which complies with Gomez’s “chain of reasoning” language.
    We agree and hold that the government met its burden un-
    der Gomez.
    For its part, the court too complied with Gomez. During a
    pretrial conference, the court instructed Mabie to read
    Gomez, which had issued the week before. The court then
    called for a hearing on the admissibility of the evidence in
    light of Gomez. At that hearing, the court indicated that, irre-
    spective of the government’s detailed memorandum on ad-
    missibility, Gomez still required the court to conduct a Rule
    403 balancing test, weighing probative value and resulting
    prejudice against each other.
    The court then invited Mabie to respond. Mabie objected
    to the evidence on relevancy grounds. He also claimed that
    “the sheer volume” of the evidence would confuse the jury.
    (R1. 219 at 7–8.) But at no point did he argue that harm of
    admitting the evidence would substantially outweigh its
    probative value.
    The court decided to admit the Rule 404(b) evidence. In
    so doing, the court acknowledged that it looks upon Rule
    404(b) evidence “with a jaundiced eye,” but sometimes, such
    evidence is appropriate. (Id. at 8.) Even so, the court held
    that Mabie was free to make specific objections at trial. And
    in accordance with Gomez, the court agreed to apply an ap-
    propriate limiting instruction.
    At trial, the court imposed a limiting instruction applica-
    ble to each witness offering Rule 404(b) testimony. Specifi-
    cally, the court instructed the jury that it could not infer from
    18                                      Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    the government’s evidence that Mabie is a bad person or has
    the propensity to commit crimes; instead, to the extent that
    the jury was to consider this evidence, it could do so only for
    a proper purpose, like background, context, knowledge, and
    motive.
    Finally, at the end of the government’s case, the court
    gave the jury an evidence-rules “tutorial.” Regarding Rule
    403, the court explained that, “even though some evidence
    can be relevant, I can still exclude it if the probative value is
    substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. In other
    words, even though it might be relevant, it is just too preju-
    dicial and you might not be able to get past it.” (R1. 214 at
    141.)
    What’s missing from the record, as Mabie points out, are
    specific findings from the court that the evidence fulfilled a
    nonpropensity purpose and that the prejudicial effect of the
    evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value.
    Even so, it’s clear from the record that the court conduct-
    ed the proper analysis. From the get-go, the court had Gomez
    on its mind: the court instructed Mabie to read Gomez; the
    court held a Gomez hearing; and the court agreed to give a
    limiting instruction at trial in light of Gomez. Moreover, the
    court had read the government’s 32-page memorandum,
    which established a chain of reasoning linking the evidence
    to a nonpropensity purpose. The court invited Mabie to re-
    spond to this filing, yet Mabie made no objection on preju-
    dice grounds. Still, the court explained numerous times that
    the government’s other-act evidence must have a nonpro-
    pensity hook. The court further acknowledged that, before it
    could admit the evidence, it had to weigh the probative val-
    ue against the resulting prejudice. Finally, the court noted
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                        19
    that it is skeptical of Rule 404(b) evidence in general, view-
    ing it “with a jaundiced eye.” (R1. 219 at 8.) After all of this,
    the court decided to admit the evidence.
    Would it have been clearer if the court had said, “I find
    that the evidence is admitted for a nonpropensity purpose,”
    or “I find that any harm in admitting this evidence does not
    substantially outweigh its probative value”? Perhaps. But
    given the court’s actions and statements combined with the
    limiting instruction and evidence tutorial given at trial, the
    court committed no error in admitting the evidence.
    B. Denial of Request to Proceed Pro Se (16-2432)
    In the assault case, as indicated, Mabie proceeded pro se
    for most of pretrial. But eventually, he asked the court to ap-
    point counsel because he needed help reviewing discovery.
    The court agreed, appointing John Stobbs as counsel.
    The case proceeded to trial. Things went smoothly
    through jury selection and opening statements, but went
    downhill from there. In the courtroom, before Judge Mills
    and the jury entered, Mabie got into a fight with Stobbs,
    causing the deputy marshals to intervene. When the judge
    entered, Stobbs explained that Mabie wanted to review some
    documents, but Stobbs told him that there wasn’t enough
    time to do so; consequently, Mabie got into a fighting stance,
    and the marshals had to remove him from the courtroom.
    Stobbs concluded by condemning Mabie’s behavior, explain-
    ing that everyone in the case had worked hard and that he
    didn’t think it was right “for someone to misbehave in Court
    to get a mistrial because things aren’t going the way they
    think they should.” (R2. 100 at 21.)
    20                                       Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    Although not in the courtroom during the foregoing,
    Mabie heard all of this discussion by way of a speaker
    transmitting courtroom sound into his holding cell. When he
    returned to the courtroom, he demanded to proceed pro se.
    The court denied this request. When Mabie insisted, the
    court said,
    [Y]ou had too many opportunities and we tried to
    bend over backwards to accommodate you and all
    we do is get difficulty. Any time that things aren’t
    going exactly as you want, you throw a tantrum
    and you fire your counsel and all of this kind of
    business. No, we have to go. We have to go. No
    way.
    (Id. at 36.) Mabie claims that the court erred in rejecting his
    request to represent himself.
    A criminal defendant’s right to self-representation, alt-
    hough well-settled, depends on the time that the defendant
    asserts it. United States v. Kosmel, 
    272 F.3d 501
    , 505 (7th Cir.
    2001). “For example, if a defendant asks to proceed pro se
    before trial commences, then that request is absolute and
    must be granted.” 
    Id. at 505–06.
    But once trial begins, “the
    district court retains discretion to balance the interests of the
    defendant against the potential disruption of the proceed-
    ings already in progress.” 
    Id. at 506.
       Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Mabie’s request to proceed pro se. The court clearly ex-
    plained its reasoning: Mabie was being disruptive, and the
    court wanted order in the courtroom. Mabie’s disruptive be-
    havior showing his inability to conduct himself in a respect-
    able manner cost him the right to represent himself. Thus,
    the court committed no error here.
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                         21
    C. Denial of Mabie’s Request to Absent Himself From Trial
    (16-2432)
    In the assault case, even at the start of trial, Mabie was
    frustrated with the way things were going: he got into a
    fight with his attorney; the deputy marshals had to remove
    him from the courtroom; and he heard his attorney speak
    badly about him. Mabie thus wanted to leave the courtroom
    and return to his cell. The court denied his request, requiring
    Mabie to attend trial.
    But Mabie was not present at trial for long: as the gov-
    ernment’s first witness began testifying, Mabie yelled,
    “You’re a piece of shit. Fuck him. Smart mouth maggot
    mother fucker. Keep that prick away from me.” (R2. 100 at
    41.) Once again, the deputy marshals had to remove Mabie.
    But this time, the jury saw everything.
    Mabie claims that the court erred in denying his request
    to leave the courtroom. Mabie further asserts that this error
    resulted in prejudice: but for the court’s error, the jury
    wouldn’t have witnessed Mabie’s tirade.
    Put aside the fact that any prejudice Mabie suffered was
    his own doing. Mabie’s argument is more deeply flawed
    than that: his claim of error depends on the assumption that
    the law requires the court to allow a criminal defendant to
    leave his own trial, which it does not do.
    To be sure, the Constitution guarantees a criminal de-
    fendant the right to attend his trial. United States v. Smith, 
    230 F.3d 300
    , 309 (7th Cir. 2000). And this right has been codified
    in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Fed. R. Crim.
    P. 43(a). But that does not mean that the reverse is true. In-
    deed, Mabie has cited no authority suggesting that a defend-
    22                                     Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    ant has a right not to attend his trial. Nor could we find any.
    In fact, the few cases that have directly addressed this issue
    have actually suggested that no such right exists. See, e.g.,
    Copeland v. Walker, 
    258 F. Supp. 2d 105
    , 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
    (noting that the Supreme Court has never recognized a right
    of absence); Sims v. Pfeiffer, No. LA CV 15-9454 JCG, 
    2016 WL 6902096
    , at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2016) (same). We see
    no good reason to recognize such a right.
    Of course, Mabie is free to try to waive his right to attend
    trial—as he did. And if the presiding judge so desires, he can
    excuse Mabie from the courtroom and conduct the trial in
    Mabie’s absence. That said, a criminal defendant has no con-
    stitutional right of absence from his own trial. Accordingly,
    Mabie’s claim of error fails.
    D. Sentences Imposed (15-1899 & 16-2432)
    Finally, we address sentencing. Undeniably, Mabie’s sen-
    tences are lengthy: Judge Reagan in the threat case and
    Judge Mills in the assault case imposed prison terms of 180
    months and 72 months, respectively; and they ran those sen-
    tences consecutively to the 88-month Eastern District of Mis-
    souri sentence for a total of 340 months’ imprisonment.
    Moreover, both sentences were above the guidelines rec-
    ommendation, and the one in the threat case was the statuto-
    ry maximum. Mabie contends that these sentences were sub-
    stantively unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a
    criminal sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Lewis, 
    842 F.3d 467
    , 477 (7th Cir. 2016).
    Mabie’s primary argument is that both of the sentencing
    judges considered the assault on Deputy Marshal Berry
    when imposing sentences on Mabie. Mabie acknowledges
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                     23
    that this does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See
    United States v. Faulkner, 
    793 F.3d 752
    , 756 (7th Cir. 2015).
    Even so, Mabie claims that it is substantively unreasonable
    for him to receive two sentences for one act, and moreover,
    for those sentences to run consecutively to each other. That
    aside, Mabie also believes that the lengthy prison terms im-
    posed were unwarranted given his crimes. For instance, in
    the threat case, Mabie notes that there was no evidence that
    he intended to act on his threats. And in the assault case,
    Mabie contends that spitting on a law-enforcement officer is
    the least serious version of an assault.
    We disagree. In the threat case, although the assault fac-
    tored into the sentencing equation, so did many other things.
    Specifically, the court considered Mabie’s “lengthy history of
    threatening anyone with whom he disagrees,” and conclud-
    ed that “there is clearly no limit to what [Mabie] will say or
    who he will say it to.” (R1. 238 at 15–16.)
    The court noted that Mabie wrote numerous letters to
    Deborah Deeba, whom Mabie had never met, in an effort to
    harm her husband. Those letters—which include letters ac-
    tually sent and letters that were addressed but seized before
    Mabie could send them—are laced with demeaning sexual
    innuendos and contain recommendations that Deborah and
    her 11-year-old daughter participate in body-cavity searches.
    Mabie also wrote several letters to Judge E. Richard
    Webber, who presided over Mabie’s trial in the Eastern Dis-
    trict of Missouri. Throughout those letters, Mabie referred to
    Judge Webber as “Lefty” because the judge has a prosthetic
    hand. Mabie also discussed plans to dig up the judge’s de-
    ceased wife’s body to search for evidence that Mabie claimed
    the judge had hidden there.
    24                                     Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    But that’s not all. While in prison, Mabie sent additional
    harassing and threatening letters to federal judges, federal
    prosecutors, FBI agents, postal inspectors, and others.
    In one letter, Mabie told Special Agent Cronan, “I can’t
    wait until you make it to St. Louis … so we can be together
    again. I know your biological clock is ticking, I’m saying I
    can have you knocked up within the first 25 or 30
    boinkings.” (R1. 238 at 18.) He signed this letter “XOXO Wil-
    liam Mabie.” (Id.)
    In another letter, Mabie said that he would “force feed
    [some document] down [AUSA] Clark’s actual throat-
    LITERALLY NOT FIGURATIVELY.” (Id. at 5.)
    And in a third letter, Mabie stated, “I am of course going
    to retrieve [my] property, if it comes to a gunfight, fine … . I
    know upon release the way to kill a snake is to cut off its
    head – so … who is the head? AUSA Ware? Follmer? Klein?
    Deeba? Reisch? Or Judge Webber/former Mrs. Webber?” (Id.
    at 9–10.)
    Mabie explained that he sends these letters to try to get
    people to change their ways; maybe they will find religion,
    or maybe they will meet Jesus—in person.
    During the sentencing hearing, Judge Reagan confronted
    Mabie with another letter that Mabie had written two weeks
    earlier. In that letter, Mabie said, “All right, how does this
    sound? I take [Deputy Marshal Berry] for a ride, meaning tie
    his nigger ass to the bumper and see what a tough guy he
    is.” (R1. 251 at 103.) Mabie considered this statement to be
    “completely reasonable” under the circumstances, and re-
    fused to disavow it when the court gave him an opportunity
    Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432                                        25
    to do so, asserting that he “didn’t know [he] had to be politi-
    cally correct.” (Id.)
    The court considered much more. But this evidence alone
    proves that the assault on Berry was but a small factor justi-
    fying Mabie’s 180-month sentence. Moreover, this evidence
    shows that the sentence imposed was substantively reasona-
    ble.
    And the same holds true for the sentence in the assault
    case. There, Judge Mills imposed a 72-month sentence and
    ran it consecutively to Mabie’s other sentences. The court
    determined that a consecutive sentence was appropriate in
    light of Mabie’s continued threats to kill a deputy United
    States marshal. For example, at trial, Mabie claimed that,
    when released, he would “hunt down” Berry, “handcuff
    him,” “beat the shit out of him,” and perhaps “just kill the
    bastard.” (R2. 102 at 99–100.) And at sentencing, Mabie
    promised to “spend the rest of [his] life bringing that lowlife
    fruit [Berry] to justice.” (R2. 130 at 25.) Upon seeing Berry in
    the courtroom, presumably smiling, Mabie added, “Yeah, sit
    there and smirk, fruit. When I see you on the street you’ll
    never smirk again. Believe it.” (Id.)
    The court also considered Mabie’s free use of racial epi-
    thets and other offensive language during trial. For example,
    during Mabie’s direct examination, Mabie admitted to mak-
    ing several derogatory comments when assaulting Berry, in-
    cluding calling Berry a “[t]ypical fucking nigger.” (R2. 102 at
    68.) Mabie also admitted to calling Berry a “bitch.” (Id. at 88.)
    At sentencing, Judge Mills commented that, “after 50
    years on the bench, state and federal, I can’t say that I recall
    anyone who was similarly situated to Mr. Mabie in my expe-
    26                                     Nos. 15-1899 & 16-2432
    rience. Nothing has deterred [Mabie] from continuing and
    escalating this pattern of threats.” (R2. 130 at 36.) Thus, the
    court imposed a lengthy sentence, expressing the need to
    protect the public from Mabie.
    The record supports Judge Reagan’s and Judge Mills’s
    decisions. It appears that no degree of punishment is capable
    of deterring Mabie’s reprehensible conduct. Given all that
    Mabie has said and done over the past several years, we
    conclude that Mabie’s sentences were substantively reason-
    able—and deserved.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    In the threat case, Judge Reagan committed no error in
    admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence. In the assault case, Judge
    Mills committed no error either in denying Mabie’s request
    to proceed pro se or in denying Mabie’s request to absent
    himself from trial. And in both cases, Judge Reagan and
    Judge Mills imposed reasonable sentences. Accordingly, we
    AFFIRM.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-1899 & 16-2432

Judges: Easterbrook, Kanne, Sykes

Filed Date: 7/7/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/27/2023